How do I know what a contorl Question And Relevant Question is?

[Conquistador]

So a control question is a question that has nothing to do with my background pack that I filled out?...

And a relevant question is one that does?...

Could someone shed some light on this please?....

[George W. Maschke]

There is no such simplistic way to differentiate between relevant and "control" questions. Questions pertaining to both are often included in pre-polygraph questionnaires.

The relevant questions on a pre-employment polygraph usually concern undetected major crimes, the completeness and accuracy of one's application, and use or sale of illegal drugs. The control questions generally concern behavior that employers secretly assume everyone -- even people they would like to hire -- has done (for example, lying to get out of trouble or petty theft from an employer). See Chapter 3 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector for a fuller explanation of the difference between relevant and control questions, along with examples.

[Conquistador]

Thank you for your reply I just have a quick question on how to answer this one!!...

on my background packet I noted a one time accidental theft where I left a pen in my pocket and did not notice until I was home.

I know I will more than likely get asked Have you ever stolen anything?..
This more than likely being a controlled...
I want to answer yes
But I know he wants a negative answer from me in which I will employ counter measures before I answer with the response he wants.

So basically I am asking everyone should I say no to this question?..

[T.M. Cullen]

But I know he wants a negative answer from me in which I will employ counter measures before I answer with the response he wants.

They don't give a shit about taking some stupid "skilcraft" pen home from work.  Unless you get some real dickhead of an examiner.  Everybody has done that.  When I retired, I had several on my dresser.  Please don't tell the FBI!

So answer NO on such a control question, if it comes up.  That is the time to employ CM.   Let them press you for awhile.  Make them work!  Then come clean, and spill the beans about that "pen hist"!

TC

[SanchoPanza]

That is the time to employ CM.  

Before you decide to try countermeasure you should realize that attempting countermeasures has its own hazards.

There is no credible scientific evidence that the countermeasures presented in Dr, Maschke's book are either easy to learn or an effective way to "beat" the polygraph. There is however, evidence that innocent examinees that use countermeasures can in fact increase their chances of failing the test.

Sancho Panza

[T.M. Cullen]

There is however, evidence that innocent examinees that use countermeasures can in fact increase their chances of failing the test.

What evidence?

OTOH, the ATF apparently agrees that the polygraph can be beaten, and has trained it's agents accordingly.  That's pretty revealing.

Reading TLBTLD is probably required reading for them!

Incidentally, you don't have to employ CMs to beat a polygraph interrogation, as many high profile spies/murderers have passed without using CM.  Aldrich Ames for one.


TC

[SanchoPanza]

What evidence?

There is evidence that some countermeasures used by innocent examinees can in fact increase their chances of appearing deceptive (Dawson, 1980; Honts, Amato, and Gordon, 2001).

Sancho Panza

[T.M. Cullen]

There is evidence that some countermeasures used by innocent examinees can in fact increase their chances of appearing deceptive (Dawson, 1980; Honts, Amato, and Gordon, 2001).

You said "countermeasures" in your original post, not "some countermeasures".

What countermeasures do you suppose those ATF agents used to beat the polygraph the Moguls made them take?  At gunpoint?  Of course, they are not like your typical young, naive, gullible, scared job applicant.

They may not have employed any CMs.   Just knowing that the polygraph can not really detect deception, and knowing what the examiner is trying to do (extract a confession, reveal information...etc.) is probably enough to pass.  That and a little acting.  People can survive an interrogation without revealing anything.  And the polygraph is just a fancy interrogation.  

TC

[SanchoPanza]

Excuse me the complete quote should be

Some examinees who have not committed crimes, security breaches, or related offenses, or who have little to hide, might nevertheless engage in countermeasures with the intent to minimize their chances of false positive test results (Maschke and Scalabrini, no date). This strategy is not risk-free for innocent examinees. There is evidence that some countermeasures used by innocent examinees can in fact increase their chances of appearing deceptive (Dawson, 1980; Honts, Amato, and Gordon, 2001). Also, several agencies that use the polygraph in screening job applicants or current employees have indicated that examinees who are judged to be using countermeasures may, on these grounds alone, be subject to the same personnel actions that would result from a test that indicated deception The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003) National Academy of Sciences
Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences and Education (BCSSE)
Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT)  PG 140

Authors such as Maschke and Williams suggest that effective countermeasure strategies can be easily learned and that a small amount of practice is enough to give examinees an excellent chance of "beating" the polygraph. Because the effective application of mental or physical countermeasures on the part of examinees would require skill in distinguishing between relevant and comparison questions, skill in regulating physiological response, and skill in concealing countermeasures from trained examiners, claims that it is easy to train examinees to "beat" both the polygraph and trained examiners require scientific supporting evidence to be credible. However, we are not aware of any such research.  The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003) National Academy of Sciences. Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences and Education (BCSSE) Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT)  PG 147  

Sancho Panza

[T.M. Cullen]

Because the effective application of mental or physical countermeasures on the part of examinees would require skill in distinguishing between relevant and comparison questions, skill in regulating physiological response, and skill in concealing countermeasures from trained examiners.......

Sounds reasonable to me.  If you are going to employ CMs, don't rush into it.  You need to:  1)  Know which questions to employ them with (control not relevant),  2)  Be able to distinguish between the two, 3) Practice altering your F3 response (whether using physical or mental triggers).

....claims that it is easy to train examinees to "beat" both the polygraph and trained examiners require scientific supporting evidence to be credible. However, we are not aware of any such research.   The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003) National Academy of Sciences. Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences and Education (BCSSE) Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT)  PG 147  

There is neither evidence that CMs work or that polygraphers can detect them.

So what is a potential false positive to do?  Tell the truth, and you can fail and be falsely called a liar.  

Best advice I've seen on what to do is in the following link:

http://www.wikihow.com/Cheat-a-Polygraph-Test-(Lie-Detector)

You can probably do everything suggested on that link, short of using CMs, and greating increase your chances of passing.  It's all about knowing what the polygraph REALLY IS, and that your polygraph interrogator is probably going to LIE to you about what it really is.   Do not go into the examination room like some naive, gullible victim who only knows what he/she has seen of the polygraph from the popular culture (TV shows, movies...etc.).  I for one, and many other regulars here (including GM probably) fell into that catagory!

TC

[George W. Maschke]

Excuse me the complete quote should be

Some examinees who have not committed crimes, security breaches, or related offenses, or who have little to hide, might nevertheless engage in countermeasures with the intent to minimize their chances of false positive test results (Maschke and Scalabrini, no date). This strategy is not risk-free for innocent examinees. There is evidence that some countermeasures used by innocent examinees can in fact increase their chances of appearing deceptive (Dawson, 1980; Honts, Amato, and Gordon, 2001). Also, several agencies that use the polygraph in screening job applicants or current employees have indicated that examinees who are judged to be using countermeasures may, on these grounds alone, be subject to the same personnel actions that would result from a test that indicated deception The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003) National Academy of Sciences
Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences and Education (BCSSE)
Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT)  PG 140

It is dishonest to cite the NAS report to support the notion that the kinds of countermeasures outlined in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector increase the risk of a truthful person being wrongly found deceptive. As discussed previously on this board, the foregoing passage refers to a study by Honts and Amato of the use of spontaneous (that is, untrained) countermeasures. See, Honts, C.R., S.L. Amato, and A.K. Gordon, "Effects of spontaneous countermeasures used against the comparison question test." Polygraph Vol. 30 (2001), No. 1, pp. 1-9.

In this study, the "countermeasures" were things that subjects ignorant of polygraph procedure did on their own in the belief that it might help them pass the polygraph. Such countermeasures are not comparable to those suggested in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

With regard to the 1980 study by Michael E. Dawson ("Physiological Detection of Deception: Measurement of Responses to Questions and Answers During Countermeasure Maneuvers," Psychophysiology 17 (1), 8–17), as explained in the article abstract: "All subjects were trained in the Stanislavsky method of acting and were instructed to use this method to appear innocent on the polygraph test." Again, this is nothing at all like the countermeasures suggested in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

Simply put, there is no evidence to support the counterintuitive notion that countermeasure use as a rule increases the risk of a false positive outcome.

Authors such as Maschke and Williams suggest that effective countermeasure strategies can be easily learned and that a small amount of practice is enough to give examinees an excellent chance of "beating" the polygraph. Because the effective application of mental or physical countermeasures on the part of examinees would require skill in distinguishing between relevant and comparison questions, skill in regulating physiological response, and skill in concealing countermeasures from trained examiners, claims that it is easy to train examinees to "beat" both the polygraph and trained examiners require scientific supporting evidence to be credible. However, we are not aware of any such research.  The Polygraph and Lie Detection (2003) National Academy of Sciences. Board on Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences and Education (BCSSE) Committee on National Statistics (CNSTAT)  PG 147  

While research into the ease with which countermeasures may be learned is scarce, the existing peer-reviewed research (by Charles Honts and others, see citations and article abstracts in the bibliography of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector) shows that half of programmed guilty subjects passed the polygraph after receiving no more than 30 minutes of training. Those facing polygraphic interrogation in the real world typically have considerably more time and much greater motivation to learn countermeasures.

[T.M. Cullen]

With regard to the 1980 study by Michael E. Dawson ("Physiological Detection of Deception: Measurement of Responses to Questions and Answers During Countermeasure Maneuvers," Psychophysiology 17 (1), 8–17), as explained in the article abstract: "All subjects were trained in the Stanislavsky method of acting and were instructed to use this method to appear innocent on the polygraph test." Again, this is nothing at all like the countermeasures suggested in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

So much for your "evidence" Sancho.  Are you trying to fudge the facts to throw Conquistador off?

Shame on you!  You should be working at a used car lot selling lemons to old ladies!

TC

[George W. Maschke]

And let us not forget that Sancho Panza recently lied about the existence of "published studies as late as 2007 that countermeasures are detectable and that honest people who employ them actually lessen their chances of passing a test." No such studies have been published.

[SanchoPanza]

Its interesting that the only parts of the NAS study you find credible and useful are the parts with which you agree.

Sancho Panza

[George W. Maschke]

The NAS report clearly does not support the position that sophisticated countermeasures (such as those outlined in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector) increase the likelihood of a truthful person being wrongly deemed deceptive. And there is no evidence that the polygraph community has any ability to detect such countermeasures.