Source: Cuban Spy Ana Belen Montes Passed DIA Polygraph

[George W. Maschke]

[See the 13th reply in this discussion thread for a report that top Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Cuba analyst Ana Belen Montes, who was a Cuban double agent throughout her 16-years of employment with DIA, took and passed at least one counterintelligence-scope polygraph "test."]

In what seems likely to be yet another failure of polygraph "testing" to detect or deter espionage, the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) senior analyst for matters involving Cuba, Ana Belen Montes, was charged on Friday, 21 Sep. 2001 with conspiracy to commit espionage for Cuba. According to the DIA website, employees are required to submit to initial and aperiodic counterintelligence-scope polygraph screening.

The arrest of DIA analyst Montes comes on the heels of the arrest in August of Brian P. Regan, a National Reconaissance Organization (NRO) contractor subject to polygraph screening, on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage.

Bill Miller and Walter Pincus of the Washington Post detail the arrest of accused Cuban spy Montes in a 22 Sep. 2001 article titled, "Defense Analyst Accused of Spying for Cuba." Miller and Pincus note:

"This is a clandestine agent for the Cuban intelligence service," said Assistant U.S. Attorney Ronald L. Walutes Jr. "This has been going on for quite some time."

If indeed Montes spied for Cuba "for quite some time," then it is likely that polygraph screening not only failed to deter her alleged espionage, but also failed to detect it, that is, that she passed a polygraph interrogation while spying for Cuba. That a spy should pass a Department of Defense (DoD) polygraph screening "test" should surprise no one. As I noted in a January 2001 open letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, during fiscal year 2000, the only persons who "failed" the DoD counterintelligence-scope polygraph "test" were those who made "substantive" admissions. Everyone who did not make a "substantive" admission ultimately passed! Some test, huh? (I received no reply from Secretary Rumsfeld.)

For further reading on the Montes case, see also the Associated Press article "Se
nior Defense Analyst is Charged as Cuban Spy" in the 22 Sep. 2001 New York Times.

A press release is also available on the FBI website, where an affidavit filed in the case may be downloaded in PDF format.

[George W. Maschke]

The Saturday, 29 September 2001 edition of the Miami Herald includes a lengthy aricle by Knight Ridder Washington correspondent Tim Johnson titled "Cub
a spy suspect was rising into senior intelligence ranks." Without stating whether Montes was polygraphed during the period of her alleged crimes, Johnson states:

Unlike the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency does not require its analysts to undergo regular polygraph tests to ensure they remain loyal, several sources said.

However, Department of Defense Directive Number 5210.48 dated 24 December 1984, which governs DIA's use of polygraph screening, states:

4.13. Polygraph examination shall be required on an interim and aperiodic basis for:

...

4.13.3. DoD civilian, military, and contractor personnel, to assist in determining their eligibility for employment with or assignment to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in positions that have been designated by the Director, DIA, as critical intelligence position, provided that the scope of such examinations shall be limited to the counterintelligence topics prescribed in Appendix B of DoD 5210.48-R.

Vacancy announcements for intelligence analysts on the DIA website suggest that Montes' position was designated a "critical intelligence position" by the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. All such vacancy announcements state: "All applicants conditionally selected for this position and all DIA employees are subject to initial and aperiodic counterintelligence-scope polygraph tests."

[George W. Maschke]

Yesterday (19 March 2002), Ana Belen Montes pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. (See articles linked from the AntiPolygraph.org Polygraph News page.)

Court documents revealed that Montes had been recruited by Cuban intelligence even before she began working for the DIA in 1985. Thus, if Montes ever submitted to any counterintelligence-scope polygraph "test" during the course of her 16-year career at DIA, it's fair to say she beat the box. If this is the case, to paraphrase Desi Arnaz (Ricky Ricardo of "I Love Lucy"), "somebody has a lot a 'splainin' to do."

[Cubanos]

She never received a poly.

[George W. Maschke]

She never received a poly.

How do you know this to be the case?

[beech trees]

The Public Information Officer for the DIA and the person tasked to answer all media questions with regard to the case, Lt. Cmdr. James Brooks, has no information with regard to whether Ana Belen Montes did or did not take a polygraph ever in her career at the DIA. When pressed, he indicated he *would* tell me if he had knowledge that she had or had not, but he could not reveal the results of those tests if they occured as the DIA considers the poly results 'medical information'.

Lt. Cmdr. Brooks referred me to the FBI, and a returned call is promised presently.

[George W. Maschke]

beech trees,

Thanks for posting that here. I had e-mailed DIA Public Affairs earlier in the day about this very point, but have not yet received a reply. I simply asked how many times Montes had been polygraphed during her DIA career.

[beech trees]

Glad to help, Sir George-- I'm curious myself if she was polygraphed.

It would appear that an intense game of pass the buck is being played with regard to who knows what about this case. Off and on today I have spoken with representatives from the DIA, the FBI, the Department of Justice and the Attorney General's Office. Each tells me that one of the others is the proper entity with whom to speak about particulars on this case. I finally landed with someone from the Attorney General's Office who reluctantly told me he would find out the information concerning her polygraph history (or lack thereof.)

The DIA has an infrastructure in place to both screen corrupted prospective employees and to ferret out 'turned' employees who are now spies or profiteers. If that infrastucture failed, then both that fact and the reasons why it failed (most notably to our interests here, the pseudo-science of polygraphy being used as part of the process) are of public interest. I plan on getting to the bottom of this and either write a lengthy post here and/or an op-ed for a Washington newspaper. Stay tuned,

bt

[George W. Maschke]

The indictment, plea agreement, and a factual proffer in support thereof filed on 19 March 2002 in the Montes case may be downloaded as a 790 kb PDF file at:

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/montes/usmontesplea031902.pdf

The factual proffer (begins at p. 8 of the PDF file) indicates that Montes was cleared for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and had been granted access to Special Access Program (SAP) information. That level access would presumably increase the likelihood that Montes would have at some point been subjected to an aperiodic counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination.

[beech trees]

Thanks George, I'm perusing it now. If I cannot receive a forthright answer from the DIA concerning Ms. Montes directly, perhaps I can reverse-engineer a few questions in the form of, "Are DIA employees who are granted SAP access polygraphed as a condition of such access?" "Are DIA employees who are granted SCI access polygraphed as a condition of such access?" etc.

Perhaps I should have been an investgative journalist.

[Cubanos]

The indictment, plea agreement, and a factual proffer in support thereof filed on 19 March 2002 in the Montes case may be downloaded as a 790 kb PDF file at:

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/montes/usmontesplea031902.pdf

The factual proffer (begins at p. 8 of the PDF file) indicates that Montes was cleared for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and had been granted access to Special Access Program (SAP) information. That level access would presumably increase the likelihood that Montes would have at some point been subjected to an aperiodic counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination.

Nope. Sorry dude, you assume wrong. Just because they give someone the clearance doesn't mean squat. And don't expect to get any answers from the DIA, they're to stupid to give you any. If you were to give them a map to their ass, they'd end up at their mouth.

[George W. Maschke]

A new article on the Montes case by Paul de la Garza in the St. Petersburg Times mentions the polygraph in passing:

Montes came under suspicion in December 2000. Brooks referred further questions about why it took so long to catch Montes to the FBI. He noted that the DIA administers polygraphs to employees.

The FBI declined to take the question, saying the case was still pending.

I have not yet received a reply to the e-mail message I sent to DIA Public Affairs.

[Mark Mallah]

Nailing a spy usually inspires a gag reflex by the polygraph community and its supporters demanding widespread polygraphs and increased funding to prevent future compromises like the last one.

Here though, silence.  It may turn out that Ana was never polygraphed, but the silence suggests otherwise.  The polygraph community is usually very quick to jump on opportunities for increased "market share."  The fact that they haven't said anything is telling.

PLUS, we already know that Cuba trained double agents to successfully beat the polygraph in the 1980's, routing the CIA.  They can see clearly from Havana that since then, the U.S. has learned absolutely nothing about polygraphs and continues to rely on them.  It's a slam dunk for Cuban intelligence, and an open invitation for any other hostile intelligence agency.  If I were them, I'd keep sending and recruting agents specifically in those agencies that rely on the polygraph.

If Ana did take the polygraph, I guess all those fearsome countermeasure detection devices did not do as advertised.

[beech trees]

A source close to the Montes case confirmed to me today that Ms. Montes was administered and passed at least one counter-intelligence polygraph while she was an employee of the DIA. I must respect the source's request to remain anonymous but I will state that the source is intimately familiar with the case.

This is conclusive proof that the polygraph is a thunderous failure as it is used in the screening and detection of spies.

Incredibly, part of the plea agreement stipulates that Ms. Montes make herself available for further polygraphs from various law enforcement agencies after she is debriefed.

[Mark Mallah]

Incredibly, part of the plea agreement stipulates that Ms. Montes make herself available for further polygraphs from various law enforcement agencies after she is debriefed.

Nothing succeeds like failure.