AntiPolygraph.org has previously reported and commented on U.S. government efforts to foist the pseudoscience of polygraphy on other countries and on local employees at U.S. diplomatic facilities. For example:
Now, for the first time, a victim of such efforts has publicly shared his story with AntiPolygraph.org. An officer in the Afghan Ministry of the Interior who specialized in anti-corruption eforts relates, among other things, how he and some 40 of his colleagues had their careers arbitrarily sidelined in 2018 when they were required to submit to polygraph screening conducted at the U.S. embassy in Kabul. His statement helps to document the ongoing harm caused by America’s stubborn reliance on this pseudoscience. See the Polygraph Statement of Sherzai Sulimany.
Friday, 18 September 2020 marks AntiPolygraph.org’s 20th anniversary online. Over the past two decades, we have published five editions of our featured publication, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, which with hundreds of thousands of downloads, is arguably the most widely read book on the topic of polygraphy.
In addition, we’ve done original reporting and commentary on polygraph-related topics, most notably on our blog. We have never revealed the identity of a source who requested anonymity, and we’ve never received a secret government order for information about any of our visitors or sources. In recent years, we’ve made available a means for secure and anonymous submission of files.
We avoided an apparent entrapment attempt in the federal government’s misbegotten Operation Lie Busters, in which federal polygraph operators targeted individuals who provided instruction on how to pass or beat a polygraph “test” for entrapment and criminal prosecution, and we provided on-scene reporting from the courtroom in Oklahoma City where prominent polygraph critic Doug Williams stood trial in 2015.
Over the years, we have also received and rejected take-down demands from lawyers for:
AntiPolygraph.org continues to host the internet’s preëminent forum for discussion of polygraph-related topics, with nearly 6,000 registered users and over 44,000 posts. We have privately responded to inquiries from thousands of individuals as well as numerous press inquiries and interview requests.
In recent years, AntiPolygraph.org has also provided pro bono consultation for both prosecution and defense in various legal matters.
Thanks are due to all who have helped to make AntiPolygraph.org a success over the years.
We look forward to continuing our efforts to educate the public about polygraph matters, to assist polygraph victims, and to ultimately bring about the abolishment of the pseudoscience of polygraphy.
On Thursday, 20 August 2020, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted former U.S. Army Special Forces officer Peter Rafael Dzibinski Debbins of Gainesville, Virginia on a single count of “Conspiracy to Gather or Deliver Defense Information to Aid a Foreign Government.” Debbins was arrested on Friday, 21 August 2020.
The indictment states that the 45-year-old Debbins graduated from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at the University of Minnesota in 1997 and served on active military duty from July 1998 until November 2005. During this time, Debbins served in the U.S. Army Chemical Corps in Korea and at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and with the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group in Germany. Debbins was investigated for a security violation during a deployment to Azerbaijan in 2004, as a consequence of which he was relieved of command and his Top Secret/SCI security clearance was suspended. After leaving active duty, Debbins served in the inactive army reserve until 2010.
The indictment alleges that throughout his military service, indeed while still an ROTC cadet, Debbins was working on behalf of a Russian intelligence service. The indictment alleges, among other things, that during a meeting with two Russian intelligence officers in 2003, Debbins provided information about the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group, noting at para. 46 that he was instructed not to take a polygraph “test’:
46. During the meeting, RIS 5 and RIS 6 instructed DEBBINS not to take a polygraph and offered to give him training on how to deceive polygraphs. They further encouraged DEBBINS to continue pursuing a career in the Special Forces.
It is not specified whether Debbins ever received such polygraph countermeasure training.
The indictment does go on to note:
60. In January 2010, an Adjudicator with the U.S. Army Central Personnel Security Clearance Facility sent DEBBINS a letter notifying him that he had been granted a TS/SCI security clearance….
The indictment does not state for what purpose Debbins was granted this security clearance, but in a profile of Debbins on the website of the Institute for World Politics he states:
I got a job working at Fort Meade as a Russian analyst and did that for three years. I then transitioned to working as a cyber instructor for CACI for another three years.
Fort Meade is home to the National Security Agency (NSA). All analyst positions at the NSA, including contractor jobs, require a full-scope (lifestyle) polygraph examination that includes questions about contacts with foreign governments.
If the espionage allegations against Debbins are true—and they seem to be well-documented, including a signed confession—then Debbins necessarily beat the polygraph to work at Fort Meade.
Thereafter, from April 2014 to December 2015, Debbins indicates that he was an associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, another government contractor that among other things provides services to the NSA. However, Debbins’ resume indicates that his work with Booz Allen Hamilton was as a “Russian cyber analyst” for the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Since 1 July January 2017, the Defense Intelligence Agency has required that all contractors outside inside the continental United States with SCI access pass a polygraph “test.” This requirement was extended to contractors outside the continental United States as of 1 July 2017. Thus, it is possible that Debbins also beat the DIA polygraph, though it’s possible that a previously passed NSA army polygraph might have obviated the need for a DIA polygraph.
After that, Debbins indicates that he worked as an instructor for military contractor CACI International, Inc. from January 2016 to September 2017. A statement by DIA Senior Expert for Counterintelligence David L. Tomlinson indicates that this work was with DIA’s Joint Counterintelligence Training Activity.
DIA Senior Expert for Counterintelligence David L. Tomlinson’s statement indicates that the specific organization for which Debbins worked was the DIA’s Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facility (RJITF) at RAF Molesworth. The RJITF is closely associated with the DIA-operated Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe (JIOCEUR) Analytic Center.
In 2015, the U.S. Air Force’s 501st Combat Support Wing produced the following public relations video about the JIOCEUR Analytic Center, commonly called the Joint Analytic Center (JAC):
Other recent failures of the NSA’s polygraph screening program include contractors Harold Thomas Martin III and Nghia Hoang Pho, both of whom are currently serving prison sentences for unlawfully retaining classified information.
That spies and security violators are beating the polygraph is not surprising. Polygraphy has no scientific basis to begin with, and as explained in AntiPolygraph.org’s free book, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, its methodology makes it vulnerable to simple, effective countermeasures that polygraph operators cannot detect.
Debbins’ arrest comes just a week after the espionage arrest in Honolulu of former CIA officer and FBI contract linguist Alexander Yuk Ching Ma, who evidently beat the polygraph to obtain employment with the FBI.
Note: This article was updated on 28 August 2020 to reflect new information made public in court filings associated with a detention hearing in this case.
On Thursday, 13 August 2020, FBI Special Agent Chris Jensen filed under seal a criminal complaint against Alexander Yuk Ching Ma of Honolulu, Hawaii, charging him with “Conspiracy to Gather and Communicate National Defense Information of the United States to a Foreign Nation.” On Monday, 17 August 2020, the complaint was unsealed.
In an accompanying affidavit, SA Jensen adduces evidence that Ma, a 67-year-old naturalized U.S. citizen born in Hong Kong who worked for the CIA from 1982-1987, acted as a “compromised asset” of the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) “at least by early 2001.”
The evidence against Ma appears to be strong, consisting in part of a video recording of meetings he and an unnamed 85-year-old relative who worked for the CIA from 1967-1983 held with “at least five (5) MSS intelligence officials in a Hong Kong hotel room” from 24-26 March 2001. The 85-year-old relative “suffers from an advanced and debilitating cognitive disease,” and the FBI has therefore not sought his arrest.
SA Jensen’s affidavit states at paras. 22-26:
22. Following the March 2001 Hong Kong meetings, MA continued to remain in contact with MSS officials and to work on their behalf. The investigation has revealed that as a mechanism to once again give himself access to U.S. government information, MA applied for employment with the FBI. On December 26, 2002, MA applied for the position of “Special Agent.” On or about December 30, 2002, after being advised by the FBI that he did not meet the age requirements for the FBI Special Agent position, MA submitted an online job application to the FBI for a “contract linguist/monitor/tester” position.
23. On or about April 14, 2003, MA submitted a written application for a contract linguist position, in Chinese languages, at the FBI Honolulu Field Office, in Honolulu, Hawaii. On or about April 21, 2003, MA used a prepaid calling card to call his MSS handlers to notify them of the status of his efforts to gain FBI employment.
24. On or about May 20, 2004, MA was notified that his background investigation for the contract linguist position was complete and that an employment contract would be ready for review in several weeks. MA agreed to continue the hiring process.
25. On or about August 10, 2004, one day before reporting to work with the FBI, MA telephoned a suspected accomplice and stated that he would be working for “the other side.”
26. On or about August 11, 2004, MA reported to work with the FBI….
Left unsaid in the affidavit is that as a condition of FBI employment, Ma necessarily sat for and passed a pre-employment polygraph “test.” The counterintelligence portion of the polygraph procedure used by the FBI includes relevant questions such as “Have you been involved in espionage or terrorism against the US?” and “Have you had any unauthorized foreign contacts?”
If, as seems likely, the criminal allegations are true, then Ma beat the polygraph to penetrate the FBI.
It is to be noted that around the time Ma applied for employment with the FBI, the Bureau had a roughly 50% polygraph failure rate for special agent applicants, with many honest persons being wrongly branded as liars and barred for life from FBI employment.
SA Jensen’s affidavit goes on to chronicle instances of Ma’s alleged espionage against the FBI up to 30 November 2010. It is possible that Ma faced a second, periodic polygraph screening “test” some time during his FBI employment.
It is not surprising that Ma could have fooled the polygraph. As documented in Chapter 4 of AntiPolygraph.org’s free book, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector (which Ma might have easily found online in 2003), polygraphy is vulnerable to simple, effective countermeasures that polygraph operators cannot detect.
Ma would not be alone in having beaten the FBI’s pre-employment polygraph “test.” On 26 April 2004, Marine Corps veteran Leandro Aragoncillo, acting for current and former officials in the Philippines, beat an FBI pre-employment polygraph “test” to gain employment as an FBI analyst.
In 2002, some two years before Ma and Aragoncillo beat the polygraph, the National Academy of Sciences advised that “[polygraph testing’s] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.”
Sadly, in the aftermath of 9/11, federal agencies ignored this advice. How many more catastrophic failures like the Ma case will it take before the U.S. government terminates its misplaced reliance on the pseudoscience of polygraphy?
The FBI’s first documented use of the polygraph in an espionage investigation came in 1938 in connection with a Nazi German spy ring operating in the United States. The most important suspect interrogated with the polygraph was Dr. Ignatz Theodor Griebl, a medical officer in the U.S. army reserve who is believed to have been the ring’s coordinator.
According to the lead FBI investigator, Special Agent Leon G. Turrou, the results of a polygraph examination administered to Dr. Griebl on 5 May 1938 “made us relax all vigilance, all watchfulness over him.” Five days later, Griebl fled to Germany aboard the S.S. Breman.
AntiPolygraph.org has previously made available Chapter 15 of Leon Turrou’s memoir, Nazi Spies in America, which discusses the role of polygraphy in the Nazi spy ring investigation. We have also obtained and published FBI case file documents related to Griebl’s polygraph examination.
However, until recently, we had never seen a photograph of polygraph-passing spy Theodor Ignatz Griebl. Recently, two archival news photographs of Griebl were offered for public sale. AntiPolygraph.org has obtained both of them and places them into the public domain.
The first photograph has a mimeographed short news story dated 18 May 1938 (eight days after Griebl fled the country) glued to the back. It appears that a person behind Griebl has been painted out of the picture with gray paint. Features of Griebl’s face, hair, and spectacles have also been retouched with paint.
Initial fears that Griebl had been kidnapped proved to be unfounded.
The second photograph has a mimeographed news story dated 14 October 1938 glued to the back. However, this unretouched photograph appears to have been taken at the same time as the previous photograph, as Griebl appears to be in the same location wearing the same clothes.
The experience of 1938 should have served as a warning to the FBI and other federal agencies that polygraphy is not to be relied upon. Nonetheless, a decade later the CIA and NSA implemented mandatory polygraph screening, with numerous other federal agencies eventually following suit.
Sadly, in 2020 the pseudoscience of polygraphy, which has not improved in any meaningful way since its spectacular failure in 1938, sits as the centerpiece of U.S. counterintelligence and personnel security policy.
An investigation by AntiPolygraph.org reveals that:
The study cited by NITV/NACVSA has dubious claim to being peer-reviewed;
The study did not involve NITV’s CVSA, but rather a different voice stress analyzer called the PSE-101 that was marketed by Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc., a company that has been defunct for some three decades;
The study is not “independent” in that its primary author had an undisclosed close and continuing relationship with NITV/NACVSA.
The citation for the study touted by NITV and NACVSA is:
Chapman, James L. and Marigo Stathis. “Field Evaluation of Effectiveness of VSA (Voice Stress Analysis) Technology in a US Criminal Justice Setting,” Criminalistics and Court Expertise, 2012 Annual Edition, Number 57.
However, a search of research libraries returns no publication titled Criminalistics and Court Expertise. As James R. Wygant noted in a 2014 commentary in the American Polygraph Association’s APA Magazine, “no trace of a publication by that name can be found on the Internet, although copies of the article itself are available.”
It turns out that the article appeared in a yearbook of the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice whose Russian title is Криминалистика и судебная экспертиза (Kriminalistika i sudebnaya ekspertiza). This periodical published Chapman and Stathis’ article in Russian under the title, “Оценка эффективности технологии VSA (Voice Stress Analysis ) на основе практики уголовного судопроизводства в США” (“Otsenka effektivnosti tekhnologii VSA (Voice Stress Analysis ) na osnove praktiki ugolovnogo sudoproizvodstva v SSHA”).
AntiPolygraph.org has obtained copies of the Chapman & Stathis study in both English and Russian.
It may seem odd that American researchers would choose to publish in an obscure Ukrainian yearbook in a language that is not their own.
Writer Bob McCarty helps to solve this mystery. In Chapter 22 of a self-published, fawning book about CVSA titled The Clapper Memo2 that is based in part on “dozens of phone calls over a three-year period” with the study’s primary author, James L. Chapman, McCarty reveals that Chapman and Stathis unsuccessfully attempted to have their article published in “a few reputable criminology-oriented, scientific journals in North America” and that it was rejected by at least two such journals.
Only after these rejections did Chapman and Stathis resort to submitting their article to the Ukrainian periodical that ultimately published it.
The article, which is referred to by NITV/NACVSA as “the Chapman study,” suffers serious methodological flaws that should have prevented it from being accepted by any peer-reviewed publication worthy of the name. One such flaw is that Chapman put his thumb on the scale by excluding cases where a confession was unlikely to be obtained, noting (at p. 12 of the English version of his study), “Contract criminals were excluded from this particular analysis, as this special type of offender is known to reject confessions, due to organized crime affiliations, etc., regardless of what their VSA results or the evidence indicate.” There is no scientific rationale for such exclusion.
Notably, the Chapman study does not mention CVSA even once. It instead refers only to “voice stress analysis.” This is because the voice stress analysis “tests” that form the basis for this study were performed by Chapman not with NITV’s CVSA device, but rather with Dektor Counterintelligence and Security’s “Psychological Stress Evaluator.”
In The Clapper Memo, McCarty discloses that Chapman “wrote a lengthy white paper” about the results of voice stress analysis “tests” that he conducted over the course of his career. AntiPolygraph.org has obtained portions of this “white paper,” which ran over 100 pages, that Chapman faxed to John J. Palmatier, who was then researching voice stress analysis, in 1993. In that original paper, Chapman writes, at p. 27:
This field study was drawn from the total number of cases processed with a Psychological Stress Evaluator, PSE-101, by James L. Chapman, Criminologist, during the eighteen years between 1971 and 1989. The procedure in each case consisted of briefing by the requesting agency, suspect interviews, questioning, and the processing of requestioning through a PSE-101, manufactured by the [sic] Dektor Counterintelligence and Security, Inc., Savannah, GA.
The fact that Chapman’s field study was based on his use of the PSE-101 and not the CVSA is unjustifiably omitted from the article published in Ukraine.
Chapman had an undisclosed conflict of interest that helps explain why he would obfuscate what specific voice stress analyzer he used.
At the time of his death on 17 April 2012, Chapman was a member of NACVSA’s Board of Executive Directors. His affiliation with NITV/NACVSA is older than that, however. Chapman’s name appears on NITV’s letterhead as a member of its Board of Directors in a letter dated 11 May 1998.3
James L. Chapman clearly had a close and continuing relationship with NITV/NACVSA. Nevertheless, in a 2011 phone call to Vancouver Sun columnist David Baines, Chapman averred that he had “no real connection” to NITV. Baines writes in a column published on 14 March 2011:
Chapman told me he has just completed a 19-year study confirming that the CVSA device is 96.4-per-cent accurate. He also said the study has been peer reviewed, but when I asked for a copy, he said it has not yet been published, and until it is, he could not provide one.
Chapman purposefully misled Baines by claiming that his study confirmed anything about CVSA.
Nine months later, Chapman delivered a presentation about his study at NITV’s 2012 Annual Advanced Continuing Education Course held 16-20 January 2012 at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On its website, NITV falsely characterized Chapman’s study as a “19-year field study of CVSA”:
NITV’s misrepresentation of the Chapman study has continued and remains ongoing. For instance, a press release dated 11 January 2013 that currently appears on NITV’s web site falsely proclaims:
A newly published research study in the 2012 annual edition of the scientific journal Criminalistics and Court Expertise reports the accuracy rate of the Computer Voice Stress Analyzer (CVSA®) is greater than 95%, an assertion long made by the system’s manufacturer.
Professor Chapman used the CVSA to conduct the research and the results achieved were highly consistent throughout the period the study’s data were collected. The study’s findings revealed the CVSA, when used as an investigative support tool, can accurately predict whether a person under investigation is being truthful or deceptive. The study’s findings are supported by scientifically-accepted statistical models, and by the 96.4% validated confession rate Professor Chapman attained during the course of the 18-year study.
A 3-page synopsis of the Chapman report currently available on the NITV website similarly falsely claims that it “is based upon actual CVSA examinations.”
More recently, NITV repeated its false claims about the Chapman study in federal court in a 2018 lawsuit against Dektor Corporation (not to be confused with Dektor Counterintelligence and Security) and Arthur Herring III when at para. 50 of its Complaint, NITV falsely attested that “a 2012 peer reviewed published study…of the CVSA showed its error rate to be less than 1%….”
And in an announcement for a CVSA training session that was to be held from 10-14 August 2020 (the week that this article is being published), NITV proclaims in bold letters, “With the recently published 18-year study validating the accuracy of the CVSA at 98%, isn’t it time to acquire the latest in truth verification technology?”
In 2020, there is no peer-reviewed research showing that NITV’s CVSA works at better-than-chance levels of accuracy.
NITV managing member Charles Humble did not respond to a request for comment for this article.
The close nexus between the NITV and the NACVSA is reflected in the fact that a single entity, Voice Biometrics, LLC, holds the trademarks for “NITV,” “National Institute for Truth Verification,” “CVSA,” “NACVSA,” and “National Association of Computer Voice Stress Analysts.” In addition, at the time of writing, the websites for both the NITV and the NACVSA share a common IP address: 22.214.171.124. [↩]
McCarty received the NACVSA’s 2013 “Professor James L. Chapman Award for Excellence” for writing this book. [↩]
That letter, from then NITV Executive Director David A. Hughes to Michael G. Adsit of the Canastota, New York Police Department, explained that if that department wished to purchase CVSA equipment and training, its chief would have to sign a letter stating that “the Canastota Police Department will not allow anyone outside of their trained examiners, and specifically Rome Lab, to use or have access to the CVSA and all proprietary interest will be protected.” The U.S. Air Force laboratory at Rome, New York, was at the time conducting research into voice stress analysis and published a report in 2002. [↩]
AntiPolygraph.org co-founder George Maschke’s talk, “Polygraph ‘Tests’ and How to Beat Them,” presented on 31 July 2020 at the Hackers on Planet Earth (HOPE) 2020 conference, may be viewed online here:
The Santa Clara County, California District Attorney’s Office has charged Robert E. Foster, a polygraph operator with the San Jose Police Department, with “with using his private security company to commit insurance fraud, tax evasion, wage theft, and about $18 million in money laundering.” The case against Foster is summarized in a press release that is reproduced here in full:
San Jose Police Officer Charged with Worker Exploitation, Multi-Million Dollar Fraud Scheme
For release on July 31, 2020
Deputy District Attorney
Insurance Fraud Unit
San Jose Police Officer Charged with Worker Exploitation, Multi-Million Dollar Fraud Scheme
The Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office has charged a San Jose police officer with using his private security company to commit insurance fraud, tax evasion, wage theft, and about $18 million in money laundering.
Robert Foster, 47, the Morgan Hill owner of Atlas Private Security, self-surrendered and will be arraigned on November 30th, at the Hall of Justice in San Jose on felony charges. Foster’s wife and eight other company employees are being charged with four counts of felony conspiracy to commit insurance fraud, unemployment insurance fraud, money laundering, and wage theft, and 39 additional felonies, including extortion and a white-collar crime enhancement. They face prison time, if convicted.
The officer and his co-defendants allegedly reduced insurance premiums and taxes by reporting false and inaccurate payroll, underreporting headcount, paying employees off-the-books, and underreporting employee injuries. In one case, an employee was allegedly threatened with deportation if she continued to speak attorneys about her rights under worker’s compensation laws after suffering a workplace injury.
The arrest comes just days after District Attorney Jeff Rosen announced a series of social justice reforms that included creating a Workers Exploitation Task Force that will investigate cases such as this one.
“This Office will root out and prosecute anyone – whether they wear a badge or not – taking criminal advantage of workers,” District Attorney Rosen said. “Our new task force will protect and heal the victims of labor trafficking, wage theft and illegal exploitation and raise awareness about how these insidious crimes are attacks on our communities of color.”
The six-month investigation was spearheaded by the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office Bureau of Investigation in close collaboration with the California Department of Insurance, Employment Development Department, California Department of Justice Bureau of Medical Fraud and Elder Abuse and United States Department of Labor.
The probe showed that Foster allegedly hid approximately $8.09 million in payroll over three years, avoided approximately $578,716.56 in tax liability and $560,293.15 in insurance premiums. To carry on their fraud scheme, the Atlas officials allegedly laundered approximately $18.20 million. The co-conspirators used and traded on Foster’s position as an active-duty San Jose Police Officer and self-described expert in lie detection to further their business interests. Yet, Foster allegedly failed to disclose to SJPD that he owned and operated Atlas or that such ownership could result in ethical conflicts.
On 25 September 2015, federal judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange sentenced Doug Williams, who pled guilty after he was entrapped in a federal sting operation called “Operation Lie Busters,” to two years of imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release “[u]pon release from imprisonment.”
Williams had taught two undercover federal agents how to pass or beat a polygraph “test.”
Williams was released from prison on 26 July 2017, and thus his three years of supervised release expired on Sunday, 26 July 2020. Williams’ terms of supervised release had prohibited him from participating “in any form of polygraph-related activity during the period of supervision.”
Williams plans to resume offering training on how to pass or beat the polygraph, and his website, Polygraph.com, now includes the following notice:
Now accepting clients. There will soon be a sign up form to set a time and date for the training.
It should be noted that no voice stress analysis technique has any scientific basis, be it NITV’s CVSA, Baker Group International’s Digital Voice Stress Analyzer (DVSA), Dektor’s Psychological Stress Evaluator (PSE), or Nemesysco’s Layered Voice Analysis (LVA).
In the lawsuit, brought before the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in Palm Beach, NITV alleges that Baker and Savage have been marketing their competing voice-based lie detector in violation of U.S. export regulations and seeks as much as $1,000,000 (or potentially more) in damages.
COUNT I Economic Damages Against Defendants due to Violation of Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Plaintiff hereby restates the allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 46 as if fully set forth herein and further alleges as follows:
Both BAKER and SAVAGE, individually and by and through EXPERTOS INC and EXPERTOS SA, have exported from the United States or re-exported VSA technologies either to or between various foreign locations including Mexico, Central America, South America and South Africa.
Upon information and belief, none of the Defendants named herein have received such US Government approved Export Licenses for the multiple sales they have made from the US to foreign countries and/or between foreign countries, and are knowingly and actively engaged in the commerce of selling US Government Export Controlled commodities to various foreign governments, foreign commercial entities, and foreign national end users who have not been properly scrutinized to be granted an Export License.
The Defendants are in violation of Federal export laws, under the EAR, as well as violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq.
The failure to comply with Federal Export Law and violation of the EAR, constitute an unfair and deceptive act and unfair practice under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Act.
Defendants’ [sic] BAKER and SAVAGE, individually and by and through EXPERTOS INC and EXPERTOS SA, deliberate and knowing efforts to export, distribute and sell the DVSA/FVAS outside of the United States without a United States Government approved Export License, constitutes a violation of 15 CFR § 730-774 under the EAR, and constitutes a criminal conspiracy to violate federally promulgated export laws, regulations and directives. Due to Defendants’ unfair and deceptive actions in circumventing export licensing requirements, Defendants have been able to expeditiously enter foreign markets to the competitive disadvantage and economic damage of NFS.
Due to Defendants’ unfair and deceptive actions in circumventing export licensing requirements, NFS has lost numerous sales to BAKER and/or SAVAGE by and through EXPERTOS INC/EXPERTOS SA.
NFS’s damages are directly proximate to Defendants’ violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. Section 41 et seq., and the Florida Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Florida Statute 501.201 et seq., and specifically 501.211 of the Florida Statutes.
NFS is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs associated with the bringing of this action pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. Section 41 et seq., and Section 501.2105 of the Florida Statutes.
WHEREFORE, NFS respectfully requests that this Honorable Court: A. Enter a money judgment of $1,000,000 against Defendants or an amount equal to the actual damages suffered by Plaintiff by reason of the violations alleged above, pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. Section 41 et seq., and Section 501.211 of the Florida Statutes; B. Enter an order requiring Defendants to pay Plaintiff’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. Section 41 et seq., and Section 501.2105 of the Florida Statutes; and C. Direct any and all further relief this court deems just and equitable.
COUNT II Injunctive and Equitable Relief Against All Defendants
Plaintiff restates the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 46 and further states:
As alleged herein, Defendants have engaged in a continuous course of violation of 15 CFR § 730-774 under the EAR and Federal Trade Commission Regulations.
Defendants will continue to violate 15 CFR § 730-774 under the EAR and Federal Trade Commission Regulations causing irreparable harm to Plaintiff, the public, United States national security, and efforts by various foreign governments to combat criminal enterprises by supplying unscreened end users with technology that can be used to thwart law enforcement, military and/or national security efforts unless enjoined.
Plaintiff does not possess an adequate remedy at law to prevent Defendants’ conduct as alleged herein from continuing.
Plaintiff has a clear right to its request for injunctive relief and the public interest will be served as Plaintiff seeks to prevent continuing violations [sic] 15 CFR § 730-774 under the EAR and of the Federal Trade Commission Export Regulations which directly damage Plaintiff, the public and others. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court: A. Grant a temporary and permanent injunction against Defendants BAKER, EXPERTOS INC, EXPERTOS SA, and SAVAGE, enjoining the Defendants from exporting, demonstrating or selling its DVSA/FVAS product to foreign customers or potential customers both inside and outside the United States without a United States Government approved export license; B. Enter an Order awarding Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney’s fees pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. Section 41 et seq., and Section 501.2105 of the Florida Statutes; C. Order Dissolution of EXPERTOS VSA, INC.; D. Order Disgorgement of any and all monies received by Defendants’ [sic] in connection [sic] their violations of Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. Section 41 et seq., and Section 501.201 of the Florida Statutes; and F. Direct any and all further relief this Court deems just and equitable.
It should be noted that in 2009, the same court awarded Elwood Gary Baker $575,000 in a defamation suit he brought against NITV, LLC. NITV to date has shirked payment of this judgment, and Baker’s efforts to collect continue. That action is Case No. 50-2005-CA-001771-XXXX-MB.
In addition, NITV is the defendant in a federal fraud suit, Fletcher v. NITV LLC, filed on 18 May 2020.