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Posted by Fair Chance
- Feb 04, 2003, 10:25 AMQuote from: Public Servant on Feb 03, 2003, 11:13 AMNo sir, you never have. I was trying to put a little levity into the posting. You now know why I do not try to make a living being a comic. The crowd would turn ugly and start throwing bottles (or cans) at me!
I'd have never jumped on you calling me Public Service. It's what I provide so I guess you could say its what I am. --What laying on the drama a little thick? OK, OK.
Regards.
Posted by Public Servant
- Feb 04, 2003, 10:14 AMGeorge,
To prevent beating dead horses here, I will only reply to one point:
I'm sure Drew would let me know if he took offense and demanded my apology. Just as you need none of the others on this site need to defend you, surely Dr. Richardson does not need you to defend his honor. While I may have used hyperbole in making my point, I was merely suggesting that his anti-polygraph views may have been transferred to his fellow FBI Agents. His assertions may have supported the determination to ignor a correct determination of NDI through polygraph. After all this site once touted Drew as something like the FBI's foremost polygraph authority (I don't recall the exact words that caused such controversy here). If the good doctor took offense to my wording, I will gladly hear his complaint. Clearly, though, you know my disagreements with his assertions. If not, please re-read the numerous threads in which we have engaged in, usually constructive, debate.
Mark,
The segment basically supported your first assertion. Except it basically said that in this case, nothing at all would erase suspicion. Until finally, the FBI obtained Russian tapes of the transactions, and through voice recognition, had to face the fact that the traitior was from within.
Hard to blame this one on polygraph or the examiner.
Regards.
To prevent beating dead horses here, I will only reply to one point:
I'm sure Drew would let me know if he took offense and demanded my apology. Just as you need none of the others on this site need to defend you, surely Dr. Richardson does not need you to defend his honor. While I may have used hyperbole in making my point, I was merely suggesting that his anti-polygraph views may have been transferred to his fellow FBI Agents. His assertions may have supported the determination to ignor a correct determination of NDI through polygraph. After all this site once touted Drew as something like the FBI's foremost polygraph authority (I don't recall the exact words that caused such controversy here). If the good doctor took offense to my wording, I will gladly hear his complaint. Clearly, though, you know my disagreements with his assertions. If not, please re-read the numerous threads in which we have engaged in, usually constructive, debate.
Mark,
The segment basically supported your first assertion. Except it basically said that in this case, nothing at all would erase suspicion. Until finally, the FBI obtained Russian tapes of the transactions, and through voice recognition, had to face the fact that the traitior was from within.
Hard to blame this one on polygraph or the examiner.
Regards.
Posted by Mark Mallah
- Feb 03, 2003, 04:13 PMPublic Servant,
I did not see the 60 Minutes program, but do not need to to note the following 2 rules, which may answer your point:
Rule 1: If the FBI believes a suspect is guilty, the polygraph will not erase that suspicion, no matter the results.
Rule 2: If a subject "fails" the polygraph, no amount of investigation, no matter the results, will erase the suspicion.
I did not see the 60 Minutes program, but do not need to to note the following 2 rules, which may answer your point:
Rule 1: If the FBI believes a suspect is guilty, the polygraph will not erase that suspicion, no matter the results.
Rule 2: If a subject "fails" the polygraph, no amount of investigation, no matter the results, will erase the suspicion.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Feb 03, 2003, 11:50 AMPublic Servant,
You write in part:
Thank you for posting the above. The reason I hadn't commented on the 60 Minutes story is that I was not able to watch it, as my cable television company does not carry CBS.
What do you mean by "poisoned by the rantings of...Dr. Drew Richardson?" What has Dr. Richardson said regarding polygraphy that is untrue? Please be specific. If you cannot answer these questions, then I think you owe Dr. Richardson an apology.
Perhaps some in FBI counterintelligence have come to realize that polygraphy is simply not reliable?
Naïveté with regard to polygraph procedure is needed for CQT polygraphy to have utlity as an interrogation aid, not for it to have validity (it has none).
No. No polygraph examiner -- no matter how "good" -- can conduct a valid CQT polygraph examination because CQT polygraphy is not a valid diagnostic technique.
You write in part:
QuoteJust watched the 60 Minutes segment regarding Brian Kelley. Interesting to note that I am the only one to post on the topic, in light of the fact that the piece stated Kelley passed his exam. It seems George, et al, abandoned this story when the only take on polygraph 60 Minutes had, was as follows:
IF THE FBI HAD JUST BELIEVED THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, THEY COULD HAVE CLEARED KELLEY SOONER; AND PERHAPS, CAUGHT HANSEN BEFORE HE DID MORE DAMAGE!!
Thank you for posting the above. The reason I hadn't commented on the 60 Minutes story is that I was not able to watch it, as my cable television company does not carry CBS.
QuoteThe question remains: why did the FBI disregard the results as evidence of a professional spy? Perhaps the CI professionals involved had been poisoned by the rantings of former FBI employee, Dr. Drew Richardson. Or perhaps, they just couldn't bring themselves to look in their own backyard and wanted to believe what was not true.
What do you mean by "poisoned by the rantings of...Dr. Drew Richardson?" What has Dr. Richardson said regarding polygraphy that is untrue? Please be specific. If you cannot answer these questions, then I think you owe Dr. Richardson an apology.
Perhaps some in FBI counterintelligence have come to realize that polygraphy is simply not reliable?
QuoteOh, and I'd like to add: Kelley passed and I am sure he is not what you'd call naive. This is touted as the quality one must possess for polygraph to work.
Naïveté with regard to polygraph procedure is needed for CQT polygraphy to have utlity as an interrogation aid, not for it to have validity (it has none).
QuoteA good examiner, with the right technique, can successfully conduct a valid exam on even the not so naive!
No. No polygraph examiner -- no matter how "good" -- can conduct a valid CQT polygraph examination because CQT polygraphy is not a valid diagnostic technique.
Posted by Public Servant
- Feb 03, 2003, 11:13 AMNot my sites obviously. This is the only poly site that is exciting enough to get me to post. I only made objectivity remarks to add a little drama. I have no complaints about my opportunity to speak my mind here. I think I have been clear on what my actual issues with this site are, in the past.
I'd have never jumped on you calling me Public Service. It's what I provide so I guess you could say its what I am. --What laying on the drama a little thick? OK, OK.
Later!
I'd have never jumped on you calling me Public Service. It's what I provide so I guess you could say its what I am. --What laying on the drama a little thick? OK, OK.
Later!
Posted by Fair Chance
- Feb 03, 2003, 10:35 AMQuote from: Public Servant on Feb 03, 2003, 09:50 AMDear Public Servant (I almost typed "Public Service" and would not want a firestorm of spelling to start),
I know I should not have complained about lack of objectivity as my opening lines may have suggested. After all this is an ANTI-polygraph site, not a polygraph information site. It is objective enough that George, Gino, et al, allow persons such as myself post here.
If I could find a "Pro-polygraph Site" or polygraph information site that does not censor than I would be happy to converse and exchange information. I just have a serious problem with people changing or omitting key words which modify the intent of my postings.
Regards
Posted by Public Servant
- Feb 03, 2003, 09:50 AMJust watched the 60 Minutes segment regarding Brian Kelley. Interesting to note that I am the only one to post on the topic, in light of the fact that the piece stated Kelley passed his exam. It seems George, et al, abandoned this story when the only take on polygraph 60 Minutes had, was as follows:
IF THE FBI HAD JUST BELIEVED THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, THEY COULD HAVE CLEARED KELLEY SOONER; AND PERHAPS, CAUGHT HANSEN BEFORE HE DID MORE DAMAGE!!
I must admit I was shocked. 60 Minutes is usually less than kind to polygraph advocates. However, they are often less kind to agencies such as the bureau. In this case polygraph helped them come down harder on the FBI.
The question remains: why did the FBI disregard the results as evidence of a professional spy? Perhaps the CI professionals involved had been poisoned by the rantings of former FBI employee, Dr. Drew Richardson. Or perhaps, they just couldn't bring themselves to look in their own backyard and wanted to believe what was not true.
I know I should not have complained about lack of objectivity as my opening lines may have suggested. After all this is an ANTI-polygraph site, not a polygraph information site. It is objective enough that George, Gino, et al, allow persons such as myself post here.
Oh, and I'd like to add: Kelley passed and I am sure he is not what you'd call naive. This is touted as the quality one must possess for polygraph to work. He surely was subject to numerous exams during his career. A good examiner, with the right technique, can successfully conduct a valid exam on even the not so naive!
IF THE FBI HAD JUST BELIEVED THE POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION, THEY COULD HAVE CLEARED KELLEY SOONER; AND PERHAPS, CAUGHT HANSEN BEFORE HE DID MORE DAMAGE!!
I must admit I was shocked. 60 Minutes is usually less than kind to polygraph advocates. However, they are often less kind to agencies such as the bureau. In this case polygraph helped them come down harder on the FBI.
The question remains: why did the FBI disregard the results as evidence of a professional spy? Perhaps the CI professionals involved had been poisoned by the rantings of former FBI employee, Dr. Drew Richardson. Or perhaps, they just couldn't bring themselves to look in their own backyard and wanted to believe what was not true.
I know I should not have complained about lack of objectivity as my opening lines may have suggested. After all this is an ANTI-polygraph site, not a polygraph information site. It is objective enough that George, Gino, et al, allow persons such as myself post here.
Oh, and I'd like to add: Kelley passed and I am sure he is not what you'd call naive. This is touted as the quality one must possess for polygraph to work. He surely was subject to numerous exams during his career. A good examiner, with the right technique, can successfully conduct a valid exam on even the not so naive!
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Jan 31, 2003, 01:48 PMThis Sunday, 2 Feb. 2003, CBS 60 Minutes will feature segment on Brian Kelley's ordeal titled, "To Catch a Spy."
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Oct 19, 2002, 04:05 PMBrian Kelley is the name of the senior CIA counterintelligence officer whom the FBI wrongly suspected of being a mole who tipped off the Soviets to the 1989 FBI espionage investigation of former State Department official Felix Bloch, according to a New York Times article by David Johnston titled "F.B.I. Paid $7 Million for File on American Spying for Russia." This information is based on a book by David Wise titled Spy: The Inside Story of How the F.B.I.'s Robert Hanssen Betrayed America that is to be published by Random House on 22 October 2002.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Aug 15, 2001, 04:46 AMFred F.,
Substantive portions of Chapter 6 of the Bellows Report, which has been heavily censored, are to be found on the Federation of American Scientists website at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/bellows_chap6.html
In addition, with regard to the role that Wen Ho Lee's ethnicity may have played in his becoming the target of DOE's and FBI's botched espionage investigation, former DOE counterintelligence officer Robert S. Vrooman stated in a sworn declaration in U.S. v. Wen Ho Lee:
Note that Mr. Vrooman's declaration is dated 10 August 2000, after the completion of the Bellows Report. Mr. Vrooman's declaration (some parts of which have been censored), may be found here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/vrooman.html
See also the 11 August 2000 declaration of former DOE Acting Director for Counterintelligence Charles E. Washington:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/washington.html
Substantive portions of Chapter 6 of the Bellows Report, which has been heavily censored, are to be found on the Federation of American Scientists website at:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/bellows_chap6.html
In addition, with regard to the role that Wen Ho Lee's ethnicity may have played in his becoming the target of DOE's and FBI's botched espionage investigation, former DOE counterintelligence officer Robert S. Vrooman stated in a sworn declaration in U.S. v. Wen Ho Lee:
Quote
3. Agent Messemer's statement that the individuals selected for investigation were chosen because they fit a "matrix" based on access to W-88 information and travel to the PRC is false. Dozens of individuals who share those characteristics were not chosen for investigation. As I explained in my prior declaration, it is my firm belief that the actual reason Dr. Lee was selected for investigation was because he made a call to another person who was under investigation in spite of the fact that he assisted the FBI in this case. It is my opinion that the failure to look at the rest of the population is because Lee is ethnic Chinese.
4. Mr. Moore's contention that the Chinese target ethnically Chinese individuals to the exclusion of others, therefore making it rational to focus investigations on such individuals was not borne out by our experience at Los Alamos, which was the critical context for this investigation. It was our experience that Chinese intelligence officials contacted everyone from the laboratories with a nuclear weapons background who visited China for information, regardless of their ethnicity. I am unaware of any empirical data that would support any inference that an American citizen born in Taiwan would be more likely than any other American citizen [deletion].
5. Of the twelve people ultimately chosen for the short list on which the investigation focused, some had no access at all to W-88 information, and one did not have a security clearance, but this individual is ethnically Chinese. I do not believe this was a coincidence. Further, this ethnically Chinese individual did not fall within the "matrix" which Agent Messemer claims was used by the DOE and FBI. In addition, although there were other names on the AI list, Mr. Trulock made clear that Dr. Lee was his primary suspect.
Note that Mr. Vrooman's declaration is dated 10 August 2000, after the completion of the Bellows Report. Mr. Vrooman's declaration (some parts of which have been censored), may be found here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/vrooman.html
See also the 11 August 2000 declaration of former DOE Acting Director for Counterintelligence Charles E. Washington:
http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/washington.html
Posted by Fred F.
- Aug 14, 2001, 11:04 PMGeorge,
Another story along the same lines appeared in the Los Angeles Times today regarding the Wen Ho Lee spy case. It can be found at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-081401chinaspy.story
This story is also a fine example of how the FBI and Energy department unfairly targeted Mr. Lee and didn't follow other leads in the espionage case.
Even so, Assistant U.S. Atty. Randy Bellows, who in a report to then AG Janet Reno denies that there was any evidence of racial profiling, also claims that they had a plan to "target" Chinese Americans who worked closely with nuclear secrets , but "didn't" carry it out.
I wonder if AUSA Bellows could pass a polygraph exam in regards to that?
Fred F.
Another story along the same lines appeared in the Los Angeles Times today regarding the Wen Ho Lee spy case. It can be found at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-081401chinaspy.story
This story is also a fine example of how the FBI and Energy department unfairly targeted Mr. Lee and didn't follow other leads in the espionage case.
Even so, Assistant U.S. Atty. Randy Bellows, who in a report to then AG Janet Reno denies that there was any evidence of racial profiling, also claims that they had a plan to "target" Chinese Americans who worked closely with nuclear secrets , but "didn't" carry it out.
I wonder if AUSA Bellows could pass a polygraph exam in regards to that?
Fred F.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Aug 14, 2001, 08:59 AMIn an 11 August 2001 article titled, "The Wronged Man: C.I.A. Officer Mistaken for Spy Down the Street," James Risen and David Johnston of The New York Times reported on the case of an anonymous senior CIA counterintelligence officer whom the FBI wrongly suspected of being a mole who tipped off the Soviets to the 1989 FBI espionage investigation of former State Department official Felix Bloch. The article is currently available on-line at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/11/national/11SPY.html
The article sheds some light on FBI polygraph policy. To begin with, the CIA officer who had been suspected of espionage seems to have been set-up for a pretext polygraph screening examination in 1998:
This putative pretext polygraph interrogation calls to mind the cases of Wen Ho Lee, who was administered a polygraph screening "test" by the Department of Energy in December 1998 on the pretext that he had just returned from a trip overseas (to Taiwan), when, in fact, he was suspected of espionage, and Army civilian employee David Tenenbaum, who in January 1997 was interrogated by Defense Security Service (then Defense Investigative Service) special agents on the pretext that his security clearance was to be upgraded for a special project, when, in fact, he was suspected of espionage.
The anonymous senior CIA counterintelligence officer presumably passed his 1998 polygraph interrogation. And since CIA employees are subject to polygraph screening every five years, it would follow that the CIA officer had also passed at least one polygraph screening "test" since the time of the abortive 1989 Bloch investigation.
Now, speaking at the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary's 25 April 2001 hearing on issues surrounding the use of polygraphs, retired FBI polygrapher and past American Polygraph Association president Richard W. Keifer testified:
Mr. Keifer's entire statement may be found here:
http://antipolygraph.org/hearings/senate-judiciary-2001/keifer-statement.shtml
If Mr. Keifer's asserted confidence level of 99.99% (i.e, a margin of error of 1 in 10,000) on decisions to clear people were true, then if the CIA official under investigation had passed two polygraph screenings, the odds of his being a mole would have been 1 in 100,000,000. (Since Aldrich Ames passed two polygraph screening "tests," the chances of his actually being a spy would also be 1 in 100,000,000; perhaps he should appeal his conviction!)
In any event, the FBI and CIA seem not to have shared Mr. Keifer's confidence in polygraphy, because even after the CIA officer was told he had passed, he remained the FBI's prime suspect. He was placed under surveillance and his home was secretly searched. Risen and Johnston report:
How strange that the FBI would turn down a suspected spy's offer to take a polygraph test! Retired FBI polygrapher Richard Keifer testified at the above-cited Senate hearing, "It is my opinion that in a security screening polygraph examination, Robert Hansen would have reacted with greater than 99% certainty." Again it seems that the FBI does not share Mr. Keifer's confidence in polygraphy.
If the FBI has such little confidence in polygraphy when push comes to shove, then why does it use it to screen applicants for employment as well as current employees?
After refusing to believe the outcome of the anonymous CIA officer's 1998 polygraph interrogation and rejecting his 1999 offer to submit to yet another polygraph interrogation, the FBI strangely demanded that he submit to yet another polygraph interrogation before returning to work at the CIA! Dan Eggen of the Washington Post reports in a 12 August 2001 article titled, "FBI Refuses to Apologize to Cleared CIA Officer":
The entire article may be read here:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64592-2001Aug11.html
The FBI's equivocal reliance on polygraphy in its investigation of the anonymous senior CIA counterintelligence officer is an appropriate topic of inquiry for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in its ongoing FBI oversight hearings.
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/08/11/national/11SPY.html
The article sheds some light on FBI polygraph policy. To begin with, the CIA officer who had been suspected of espionage seems to have been set-up for a pretext polygraph screening examination in 1998:
QuoteIn an apparent effort to expose him, he was asked to join a supposedly sensitive joint operation involving a Russian agent who was about to come to the West, and who could solve the riddle of who sabotaged the Bloch case. But he was told that to join the team, he had to take a lie detector test. When he agreed, the investigators subtly probed his reaction to the possibility that the government would soon learn who compromised the Bloch investigation. He was told that he passed the test. But then he was told that the Russian defector was not arriving after all, and that he was no longer needed in the investigation.
In retrospect, the C.I.A. officer and his lawyer suspect that the operation was a ruse. Law enforcement officials would not discuss the matter.
This putative pretext polygraph interrogation calls to mind the cases of Wen Ho Lee, who was administered a polygraph screening "test" by the Department of Energy in December 1998 on the pretext that he had just returned from a trip overseas (to Taiwan), when, in fact, he was suspected of espionage, and Army civilian employee David Tenenbaum, who in January 1997 was interrogated by Defense Security Service (then Defense Investigative Service) special agents on the pretext that his security clearance was to be upgraded for a special project, when, in fact, he was suspected of espionage.
The anonymous senior CIA counterintelligence officer presumably passed his 1998 polygraph interrogation. And since CIA employees are subject to polygraph screening every five years, it would follow that the CIA officer had also passed at least one polygraph screening "test" since the time of the abortive 1989 Bloch investigation.
Now, speaking at the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary's 25 April 2001 hearing on issues surrounding the use of polygraphs, retired FBI polygrapher and past American Polygraph Association president Richard W. Keifer testified:
QuoteBased on the results of scientific studies, when conducting a screening polygraph, you will have high confidence (99.99 %) on decisions to clear people. In other words, the error rate on those who pass the test is very miniscule.
Mr. Keifer's entire statement may be found here:
http://antipolygraph.org/hearings/senate-judiciary-2001/keifer-statement.shtml
If Mr. Keifer's asserted confidence level of 99.99% (i.e, a margin of error of 1 in 10,000) on decisions to clear people were true, then if the CIA official under investigation had passed two polygraph screenings, the odds of his being a mole would have been 1 in 100,000,000. (Since Aldrich Ames passed two polygraph screening "tests," the chances of his actually being a spy would also be 1 in 100,000,000; perhaps he should appeal his conviction!)
In any event, the FBI and CIA seem not to have shared Mr. Keifer's confidence in polygraphy, because even after the CIA officer was told he had passed, he remained the FBI's prime suspect. He was placed under surveillance and his home was secretly searched. Risen and Johnston report:
QuoteAt one point, he kept a map of Nottoway Park, marking his jogging times from point to point. Investigators who found it during a surreptitious search of his house saw it as proof of his betrayal.
On Aug. 18, 1999, he was summoned to a cramped conference room at C.I.A. headquarters, where two F.B.I. agents shoved in front of him a copy of his old jogging map, stamped "Secret" by the F.B.I.
The map, the agents told him, was solid evidence that he was the Russian mole. The "X" marks and time notations were seen as telltale signs of where and at what time he had dropped off classified information. They called it a "spy map" and demanded that he confess. "How do you explain this?" one shouted.
"Where did you get my jogging map?" he asked in return.
In the four-hour F.B.I. interrogation, the C.I.A. officer offered to answer all questions without a lawyer, and to take a lie detector test. But his lawyer says the F.B.I. declined to take him up on the offer. He was escorted out of C.I.A. headquarters, stripped of his security badge and put on administrative leave.
How strange that the FBI would turn down a suspected spy's offer to take a polygraph test! Retired FBI polygrapher Richard Keifer testified at the above-cited Senate hearing, "It is my opinion that in a security screening polygraph examination, Robert Hansen would have reacted with greater than 99% certainty." Again it seems that the FBI does not share Mr. Keifer's confidence in polygraphy.
If the FBI has such little confidence in polygraphy when push comes to shove, then why does it use it to screen applicants for employment as well as current employees?
After refusing to believe the outcome of the anonymous CIA officer's 1998 polygraph interrogation and rejecting his 1999 offer to submit to yet another polygraph interrogation, the FBI strangely demanded that he submit to yet another polygraph interrogation before returning to work at the CIA! Dan Eggen of the Washington Post reports in a 12 August 2001 article titled, "FBI Refuses to Apologize to Cleared CIA Officer":
QuoteThe focus of the FBI's probe did not shift until late last year when investigators obtained documents pointing toward Hanssen. Finally on Feb. 19 -- the day after Hanssen's arrest -- the CIA officer was contacted by the FBI and asked to take another polygraph, which he passed.
The entire article may be read here:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64592-2001Aug11.html
The FBI's equivocal reliance on polygraphy in its investigation of the anonymous senior CIA counterintelligence officer is an appropriate topic of inquiry for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary in its ongoing FBI oversight hearings.