There are a number of consequences to failing a polygraph exam which will not be disclosed to an applicant. Any United States Secret Service (USSS) applicant should review the following true case and consider refusing to take a USSS polygraph examination, especially with Special Agent Ellen Ripperger. Should an applicant decide to go forward with a USSS polygraph exam after digesting this information, they should be aware that USSS can always assign another examiner to administer a polygraph exam at the applicant’s request.

Any experience the reader may have with Special Agent Ellen Ripperger may be substantially different than that described here, however two USSS Special Agents confirmed that the experience described here was far from unique.

The applicant in question expressed gratitude to the two USSS Special Agents who contacted him after his exam, and are making continuing efforts to correct an injustice. It was not lost on this applicant the significance of two Special Agents choosing to support an applicant to their organization that they did not know personally, but who felt was treated improperly, over that of one of their fellow Special Agents whom they both felt did not behave ethically.

When anyone takes a polygraph exam with any federal agency including the USSS, a recording is made of the entire exam. In fact, all modern Commercially Available off the Shelf (COTS) polygraph software utilized by federal agencies has both video and audio capability built into the software. The applicant will be told that the recording is made to protect both them and the Special Agent administering the exam. However, in this instance, the applicant was not provided a copy of the audio recording when they alleged that something illegal, improper, or unethical happened during their exam. The recordings have been routinely produced however to exonerate a Special Agent accused of any wrong doing during an exam. Even a FOIA request may not yield the release of the recording of an exam, and if it does anything useful will probably be redacted, and its release will take years after which any time limits for legal remedies will have long expired.

In this instance, a judge ordered the release of the audio of the polygraph exam in question which the USSS vigorously fought to suppress under “law enforcement investigatory privilege.” After the USSS objection to providing the recording was overruled, the USSS provided the audio files that supposedly contained the sought after recording.  However, the audio files provided by the USSS were virtually blank and contained nothing of any use or significance. Only a few minutes of the approximately five-hour-and-thirty-five-minute polygraph examination were audible.

The polygraph examinee was contacted by two individuals who identified themselves as USSS Special Agents. The agents made clear they knew intimate details of the applicant’s exam. One Special Agent told the applicant the audio file of his exam had been destroyed when he filed a complaint. Another Special Agent told the applicant he had ethical issues with how his exam was conducted.

Despite an affidavit from Danny Seiler, a former Supervisor Sergeant and Polygraph Examiner for the Maryland State Police which stated “Since 1991 in the approximate 2,500 polygraph examinations that I have given, the microphones have never failed to record the exam; nor have the exams not been recorded for any other reason”, the Judge ruled against the applicant when a default judgment was requested based on the illegible polygraph audio files and chose to accept the USSS explanation that a faulty microphone caused all the pertinent areas of the audio recording of the polygraph exam to not be recorded.

A complaint was sent to the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) John Roth (attached) requesting they investigate the Possible Destruction or Tampering of Evidence Utilizing of Government Information Technology Systems by the United States Secret Service. Multiple inquiries by Senator Chris Van Hollen finally revealed that DHS OIG chose not to investigate this matter, but instead referred the matter back to the United States Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility. Despite significant evidence submitted to DHS OIG that either the crime of perjury by a USSS Special Agent, or the destruction of evidence by USSS had more likely than not been committed by the USSS, DHS OIG chose not to investigate the matter. 

Since DHS OIG has refused to investigate this matter, follow up requests for investigation of this matter have been sent to the Department of Justice, the Office of Government Ethics, and a second request to the new acting DHS OIG Inspector General John Kelly articulating concerns about how the former Inspector General John Roth of DHS OIG choose to handle this matter.

Updates with information pertaining to this case will continue to be posted to this thread so that others may have the ability to make an informed decisions about submitting to a process which carries the risk of long term negative career implications even when the applicant is innocent of any wrong doing. There is a witch hunt within the USSS regarding this matter, which may hinder the ability to post new information in a timely manner.

USSSWARNING, how can I get in touch with you?

This is not the first time this has happened with SA Ripperger and I can prove it.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has an active investigation pertaining to this matter. They are encouraging any individual who knows of misconduct or criminal activity related to this matter to report it to DHS OIG so that it can be investigated. Anyone with information may call the DHS OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603 or file a report online at: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/hotline

The post is up for 7 months but suddenly the user is banned for "anti-LE" postings. Makes one think who pressured them to do so. Especially given only the facts were stated. When the truth isn't to your liking, or supports your narrative, simply suppress it.

AntiPolygraph.org has obtained minimally redacted copies of the 18 October 2016 depositions of U.S. Secret Service polygraph operators Ellen Ripperger and Edward D. Alston. They are attached to this post.

Notes on Ripperger deposition:

p. 36: Ripperger lied under oath when, upon being asked "how does [the numbers test] factor into the rest of the polygraph process?" she answered: "We want to see what the individual's physiology looks like when he tells a lie, so we ask him to lie at number four."

Ripperger told the same lie that polygraph operators routinely tell examinees about the rationale for the numbers test (or stimulation, or "stim" test). It's actually intended to "sell" the polygraph to the examinee and convince him that the polygraph can detect the slightest hint of deception.

p. 59: "Well, per Secret Service policy, okay, a countermeasures call is only made when an individual has made an admission to countermeasures." (Later in the deposition, it is disclosed that this policy has changed since September 2014.)

p. 68: "There's inability to maintain a baseline in the breathing, which, what we're seeing here is consistent with countermeasures."

pp. 70-71: "At 1B on page 57, you have convergent and divergent pneumographs. This is consistent with countermeasures."

p. 78: no changes to polygraph protocol due to examinee's disclosure of medications and OCD.

p. 111: "...I don't believe denials when I have a failing polygraph result."

p. 116: No periodic polygraphs for USSS employees.

p. 144: "I said I was certain of my results. What I wasn't -- or what  -- countermeasures -- we can't specifically say countermeasures on a report unless we get an admission of countermeasures, or at that time we couldn't.
Q You can now?
A The policy has changed, yes."

Notes on Alston deposition:

p. 18: Alston was almost certainly lying when he denied knowing what the policy at Security Management Division (SMD) or Security Clearance Division (SCD) is regarding whether a failed polygraph precludes one from Secret Service employment.

p. 20: Alston was almost certainly lying about not understanding what "better qualified applicant" (BQA) means. It means that some other, "better qualified applicant" was given the job.

p. 47: Alston didn't actually know what LEPET stands for (Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Test). He thought it was Law Enforcement Placement Test.

pp. 54-55: Alston essentially admits that the question about medications is not needed for purposes of conducting the polygraph exam.

AntiPolygraph.org has obtained minimally redacted copies of two additional documents associated with the case of an applicant for a GS-15 information technology position with the U.S. Secret Service who received treatment for obsessive compulsive disorder and whose application was rejected following an allegedly failed pre-employment polygraph "test." For background information, see the previous posts in this message thread.

The new documents, submitted before the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations, include:

1. The U.S. Secret Service's 19 October 2018 "Opposition to Complainant's Appeal" of Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates' 20 August 2018 Order Entering Judgment (in favor of the U.S. Secret Service, granting summary judgment). This 13-page brief, signed by Steven Giballa and U.S. Secret Service Chief Counsel Donna Cahill, provides legal arguments as to why Judge Eates' order dismissing the case should be upheld.

2. The complainant's 22 April 2019 "Response to USSS Opposition of Appeal from a Decision of Summary Judgment to United States Secret Service Without a Hearing." This 21-page pleading by complainant's attorney, Thomas J. Gagliardo, addresses in detail the arguments made in the USSS opposition brief, and provides legal arguments that Judge Eates' granting of summary judgment was premature and "should be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings."

We invite anyone with knowledge of this case, or of other relevant information regarding the U.S. Secret Service polygraph program, to contact us (anonymously if you prefer). You can anonymously send us a note (as a plain text document) or upload relevant documents via our OnionShare dropbox.

AntiPolygraph.org has received the following statement and attached correspondence regarding the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General's investigation of the U.S. Secret Service polygraph branch's alleged destruction of an audio recording of a pre-employment polygraph interrogation that would allegedly have documented misconduct on the part of Secret Service polygraph operator Ellen Ripperger.

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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) office of the Inspector General (OIG) has spent a year and half investigating the possible intentional destruction of polygraph audio files by the United States Secret Service (USSS) of an Electrical Engineer’s polygraph selected for a GS-15 position in the Office of the Chief Information Officer at the United States Secret Service.

Why are the results of this investigation being kept secret from the American people and not being published in DHS OIG Semiannual Reports to Congress?

Why are the results of this investigation being kept secret from Congress?

Why are the results of this investigation being withheld from Senator Chris Van Hollen, without whose assistance this matter would have been hidden and disposed of from the American people?

Why will the Inspector General not even reveal if the case is now closed or still ongoing to anyone?

Why did Special Agent Edward Alston choose to retire when OIG started investigating this matter, which means legally he no longer has to cooperate with the investigation?  Recall Special Agent Edward Alston was one of two quality control reviewers who signed the quality control worksheet stating the polygraph audio files were intact and audible at random periods for the entire exam.

Why is Special Agent Ellen Ripperger (who conducted the exam whose audio was allegedly destroyed) no longer listed on LinkedIn as a Polygraph Examiner for the United States Secret Service?

The Office of the Inspector General does not keep cases without merit open for more than 30 days.  It sent the audio files out for forensic examination.  If there was no merit to the case, or no destruction of evidence, the case would have been closed upon receiving a forensic report indicating no malfeasance on the part of the United States Secret Service.

This is not how a Democracy or Republic is supposed to function. This is how third world countries are run, not healthy governments.

AntiPolygraph.org has obtained the attached two letters from United States Senator Chris Van Hollen to the individual polygraphed by U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Ellen Ripperger.

The first letter, dated 19 August 2019, informs the individual, "I have just been advised by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General that its investigation in response to my inquiry is ongoing and that the agency is close to completing its investigative work."

The second letter, dated 3 September 2020, informs the individual, "At my request, my staff recently met with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG) regarding the status of your complaint. They expressed my concern about the amount of time that has passed without a response and were advised that DHS-OIG is striving to conduct a thorough investigation. In doing so, it advised, DHS-OIG is unable to provide a definitive timeline for when it will complete its investigation. It further advised that it will not provide any updates until the investigation is complete and a Report of Investigation is issued."

So the investigation of alleged misconduct by Special Agent Ripperger went from close to completion in August 2019 to ongoing and indefinite in September 2020. Something certainly seems fishy.