[See the 13th reply in this discussion thread for a report that top Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Cuba analyst Ana Belen Montes, who was a Cuban double agent throughout her 16-years of employment with DIA, took and passed at least one counterintelligence-scope polygraph "test."]

In what seems likely to be yet another failure of polygraph "testing" to detect or deter espionage, the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) senior analyst for matters involving Cuba, Ana Belen Montes, was charged on Friday, 21 Sep. 2001 with conspiracy to commit espionage for Cuba. According to the DIA website, employees are required to submit to initial and aperiodic counterintelligence-scope polygraph screening.

The arrest of DIA analyst Montes comes on the heels of the arrest in August of Brian P. Regan, a National Reconaissance Organization (NRO) contractor subject to polygraph screening, on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage.

Bill Miller and Walter Pincus of the Washington Post detail the arrest of accused Cuban spy Montes in a 22 Sep. 2001 article titled, "Defense Analyst Accused of Spying for Cuba." Miller and Pincus note:

Quote:


If indeed Montes spied for Cuba "for quite some time," then it is likely that polygraph screening not only failed to deter her alleged espionage, but also failed to detect it, that is, that she passed a polygraph interrogation while spying for Cuba. That a spy should pass a Department of Defense (DoD) polygraph screening "test" should surprise no one. As I noted in a January 2001 open letter to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, during fiscal year 2000, the only persons who "failed" the DoD counterintelligence-scope polygraph "test" were those who made "substantive" admissions. Everyone who did not make a "substantive" admission ultimately passed! Some test, huh? (I received no reply from Secretary Rumsfeld.)

For further reading on the Montes case, see also the Associated Press article "Se nior Defense Analyst is Charged as Cuban Spy" in the 22 Sep. 2001 New York Times.

A press release is also available on the FBI website, where an affidavit filed in the case may be downloaded in PDF format.

Yesterday (19 March 2002), Ana Belen Montes pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit espionage. (See articles linked from the AntiPolygraph.org Polygraph News page.)

Court documents revealed that Montes had been recruited by Cuban intelligence even before she began working for the DIA in 1985. Thus, if Montes ever submitted to any counterintelligence-scope polygraph "test" during the course of her 16-year career at DIA, it's fair to say she beat the box. If this is the case, to paraphrase Desi Arnaz (Ricky Ricardo of "I Love Lucy"), "somebody has a lot a 'splainin' to do."

Quote:


How do you know this to be the case?

beech trees,

Thanks for posting that here. I had e-mailed DIA Public Affairs earlier in the day about this very point, but have not yet received a reply. I simply asked how many times Montes had been polygraphed during her DIA career.

The indictment, plea agreement, and a factual proffer in support thereof filed on 19 March 2002 in the Montes case may be downloaded as a 790 kb PDF file at:

http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/montes/usmontesplea031902.pdf 

The factual proffer (begins at p. 8 of the PDF file) indicates that Montes was cleared for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and had been granted access to Special Access Program (SAP) information. That level access would presumably increase the likelihood that Montes would have at some point been subjected to an aperiodic counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination.

Quote:


Nope. Sorry dude, you assume wrong. Just because they give someone the clearance doesn't mean squat. And don't expect to get any answers from the DIA, they're to stupid to give you any. If you were to give them a map to their ass, they'd end up at their mouth.

Nailing a spy usually inspires a gag reflex by the polygraph community and its supporters demanding widespread polygraphs and increased funding to prevent future compromises like the last one.

Here though, silence.  It may turn out that Ana was never polygraphed, but the silence suggests otherwise.  The polygraph community is usually very quick to jump on opportunities for increased "market share."  The fact that they haven't said anything is telling.

PLUS, we already know that Cuba trained double agents to successfully beat the polygraph in the 1980's, routing the CIA.  They can see clearly from Havana that since then, the U.S. has learned absolutely nothing about polygraphs and continues to rely on them.  It's a slam dunk for Cuban intelligence, and an open invitation for any other hostile intelligence agency.  If I were them, I'd keep sending and recruting agents specifically in those agencies that rely on the polygraph.

If Ana did take the polygraph, I guess all those fearsome countermeasure detection devices did not do as advertised.

Quote:


Nothing succeeds like failure.