NAS Polygraph Report

[Marty]

Skeptic,

"killing off a large portion..."  ROFLMAO. True. This is yet another reason why it is much more harmful for current employees.  False positives have very real consequences to many innocent loyal employees.  OTOH, screening of prospective employees is seen as less damaging.

The need for secrecy is a hysteretic phenomina. So long as the polygraph is seen as more effective if the public is deceived about it's effectiveness, the secrecy is continued.  Were secrecy to be dropped presumable the polygraph, in all it's applications, would become a lot less effective. Perhaps that is why they are fighting so hard to maintain the illusion. Still, that horse is in the process of exiting the barn.

-Marty

[Marty]

Skeptic,

The excerpt from the NAS report is somewhat disingenuous.

"Preemployment Screening The relevance of available research to preemployment polygraph screening is highly questionable because such screening involves inferences about future behavior on the basis of polygraph evidence about past behaviors that are probably quite different in kind.  The validity for such inferences depends on specifying and testing a plausible theory that links evidence of past behavior, such as illegal drug use, to future behavior of a different kind, such as revealing classified information. ....

The attack here is on the hiring policy re prior drug use rather than the polygraph. It seems to me that if an agency wants to establish such policy they have every right. Clandestine drug use could be leveraged by an adversary to compromise an employee, even if it did not correlate with a proclivity to compromise classified info.

-Marty

[George W. Maschke]

Skeptic,

"killing off a large portion..." ?ROFLMAO. True. This is yet another reason why it is much more harmful for current employees. ?False positives have very real consequences to many innocent loyal employees. ?OTOH, screening of prospective employees is seen as less damaging.

The need for secrecy is a hysteretic phenomina. So long as the polygraph is seen as more effective if the public is deceived about it's effectiveness, the secrecy is continued. ?Were secrecy to be dropped presumable the polygraph, in all it's applications, would become a lot less effective. Perhaps that is why they are fighting so hard to maintain the illusion. Still, that horse is in the process of exiting the barn.

-Marty

Marty,

One of this website's objectives is to pierce the veil of secrecy that has surrounded polygraphy. Any educated person who gets on the Internet to research polygraphy is now likely to quickly find information on both polygraph procedure and countermeasures. And there's nothing the polygraph community can do to stop it.

[George W. Maschke]

Skeptic,

The excerpt from the NAS report is somewhat disingenuous.


The attack here is on the hiring policy re prior drug use rather than the polygraph. It seems to me that if an agency wants to establish such policy they have every right. Clandestine drug use could be leveraged by an adversary to compromise an employee, even if it did not correlate with a proclivity to compromise classified info.

-Marty

Under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, governmental agencies do have a legal right to screen for past or present drug use using a completely invalid methodology: polygraph screening. But it is immoral and irresponsible (some might say un-American) to do so. Based on their misplaced faith in polygraphy, agencies like the FBI are falsely branding many as drug users and/or traffickers and denying them due process -- there's no appealing the verdict of the "magic spirit box."

Recent drug use may be screened for with urinalysis test. Indications of past drug use may be gleaned through thorough background investigations.

[Marty]

I agree, both that they have the right to look into past drug use and that it's a rather stupid exercise.  You can't always expect governments to act rationally. They tend to take on public fads and fears.

My point about the NAS report was that it was condemning the drug history questions usefulness more than the polygraph's value.  I gather from NAS's argument that were the polygraph 100% effective they would object even more. They have a point, it's just not particularly related to the polygraph's accuracy in that example.

-Marty

[Marty]

One of this website's objectives is to pierce the veil of secrecy that has surrounded polygraphy. Any educated person who gets on the Internet to research polygraphy is now likely to quickly find information on both polygraph procedure and countermeasures. And there's nothing the polygraph community can do to stop it.

And I thank you for providing that information. I had always been curious about how polygraphs worked and kinda thought there must be some sort of comparison question deception ever since I saw a TV program where a woman was incorrectly accused of taking money from a bank by an examiner who assumed she was a lesbian as a result of interviewing her.  That was when I first had an inkling that the examiners were trying to get you to lie to a question they didn't really care about in order to calibrate the real question.

One day I recalled that show and was just surfing and that's how I had found your site. You have really done a good job putting together a lot of facts and links and exposing the secrets. One doesn't cure stupidity by propogating ignorance.

What the polygraph community can do though is encourage rather than hinder higher quality research such as NAS recommends and hope they can improve/change the technology to something that actually works and doesn't operate on the placebo effect.

-Marty

[George W. Maschke]

Who's lying?!

From the NAS/NRC polygraph report (graciously transcribed by Skeptic):

"Also, we were adivsed by officials from DOE and DoDPI that there was information relevant to our work, classified at the secret level, particularly with regard to polygraph countermeasures. ?In order to review such information, several committee members and staff obtained national security clearances at the secret level. ?We were subsequently told by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and DoDPI that there were no completed studies of polygraph countermeasures at the secret level...

From the polygraph committee's 17 October 2001 public meeting:

DAVID M. RENZELMAN (DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLYGRAPH PROGRAM CHIEF): I'd just like to make an observation. All of our examiners went through the countermeasures [unclear] and Dr. Barland and his staff, who is the recognized countermeasures person in this country [unclear] he trained our examiners, and I alluded to this when you came to [unclear] facility. And they taught our examiners how to practice countermeasures. And we tested each other. I don't have a person on my staff that's not an experienced examiner. We caught every one. Every one that was practicing [countermeasures]. A hundred percent. You then--

RICHARDSON: Are you willing to take my challenge?

RENZELMAN: I didn't interrupt you. And I told you this before. And there are studies, but they are classified, for obvious reasons. Because if they were unclassified, they'd be on AntiPolygraph.org, and that doesn't make sense. But I think you were offered the opportunity to go to the place where they are, and you were offered an opportunity to have that briefing, and I recommend that you get that.

Perhaps the classification level of these supposed countermeasure studies was raised from secret to keep them away from the National Academy of Sciences?

[polycop]

...Although the committee did allow that specific issue testing had an accuracy somewhat greater than chance and substantially less than perfection...

Drew,

I believe the committee said specific issue polygraph exams discriminated at levels "well above chance."

Just thought I would correct a little "spin" here...

Polycop...
  

[beech trees]

Drew,

I believe the committee said specific issue polygraph exams discriminated at levels "well above chance."

Just thought I would correct a little "spin" here...

Polycop...
 

Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.......... gosh they're nice and straight now.

[Drew Richardson]

Polycop,

No spin intended or needed, but thank you for any warranted correction(s)...  The report was an overwhelming confirmation of many things I have been saying for years, particularly as to the lack of validity associated with polygraph screening applications, susceptibility of polygraph lie detection formats to countermeasure efforts, and a need for independent research.  I would agree with this panel that certain specific issue polygraph exam formats have greater validity and show far more promise.  If you care to read my opening statement (http://www.antipolygraph.org/hearings/senate-judiciary-1997/richardson-statement.shtml) made before the U. S. Senate some five years ago, you will note that I made all of these points (and others) at that time.  Regards,

Drew Richardson

[George W. Maschke]

Former CIA and DOE counterintelligence boss Ed Curran, who brought greatly expanded reliance on polygraph screening to both organizations, has once again shown that intelligence is not necessarily a prerequisite for rising to the highest levels of the counterintelligence community.

The following is an excerpt from Shankar Vedantam's article "
Can Polygraphs Detect Spies?" in today's (9 Oct. 2002) Washington Post:

Edward J. Curran, a former director of counterintelligence for the Energy Department, disputed the findings. "To have them say it's ineffective is irresponsible," Curran said. "You can ask the prisoners in the jail what they think of the jail and you will get the same answer. You are asking scientists who don't want to take the tests" to evaluate them.

Mr. Curran didn't even have a clue that the scientists who conducted the National Academy of Sciences research review were not themselves subject to being polygraphed! (Or perhaps he thinks of scientists as interchangeable parts, like nuts and bolts?)

 

[Skeptic]

Mr. Curran didn't even have a clue that the scientists who conducted the National Academy of Sciences research review were not themselves subject to being polygraphed! (Or perhaps he thinks of scientists as interchangeable parts, like nuts and bolts?)

Oh, yeah.  Scientists look out for each other, you know.  It's all about avoiding the polygraph.

I didn't realize Curran was such a fool.  He sure don't like them durn high-falutin' scientists, though.  Polygraph 'em all!

Skeptic

[Fair Chance]

I just started to read this website after two unsucessful attempts to pass the FBI pre-employment screening polygraph test.  My first one was inconclusive and my second one came back "not withing acceptable parameters."  I am appealing the decision via certified return receipt mail.  I realize the chance of appeal is slim to none but this will begin the process of clearing any "suspicions" which might be cast upon my integrity.  I have never read this site until yesterday. During my second polygraph, the operator was almost ranting and raving on how I must confess to visiting such websites because of my polygraph results.  Now I finally know what he was talking about concerning "countermeasures."   I also stayed very calm and told the truth.  I now know why my examiner was so angry with me, it was all a show and I did not "confess" to any of his allegations.  Needless to say, ignorance is not bliss.  When my appeal is over, I will describe my ordeal in detail.  I am also a federal law enforcement officer.

My point of my first log-in.  After digesting many pages of the NAS report, one aspect strikes me very clearly.  If problems are encountered during the polygraph process, IT SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED.  No conclusions of guilt or negative employment decisions should be base only on polygraph interpretation.  I have read in the papers about the polygraph being part of a "total fabric of security" which also includes intensive background checks.  If I am so suspicious and untrustworthy, why am I still in my present sensitive position in the Department of Justice.  I am in my position because I have passed three intensive background checks in both the Department of Defense and Department of Justice.  I am reinvestigated every five years.  I have always performed with the highest sense of integrity and I am well respected by my peers.  I invite the FBI to do their intensive investigation and see if I live up to my billing.  Unfortunately, I will never be given the chance because I am considered to be part of the acceptable "friendly fire" losses because "no better choice is available."  Why not do what they used to do before 1994?   Trust in a good old fashion hard nosed background investigation.   I am the same person I was before the test.  I am now going to be very interested in the uses of polygraph in the future.  I cannot condemn all polygraph for there are aspects represented in the report that leave specific uses possible with more research to measure their usefulness.  I just concur that if it is going to be used as a "pre-screening tool", any discrepencies should be investigated and adjudicated one way or another, not just throw away the applicant because it is too much bother or money.  The applicant's integrity is also being thrown away without any method of appeal under current policies.  I look forward to educating myself on the polygraph now.  I intentionally did not read anything about it before my interviews so I could honestly state that I did not research it.  I was still accused anyway.  If I am asked during the appeal, I will truthfully state that I have researched and not hide in the closet.  I know that I will be kissing my employment opportunity good-bye by at what price do I start to sell my soul?  I am used to doing the right thing, even if it is hard and cost me money or opportunity.  I do not have any bad feelings toward the FBI, just a little disappointment in the system.  I have a great job and I will be retiring in ten years under federal law enforcement retirement.  I will never regret applying because at least I tried to join the system to improve it.  I hope to help improve the system so that my children can enjoy a different type of application process should they want to apply to the FBI or any government agency in the future.

P.S.  No one in our organization is required to pass a lie detector for employment.  We have our fair share of people who do wrong things.  As we investigate their failings, it has been the conclusion that a polygraph would not have prevented or foreseen their problems. Many of those problems are found during background reinvestigations which occur on a regular basis.  Our organization also has a tremendous amount of loyal, ethical, and trustworthy individuals who I trust with my life everyday.  We are proud to serve the American public without much fanfare.

[watcher]

Interesting discussion.  You must remember that as much bias as there is to show that the polygraph works there is also just as much bias to show that it does not work.  Remember, that those very same evaluators at NAS are scientist that are in support of the scientists that complained at DOE.  The instrument is nothing more then a recording device...period.  It records physiological responses.  You guys still don't get it.  The examiner is the key.  The training is critical and common sense approach to interpetation of the results is mandatory.  There is no clear cut reason for a person to respond to a particular question other then if the question creates concern in the person taking the test.  This site has got more people screwed up about taking such a test then you can imagine.  After testing people have stated that they should have never visited this site or other sites about polygraph because this site clouded their good judgement and created concerns when there were none.  Your site does more to support the use of polygraph then any other site because we get the opportunity to show people just how wrong you are about polygraph.  Please keep up the "good" work! :

[Marty]

During my second polygraph, the operator was almost ranting and raving on how I must confess to visiting such websites because of my polygraph results.  Now I finally know what he was talking about concerning "countermeasures."...... When my appeal is over, I will describe my ordeal in detail.  I am also a federal law enforcement officer.

First, do not take the accusations during interrogation personally. Examiners are rated on their confession rate which is one of the few things that are at all reliable about the polygraph. And yes, for applicants to new positions they tolerate and rationalize a high false positive rate. It's too bad the process is so abusive. Thank you for your sevice in the DOJ though.

=Marty