U.S. Senate Energy Cttee. Hearing on Polygraphs

[Skeptic]

Skeptic,

I found Kyle's rationalization nuanced and not totally without merit.

Just because they haven't provided the basis for statistical utility doesn't mean it doesn't exist.

Of course.  But it also doesn't mean such basis does exist, either, and since the people in question want to use the polygraph and (in some cases) have a vested interest in it, the burden is upon them to prove that utility, rather than upon others to prove the negative.

As for info of use to adversaries, any information that were to indicate the poly either more or less reliable in actual usage would be of value in structuring an attack. Adversaries depend on a global assessment of both strengths and weaknesses in order to optimize and target.

And again, I'll say "perhaps".  Some details (such as the combination on a lock) are clearly helpful to an adversary.  OTOH, letting people know that you have a padlock on your door, and that its a 3" Masterlock made of hardened steel, and that 10 burglars have tried without success to open the lock, would likely have a deterrent effect.  Telling people what tools have been tried might or might not be a bad idea.  It all depends upon the nature of the information, and what your adversary already knows.

From a certain point-of-view, simply letting people know that we polygraph could be useful to those looking for a way in.  But look at it this way: if you are dealing with an adversary who is sophisticated enough to scientifically structure an effective breach of security, you're likely dealing with someone who is capable of doing their own studies on polygraphs and knows the weaknesses full well.  If this is the case, failing to release not just full details but *any* details regarding how the polygraph has or has not caught spies only serves to keep ourselves in the dark regarding its utility.

Still, the poly as a screening tool for knowledgable examinees is offensive and irritating.

I agree with you, and as regards current usage, I'll throw in "detrimental to one's career and mental health".

Because of that, I respect the poeple that are willing to go through it to provide service to this country. It's more than I would do.

Same for me.

Skeptic

[Skeptic]

Does anyone else find it curious that details of apparently all of polygraph screening's purported counterespionage successes to which Mr. McSlarrow referred remain classified (bearing in mind that the U.S. government has been doing this for 50+ years), and apparently none led to criminal prosecutions?

To me, that last point is especially damning.  Makes you wonder how much boasting is going on, as in "we are pretty sure we've stopped a bunch of spies, but we could never actually prove any of them were spies.  Still, we're going to claim these as polygraph successes anyway".

Skeptic

[Marty]

Of course.  But it also doesn't mean such basis does exist, either, and since the people in question want to use the polygraph and (in some cases) have a vested interest in it, the burden is upon them to prove that utility, rather than upon others to prove the negative.

I agree. In fact it would be quite impossible to prove a negative in this instance.  That said, there is no obligation (though it would certainly be desireable) to disclose any proven utility to the outside.

OTOH, letting people know that you have a padlock on your door, and that its a 3" Masterlock made of hardened steel, and that 10 burglars have tried without success to open the lock, would likely have a deterrent effect.  ...

...  If you are dealing with an adversary who is sophisticated enough to scientifically structure an effective breach of security, you're likely dealing with someone who is capable of doing their own studies on polygraphs and knows the weaknesses full well.  If this is the case, failing to release not just full details but *any* details regarding how the polygraph has or has not caught spies only serves to keep ourselves in the dark regarding its utility.

In general, any information one discloses to an adversary, about whether something works or not, is useful to allow refocussing resources. As for the more capable adversarys, knowing the mechanics and weaknesses of polygraphs is a long way from knowing the kind of statistical information that is lacking here.

That said, I do believe and I think anecdotal and published evidence supports, some types of countermeasures, especially combined with practice on a polygraph, could be very effective. Enough so as to effectively limit the main use of the poly to a prophylactic utility. It likely is far less effective against well trained moles. Since we have caught some of these spys, it would be interesting to learn what training they recieved re polys. Don't think we will ever see that in public though.

-Marty