Trial Date Set in U.S. v. Doug Williams

At a 15-minute arraignment hearing (258 kb PDF) held on Tuesday, 18 November 2014, Doug Williams of Norman, Oklahama, who was indicted last week in connection with his business teaching people how to pass polygraph tests, pled  not guilty, was released on his own recognizance, and a trial date of Tuesday, 13 January 2015 was set. The case is to be heard before Chief Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange at the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Williams is represented by attorneys Chris H. Eulberg and Stephen H. Buzin.

Doug Williams Indicted for Teaching How to Pass a Polygraph Test

Doug Williams

Doug Williams in August 2013 Interview

On the afternoon of Friday, 14 November 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment (the day before) of Douglas Gene Williams, a former Oklahoma City police polygraphist and the proprietor of, who has been teaching individuals how to pass polygraph “tests” since 1979. The 21-page five-count indictment accuses Williams of two counts of mail fraud for having received payment for his services through the U.S. Postal Service and three counts of witness tampering for allegedly “persuad[ing] or attempting to persuade” two undercover agents posing as customers “to conceal material facts and make false statements with the intent to influence, delay, and prevent the testimony” of the undercover agents “in an official proceeding….”

Williams is not charged with any alleged crime not involving an undercover agent posing as a customer. Whatever the legal merits of the government’s case against Williams, it seems clear that the overarching motivation of the criminal investigation against him is to suppress speech that the government dislikes. U.S. v. Doug Williams has serious implications for free speech in the United States.

For the time being, Williams is limiting his public comments based on legal counsel. However, he has previously described the February 2013 entrapment operation and raid that federal agents conducted on his home and office. Using business records seized during the raid, federal officials compiled an inter-agency watch list comprising the names and personal details of thousands of Williams’ customers, as well as a lesser number of customers of a second man, Chad Dixon, who was also targeted for prosecution.

The indictment (2.6 mb PDF) of Doug Williams is an implicit admission by the U.S. government that 1) polygraph countermeasures work,  2) it has no effective means of detecting them, 3) it is deeply concerned about polygraph countermeasures.

A decade ago, an instructor at the federal government’s polygraph school suggested in a polygraph trade journal that providing information about polygraph countermeasures to the public should be outlawed. co-founder George Maschke posted a public response, never thinking that the U.S. government would actually pursue such a radical plan. But it appears to be happening.

Recommended reading:

Also, for discussion of the indictment from the time it was first made public, see the message board thread Doug Williams of Indicted. Comments may also be posted here. Registration is not required.


NSA Director Mike Rogers on Polygraph Screening


NSA Director Mike Rogers Speaking on Polygraph Screening

NSA Director Admiral Mike Rogers says that he hates polygraphs but nonetheless considers them “a good tool for us.”

Rogers made the remark during an appearance on Monday, 3 November 2014 at Stanford University in response to a question by professor of political science Scott Sagan, who asked what Rogers has done in terms of background checks, security clearances, and personnel reliability programs to preclude another security breach like Edward Snowden’s.

The first specific measure Rogers mentioned was polygraph screening, replying in relevant part (at 1:09:09 in the webcast):

So, I remind the workforce, we all signed up to a higher level of scrutiny and a higher level of security. We all know that that’s part of the job. We all agree to that. Whether it’s polygraphs, whole lots of other things that we do–I mean, I can’t stand ‘em. I’ll be the first to admit I hate ‘em, but it is as…but I acknowledge that it’s a good tool for us, and if I’m gonna do this, I go into it with my eyes open even though part of me goes, “Oh man, I’ve got to sit down and get wired to a machine.” ‘Cause we have one standard for all of us. It doesn’t matter if you’re the four-star running the organization, or you’re a junior individual. I’ve got one standard for all of us when it comes to the security framework.

Rogers seemingly ignores the fact that polygraph screening is completely without scientific basis and disregards the National Research Council’s conclusion that “[polygraph testing’s] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.”

Rogers also seems to suggest that he’s setting an example for his employees: everyone from the highest to the lowest ranking at NSA has to take the polygraph. But it’s not really the same. When the director of the NSA sits for a polygraph “test,” it’s the polygrapher’s job that’s on the line. No director of the NSA need fear failing a polygraph. The same is not true for those further down the food-chain, for whom a false-positive outcome is a serious risk.

Of course, polygraph screening is not a policy instituted by NSA in response to Edward Snowden’s disclosures. NSA has been (mis-)relying on polygraphy for almost its entire history. It may be the case, however, that NSA has increased the frequency of polygraph screenings. In December 2013, Daniel W. Drezner, writing for Foreign Policy magazine, reported following a visit to NSA headquarters:

Snowden has also changed the way the NSA is doing business. Analysts have gone from being polygraphed once every five years to once every quarter.

Update: While DIRNSA Mike Rogers says he goes into polygraphs “with [his] eyes open,” the NSA has produced a video for employees and contractors that attempts to mislead them about key aspects of polygraph screening. And NSA-affiliated personnel who attempt to open their eyes about polygraphy by researching it online may have their web browsing history intercepted and presented to them during their polygraph sessions.

DEA Contractor Metropolitan Interpreters and Translators Found Liable for Breach of Anti-Polygraph Law

metlang-logoMcClatchy reporter Marisa Taylor reports that a federal judge has found Metropolitan Interpreters and Translators liable for violation of the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, which restricts the use of polygraphs and other purported “lie detectors” by non-governmental employers. Excerpt:

— At the behest of the Drug Enforcement Administration, a leading court translation service forced its employees to take lie-detector tests in violation of federal law, a federal judge has found.

U.S. District Judge Jeffrey Miller concluded that the New York-based company, Metropolitan Interpreters and Translators Inc., was liable for requiring nine translators in San Diego to take what they described as highly invasive polygraph tests to keep their jobs as contractors with the DEA.

The ruling paves the way for a trial in which a jury will determine how much the company will have to pay in damages. Miller also found the company’s vice president, Joseph Citrano, liable. Five other translators already have settled with the company.

The decision, which was issued Oct. 24, comes after the DEA agreed to pay the 14 plaintiffs a total of $500,000 to settle the lawsuit. The contract employees translated Spanish conversations collected during court-authorized wiretapping of the DEA’s criminal suspects. Metropolitan fired the employees after they failed or refused to take the polygraphs.

A 1988 law banned most private employers from polygraphing their workers because of scientific questions about the technique’s reliability and after accounts of employer abuses.

“This ruling shows companies are responsible for their own actions when they violate the law,” said San Diego lawyer Gene Iredale, who represented the plaintiffs. “It also shows courts are ready, willing and able to enforce this law.”

The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 still allowed the federal government to polygraph its employees and applicants. It also lists certain intelligence and law enforcement agencies as permitted to test their contractors. However, it does not list the DEA.

Read the rest of the story here.

Confirmed Polygraph Countermeasure Case Documentation

902nd Military Intelligence Group Crest

902nd Military Intelligence Group Crest

The United States government is so worked up about polygraph countermeasures that it launched an ongoing criminal investigation dubbed Operation Lie Busters targeting individuals who teach others how to pass or beat polygraph examinations. An Indiana electrician named Chad Dixon who taught people how to pass the polygraph as a side job was sentenced to eight months in federal prison, and former police polygraphist Doug Williams, who operates the website, was raided by federal agents who seized his customer records. At the time of this writing, he has not been charged with any crime but remains in legal jeopardy. Federal investigators created and circulated a watch list based on Dixon’s and Williams’ customer records. co-founder George Maschke appears to have been the target of an attempted entrapment as well, and evidence suggests that the U.S. government may be monitoring visitors to this site.

Polygraphers often claim that they can reliably detect the kinds of countermeasures outlined in’s free book, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector (1 mb PDF) and in Williams’ manual, “How to Sting the Polygraph.” Yet no polygrapher has ever demonstrated such an ability, and polygraph community documentation obtained by strongly suggests that polygraphers have no reliable methodology for detecting them.

Confessions to countermeasure use are relatively rare, and when they occur, at least some federal agencies send case information, stripped of the examinee’s personal details, to the federal polygraph school, the National Center for Credibility Assessment, for study. has received documentation of one such case. It concerns a counterintelligence-scope polygraph screening examination, case no. 902-0470-14, conducted by Thomas M. Touhey of the 310th Military Intelligence Battalion, 902nd Military Intelligence Group, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command at Fort Meade, Maryland on 7 January 2014. In his Report of Polygraph Examination (195 kb PDF), Touhey summarizes the case thus:

7. (U//FOUO) OTHER REPORTABLE INFORMATION: During the conduct of testing EXAMINEE exhibited atypical physiological responses, indicative of the use of countermeasures (CM). During post-test questioning, EXAMINEE admitted to altering HIS breathing during the initial phase of collection of polygraph charts. EXAMINEE stated that prior to the polygraph session, HE researched polygraph via internet searches using the keywords “polygraph”, CIA polygraph”, full scope polygraph” and “polygraph truth”. EXAMINEE recalled HE read a DOD-sponsored site and watched a video designed to inform readers about the polygraph process and of [sic] the website “”. EXAMINEE related HE did not employ any physical countermeasures outlined in the web searches, such as pressing HIS toes or using a small stone or tack in HIS shoe. EXAMINEE related HE focused on changing HIS breathing during questions where HE wanted to create a clear response. EXAMINEE stated HE talked to co-workers about polygraph and was advised to relax and be honest. EXAMINEE stated HE felt the need to exaggerate HIS responses as HE was unsure of the sensitivity of the instrumentation. EXAMINEE executed a sworn, written statement, detailing the information.

Touhey’s report includes a hand-written statement by the examinee, a government contractor employed by the Tatitlek Corporation, that is consonant with the above summation.

From Touhey’s report, one might conclude that this is an example of a person who visited, followed the countermeasure advice found in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, and got caught. But is that what actually happened here? Touhey doesn’t specify what “atypical physiological responses” were “indicative of the use of countermeasures.” But a look at the polygraph charts makes it clear:

Extract from examinee's first chart.

Extract from examinee’s first chart.

Above we see the beginning of the first chart collection following the so-called “acquaintance” or “numbers” test (a gimmick intended to convince the examinee that the polygraph can detect the slightest deception). At the top, you see the upper and lower respiratory tracings in blue, followed below by the electrodermal (palmar sweating) tracing in green, the cardio tracing in red, and at the bottom, the “countermeasure sensor” in black. Such sensors typically consist of a pressure-sensitive pad placed on the seat of the polygraph chair. If the examinee presses his toes to the floor, or presses his toe against a tack in his shoe, a spike will register on the countermeasure channel. And that is precisely what happened here. Note the huge spike after the first comparison question (also called a “control” question). Note also the large spike after the second comparison question.1

This, and not any breathing irregularity, is what alerted the polygraph examiner that the examinee was attempting countermeasures. It explains why Touhey asked the examinee about toe-pressing. But note that specifically advises against this kind of countermeasure. Indeed, none of the suggested countermeasures in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector would produce the kind of spikes observed on the countermeasure tracing here. has also received a copy of an “INSCOM Polygraph Countermeasures Report” (46 kb PDF) associated with this case. Despite the fact that, as discussed above, the examinee employed countermeasures that specifically advises against, Touhey reports that the examinee received his countermeasure information from

The countermeasures report further notes that “EXAMINEE was re-tested the same day with favorable results.” co-founder George Maschke’s pre 9/11 observation that the key to passing the DoD counterintelligence-scope polygraph is evidently to make no substantive admissions may still hold true today.

Federal officials are deluding themselves if they think they can detect the kinds of countermeasures documented on based on examples like the above case. Well-trained spies, saboteurs, and terrorists who understand polygraph procedure will not make the rookie mistake that the examinee in this case made. makes information about polygraph countermeasures available to afford truthful persons a means of protecting themselves against the random error that is all too common in polygraph screening. But inevitably, the same techniques can also be used by those working against the United States (as happened in the case of Ana Belen Montes, a Cuban double agent trained in polygraph countermeasures who penetrated the Defense Intelligence Agency while passing her polygraph examinations “with flying colors”).

Instead of trying to criminalize the dissemination of information about polygraph countermeasures, the U.S. government should heed the warning of the National Research Council that “[polygraph testing’s] accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.” Polygraphy must be abolished.

UPDATE: An inspection of the examinee’s statement suggests that the polygraph examiner may have encouraged the examinee to mention The statement reads in part:

Prior to my examination, I visited some websites both pro + con relating to the polygraph process. I did so to gather information so I could feel comfortable during my first exam. I performed primarily “Google” searches on terms: Polygraph, CI Polygraph, Full Scope Polygraph, and Polygraph Truth. Specific sites I recall visiting were: DoD sponsored/[owned?] polygraph site + video, and (I think). Mind you that many sites visited were google search results so I don’t specifically recall individual URLs….

It appears that “” [sic] was inserted between the lines at some later point:

Sceen shot from examinee statement in Case No. 902-0470-14

Sceen shot from examinee statement in Case No. 902-0470-14

  1. The polygraph chart data is included in a file, 902-0470-14.lip, that may be viewed with Limestone Technologies‘ PolygraphPro software. Incidentally, regular readers of may recall that Limestone’s vice president was arrested and charged with sexual assault in Massachusetts last year. []

Federal Polygraph School Gave Countermeasure Information to Polygraph Company

Coming on the heels of an accusation that a senior official at the National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) facilitated the transfer of classified information to the government of Singapore via the Lafayette Instrument Company, has received information that NCCA has provided polygraph countermeasure documentation to a representative of Stoelting Co., another polygraph-manufacturing company. In 2004, Stoelting’s then CEO Lavern Miller pleaded guilty to attempting to export polygraph instruments to China without a license.

The documention provided by NCCA to the Stoelting representative forms the basis of a slide presentation, a copy of which was made available to The presentation includes a caution to keep the information provided in the presentation confidential (slide 2):stoelting-countermeasures (p.2)Of particular note, the presentation includes previously unpublished color screen shots from a pre-employment polygraph examination conducted by the CIA in 1997. This polygraph examination formed the basis for a 1999 American Polygraph Association (APA) journal article co-authored by the CIA polygrapher who conducted it and Donald J. Krapohl, the NCCA official recently accused of an Espionage Act violation.1

Screen shots in the slide presentation include details not shown in the 1999 article, such as the various questions asked, the precise date of the polygraph session, and the fact that it was a CIA polygraph examination. (In the 1999 article published in the APA quarterly, Polygraph, the CIA is not named as the agency involved.) This polygraph screen shot (slide 12) shows the date that the examination was conducted, 30 April 1997, and reveals one of the probable-lie “control” questions used:

stoelting-countermeasures (p.12)

Slide 24 shows that the PolyScore polygraph chart-scoring software developed by the U.S. government gave the examinee a passing score. It also reveals the specific relevant questions that were asked in this polygraph examination:stoelting-countermeasures (p.24)

As we see, the relevant questions were:

  1. Have you been offered any money to work for a foreign intelligence service?
  2. Have you secretly provided the [redacted] technology to any foreign government?
  3. Have you been directed to penetrate the CIA by any foreign intelligence service?

Combine this with the probable-lie “control” questions cited in earlier slides:

  1. Other than what we discussed, have you ever misrepresented you [sic] academic abilities to make yourself look important?
  2. Before joining the military, did you ever lie about anythig [sic] that you don’t want the CIA to find out about?

and you have the key information required to successfully defeat such a polygraph examination.

Polygraph examinations are not difficult to defeat, and it would be hard to credibly argue that public release of the information contained in the presentation will harm U.S. national security interests in any way. But this is the kind of information that NCCA’s parent agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, would probably withhold from a member of the public who requested it under the Freedom of Information Act. Yet such things seemingly circulate among NCCA’s favored friends.

It’s worth noting that the examinee in the above case study had purchased Doug Williams’ manual, “How to Sting the Polygraph.” The CIA polygraph examiner suspected countermeasures because of the large size of a reaction, but was only able to confirm that countermeasures were employed because the examinee admitted such when asked. An in-depth discussion of this case may be found on the message board.

The presentation (6.6 mb PDF | 6.8 mb PPTX) runs on for a total of 134 slides, but like other polygraph community documentation on countermeasures previously published by, it offers no coherent strategy for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in’s free book, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector (1 mb PDF), or in former police polygraphist Doug Williams’ manual, “How to Sting the Polygraph.”

Update: With respect to why a polygraph manufacturer might want NCCA training slides on countermeasures, note that as McClatchy reporter Marisa Taylor mentioned last year in her article, “Polygraph world’s close ties spark accusations of favoritism,” Stoelting Co. has purchased a polygraph school. While Stoelting refused comment to Taylor on this, it appears that the polygraph school Stoelting purchased is the Academy of Polygraph Science in Fort Myers, Florida.

  1. The CIA polygrapher wrote under a pseudonym, Peter S. London. The article citation is, London, Peter S. and Donald J. Krapohl, “A Case Study in PDD Countermeasures,” Polygraph, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1999), pp. 143-148. []

NCCA Seeks Polygraph Countermeasure Detection Software

A 2013 presentation by the National Center for Credibility Assessment documents that the federal polygraph school is working on a computer software project intended to automate the detection of polygraph countermeasures. It appears that the software does not employ a new approach to countermeasure detection, but rather seeks to “[v]alidate the countermeasure detection features taught by the NCCA Threat Assessment and Strategic Support Branch.” A competent scientist might first attempt to determine whether such putative “countermeasure detection features” are indeed valid, rather than set out to “validate” them. NCCA seems not to allow for the possibility that any of their teachings might not be valid.

To date, no polygrapher has ever demonstrated any ability to detect the kinds of countermeasures described in’s free book, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector or in former police polygraphist Doug Williams’ manual, “How to Sting the Polygraph” and documentation obtained by indicates that the polygraph community has no reliable method of detecting such countermeasures.

Indeed, the federal government considers Doug Williams’ information to be such a threat that it launched a criminal investigation into him, attempted to entrap him and raided his home and office, seized his customer records, and created and distributed a watch list based on them. Williams remains in legal jeopardy for teaching techniques that the head of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection polygraph unit avers “can be routinely identified.”

The NCCA presentation projects that the countermeasures detection software project would be completed by the end of 2013 with a report and software to be delivered at a date that remained to be determined. The project had a budget of $199,200 in fiscal years 2012 and 2013, with another $100,000 projected for fiscal year 2014.

The slides from the presentation that deal with the countermeasure detection software are reproduced below. Among other things, the presentation indicates that NCCA has developed a “common NCCA specification” for polygraph chart data. To’s knowledge, such specification has not been publicly documented.




Polygraph Operator Ken Blackstone Pleads Guilty to Perjury

Ken Blackstone

Ken Blackstone

Georgia polygraph operator Ken Blackstone has pleaded guilty to a single count of perjury, a felony punishable by one to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to $1,000 under Georgia state law. Blackstone committed perjury by falsely claiming during a court hearing that another polygraph examiner, Charles Slupski, had reviewed the charts of a polygraph examination that Blackstone conducted on Guy Heinze Jr., who was charged with, and has since been convicted for, eight murders and one attempted murder. Blackstone was sentenced to five years’ probation and a $1,000 fine.

Florida Times-Union reporter Terry Dickson writes:

Polygraph examiner pleads guilty to lying in Guy Heinze Jr. hearing
Kenneth Blackstone sentenced to 5 years probation, gets 2-year ban on criminal trial testimony

By Terry Dickson Fri, Oct 10, 2014 @ 8:42 pm

BRUNSWICK | A polygraph examiner pleaded guilty to perjury Friday for testifying falsely under oath in the Guy Heinze Jr. murder case.

Kenneth Blackstone, 63, of Stone Mountain pleaded guilty Friday to a single count of perjury over his testimony on July 18, 2013, in a motions hearing in Heinze’s case, District Attorney Jackie Johnson said in a release.

Superior Court Judge Roger Lane accepted Blackstone’s plea under Georgia’s First Offender Act, sentenced him to five years to be served on probation and ordered him to pay a $1,000 fine, Johnson said.

Lane also banished Blackstone from the 5-county Brunswick Judicial Circuit and ordered him not to testify in any criminal proceedings in court for two years, Johnson said.

In the motions hearing, Blackstone said he had administered a polygraph to Heinze in which Heinze said he had not killed his father, Guy Heinze Sr., his father’s friend, Russell Toler Sr., Toler’s four children and sister and the boyfriend of Toler’s eldest daughter. It was Heinze Jr. who made the 911 call on Aug. 29, 2009 in which he told an operator he had come home to find his whole family “beat to death.”

One person survived the beating. Byron Jimerson Jr., the then 3-year-old son of Chrissy Toler recovered from a severe head injury.

Blackstone, who was hired by Heinze’s defense team, testified that the test indicated the Heinze was not being deceptive when he said he had not killed the eight victims.

When Assistant District Attorney John B. Johnson III questioned Blackstone about his methods, Blackstone said he had sent the charts from the polygraph exam to Charles “Chuck” Slupski, an independent expert in polygraph examination methods. The state had its own expert, retired Georgia Bureau of Investigation special agent Jerry Rowe who told prosecutors that Slupski had been out of the country at the time and said he had not spoken with Blackstone about the Heinze examination.

Confronted with Slupski’s statement, Blackstone said something to the effect he had been caught.

Polygraph exams are not admissible as evidence but Heinze’s lawyers had intended to use the results as mitigation during sentencing if Heinze had been found guilty later. The defense withdrew the motion and a Glynn County grand jury later indicted Blackstone for perjury.

Heinze was found guilty in November of all eight murders and the attempted murder of Byron Jimerson and is serving life in prison.

Terry Dickson: (912) 264-0405

As of the time of this writing, Blackstone remains listed as a member in good standing of the American Polygraph Association, the Georgia Polygraph Association, and the Florida Polygraph Association.

Update (17 Oct. 2014): Ken Blackstone’s profile page on the American Polygraph Association member directory has been deleted.

Senior Official at Federal Polygraph School Accused of Espionage

Donald Krapohl

Donald Krapohl

Scott W. Carmichael, a recently retired counterintelligence investigator with the Defense Intelligence Agency, has accused Donald Krapohl, Special Assistant to the Chief, National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) and longtime editor of the American Polygraph Association quarterly, Polygraph, of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. In an e-mail message to retired FBI polygraph examiner Robert Drdak dated 3 September 2014, a copy of which was received by, Carmichael alleges that Krapohl manipulated Drdak in an elaborate scheme to funnel classified information about polygraph countermeasures to the government of Singapore.

Carmichael theorizes that Krapohl encouraged Drdak to write a paper on polygraph countermeasures that was ultimately based on a classified study conducted in 1994 by Dr. Gordon H. Barland, then a researcher with the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (now the NCCA), and to sell that paper to the Lafayette Instrument Company, knowing that the information in the paper would make its way to the Singaporean government.

Carmichael concludes his e-mail by urging Drdak to “[call] the FBI before they begin to look at you as a suspect.”

Scott Carmichael

Scott Carmichael

Carmichael played a key role in the investigation of Cuban spy Ana Belen Montes (who incidentally beat the polygraph), about which he has authored a book, True Believer.

The full text of Carmichael’s e-mail to retired FBI polygraph examiner Robert Drdak (with one redaction) follows:

From: Scott W. Carmichael <>
Date: Wed, Sep 3, 2014 at 9:22 AM
Subject: Your countermeasures document on Lafayette and Limestone


You’ve got a problem.  Recommend you read this more than once before taking action.

A little background on me:  My name is Scott W. Carmichael.  You and I have never met, and I doubt that you have ever even heard of me. For background, I served for a period of four years as an NCIS agent from 1984-1988, and then took a job in 1988 with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a counterintelligence investigator based in Washington, D.C..  I retired just months ago, this past April, after serving for nearly 26 years with that agency.  I was DIA’s senior security and counterintelligence investigator at the time of my retirement.  Some people in the business know me because of my role in identifying former DIA analyst Ana B. Montes as an espionage suspect, and then persuading WFO to open the investigation which lead in time to her arrest as a Cuban spy back in CY2001.  I wrote a book about the case – you can find a reference to it on  You can find additional references on Amazon to other books that I’ve written, and you can find other references to me simply by Googling my name plus the keyword DIA on the internet.

I am generally aware of your professional background, including the role you played in clearing Richard Jewel of suspicion in the 1996 bombing in Olympic Park.  I took my son to watch the Dream Team play against Yugoslavia that night, by the way, and missed the bombing only because my son was too tired after the game to walk to the Park.

Your problem:  The document which you provided to Lafayette and Limestone was plagiarized.  That is correct.  Worse, the original was an official U.S. government document which summarized the findings of a study performed in CY2003 by Dan Weatherman and Paul Menges.  Their findings were tested/verified by Dr. Stuart M. Senter.  The study conducted by Dan and Paul drew on raw data collected by Dr. Gordon H. Barland and the classified report of his earlier study of mental countermeasures dated in 1994.  Dan, Paul and Dr. Senter performed their work as employees of DoDPI.  Your old colleague and former business partner Don Krapohl provided oversight for their work and edited the report submitted by Dan and Paul back in CY2003.  The entire effort was official, and it was based on a classified study.

Dan and Paul believed their findings constituted a new, reliable, and therefore extremely valuable diagnostic tool.  Dr. Senter tested the tool and determined that, sure enough, the specific diagnostic features identified by Dan and Paul through their study correlated with a high degree of probability to the employment of countermeasures.  As you may know, the U.S. government now requires all federal polygraph examiners to receive 40 hours of instruction on polygraph countermeasures to become certified as federal examiners; and, to receive 4 hours of polygraph countermeasures refresher training every year to maintain their certifications.  DoDPI/DCCA is so confident in the diagnostic tool developed by Dan and Paul, they decided to use the new tool as the very foundation for the 40-hour instruction and the annual 4-hour refresher training.

Again, Dr. Barland’s 1994 study, which formed the basis for Weatherman and Menges’s study, was classified.  By definition, then, and by DoD Instruction, Weatherman and Menges’s study and findings, were therefore also classified.

But DoDPI did something stupid.  They committed a security violation.  In fact, they did so repeatedly.  They found it inconvenient and unwieldy to carry classified briefing slides around with them as they traveled to various parts of the country to teach the diagnostic tool to examiners – and, when they found it necessary to brief uncleared personnel on the tool, rather than follow routine but bothersome administrative procedures which would have enabled them to do so, they elected to simply not stamp their briefing slides at all.  Instead, they stamped their materials as Unclassified/FOUO – while handling and treating their materials as though they were classified, in order to ensure their tool did not fall into foreign hands.  Why?  Because anyone who learns how the entire US government now detects the employment of countermeasures, will be able to device methods to defeat the US government examination process.

And then you sold it to Lafayette and Limestone.

Quite a shock, isn’t it.

Don Krapohl roped you in, Bob.  Used you.  You were a dupe.  Of that, I am fairly certain.  I was in the CI business for 30 years, Bob, and Ana B. Montes was not the only spy whom I personally identified, and not the only one I put in jail.  I achieved some small success in the business, and I got to be pretty good at connecting the dots.

Let me make an educated guess:  One day, out of the blue, Don either called you or approached you, and asked whether you were yet published.  He told you that getting published was a good idea, because it made you an ‘expert’.  And since you were retired, you could command more money for speeches and appearances as a ‘published’ expert.  So he then told you that he had something that he’d been working on in his spare time – some ideas that he’d been kicking around, and that he hadn’t gotten around to actually publishing them yet.  He offered them to you ‘to take a look’ at them.  So he provided a ‘draft’ paper and charts.  Then you probably talked about the concepts a bit, maybe posed a few questions, and then Don probably suggested that you write an introduction and maybe make some changes or whatever – and offered to ‘edit’ the final paper for you.  And then offered to ‘facilitate’ an introduction to both Lafayette and Limestone – since he already had a business relationship with both companies.  Am I far off the mark, Bob?  Don was just being a good friend and generous buddy.

Or am I wrong?

I’m right.

A little history for you:  Back in CY2008, Don Krapohl had just completed a tour as president of APA, and was then the editor-in-chief of APA’s magazine, Polygraph.  As editor, he had to drum up business for the magazine, by which I mean that he had to persuade others to write articles for the magazine. Among those he approached were Donnie Dutton and Jack Ogilvie, who at that time served as chief of Phoenix P.D.’s polygraph shop.  The pitch which Don used to persuade Donnie and Jack was the same as that described above:  Are you published, yet?  It would be good for you to be published….  An article appeared in the magazine by Donnie and Jack which purported to be a re-study of an earlier study of chair sensors used to detect countermeasures.  The earlier study was one conducted by a graduate student at Michigan State University (MSU) in CY2002 who provided both his raw data/charts as well as his ‘unpublished’ paper for use by Donnie and Jack.  The graduate student in question?  A Singaporean military intelligence officer who served as chief of the government of Singapore’s polygraph school – V. Cholan Kopparumsolan – who happened to be a countermeasures specialist.  Cholan was a member of APA.  An APA VP controlled a contract to provide polygraph training to Cholan’s school. I interviewed both Donnie and Jack.  Neither of them ‘wrote’ the article in question.  A ‘draft’ of the article was provided by Don Krapohl to them; they added comments; Don Krapohl ‘edited’ their comments and finalized the article. Question:  Who wrote the ‘draft’, and where did it come from?

Bob – you are a retired FBI Special Agent.  Re-read the above paragraph, then figure that one out, for yourself.

Jack Ogilvie retired shortly after the article was published in Polygraph magazine.  Krapohl, Donnie and..Cholan were invited to the annual AAPP convention to witness as Jack gave a presentation on his and Donnie’s ‘findings’ as published in the article.  Right in front of Cholan.  After the convention, Krapohl and Cholan went for a hike in the Grand Canyon. Thereafter, each year following the annual APA convention, Cholan led a Singaporean delegation to DoDPI/DCCA/NCCA…to request training, including training in countermeasures.  Naturally, the request for countermeasures training was refused.  Cholan and other foreign members of APA had very good reason to believe that NCCA did indeed possess something special in the way of countermeasures training.  Why?  Because every year during the annual APA convention, NCCA set aside a 4-hour block of time for federal/USG examiners to receive their annual 4-hour refresher training in countermeasures – and they penned it onto the calendar!  And every year, foreign members of APA asked the Americans what they knew about countermeasures that no one else in the world seemed to know.

Cholan, therefore, had good reason to believe that NCCA…and Krapohl…had access to something special with regard to countermeasures.  But that NCCA was not willing to simply hand it over.

Until you gave it to Lafayette and Limestone.

I suspect Cholan threatened to blow the whistle on Krapohl for plagiarizing his MSU ‘unpublished’ paper, and that Cholan demanded a quid pro quo – something of equal value in return.  Krapohl wasn’t about to simply hand over the paper written by Weatherman and Menges.  So he had you do it, for him.

The Singaporeans use Lafayette machines.  Once you sold your paper to Lafayette and Limestone, Krapohl simply told Cholan where to find it.

Dan Weatherman and Stu Senter reviewed your paper and compared it to their paper.  There is no doubt whatsoever.

Bob – I worked counterintelligence for 30 years.  I personally identified two suspects who were subsequently convicted under federal espionage statutes and imprisoned – that’s a good record.  And I neutralized quite a few others. I know espionage.  Anyone who should have known that that material would fall into the hands of a foreign government, to the benefit of a foreign government or to the detriment of ours, violated 18 USC 794.  The compromise of the Weatherman/Menges paper constitutes espionage.

And your name is all over that paper, and probably all over contracts with Lafayette and Limestone.

You have a problem.

Call Dan Weatherman.  Ask.  Then call your former colleagues at the FBI and offer to serve as a material witness.

Because frankly and candidly, my assessment is that you were a victim in this.  Just my assessment.

But DO NOT call Don Krapohl.  He does not know that I am even remotely aware of any of this.  If you call him – to alert him – then we’ll know that you and Don cooked this up together.

Call Dan Weatherman at [phone number redacted].  That is Dan’s home telephone number. Verify what I’ve told you.  Then get ahead of this by calling the FBI before they begin to look at you as a suspect.

Call the FBI.  Before I call the FBI.

And don’t you dare alert Don Krapohl.

Scott W. Carmichael

Update: For related discussion of this post, see the message board topic, Don Krapohl Accused of Violating Espionage Act and also retired FBI scientist and supervisory special agent Drew C. Richardson’s commentary here.

Sacked U.S. Customs and Border Protection Internal Affairs Chief James F. Tomsheck Was Keynote Speaker at 2013 NCCA Graduation Ceremony

James F. Tomsheck

James F. Tomsheck

On Monday, 9 June 2014, the Los Angeles Times reported that U.S. Customs and Border Protection Assistant Commissioner James F. Tomsheck, who headed CBP’s Internal Affairs unit, “was removed from his post…amid criticism that he failed to investigate hundreds of allegations of abuse and use of force by armed border agents.”

Tomsheck, himself a former polygraph operator, was ultimately responsible for Operation Lie Busters, an ongoing criminal investigation that attempted to entrap individuals who provide instruction in how to pass polygraph examinations.

In July 2013, Tomsheck was the commencement speaker at a National Center for Credibility Assessment graduation ceremony. Tomsheck’s speech was the top story in the August 2013 issue of the CBP-IA newsletter, Special Delivery, a copy of which (1.2 mb PDF) has been obtained by The full text of the article is reproduced below:


NCCA Commencement - July 2013On July 24, 2013, five CBP students received diplomas completing the masters-level curriculum in Forensic Psychophysiology at the National Center for Credibility Assessment (NCCA) commencement. The graduates are now assigned as intern Polygraph Examiners in the CBP-IA Credibility Assessment Division (CAD). After a successful six-month internship, the graduates will become federally certified polygraph examiners. Once certified, these new polygraph examiners will play an important role in the effort to conduct 100% screening of all law enforcement applicants before they are hired by CBP, as required by the Anti-Border Corruption Act.

NCCA Director William Norris introduced the Commencement Speaker as “one of us” and directed the attention of the audience to a highlighted photograph of the 1984 graduating class that included a young Secret Service Agent, now CBP IA Assistant Commissioner James Tomsheck. AC Tomsheck congratulated the 32 graduates representing numerous federal agencies and praised them for their diligent work in the classroom and laboratories. He emphasized their success could not have been possible without the support of their families and agencies, and the excellent instruction received by the NCCA faculty. Mr. Tomsheck advised the graduates that they were entering the profession at a time unparalleled in the government, when all agencies were relying more on the unique ability of polygraph to protect our National Security from Insider Threats, and provided the assemblage with examples of penetration attempts wherein polygraph developed critical information impossible to obtain through traditional vetting methods. He emphasized that the graduates must always maintain and follow the standards taught and endorsed by NCCA, and implemented through the policies of their respective agencies.

This semester’s CBP graduates and their future office assignments are: Michael Gonzalez, McAllen; Eric Modisett, San Diego; Michale Moylan, San Diego; David Pelfrey, Detroit; and Sapphia Small, Newark.

NCCA, the federal government’s polygraph school, turns out newly minted polygraphers in 14 weeks, less than half the length of a typical barber college.