No Lie MRI to Begin Offering “Lie Detection” Services

In “Betrayed By Your Brain?” (9 October 2006) Philadelphia Inquirer staff writer Faye Flam reports on No Lie MRI, a Philadelphia start-up company that will soon offer “lie detection” services to the public:

Betrayed by your brain?
A Phila. company is poised to offer a lie-detecting MRI, though questions about its reliability remain.
By Faye Flam
Inquirer Staff Writer

Orwell’s 1984 thought police used the age-old tactic of intimidation to get into people’s heads, but by 2084, authorities could have more direct access. Scientists are already starting to use brain scanning, EEG and other tools to extract information directly from the brain.

“The science really has gone to the point where under very controlled circumstances you can tell whether someone is lying,” says Paul Root Wolpe, a bioethicist at the University of Pennsylvania.

This month, a Philadelphia-based company called No Lie MRI anticipates sliding its first clients into a scanning machine. Founder Joel Huizenga says they run the gamut, from women trying to prove they didn’t cheat on their husbands to convicts claiming innocence. A priest wants to clear charges of child molestation, and an Australian man wants to use this to prove he’s not gay. There’s also interest from Internet dating companies.

Huizenga says he’s charging $30 a minute and the procedure should take about an hour.

Many brain scientists say customers won’t get much for their money, since the technique will not deliver answers, only odds. But they also agree that technology is starting to break into the mind in a new way, opening up some novel ethical questions.

“Do we have a right to privacy in terms of subjective thoughts?” asks Penn’s Wolpe. “Who will have access to them?”

Soon after 9/11, a burst of government funding went into high-tech interrogation tools. Some of that went to Penn, where psychiatrist Daniel Langleben and neuropsychiatrist Ruben Gur had already spent several years exploring the potential of a brain scanning technique called functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI.

The machine roughly measures changes in activity in different regions of the brain by tracking hemoglobin in the blood. When neurons become active they remove oxygen from hemoglobin, changing its magnetic properties, which the MRI’s magnet detects.

The researchers tried several experiments. One involved what’s called the guilty knowledge test, designed to determine whether you’re familiar with a particular person, object, scene or fact. Gur reasoned that he might discern whether, say, a suspect was familiar with a crime scene or someone associated with a terrorist act by how his brain reacted to a photograph.

Experiments so far show that indeed familiar objects elicit a different brain response than new ones, says Gur.

He and Langleben also did an experiment in which they gave their subjects a known playing card, then instructed them to lie about the card while under the scanner. Though they found no single lying center in the brain, when they averaged their subjects’ responses together, the distribution of brain activity looked different for the lies than the truthful statements.

But could they detect when an individual was lying? To find out, Langleben gave 26 male students envelopes with two playing cards and a $20 bill. They were told they could keep the envelopes if they could fool his colleague about the contents.

They were then led to a building with the fMRI. There, the colleague instructed them to tell the truth.

That way, Langleben says, he was prompting more spontaneous lying, as opposed to lying on cue, which he considered more like acting. He says 11 of the volunteers tried to fool the scanner by concentrating harder while they were telling the truth. For most, it didn’t help, he says. Two subjects, however, did manage to lie without their brains giving anything discernible away. “I’m sending them to the CIA,” he joked.

Overall, the scientists discriminated lies from truth between 76 and 85 percent of the time. The questioning technique is crucial, Langleben says. “We’re not talking about mind-reading… fMRI can’t just tap into someone’s brain and read free-flowing thoughts.”

In these more recent experiments, Langleben saw a significant difference in parts of the frontal cortex, which is involved with inhibition.

In 2001 the Penn experiments caught the attention of biologist-turned-entrepreneur Huizenga, who eventually bought patents from Penn and started No Lie MRI. Another company, called Cephos, is also developing fMRI, while still another is promoting the use of EEG to do “brain fingerprinting.”

Huizenga says he has more than 50 clients lined up – a mix of personal and legal cases.

He hopes to unveil the technology later this month before 24 television stations in California.

He says he thinks the technique could help people build trust. “Civilization is built on trust,” he says.

But should we trust him?

J. Peter Rosenfeld, a psychologist at Northwestern University, says he has no trouble believing fMRI can discriminate lies 80 percent of the time, but that’s still a huge error rate. Since the 1980s, Rosenfeld has been experimenting with EEG to see lies in the form of brain waves. He says his most recent round of experiments suggest it’s more reliable and accurate than fMRI.

Stephen Fienberg, a statistician at Carnegie Mellon University, is skeptical of both. He headed a recent National Academy of Sciences panel that evaluated the polygraph.

Fienberg argues that neither fMRI nor EEG have demonstrated greater reliability than the polygraph, which his panel deemed too inaccurate for the government to use to screen employees.

“We’re looking at technologies that have not been proven and have many of the same pitfalls as we articulated in our report,” he says.

Polygraphs measure sweat, pulse changes and several other signals of stress. In carefully controlled studies, it gave about 20 to 30 percent false negatives and false positives, he says. Some studies showed it could tell you which subjects were lying about 70 percent of the time, he says, but if you read the fine print, “only about half were detected as being deceptive about the right question.”

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The Truth About the Lie Detector

Andrew Stephen skewers polygraphy in this feature article published in the 16 October 2006 issue of the British periodical, the New Statesman:

The truth about the lie detector
Features
Andrew Stephen
Monday 16th October 2006

Critics claim that polygraph testing is as credible as the tooth fairy or witchcraft. Yet the US government still relies on it to identify terrorists and vet FBI agents. Andrew Stephen on America’s alarming love affair with junk science

Did ex-Representative Mark Foley have sex with teenage male congressional pages? Was Wen Ho Lee, an American nuclear scientist, guilty of espionage by passing nuclear secrets to the Chinese? Did John Mark Karr kill six-year-old JonBenet Ramsey? Was the British nanny Louise Woodward guilty of the involuntary manslaughter of the baby in her care? Was Aldrich Ames, a senior CIA official in charge of analysing Soviet intelligence, actually a Soviet double agent? Was Leandro Aragoncillo, an FBI analyst with top-secret clearance who was based in the White House under Vice-Presidents Gore and Cheney, also a spy? What about Dr Ignatz Theodor Griebl, a Nazi ringleader who fled New York on the SS Bremen in 1938?

I do not care about Foley, or Karr – who was innocent of JonBenet Ramsey’s murder, as it turned out – but all the other cases have a thread in common. They illustrate a century-old American fallacy which, at long last, is beginning to crumble: that polygraph (aka lie-detector) tests actually work. Evidence is mounting that, far from being the infallible tools of world-beating American investigative procedures that Hollywood would have us believe, they have actually been responsible for countless miscarriages of justice and have ruined lives.

Ames, for example, sailed through three polygraphs before the CIA discovered that he was actually one of the worst US traitors in history. Woodward “passed” one but was then convicted on other evidence. Lee both “failed” and “passed” polygraphs, resulting in him being imprisoned and then released before being awarded $1.65m in damages by the federal government. Aragoncillo “passed” a pre-employment FBI polygraph but pleaded guilty to espionage in May. Griebl “passed” an FBI polygraph test and promptly returned to Hitler’s side.

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More on New Energy Department Polygraph Policy

Roger Snodgrass of the Los Alamos, New Mexico Monitor reports on the newly revised Department of Energy polygraph policy in an 11 October 2006 article titled “DOE Curbs Polygraphs”: The Department of Energy has published a new final rule for how it will use polygraph tests, claiming it will “significantly” reduce the numbers of people … Read more

Energy Department to Reduce Number of Employees Polygraphed

In his Secrecy News newsletter & blog, Steven Aftergood of the Federation of American Sciences publishes news and commentary regarding the Department of Energy’s decision, published in the Federal Register, to reduce the number of employees subjected to polygraph screening. See “Energy Department Will Significantly Reduce Polygraph Testing.” However, while the new polygraph policy may … Read more

Federal Polygraph Lawsuit Dismissed

On 29 September 2006, United States District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted summary judgment (90 kb PDF) to the defendants in Croddy, et al. v. FBI et al. (Civil Action No. 00-651 [EGS]), dismissing the lawsuit which challenged the FBI’s and U.S. Secret Services’ pre-employment polygraph policies whereby applicants are denied employment based solely on … Read more

Justice Report: Standards Lacking on “Lie Detector” Tests

Jeff Stein, Congressional Quarterly’s national security editor, reports on the U.S. Department of Justice’s recently released report, “Use of Polygraph Examinations in the Department of Justice” (1 mb PDF). Excerpt: The FBI and three other Justice Department components are conducting over 16,000 polygraph tests a year, even though they have no uniform standards for administering … Read more

U.S. Appeals Court Allows Testimony Regarding Polygraph Examination in U.S. v. Allard

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in its decision (43 kb PDF) in U.S. v. Linda Gay Allard (Case No. 05-20087) filed on 11 September 2006, upheld the admission of testimony regarding a polygraph examination administered by Special Agent William Wind of the United States Secret Service. After failing the polygraph, … Read more

Senate Report Disputes Press Accounts of CIA Polygraph of Iraqi Informant

As mentioned by Washington Post staff writer Walter Pincus in a recent article, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence‘s recently released report, The Use by the Intelligence Community of Information Provided by the Iraqi National Congress (9.5 mb PDF), documents three intelligence sources who provided unreliable information but nonetheless passed DIA polygraph screening examinations. … Read more

Iraqi Fabricators Passed DIA Polygraph

On Saturday, 9 September 2006, Washington Post staff writer Walter Pincus reported on the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s recently released review of pre-war intelligence on Iraq in an article titled, “Report Details Errors Before War.” Excerpt: The long-awaited Senate Intelligence Committee report released yesterday sheds new light on why U.S. intelligence agencies provided … Read more

American Polygraph Association Warns Against Reliance on Polygraph Results

In its new Model Policy for Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Screening Examinations, in defiance of law enforcement agencies across the country that disqualify applicants based on nothing more than failure to “pass” a pre-employment polygraph examination, the American Polygraph Association (APA) holds, at para. 3.12.1.3, “The decision to hire, or not to hire an applicant, should … Read more