NCCA Test Data Analysis Pamphlet

AntiPolygraph.org has today published the National Center for Credibility Assessment’s “Test Data Analysis: Numerical Scoring System Pamphlet” dated August 2017 (488 kb PDF). A note before the table of contents details the changes made over the years:

Note: The content and substance of this pamphlet was officially approved on 23 Aug 2006. In March 2011, this pamphlet was edited, but only for grammatical issues and curriculum style, format, and consistency of design factors, and no substantive changes to the content were made. In January 2012, content changes were made relative to requirements for two artifact free askings. In June, 2014, content changes were made effectively eliminating the 2:1 ratio from the EDA Ratio Scale. In Aug 2015, content changes were made changing the wording of “artifact free” to “valid asking”, as well as a definition added to App. G. Jan 2017: Changed EDA/CV ROW from “SO to EA” to “SO to 5 seconds beyond the EA”. The latency rule is effectively eliminated by the new ROW. Aug 2017: Updated the description of the 7-position scoring methods for the CV channel.

AntiPolygraph.org has previously published the August 2006 version of this document, which remains available (376 kb PDF).

NCCA Polygraph Countermeasure Course Files Leaked

AntiPolygraph.org has today published a collection of documents associated with the National Center for Credibility Assessment’s training courses on polygraph countermeasures. These documents, which date to circa 2013, describe the U.S. government’s best efforts to detect polygraph countermeasures. Key revelations include:

  • In a secret 1995 study, 80 percent of test subjects who were taught polygraph countermeasures succeeded in beating the U.S. government’s primary counterintelligence polygraph screening technique. The training took no more than an hour. NCCA officials have concealed this study from the National Academy of Sciences and the American public;
  • The federal government’s methods for attempting to detect polygraph countermeasures are conjectural in nature and were developed by two non-scientist polygraph operators at the federal polygraph school;
  • The U.S. government’s polygraph countermeasure detection training is centered on countering information found on two “anti-polygraph websites” (including this one) run by U.S. citizens (one of whom was entrapped and sent to prison and the other of whom was targeted for entrapment). Minimal attention is paid to foreign intelligence services.

The core of the U.S. government’s training for polygraph operators on how to detect countermeasures is a 40-hour “comprehensive” course taught by the National Center for Credibility Assessment’s Threat Assessment and Strategic Support Branch (TASS). The course, called “CE 839,” is restricted to federally certified polygraph operators. The NCCA website, which disappeared from the Internet shortly after the 2016 presidential election, described the course thus (PDD is short for “Psychophysiological Detection of Deception,” a buzzword for “polgyraphy”):

This 40-hour course prepares the PDD examiner to deter and detect employment of polygraph countermeasures in criminal and intelligence testing environments. The course presents background information for a foundation in concepts, theories, and research data related to polygraph countermeasures. Laboratory exercises are included to enhance skills and provide hands-on experience. Detailed discussion of numerous case studies involving examples of confirmed countermeasures. Law enforcement and intelligence PDD examinations are used to demonstrate methods of detecting and defeating this threat. Information provided includes discussion of threats posed by foreign intelligence services, terrorist organizations, and other criminal elements attempting to defeat law enforcement and intelligence PDD examinations. This course is intended as the primary polygraph countermeasures course for criminal and security screening PDD examiners or as a periodic refresher course for examiners supporting intelligence operations. The course included daily directed reading assignments followed by classroom discussions and quizzes.

The documents published today by AntiPolygraph.org include an instructor’s template as well as PowerPoint presentations (including presenter’s notes) for the course.

A note to slide 7 of the first block of instruction (18 MB PDF), dubbed “Back to Basics,” chides AntiPolygraph.org for publishing two Arabic-language jihadist documents on polygraph countermeasures with English translations, averring that “For the Anti-polygraph crowd the ‘end justifies the means’ – they are willing to compromise national security in their quest to rid the world of polygraph.”

No explanation is provided as to how AntiPolygraph.org’s documenting of jihadist literature on polygraph countermeasures (and in the process bringing it to the attention of the federal polygraph community) constitutes our compromising national security. We would counter that NCCA is compromising national security through its embrace of the pseudoscience of polygraphy and its mulish resistance to independent review of its “research” findings.

This “Back to Basics” presentation also includes a suggestion (at slide 22) to overinflate the blood pressure cuff (which causes pain) to punish examinees who breath more slowly than the polygraph operator would like:

Block 2 (11.4 MB PDF) of the comprehensive course (“Physiological Features”) is what NCCA considers to be the core of the course. It identifies features of polygraph tracings that NCCA believes are indicative of polygraph countermeasure use. Although none of the NCCA documents provided to AntiPolygraph.org are marked as being classified, the presenter’s notes for slide 5 state that the discussion will be classified “secret”:

The presenter’s notes for the concluding slide (52) bemoan the fact that “Today we have many performing high level CM. The average person can go on-line and find not only the test technique that will be used in their polygraph but the questions asked.”

You are at the right site to find that kind of information.

The presentation for the fourth block of instruction (4.5 MB PDF) includes some of the information we found most interesting. It documents a secret U.S.  government countermeasure study conducted by Gordon H. Barland circa 1995 in which (including inconclusive results) 80% of test subjects taught to beat the polygraph were successful in doing so. Countermeasure training lasted no more than an hour and consisted of telling the examinee, upon hearing a “control” question, to pick a number over 600 and count backwards by threes.

Slides 7-9, with presenter’s notes, are reproduced below (you can click on the images to view them in a larger size):

Barland’s study strongly suggested that polygraph screening is highly vulnerable to polygraph countermeasures. The U.S. government has concealed this study from the public, including the U.S. National Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council, which in 2001-2002 conducted a  review of the scientific evidence on the polygraph. In its report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection (10.3 MB PDF), the Council noted (at p. 118, emphasis added):

“…we were advised by officials from [the Department of Energy] and [the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, since renamed the National Center for Credibility Assessment] that there was information relevant to our work, classified at the secret level, particularly with regard to polygraph countermeasures. In order to review such information, several committee members and staff obtained national security clearances at the secret level. We were subsequently told by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and DoDPI that there were no completed studies of polygraph countermeasures at the secret level; we do not know whether there are any such studies at a higher level of classification.”

NCCA deliberately misled, and concealed relevant documentation from, the National Research Council.

With respect to the mention of officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, note that the most influential person at DoDPI/NCCA at the time was Donald J. Krapohl, a career CIA agent and polygraph operator who for many years was the éminence grise at DoDPI/NCCA.

The presentation goes on to document how two non-scientist NCCA staff members, Paul M. Menges and Daniel V. Weatherman, devised a system that purports to identify those who employed countermeasures in Barland’s study by examining the polygraph tracings. Their scheme identifies a number of “physiological features” that are posited to be evidence of polygraph countermeasure use. The criteria are so broad that any polygraph operator could likely find indications of countermeasure use in any particular set of polygraph charts if he looks hard enough. Slide 13 notes that when Weatherman applied his “global scoring” approach to detect countermeasures, only 47% of the innocent were correctly identified.

The entire NCCA comprehensive countermeasure course is centered on these two non-scientists’ unpublished, un-peer-reviewed “research.”

Slide 36 notes: “Software unable to identify CM.” This is not surprising, given the conjectural, “I know them when I see them!” nature of Menges’ and Weatherman’s countermeasure “detection” methods.

It’s worth noting that around the time Menges and Weatherman were attempting to devise a technique for detecting polygraph countermeasures, Menges authored an article published in the American Polygraph Association quarterly, Polygraph, suggesting that teaching polygraph countermeasures to the public should be outlawed.

A decade later, Doug Williams, who runs Polygraph.com, which features prominently in NCCA’s polygraph countermeasure training, was targeted for entrapment in Operation Lie Busters and ultimately sentenced to two years in federal prison. He has since been released but is prohibited from providing in-person training on how to pass a polygraph “test” until July 2020. AntiPolygraph.org co-founder George Maschke was also targeted for entrapment during Operation Lie Busters but was not charged with any crime. Contemporaneous evidence suggests that AntiPolygraph.org was additionally targeted for surveillance by the NSA.

The fifth block of instruction (5.7 MB PDF) covers suggested supplemental polygraph counter-countermeasure techniques such as the “Repeat the Last Word Test,” the “Focused CM Technique,” the “Yes/No Test,” and the abandonment of the “control” question “test” (CQT) in favor of the Concealed Information Test.

On a final note, recall our 11 October 2014 blog post, “Senior Official at Federal Polygraph School Accused of Espionage.” Then recently-retired Defense Intelligence Agency counterintelligence investigator Scott W. Carmichael said this about these documents in an e-mail message to retired FBI polygrapher Robert Drdak:

The study conducted by Dan [Weatherman] and Paul [Menges] drew on raw data collected by Dr. Gordon H. Barland and the classified report of his earlier study of mental countermeasures dated in 1994. Dan, Paul and Dr. Senter performed their work as employees of DoDPI. Your old colleague and former business partner Don Krapohl provided oversight for their work and edited the report submitted by Dan and Paul back in CY2003. The entire effort was official, and it was based on a classified study.

Dan and Paul believed their findings constituted a new, reliable, and therefore extremely valuable diagnostic tool. Dr. Senter tested the tool and determined that, sure enough, the specific diagnostic features identified by Dan and Paul through their study correlated with a high degree of probability to the employment of countermeasures. As you may know, the U.S. government now requires all federal polygraph examiners to receive 40 hours of instruction on polygraph countermeasures to become certified as federal examiners; and, to receive 4 hours of polygraph countermeasures refresher training every year to maintain their certifications. DoDPI/DCCA [sic, correct NCCA] is so confident in the diagnostic tool developed by Dan and Paul, they decided to use the new tool as the very foundation for the 40-hour instruction and the annual 4-hour refresher training.

Again, Dr. Barland’s 1994 study, which formed the basis for Weatherman and Menges’s study, was classified. By definition, then, and by DoD Instruction, Weatherman and Menges’s study and findings, were therefore also classified.

But DoDPI did something stupid. They committed a security violation. In fact, they did so repeatedly. They found it inconvenient and unwieldy to carry classified briefing slides around with them as they traveled to various parts of the country to teach the diagnostic tool to examiners – and, when they found it necessary to brief uncleared personnel on the tool, rather than follow routine but bothersome administrative procedures which would have enabled them to do so, they elected to simply not stamp their briefing slides at all. Instead, they stamped their materials as Unclassified/FOUO – while handling and treating their materials as though they were classified, in order to ensure their tool did not fall into foreign hands. Why? Because anyone who learns how the entire US government now detects the employment of countermeasures, will be able to device [sic] methods to defeat the US government examination process.

Additional NCCA countermeasure training materials, with brief descriptions, are available for download here.

 

Gordon H. Barland on Polygraph Countermeasures

Gordon H. Barland, Ph.D. worked at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (now the National Center for Credibility Assessment) from 1986 until his retirement in 2000. During this period, he conducted research on polygraph countermeasures, and by his own estimation, “[p]rior to his retirement from DoDPI, he was the Federal Government’s primary authority on polygraph countermeasures.”

In July 2003, Dr. Barland presented a week-long course on polygraphy including polygraph countermeasures at the Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses in Mexico City. According to an NCCA timeline on polygraph countermeasures, “[t]he course was presented by Barland after being approved by the National Security Agency.”

AntiPolygraph.org has obtained a copy of the 397-slide PowerPoint file Dr. Barland used in this presentation, which we are also making available as a PDF file. All are invited to download the file and to review it slide by slide. We present here only a few highlights.

The title slide:

Slide 42 discusses common polygraph operator doctrine about countermeasures and admits that it only applies to “naïve” countermeasures, that is, the sort of thing that someone who doesn’t understand polygraph procedure might attempt. In this slide, “E” is shorthand for “examiner”:

In slide 54,  Dr. Barland’s mentions his fear, in the aftermath of the National Research Council’s damning 2003 report (10.3 mb PDF) and referencing a federal lawsuit that was ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds, that the United States Congress might outlaw polygraph screening:

Dr. Barland was particularly concerned with two websites that he said polygraph operators needed to monitor regularly: www.polygraph.com, run by former Oklahoma City Police Department polygrapher Doug Williams, who turned against polygraphy and began offering the public information about polygraphy’s shortcomings and how to pass or beat a polygraph “test,” and AntiPolygraph.org. The CAAWP listserv mentioned in the presentation is defunct:

The presentation devotes numerous slides to Doug Williams, including a biographical synopsis:

Regarding Williams’ motives, Barland paints a very different picture of Williams than did the federal officials behind Operation Lie Busters, who set out to entrap, arrest, and incarcerate him:

Barland goes on to discuss Williams’ manual, How to Sting the Polygraph, at length.

Slide 148 suggests interrogation approaches for getting a polygraph examinee to admit to having used countermeasures:Barland also addresses AntiPolygraph.org and characterized our book, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector as “an excellent polygraph manual, with an extensive chapter on [countermeasures]”:

Numerous slides discuss conversations on the AntiPolygraph.org message board and the contents of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

Absent from the presentation is any clearly stated, effective method for reliably detecting the kinds of countermeasures outlined in How to Sting the Polygraph and The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

NCCA White Paper on Polygraph Countermeasure Detection Training

AntiPolygraph.org has received an archive of National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) documents about polygraph countermeasures.

We begin publication with an undated “white paper” titled “Timeline Detailing the Countermeasures Classification Issue” (288 kb PDF). Metadata in the Microsoft Word version (140 kb DOC) of the document indicates that it was created on 15 August 2012 by NCCA Quality Assurance Program chief Gary Light.

The white paper argues that “CM [countermeasure] detection information from its inception has been researched, developed and implemented in an unclassified environment. CM procedures were not, are not and need not be classified when teaching the detection process.”

In January 2014, McClatchy investigative reporter Marisa Taylor reported on efforts by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), NCCA’s parent agency since 2008, to classify certain information about polygraphy. (See AntiPolygraph.org’s commentary on her reporting here.) Gary Light’s white paper helps to shed light on the internal debate over whether information about polygraphy, including polygraph countermeasures, should be classified. Light appears to be firmly in the “no” camp.

The white paper includes an appendix documenting the publication and presentation of information about polygraph countermeasures “in an unclassified environment,” including, among other things, a 2005 class taught by former NCCA (then DoDPI) researcher Charles R. Honts in the People’s Republic of China.

Of particular note, the white paper also mentions a 2011 “Russian CM Policy Chapter #5 provided to the Department of Energy (DOE),” noting “DOE personnel were provided with a 125 page document describing the CM policy of a Russian government agency. The CM criteria described in the text were similar to those of DoD. Basically only the names of the criteria differed.”

On 25 April 2001, then Defense Security Service Deputy Director for Developmental Programs and former Department of Defense Polygraph Institute director Michael H. Capps testified to Congress that “[t]he U.S. government has supported the use of the polygraph among allied nations when mutual interests were at stake, such as when it supplied training and state-of-the-art polygraph equipment to Russia, to help them maintain security over their nuclear weaponry after the fall of Communism.” Perhaps the “Russian government agency” whose polygraph countermeasure policy chapter was provided to the U.S. Department of Energy is the same one to which NCCA (then DoDPI) provided “training and state-of-the-art polygraph equipment.”

In sum, this NCCA white paper acknowledges that information about polygraph countermeasures originated outside of the U.S. government, is widely available around the world, and should not be considered “classified.”

Light also writes that “[i]t should be … noted that since 2000 the federal government has conducted over 1,000,000,000 [sic] examinations.” It seems likely that this is a typographical error, and that the actual number is an order of magnitude lower, or over 1,000,000 polygraph examinations conducted between 2000 and 2012. This would average out to about >83,300 polygraph examinations per year across the federal government during the relevant time period. According to Department of Defense (DoD) polygraph operator Brian R. Morris, DoD alone has been conducting more than 129,000 polygraphs per year in the aftermath of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations.

Light concludes his white paper noting “In this time and after all of these examinations, not one example can be provided wherein NCCA procedures for the protection of CM protocols has [sic] failed.”

AntiPolygraph.org can attest that NCCA procedures for the protection of its polygraph countermeasure protocols have indeed failed. We have them and will be publishing them in due course. Watch this space.

Note also retired DIA counterintelligence officer Scott W. Carmichael’s 2014 claim that the then number two official at  NCCA, Donald Krapohl, violated the Espionage Act by funneling classified information about polygraph countermeasures to the government of Singapore.

Democratic Senator Dick Durbin Hypocritically Embraces Polygraph “Testing”

U.S. Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL)

U.S. Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) has introduced Senate Bill 1560, which would expand polygraph screening at the Department of Homeland Security. Specifically, the bill would block any exemptions to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP’s) pre-employment polygraph requirement (as contemplated by House Resolution 2213) and mandate pre-employment polygraph screening at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). In addition, the bill would mandate periodic and random polygraph screening of selected employees of both agencies. The bill has been co-sponsored by Senators Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY).

It would appear that Senator Durbin has introduced this legislation in a cynical ploy to attack Republicans from the right, that is, to appear “tougher on security” than them. House Resolution 2213, which was broadly supported by House Republicans, would allow CBP to waive its pre-employment polygraph requirement for some applicants with prior military or law enforcement experience, which would allow for a more rapid expansion of CBP’s workforce. In January 2017, President Trump signed executive orders mandating the hiring of an additional 5,000 CBP and 10,000 ICE agents.

In 2002, the National Academy of Sciences concluded that “[polygraph testing’s] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.”

Despite this, in 2010, the U.S. Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, legislation introduced by Senator Mark Pryor (D-AR) mandating polygraph screening of CBP applicants.

CBP has a pre-employment polygraph failure rate on the order of 60%, and many qualified applicants are falsely accused of lying and are blacklisted from CBP employment based on scientifically baseless polygraph results. If Senate Bill 1560 becomes law, we can expect a similar outcome at ICE.

Moreover, polygraph “testing” is easily beaten using simple countermeasures (PDF, see Chapter 4) that polygraph operators cannot detect.

Senator Durbin’s sponsoring of this legislation is hypocritical because he knows that polygraphy is unreliable. Speaking at a 2001 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on “Issues Surrounding the Use of Polygraphs,” Senator Durbin stated:

As an attorney, I never advised clients to take a polygraph. I just did not believe in them. I still do not. They are largely inadmissible in most courts of law. I think the Federal Supreme Court has ruled, and others have, as well, that they are not admissible. Perhaps State and local courts can reach other conclusions, and there are a variety of reasons for that.

I guess some feel that if a jury saw a polygraph test, they would think, well, that is really the good measure of truthfulness and we do not have to reach our own conclusion, and some who just question whether the science is reliable at all.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Sen. Durbin summarized his position on polygraph screening thus:

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this hearing. I have not thought about this issue a lot since I practiced law, but it has come up more and more and I think part of it has to do with our concern over national security. I think part of it has to do with the fact that we are looking for a quick fix here. We are trying to find some machine that is going to solve our problem. I do not think this is the machine. Thank you.

With Senate Bill 1560, Sen. Durbin is hypocritically seeking a quick fix that he knows isn’t going to solve our problem.

 

Polygraph Critic Doug Williams Freed from Prison

Doug Williams upon release from the federal prison camp at Florence, Colorado

Polygraph critic Doug Williams, who was targeted for prosecution in Operation Lie Busters for teaching people how to pass or beat a polygraph “test,” was released this morning from the federal prison camp in Florence, Colorado and is now on his way back home to Oklahoma. We wish him Godspeed and look forward to his renewed participation in the public debate over polygraph policy!

DIA Video on Ana Belen Montes Espionage Case

AntiPolygraph.org has obtained and is publishing a copy of a “For Official Use Only” video produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2006 about the Ana Belen Montes espionage case. This never-before-published video, titled The Two Faces of Ana: Model Employee/Cuban Spy, includes interviews with Montes’ colleagues at DIA. The video mentions (at 16:31) that she used polygraph countermeasures to pass a 1994 DIA polygraph screening “test,” which facilitated her espionage:

The polygraph test in 1994 made her even more dangerous. By deflecting suspicion away from her, she was freer to pursue her espionage. And to pass the polygraph, she had used a countermeasure taught to her by the Cubans.

Regarding the significance of the Montes case for DIA polygraph policy, see Ignoring Science After Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes Beat the Polygraph, DoD IG Recommended More Polygraphs. Regarding the ineffectiveness of DIA’s polygraph countermeasure detection efforts, see Leaked Documents Point to DIA’s Inability to Detect Sophisticated Polygraph Countermeasures.

You may also download this video as a 138 MB MKV file.

Imprisoned Polygraph Critic Doug Williams on This American Life

Episode 618 of the popular radio program This American Life features the story of Doug Williams, the former police polygraphist who turned against polygraphy and in 1979 began providing the public with information and training on how to pass or beat a polygraph “test.” Over three decades later, Williams was targeted for prosecution in a federal investigation dubbed “Operation Lie Busters” and is now nearing the end of a two-year prison sentence. You can listen online or download the episode as an MP3 file here.

Doug Williams Argues Why He Should Be Allowed to Continue Teaching People How to Pass a Polygraph Test

On 21 November 2016, imprisoned polygraph critic Doug Williams filed a court motion seeking amendment of federal judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange‘s sentencing order, which stipulates that upon release, Williams will be subject to three years’ “supervised release” during which time he “shall not participate in any form of polygraph-related activity.” Williams asks the court to modify the conditions of his release to allow him to engage in polygraph-related activity to the extent that it is not “intended or part of a scheme to defraud the United States or tamper with witnesses.”

On 10 February 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief opposing Williams’ motion, effectively conceding that polygraph countermeasures work and arguing that “the restriction on polygraph-related activities for the full term of supervised release is the minimum restriction necessary to protect the public.”

On 21 February 2017, Doug Williams filed a reply to the government’s opposition, challenging the Justice Department’s legal arguments and arguing forcefully why his freedom of speech should not be curtailed. His broader arguments are worth citing here (cited as filed, without corrections):

7. Williams is a highly trained and experience polygraph operator. He has been working in his profession for over 44 years. The District Court has discretion to impose an occupational restriction as a special condition of supervised release, but its discretion must be exercised in accordance with 18 U.S.C. S3538 (d) Subsection (a) states that a sentencing court may impose an occupational restriction only if it determines that ” … Imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted.”

8. In this case there is no reason to believe that Williams will “continue to engage in unlawful conduct.” Williams can practice his profession as a polygraph operator and continue to publish information about the ineffectiveness of the polygraph examination without engaging in a scheme to defraud the United States Government, or without tampering with a witness. Williams has a 1st Amendment right to provide information about how a person taking a polygraph test can avoid being falsely accused of deception simply because they have a nervous reaction to a relevant question. Williams has no intention of providing information or training to any person for the purpose of defrauding the government, or the tampering with a witness. In his business and occupation, Williams seeks to provide comprehensive information about the use of the polygraph examination as well as methods used by the subject being tested to prove their truthfulness on a polygraph examination.

9. Any occupational restriction must be “reasonably necessary to protect the public” which requires a finding by the Court that, in the absence of the restriction “the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. 5F1.5 (a)(2). In providing information about the use of the polygraph examination as well as methods to produce a “truthful” polygraph chart tracing, Williams is actually protecting the public and individual citizens from being defrauded by government agencies or employees who improperly use the polygraph testing process, and falsely brand a truthful person as a liar simply because they are nervous.

10. The government’s response states: “Given the defendant’s (Mr. Williams) extreme disregard for public safety and national security, there are no less restrictive alternatives that would adequately prevent him from helping individuals lie in order to obtain or keep sensitive government positions. Williams would submit that he is more concerned with our national security as evidenced by the fact that he has devoted almost forty years of his life proving the polygraph is nothing but a scam and he has been warning the government that it is foolish and dangerous to rely in the polygraph as a “lie detector”. In truth and in fact, it is the polygraph operators and those government officials who rely on the polygraph who are the ones who have demonstrated little regard for public safety and national security by relying on such an unreliable procedure as polygraph testing. Furttier, there IS no evidence that Williams has ever been involved in “helping individuals lie in  order to obtain or keep sensitive government positions”. In fact, the government seized Mr. Williams’ computer and downloaded the records of over 4900 people who had either purchased his manual and DVD or took part in my one on one polygraph test preparation training. The government agents, and an AUSA interviewed every one of these people who were of interest to them. They started the interview by saying, “We’re not after you, we are after Doug Williams.”. They interrogated them very intensely asking them if Williams ever told them to lie or if they ever told Williams they were going to lie. Not one of these people ever said Williams told them to lie or that they ever told Williams they were going to lie. It is of interest to note that polygraph operators from this same agency, the Customs and Border Patrol, admit that over two-thirds of the applicants for positions with that agency are denied employment because of a “failed” polygraph test so it is obvious that many thousands of people have been falsely accused of deception by government polygraph operators. This failure rate is another example of the polygraph program’s extreme disregard for public safety and national security by thwarting the Customs and Border Patrol’s efforts to adequately staff their agency.

11. The government’s response states: “Both UCs made it clear to defendant (Mr. Williams) that they could not keep or obtain federal employment unless he helped them lie about their crimes during their respective polygraph examinations. Knowing the UCs intent to lie to federal investigators in  order to get or keep federal law enforcement positions, defendant (Mr. Williams) willingly trained them how to provide false responses to polygraphers questions and still pass.” That is not true, neither of the UCs told Mr. Williams they were going to lie on the polygraph test, nor did Mr. Williams ever tell them to lie. The first undercover agent simply said the investigators already knew he had “turned his head” while a friend brought in  some drugs and the second undercover agent said he was going to tell the polygraph operator about his “crimes” and his only concern was that it would get back to the sheriff and he would lose his job as a deputy. Also, the government has no evidence that Mr. Williams “trained them to provide false responses to polygraphers questions and still pass”. The fact is that no polygraph test was ever administered to either of these undercover agents, nor did they ever intend to take a polygraph test. And there is no evidence that Mr. Williams helped them “lie about their crimes during their respective polygraph examinations” when no such test was ever taken. The UCs were the ones doing all the lying and they needed no help from Mr. Williams. Indeed, this was all pretend and they were even lying about lying since everything they said was scripted.

12. The polygraph is A simple device that has not changed significantly since in was invented in 1920. It records the subject’s blood pressure, pulse rate, respiration and what’s known as the galvanic skin response which is basically just a measurement of the increase or decrease of sweat activity on the subject’s fingers. Polygraph operators ask a series of questions during the test and measure the subject’s reaction or lack of reaction to the questions. There are two types of questions asked on the polygraph test – relevant and control. The relevant questions are those that pertain to the point at issue. For example, if the polygraph test is about drug smuggling, the questions would be as follows: Did you smuggle drugs into the country? Did you work with someone to smuggle drugs into the country? Right now could you take me to any of the drugs that were smuggled into the country? The polygraph operator will intersperse control questions during the test. The control questions would be as follows: Have you ever lied to anyone in authority to keep from getting in trouble? Did you ever deliberately hurt anyone? Have you ever stolen anything? The theory underlying the polygraph as a “lie detector” is as follows: If a subject has a reaction on a relevant questions that is greater than their reaction to a control questions, the subject is deemed to be deceptive. If the reverse is true, and the subject has a reaction to the control questions that is greater than their reaction to the relevant questions, the subject is deemed to be truthful. This reaction that would brand a person as a liar is  simply a nervous reaction such as is seen in the fight or flight response. When a person is confronted with a threatening stimulus their body releases a shot of adrenalin which causes their blood pressure to increase, their breathing to become erratic, and the sweat activity on their hand to increase. In order for the polygraph to be accurate as a “lie detector’, this reaction that polygraph operators refer to as a “lying reaction” or a “reaction indicative of deception” must always indicate deception. The problem is that there is no such thing as a “lying reaction”. In fact, the reaction that brands a person as a liar can and often is caused by any number of innocent stimuli – such as embarrassment, rage at having been asked an accusatory question, simple nervousness, fear of being falsely accused of lying – even the tone of the examiner during questioning can elicit a reaction that would cause a person to fail the test. So, the polygraph records a person’s nervous reaction to relevant questions but the problem is that nervousness does not always indicate deception – in fact it only indicates deception about 50% of the time. Thus the polygraph is no more accurate than “the toss of a coin”. Mr. Williams simply teaches people what the polygraph records, teaches them the difference between the relevant and control questions and runs them through a relaxation exercise similar to that used in the Lamas technique of natural child birth. This training only takes about twenty minutes and then the subject is hooked up to the polygraph and is allowed to demonstrate their ability to relax when answering the relevant questions and think of something frightening when answering the control questions thereby producing a perfect “truthful” chart. When you consider the extraordinary failure rate of almost 70% at the Customs and Border Patrol – as well as other government agencies – it is logical to assume that many thousands of people are falsely branded as liars by government polygraph operators. It would be unconscionable to deprive those persons seeking this training from receiving it by prohibiting Mr. Williams from continuing to educate them about how to avoid being falsely accused of deception simply because they are nervous.

13. The government’s response states: “Because defendant’s criminal conduct was inextricably linked with his polygraph business and because defendant has repeatedly and deliberately sought to avoid knowledge of his clients intention to lie during polygraph examinations (in order to insulate himself from criminal activity), the Court’s restriction on defendants participation in polygraph related activity is necessary to protect the public.” There is no statute that prohibits Mr. Williams from teaching a person to pass, or for that matter to “beat” a polygraph test. Williams was charged with witness tampering and Mr. Williams’ knowledge or lack of knowledge about his clients intention to lie during polygraph examinations is irrelevant simply because having the knowledge that a person he is training plans to lie does not constitute a crime. The crime Mr. Williams was charged with is witness tampering not teaching a person how to pass a polygraph test. Further, as will be discussed later, except in these two cases, there is no evidence that anyone has ever told him they intended to lie during polygraph examinations, and Mr. Williams has certainly never told anyone to lie on their polygraph examinations – and in  fact Mr. Williams never told any of these undercover agents to lie – nor did they ever tell Mr. Williams they planned to lie on their polygraph examinations. As regards the charges of witness tampering, it appears from the record that the only “tampering” being done was done by the government’s undercover agents. And it should be noted that these agents were not “witnesses” to anything. In fact everything they said was a lie. Also, everything Mr. Williams told the government’s undercover agents about how to pass a polygraph test was in his testimony to the congress in 1985 in support of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. So Mr. Williams is  in prison for telling the undercover agents exactly what he told the congress over thirty years ago.

14. Williams has been demonstrating how simple it is to “beat the box” on national television and in hundreds of seminars over the past thirty eight years. It is true that anyone can use Mr. Williams’ techniques to pass their polygraph test regardless of whether they are nervous or not, lying or not, no matter what. Mr. Williams has been saying that for almost forty years. He says that is hopes that those who use the polygraph or rely on the results reported to them by polygraph operators will realize that it is not accurate or reliable as a “lie detector” and will quit using it. Besides, liars can pass the polygraph test easily regardless of whether they have been trained or not. History is replete with examples of people who have lied and passed polygraph tests with no problem, Aldridge Ames, the CIA agent who was a notorious traitor, passed many polygraph examinations – and he was actively passing classified information to the Soviets when he took – and passed – many polygraph tests. As a matter of fact, there has never been even one traitor, or spy ever caught by the polygraph. Even the most recent episode with Edward Snowden demonstrates how foolish and dangerous it is to rely on the results of a polygraph test. Snowden passed two polygraph tests in order to get access to the information he leaked from the NSA. Snowden not only passed the pre-employment polygraph test, but he also passed the all encompassing, highly vaunted “lifestyle” polygraph test. Snowden passed both polygraph tests, even though he knew at the time he took the tests what he planned to do when he got his security clearance. If that doesn’t prove the polygraph is worthless, what does? So, the polygraph brands truthful people as liars and allows liars to pass the test with no problem. In fact, liars have demonstrated the ability to pass the polygraph test without any training whatsoever while truthful people are branded as liars at an alarming rate. Therefore, Williams’ training is essential to help truthful people avoid being falsely accused of deception. Accordingly Williams requests that the Court remove the special condition of his supervised release prohibiting his participation in any form of polygraph related activity.

Respectfully submitted

Douglas G Williams
Pro Se

Williams’ full brief may be downloaded here. For discussion of Williams’ case, see the Doug Williams Polygraph Trial Discussion Thread.