NCCA Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Test (LEPET)

NCCA LEPET Administration Guide has obtained a copy of the National Center for Credibility Assessment’s documentation of the polygraph screening technique “used by federal law enforcement agencies during the pre-employment process.”

The 23-page document, dated 3 March 2016, provides instructions for administration of the so-called “Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Test” (LEPET), to which applicants for employment with such agencies as the FBI, DEA, ATF, and U.S. Secret Service are subjected.

In 2004, published an earlier version of this document, dated January 2002, which remains available. The LEPET manual has changed little since this earlier version.

When we first published this document, then recently retired FBI supervisory special agent, scientist, and polygraph expert Drew Campbell Richardson observed regarding it:

This is more or less THE SCRIPT for what you will see and what you will hear. You will see the order, even the very language and characterizations of the foolishness that we have come to know as polygraph screening. This document is sufficiently important that it requires your careful attention and then your careful attention again.

The LEPET manual will remain of great interest to anyone seeking employment with a federal law enforcement agency with a polygraph screening requirement.

FBI Suspends Senior Analyst’s Security Clearance Over Alleged Polygraph Countermeasures

fbi-polygraphHuffington Post reporter Jessica Schulberg tells the story of a senior FBI intelligence analyst who lost his security clearance and his job over a polygraph operator’s accusation that he employed polygraph countermeasures. Excerpt:

WASHINGTON — Logan tried to stay calm as he boarded the subway to take the one-mile trip from his office at FBI headquarters to Patriots Plaza. He could have walked, but he didn’t want to risk getting sweaty or disheveled before his polygraph examination.

There was nothing to worry about, Logan told himself. During his 11 years as an FBI intelligence analyst, he had already passed two polygraphs — one when he was hired in 2003 and another in 2008. The bureau administers polygraphs to potential hires and then reinvestigates its employees every five years throughout their employment.

But as he headed to Patriots Plaza that morning in September 2014, Logan (whose name has been changed to protect his identity) couldn’t stop thinking about his polygraph results from the year before. His anxiety had taken over, and the test caught physiological reactions in response to national security questions. The examiner accused him of lying and attempting to cheat the polygraph. Logan denied both charges. The FBI scheduled a retest.

This time would be different. It had to be different, or he could lose his security clearance and his job.

But the 2014 retest got off to a bad start. Logan felt a panic attack set in as soon as the exam began. He focused on steadying his breathing and restoring his calm.

Logan’s attempts to quiet his nerves backfired. The polygrapher accused him of using a “countermeasure” ? a poorly defined term for deliberately altering one’s physiological state (by, say, sticking a thumbtack in one’s shoe) in order to hide lying on a polygraph. Logan denied the charge, but after several hours under pressure, he amended a written statement to include self-incriminating phrases he alleges were fed to him by the polygrapher. That statement was later used against him when the FBI revoked his security clearance, effectively putting him out of work. Logan appealed.

After nearly two years without pay, he is still trying to regain his clearance.

Read the rest of this important story here. In September 2105 the late Dr. Drew C. Richardson, a retired FBI scientist and polygraph critic, posted to the text of a declaration that he provided in support of the FBI employee in question.

Federal Judge Throws Out FBI Post-Polygraph Confession Over Concerns About Voluntariness

United States Courthouse, Albuquerque, New Mexico

On 9 June 2016, Chief United States District Judge for the District of New Mexico M. Christina Armijo signed an 8-page order suppressing inculpatory statements made to an FBI polygraph examiner by the suspect in a child molestation investigation. The post-polygraph statements made by Jamaico Tennison to FBI Special Agent and polygraph examiner Jennifer Sullivan constituted the key evidence against Tennison, who was criminally charged.

Armijo, a George W. Bush appointee, had serious concerns about the voluntariness of Tennison’s statements, noting “Sullivan’s interrogation of Defendant on June 11, 2014 was tainted by the denial of Defendant’s request for appointed counsel.” Armijo also expressed serious concerns about the polygraph “test” (at pp. 6-7):

The polygraph exam

The Court and the parties spent a considerable amount of time and effort addressing the validity of the results of the polygraph examination conducted by SA Sullivan on June 11, 2014. SA Sullivan conducted a polygraph examination that was valid under the FBI’s in-house protocols. Although SA Sullivan is an experienced polygrapher, she demonstrated little understanding of, or interest in, the underlying theory. The FBI employs a three-point scoring system, knowing that it enhances sensitivity at the expense of specificity. SA Sullivan uses this standard FBI format because it is what she is authorized to use. She believes that her polygraphs are 100% accurate. In fact, from the testimony adduced at trial, due to the high sensitivity and low specificity of the FBI format, an innocent person has about a one-in-three chance of being classified as non-deceptive. The likelihood that innocent subjects will be subjected to post-test interrogation is heightened by SA Sullivan’s practice of interrogating any subject whose scores are inconclusive, not merely those subjects whose charts are scored as deceptive. Moreover, the Court does not find the single study of the two comparison-two relevant questions format cited by the United States…as conclusive of the validity of the two comparison-two relevant questions format. Based upon the testimony adduced at hearing, the Court is left with the impression that as used by SA Sullivan in Defendant’s case, the polygraph examination was employed to ratchet up the emotional pressure in anticipation of the inevitable interrogation of Defendant.

The equipment used by Agent Sullivan was capable of making an audio recording. Pursuant to FBI policy, Agent Sullivan did not record the pre-test or the polygraph examination proper, and for reasons of her own, did not record the post-test interrogation. Under the circumstances of this case, the absence of a recording of the interrogation, which would have permitted the Court to hear the actual words and the tones of voice of the participants, constitutes a failure of proof as to whether SA Sullivan conducted her interrogation within Fifth Amendment bounds. See United States v. Bundy, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1186 (D.N.M. 2013).

The Court further concludes that the taint of the initial confession was not sufficiently dissipated before the final interrogation, which began a few minutes after the unrecorded post-test interrogation. Accordingly, the statements made by Defendant during the final recorded interrogation were the fruit of the involuntary unrecorded confession. See Lopez, 437 F.3d at 1066.

FBI Polygraph Operator Jennifer Sullivan
FBI Polygraph Operator Jennifer Sullivan (Waterloo, Iowa Courier photo)

Selected filings from U.S. v. Tennison (Case 1:15-cr-00212-MCA in the District Court for the District of New Mexico), including hearing transcripts, are available on’s Polygraph Litigation page. This case will be of particular interest to defendants in criminal cases seeking to suppress uncounseled statements made to polygraph operators.

Marisa Taylor on FBI Pre-Employment Polygraph Screening

fbi-polygraphMarisa Taylor reports for McClatchy on the high failure rate of the FBI’s pre-employment polygraph screening program using, among other sources, a 198-page document containing complaints of discrimination associated with the Bureau’s polygraph program. Excerpt:

WASHINGTON — Thousands of job applicants come to FBI offices all across the country every year, eager to work for the top law enforcement agency in the U.S.

But many of them have their hopes dashed, and it’s not because of their work experience or education or criminal records. They’re turned down because they’ve failed their polygraph tests.

The FBI’s policy of barring job candidates who fail their polygraph tests clashes with the view of many scientists that government agencies shouldn’t be relying on polygraph testing to decide whether to hire or fire someone. Experts say polygraph testing isn’t a reliable indicator of whether someone is lying – especially in employment screening.

Further, a little-known technical glitch in one of the leading polygraphs that the bureau and many other government agencies have used could give applicants who fail polygraphs even more reason to assert that they were inaccurately and unfairly labeled liars.

“I was called a lazy, lying, drug dealing junkie by a man who doesn’t know me , my stellar background or my societal contributions,” wrote one black applicant in Baltimore, who said he was told he qualified for a job except for his polygraph test failure. “Just because I am young and black does not automatically denote that I have ever used any illegal drugs.”

Government agencies use polygraph testing not only to weed out job applicants but also to question criminal suspects and to determine whether sex offenders are complying with psychological treatment or probation.

Although all polygraph testing is controversial, many scientists are highly critical of its use in job screening, saying it’s especially prone to inaccuracies because the questions are often more vague than they are in criminal investigations and therefore they’re more likely to provoke reactions from the innocent that might seem like deception.

Adding to the skepticism, polygraphers have documented problems with the measurement of sweat by the LX4000, a polygraph that the FBI and many other federal agencies and police departments across the country have used, McClatchy found. Polygraphers also interpret measurements of respiration and blood pressure for their decisions on whether someone is lying, but many see the sweat measurement as especially indicative of deception. The manufacturer of the LX4000, Lafayette Instrument Co. Inc., describes the problem as rare but it isn’t able to specify what that means. The company also points out that other polygraphs that use the same technology might have the problem as well.

For the rest of the story, see “FBI Turns Away Many Who Fail Lie-Detector Tests.” (Actually, the article might better have been titled “FBI Permanently Bars from Employment All Who Fail Lie-Detector Tests.” There is no appeal process.

The Inconvenient Issue of Alleged Anthrax Killer Bruce Ivins’ Polygraph Results

On Tuesday, 15 February 2011, the National Research Council made public its Review of the Scientific Approaches Used During the FBI’s Investigation of the Anthrax Letters, seriously undermining the Bureau’s case against U.S. Army researcher Bruce Ivins, whom the FBI maintains was the sole perpetrator of the anthrax mailings.

Polygraphy was not among the scientific approaches reviewed by the National Research Council–appropriately so, as it has no scientific basis. Nonetheless, the FBI did rely extensively on polygraphy in its investigation of the anthrax mailings, and Ivins passed a 2002 polygraph examination regarding the anthrax attacks. The FBI avers that Ivins passed the polygraph by using countermeasures.

Jeff Stein of the Washington Post addresses Ivins’ polygraph results in a new SpyTalk column titled, “Ivins Case’s Inconvenient Issue: His Polygraph.”

For prior commentary on Ivins’ polygraph examination, see “DOJ Rationalizes Away Polygraph’s Failure to Catch Alleged Anthrax Killer Bruce Ivins” and Scott Horton’s interview of co-founder George Maschke. For insightful commentary on the latest (non-polygraph related) developments in the Ivins case, see columnist Glenn Greenwald’s article, “Serious Doubts Cast on FBI’s Anthrax Case Against Bruce Ivins.”

John Dullahan, DIA Analyst Fired After Failing Polygraph, Profiled in Washington Post

Washington Post staff writer Peter Finn reports in an above-the-fold front page article on the case of retired army lieutenant colonel and Defense Intelligence Agency analyst John Dullahan, whose security clearance was suspended in February 2009 after he failed three polygraph “tests.” Then DIA director LTG Michael D. Maples fired Dullahan in March 2009 (his last month as director).

DIA refuses to state its reasons for terminating LTC Dullahan, averring that “the interests of the nation do not permit disclosure to the employee of specific information about the reasons for his removal from federal service,” and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has not responded to an appeal Dullahan submitted some 18 months ago.

Continue reading John Dullahan, DIA Analyst Fired After Failing Polygraph, Profiled in Washington Post

Scott Horton Interviews George Maschke Regarding Bruce Ivins’s Polygraph Examination

On Wednesday, 24 February 2010, Scott Horton of Antiwar Radio interviewed co-founder George Maschke about the polygraph examination of Dr. Bruce Ivins, the DoD microbiologist the FBI asserts was the sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax mailings. Ivins passed a polygraph screening test in 2002. The interview is now available on-line here.

DOJ Rationalizes Away Polygraph’s Failure to Catch Alleged Anthrax Killer Bruce Ivins

Bruce E. Ivins
Bruce E. Ivins

On Friday, 19 February 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the conclusion of its investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks. The DOJ maintains that  Dr. Bruce Edwards Ivans, who in 2002 passed a polygraph test regarding the anthrax attacks, was the sole perpetrator.

In an investigative summary (640 kb PDF), the DOJ characterizes Ivins’ passing of the polygraph as part of an effort to “stay ahead of the investigation,” alleging (at p. 84, fn. 51) that he used countermeasures to fool the polygraph:

In some sense, Dr. Ivins’s efforts to stay ahead of the investigation began much earlier. When he took a polygraph in connection with the investigation in 2002, the examiner determined that he passed. However, as the investigation began to hone in on Dr. Ivins and investigators learned that he had been prescribed a number of psychotropic medications at the time of the 2002 polygraph, investigators resubmitted his results to examiners at FBI Headquarters and the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute for a reassessment of the results in light of that new information. Both examiners who independently reassessed the results determined that Dr. Ivins exhibited “classic” signs of the use of countermeasures to pass a polygraph. At the time the polygraph was initially examined in 2002, not all examiners were trained to spot countermeasures, making the first analysis both understandable under the circumstances, and irrelevant to the subsequent conclusion that he used countermeasures.

Although the summary doesn’t state what “classic” signs of countermeasures Ivins allegedly displayed, Michael Isikoff of Newsweek reported in 2008 that the FBI “concluded he’d used ‘countermeasures’ such as controlled breathing to fool the examiners.”

Continue reading DOJ Rationalizes Away Polygraph’s Failure to Catch Alleged Anthrax Killer Bruce Ivins

Former Aide to Colin Powell Accused of Espionage, Fired Based on Polygraph Results

DIA sealA recently filed federal lawsuit documents how a veteran intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was accused of espionage and summarily fired after failing a series of polygraph “tests” (a procedure roundly rejected by scientists as being without scientific basis). The following is an excerpt from the statement of complaint (160 kb PDF) filed on 7 January 2010 by attorney Mark S. Zaid in behalf of Lieutenant Colonel John Dullahan, United States Army (retired) against the DIA and others:

19. Dullahan retired from the Army in 1992 as a Lieutenant Colonel after more than two decades of distinguished military service, including airborne and Ranger training, with the 82ndAirborne Division, and combat in Vietnam as an artillery forward observer. During his career, Dullahan learned German, French, and Arabic, became both a European and Middle Eastern Foreign Area Officer, and served in various capacities for the U.S. government in Europe and the Middle East.

20. In September 1997, Dullahan returned to DIA as a civilian employee. In the course of his work for DIA, he successfully completed a polygraph examination during which no issues surfaced.

21. In early 2008 two FBI agents asked Dullahan if he would participate in a special program, subject to approval by then-Director of DIA LTG Michael Maples. In or around February 2008, Dullahan willingly participated in an FBI polygraph as a condition of his participation in the special program.

22. During the polygraph examination, the FBI examiner alleged that Dullahan’s participation in Ranger, Airborne training, and combat duty (as well as his enjoyment of hang-gliding) demonstrated “risk-taking” behavior which made him more likely to seek contact with a foreign intelligence service. The polygraph examiner accused Dullahan of meeting “Soviet handlers” when he had visited — twenty years earlier — East Germany in the early 1980s, during his U.N. assignment in Syria, and on his numerous official trips to Europe while on the Joint Staff, including trips with General Powell.

23. The polygraph examiner also alleged Dullahan had adopted the Communist beliefs of his liaison counterparts merely by associating with them. The polygraph examiner’s supervisor likewise accused Dullahan of spying for the Soviets. After the exam was complete, FBI officials informed Dullahan he had “failed” the polygraph and was “in big trouble.” At no time did Dullahan make any unfavorable admissions during the course of the polygraph examination that would justify such conclusions. Upon information and belief, the only “evidence” that allegedly existed to support the FBI’s apparent conclusions was, if anything, the technical results of the polygraph examination.

24. Both Dullahan and his wife, who was then and still remains at the time of filing a senior DIA employee, immediately reported the alleged FBI polygraph results to their respective DIA chains of command. Dullahan further requested that DIA conduct an extensive background investigation to clear his name.

25. Shortly thereafter, two FBI officials, Alexis LNU and Carlos LNU, showed Dullahan an outdated 1985 report that contained adverse accusations about his activities and informed him that they understood his probable anxiety about the incident, had no concerns with his foreign contacts, and that a second polygraph would likely resolve the issue. They opined the alleged FBI polygraph failure was unlikely to present an obstacle to Dullahan’s participation in the special program.

26. In or around February 2008, the FBI administered a second polygraph examination to Dullahan and again claimed that he “failed”. At no time before, during or after the examination did Dullahan make any admissions that could be construed as adverse to his interests.

27. Dullahan then sent separate letters to DIA Director LTG Maples and the FBI protesting what he believed was an unfair process and that the polygraph results were inaccurate. He reiterated his willingness to participate in the special program as the FBI had requested. No written responses were ever received.

28. Shortly thereafter, FBI Special Agents Alexis LNU and Carlos LNU again interviewed Dullahan. During this second meeting, the two Special Agents asked Dullahan why he had not previously reported an unspecified foreign intelligence service “offer.” Apparently, Dullahan had mistakenly typed in one of the letters referenced above the sentence “I went to the home of the Soviet offer [sic].” The word “offer” should have been “officer” and the error was being misinterpreted as if he had gone to a Soviet home and received some form of recruitment “pitch” or “offer”. Special Agents Alexis LNU and Carlos LNU now accused Dullahan of trying to conceal and/or lie about this nonexistent foreign intelligence overture. In fact, Dullahan had received no such pitch or overture but his explanation, however, appeared to fall on deaf ears.

29. On October 1, 2008, Dullahan wrote another letter to the FBI. In it, he once again protested what he believed was an unfair process and that the polygraph results were inaccurate. He again reiterated his willingness to participate in the special program as the FBI had requested. Dullahan requested a personal meeting with the deciding authority and offered to re-take another polygraph examination. No written response was ever received.

30. In November 2008, Dullahan applied for another DIA position on the Joint Intelligence Task Force Combating Terrorism. A DIA counterintelligence official informed him that the two “failed” FBI polygraphs would have to be resolved before Dullahan could receive another position within DIA.

31. On or about December 18, 2008, Scott C. and Cassie LNU, two DIA counterintelligence officers, interviewed Dullahan. They initially appeared satisfied with Dullahan’s explanations and stated that resolving the issue was likely to be a relatively simple matter of administrative action. Furthermore, they also noted that Dullahan was not the first DIA person to experience difficulties with the FBI’s polygraph examinations. They stated that the alleged FBI polygraph failures were unlikely to present a further obstacle to Dullahan’s career and expressed their belief that a DIA polygraph, which was reputedly “fairer,” was likely to clear the matter up. Dullahan willingly agreed to undertake whatever examination DIA deemed necessary to resolve the issue.

32. On February 3, 2009, Dullahan underwent a third polygraph but this time performed by a DIA polygraph examiner. The polygraph examiner informed Dullahan he detected deception. No details were provided to Dullahan to explain the polygraph results, and absolutely no adverse admissions were made by him during the course of the examination.

33. On February 17, 2009, Dullahan was placed on administrative leave and his clearance was suspended without explanation. Upon information and belief, DIA took this action based solely, or at least predominantly, as a result of the technical results of the polygraph examinations.

34. On March 17, 2009, DIA Director LTG Maples personally issued two letters stating that Dullahan’s employment with DIA was terminated and his SCI access was permanently revoked. No substantive or detailed reason was given for Dullahan’s termination or clearance revocation.

It should be noted that both the FBI and DIA have willfully ignored the 2002 finding of the National Academy of Sciences that “[polygraph testing’s] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.” In fact, both agencies have substantially increased their reliance on polygraphy over the past decade. In 2008, the Associated Press reported that the DIA was implementing a major increase in its polygraph program, despite the polygraph’s failure to catch the DIA’s most notorious double agent and the success of Iraqi fabricators in fooling the DIA’s polygraph operators. will follow the case of LTC Dullahan closely and provide updates as further information becomes available.