Polygraph Counter-countermeasure Techniques

[JB Dawson]

The point is that before an examiner employs the SAT and the yes test, the examiner must obviously see something that leads them to suspect CM.  This flies in the face of your position that polygraphers can't detect CMs.  

[George W. Maschke]

Certainly, polygraphers may observe behaviors that may lead them to suspect countermeasures. But this is not evidence, let alone proof, that they can actually detect the kinds of countermeasures described in TLBTLD at better-than-chance levels.

With regard to the Silent Answer Test described by Matte, recall that it is suggested for "eliminating causes of distortions from the examinee who prepares himself or herself to answer each question aloud by inhaling a great amount of air; from the examinee who loudly bellows his or her answer to emphasize his or her denial; from the examinee who feels compelled to give an elaborate answer instead of a simple "yes" or "no" as instructed; and from the examinee whose throat is dry or irritated necessitating the clearing of his or her throat or coughing at intervals during the test. "

Note that none of the foregoing behaviors are consistent with the countermeasures described in TLBTLD.

[Jim]

DADDY-O

I am a first time poster today, and I read your post and it pissed me off!! I am only here because I am curious as to how the polygraph works, how it can be beaten and why the exam sessions are run the way they are!! I DO NOT have sex with children, I AM NOT a convicted felon and I AM NOT a threat to U.S. national security (let alone my own country!!). I would just like to say, you are [glb]PARANOID[/glb]. I am probly like a large percentage of the posters here, curious. And the other people here are here to answer questions. Share knowledge. That is all. It is up to the individual person as to how they use that knowledge.

-Jim

[gijoeyl33]

learning how the test works, and learning how to beat it go hand in hand. if you know all the little secrets to the test, in my opinion and im sure george will confirm or deny, you will have no chance to pass the test because you wont worry about the questions you should (control) because you've learn of certain irrelevences to questions. either go in blind, or with full vision. not partial

[Amazed]

learning how the test works, and learning how to beat it go hand in hand. if you know all the little secrets to the test, in my opinion and im sure george will confirm or deny, you will have no chance to pass the test because you wont worry about the questions you should (control) because you've learn of certain irrelevences to questions. either go in blind, or with full vision. not partial

This idiotic babble is typical of the advice given on this site.  No wonder George and his followers are a considered nothing but fools crying to one another.

[George W. Maschke]

learning how the test works, and learning how to beat it go hand in hand. if you know all the little secrets to the test, in my opinion and im sure george will confirm or deny, you will have no chance to pass the test because you wont worry about the questions you should (control) because you've learn of certain irrelevences to questions. either go in blind, or with full vision. not partial

gijoey,

There is no peer-reviewed research on the effects of examinee knowledge of polygraph procedure on the accuracy of polygraph outcomes. However, the basic assumption of CQT polygraphy (that is, that  truthful subjects will be more concerned about the "control" questions while deceptive subjects will be more concerned about the relevant questions) collapses when the examinee understands the true nature of the "control" questions.

Some polygraph programs, such as the counterinteligence-scope screening programs of the Departments of Defense and Energy, as well as the FBI's screening program for current employees (as opposed to applicants) have a nearly 100% pass rate. In programs such as these, knowing the truth about the procedure may be less likely to have an effect on the outcome, since policy considerations dictate that almost everyone will "pass."

In other polygraph programs, where the failure rate is higher (for example, the FBI's pre-employment polygraph screening program, with a failure rate of about 50%), it is still hard to say what the effect of one's knowledge will be. Some people, understanding the function of the "control" questions, might involuntarily show physiological reactions to them just because they know that doing so is crucial to passing the "test." Then again, others might not react to them, based on their knowledge that the polygraph operator is not really concerned about "deception" to these questions.

Considering that CQT polygraphy has no scientific basis and polygraphers have no demonstrated ability to detect countermeasures, I do think it would be prudent for anyone facing a polygraph examination to employ countermeasures rather than leaving the results to chance.

[George W. Maschke]

An Israeli named Emmanuel Cohen has filed a U.S. patent application for a "System for and method of detecting polygraph countermeasures." The technique, which is explained in detail in the application, involves comparing the length of time between the asking of a question and the examinee's response. HTML and PDF versions of this document are available, respectively, here:

http://antipolygraph.org/documents/cohen-patent-application.shtml

http://antipolygraph.org/documents/cohen-patent-application.pdf

The technique described in this patent application seems similar to that of Lafayette Instrument Co.'s Countermeasure Detection System Model 76876US.

Interestingly, the patent application mentions AntiPolygraph.org by name in its discussion of polygraph countermeasures.

[Anonymous]

An Israeli named Emmanual Cohen has filed a U.S. patent application for a "System for and method of detecting polygraph countermeasures." The technique, which is explained in detail in the application, involves comparing the length of time between the asking of a question and the examinee's response. HTML and PDF versions of this document are available, respectively, here:

http://antipolygraph.org/documents/cohen-patent-application.shtml

http://antipolygraph.org/documents/cohen-patent-application.pdf

The technique described in this patent application seems similar to that of Lafayette Instrument Co.'s Countermeasure Detection System Model 76876US.

Interestingly, the patent application mentions AntiPolygraph.org by name in its discussion of polygraph countermeasures.

I think it likely that there is sufficient variance in the timing of events measured over question types in a standard polygraph exam (in the absence of properly applied countermeasures) such as to make any conclusions drawn, stemming from relative changes noted in such timing during a situation in which countermeasures might be so applied, as completely meaningless.  But the proof is in the pudding...

[gijoeyl33]

i think you are an idiotic babble. if you think there is some info on this board that is misleading, and you can prove it. please post it right here.

This idiotic babble is typical of the advice given on this site.  No wonder George and his followers are a considered nothing but fools crying to one another.

[Skeptic]

A patent is no indication that an invention actually works.  I don't know for sure, but I'd bet that there are patents out there on activity sensors for detecting countermeasures, too.

I would think that the idea behind the invention is either the assumption that knowing the two types of questions are different in importance will translate consistently into different time lapses between questions and answers, or that conscious concentration on countermeasures during control questions will cause the same result.  This may, of course, be the case, but I'll wait for the evidence.  After all, if such an obvious indicator were available, I would guess countermeasures would be consistently detectable by polygraph operators themselves, without the need for the electronic timing mechanism that the patent holder would doubtless be happy to sell them.  

Why buy an expensive stopwatch when you could be making money ($5000) by taking up Antipolygraph.org's countermeasure challenge?

Skeptic

I think it likely that there is sufficient variance in the timing of events measured over question types in a standard polygraph exam (in the absence of properly applied countermeasures) such as to make any conclusions drawn, stemming from relative changes noted in such timing during a situation in which countermeasures might be so applied, as completely meaningless.  But the proof is in the pudding...

[Skeptic]

i think you are an idiotic babble. if you think there is some info on this board that is misleading, and you can prove it. please post it right here.

gijoey,
Don't sweat it.  I think this is a case of miscommunication: Amazed's comment is standard polygraph-ese for "Yeah, we've got nothin'.  And we're scared to death".

Skeptic

[George W. Maschke]

A patent is no indication that an invention actually works.  I don't know for sure, but I'd bet that there are patents out there on activity sensors for detecting countermeasures, too.

Isn't some showing that an invention actually does that which its inventor claims required? Would Thomas Edison have been granted a patent for his electric lamp (U.S. Patent Number 223,898) if it did not yield electromagnetic radiation within the visible spectrum?

I searched the U.S. Patent Office website, but was unable to find any patents or applications for patents for the activity sensors (seat pads) that are currently being marketed as countermeasure detection devices. I did, however, find some patents by such polygraph pioneers as Leonarde Keeler, C.D. Lee, and John Reid. While I have not yet thoroughly reviewed these patents, the inventors do not at first sight appear to make the claim that their inventions actually detect deception. They instead describe them as physiological recording instruments. These patents will eventually be made available on AntiPolygraph.org.

I would think that the idea behind the invention is either the assumption that knowing the two types of questions are different in importance will translate consistently into different time lapses between questions and answers, or that conscious concentration on countermeasures during control questions will cause the same result.  This may, of course, be the case, but I'll wait for the evidence.  After all, if such an obvious indicator were available, I would guess countermeasures would be consistently detectable by polygraph operators themselves, without the need for the electronic timing mechanism that the patent holder would doubtless be happy to sell them.

I am aware of no studies (published or unpublished) of Mr. Cohen's technique. Surprisingly (to me, at least) a Google search for "Emmanuel Cohen" and "polygraph" yielded no matches.

Why buy an expensive stopwatch when you could be making money ($5000) by taking up Antipolygraph.org's countermeasure challenge?

Indeed!

[Marty]

Isn't some showing that an invention actually does that which its inventor claims required?

George,

Skeptic is right.

In a majority of cases a patent application is filed without any supporting experimental evidence that the "invention" works. Patent offices do not have the resources to validate the technologies involved. Mostly, they just look for a lack of prior art combined with non obviousness. Since patents are pretty meaningless until productized, the market serves to weed out the bogus patents from useable ones. Most of the time this works.

-Marty

[George W. Maschke]

Here is another counter-countermeasure technique that may be in use within the federal polygraph community with subjects who deny having researched polygraphy and who produce "passing" charts.

After the "in-test" or chart-collection phase, the polygrapher will inform the examinee that his polygraph results are "NDI." An examinee who has not researched the polygraph should not understand that "NDI" means "No Deception Indicated" (that is, he/she has passed), and should appear confused by the examiner's statement. On the other hand, if the examinee appears relieved by the news that his charts were "NDI" it would suggest that the examinee had in fact researched polygraphy and it might be further inferred that the examinee had employed countermeasures.

Alternatively, the polygrapher might use the term "NSR," which is shorthand for "No Significant Response." Some agencies prefer to use this term in the context of screening examinations instead of "NDI."

This ruse can also be used with subjects whose charts are scored as "failing." In this case, the polygrapher may start by telling the examinee that his charts are "DI" which is shorthand for "Deception Indicated" (or possibly "SR" for "Significant Response"). Again, the subject who has not researched polygraphy should not understand the meaning of either of these terms.

[anythingformoney]

One thing I don't get about all this countermeasures stuff:

If a person continually shows an abnormal response to a "relevant" question, despite a manipulation to the "control" questions, wouldn't that be a dead giveaway to an experienced polygrapher?

What I mean by "abnormal response" is an obvious reaction that is consistent throughout the exam.  A person who HAS used illegal drugs, for example, and lies about it, is really going to have much more of a response to that question than the polygrapher usually sees on that question.  If that strong response is consistent over the course of the whole examination, it seems to me that any polygrapher worth his salt would see that reaction despite the control question manipulations.  And don't polygraphers move the relevant questions around during the test so that you'd have to manipulate ALL of the control questions at the right time to get them to counter the obvious and consistent relevant question response?

Not only that, but wouldn't it appear strange to a polygrapher that not just one or two control questions "spike" off the chart, but that ALL of them do?  It's my understanding that people taking a polygraph usually are MUCH more concerned about one particular control question than the others, so I think that if all the control questions are showing very high reactions it might lead to suspicion.