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Posted by Michelle
 - Feb 18, 2003, 03:49 AM

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Nov 22, 2002, 07:13 AM
Public Servant asks:


Clearly, the polygraph community wants the public to believe that it has the ability to reliably detect countermeasures such as those described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

I have been trying to d/l this and am unable to.  I continue receiving error messages saying I am missing a DLL file or something like that after d/l'ing pdf.  When I try to read the html version it won't open, I keep clicking on the page numbers and nothing happens.

Is there *any* other way to receive this document?

Thanks!
Posted by George W. Maschke
 - Dec 24, 2002, 04:22 AM

Quote from: Guest on Dec 24, 2002, 12:56 AM
Do I detect a bit of animosity between Georgie Porgie and Ed Curran? Hmmmm....let's see...was HE the "buffoon" who was managing the FBI program when George crashed and burned?...

No. At the time of my FBI pre-employment polygraph, Ed Curran was at CIA.
Posted by Skeptic
 - Dec 24, 2002, 01:17 AM

Quote from: Guest on Dec 24, 2002, 12:56 AM
Do I detect a bit of animosity between Georgie Porgie and Ed Curran? Hmmmm....let's see...was HE the "buffoon" who was managing the FBI program when George crashed and burned?  I think you should try to develop a better relationship with Ed and maybe he will answer some of your questions.  Can't blame him if all you do is attack him (and call him names).  Don't know the gent, but you sure seem to be pretty tough on him.

Guest,
Your ignorance is apparent without your explicit admission -- on many levels.

It's obvious that, like so many other pro-polygraph posters here, you know nothing about that on which you comment; rather, your main purpose is merely to incite.

In 'net lingo, therefore, you are a "troll".

Skeptic
Posted by Guest
 - Dec 24, 2002, 12:56 AM
Do I detect a bit of animosity between Georgie Porgie and Ed Curran? Hmmmm....let's see...was HE the "buffoon" who was managing the FBI program when George crashed and burned?  I think you should try to develop a better relationship with Ed and maybe he will answer some of your questions.  Can't blame him if all you do is attack him (and call him names).  Don't know the gent, but you sure seem to be pretty tough on him.
Posted by George W. Maschke
 - Dec 21, 2002, 07:21 AM
Quote from: Mark Mallah on Dec 20, 2002, 03:52 PM
...
My main point is that now, especially since the NAS report, it reflects very poorly on any organization that continues to use polygraph screening.  Chances are, their myopia and blinkered approach about this particular issue repeats itself in other areas too.  No organization is perfect, each has flaws, but when the evidence is so overwhelming, and the old approach is adhered to nevertheless, there's a problem.

Mark,

I think a key aspect of the problem is that the counterintelligence arms of federal agencies such as the CIA, FBI, and NSA are largely in the hands of buffoons. Polygraph advocate Ed Curran, who wreaked havoc while maladministering counterintelligence for the FBI, CIA, and DOE is a prime example of the problem.

The abolishment of polygraph screening will have to come from the outside: the senior management of these organizations are too corrupt and/or incompetent to make a policy change that would necessarily involve an implicit public admission of a past error of such magnitude.
Posted by False +
 - Dec 20, 2002, 07:21 PM
Stopnik,

I can directly relate to your experience with the CIA. I had a specific issue test with them, to "verify" my stated drug-use of a one-time experience with marijuana. It was without a doubt the most degrading experience of my life. The examiner's conclusion was that I was not only a habitual user (including the eve of the polygraph itself), but also a dealer. He didn't go homosexual on me though, but I assume your polygraph was much longer than the 5 hours I was under, because I was working for a defense contractor and not the CIA itself.

Much like you and Mark have stated, the organizations behind these polygraphs need serious revamping. Since the inertia behind the polygraph ball and chain is so great, these agencies don't want to hear about change, or about anything requiring serious effort. I remember trying to reason with my CIA adjudication officer if it made any sense to her whatsoever that the examiner's accusations were true, given my academic and professional history (and my clean police record etc..). She didn't want to hear about it. The polygraph gives them a nice, simple "pass" or "fail". Any reasoning transcending this model is systematically rejected. It works great for the people that are "IN".
Posted by stopnik
 - Dec 20, 2002, 05:22 PM
Very true. Unfortunately, I feel like we are living in a society that is quite blindly groping for an adequate solution to the events of 9-11. Notwithstanding the NAS report, I think most public safety agencies will begin to rely even more heavily on the polygraph as a screening tool. Because it gives some of these organizations with less than stellar records (read: FBI, CIA), a false sense of security and feeling like they are accomplishing something tangible (ruining the career aspirations of potential job candidates). Sort of like the old police adage that the only way to really site an officer's effectiveness is through the number of traffic citations they issue. For example, the FBI's reaction to the Hansen (sp?) espionage case was to begin polygraphing all employees! You really have to wonder about the mentality behind silly decisions such as that!

As for any deflectors – yes, I have an axe to grind. When I was an undergraduate in college, I interviewed with the CIA. I had to rank their polygraph process as the worst experience of my life. I had no knowledge of polygraphy (rhymes with polygamy!) and their "interrogation" techniques. Basically, I was accused of being a homosexual drug pusher! Talk about scary false positives. I can't possibly see the benefit of that whole process. There I was – young, well-educated, trilingual – and I was humiliated and rejected on the basis of that stupid machine! And to think federal agencies are suffering a dearth of qualified LEO and intelligence personnel – and they still use the polygraph (after Aldrich Ames, Robert Hansen, etc.) I really have to wonder what nimrods are running the system we live in? Just some letting off some steam....
Posted by Mark Mallah
 - Dec 20, 2002, 03:52 PM
QuoteI just wanted to say that is an excellent point you raised -- about the use of the polygraph being a reflection of the agencies that use them. You are absolutely right -- but poly's are an unfortunate method that is used to screen candidates for some very rewarding occupations (FD, PD, etc.). That is why the use of countermeasures is so important -- so people can work around some of the ridiculous obstacles placed in their path (i.e.: polygraphs). Sometimes it is a reflection of "the system" more than a particular agency.

I agree, there is definitely a distinction between the occupation and the agency.  Law enforcement and intelligence can be wonderful and rewarding occupations, and needless to say, vitally important.  

Then there are the law enforcement and intelligence organizations.  Whether those organizations function effectively is a separate issue.

My main point is that now, especially since the NAS report, it reflects very poorly on any organization that continues to use polygraph screening.  Chances are, their myopia and blinkered approach about this particular issue repeats itself in other areas too.  No organization is perfect, each has flaws, but when the evidence is so overwhelming, and the old approach is adhered to nevertheless, there's a problem.
Posted by stopnik
 - Dec 20, 2002, 01:31 PM
I just wanted to say that is an excellent point you raised -- about the use of the polygraph being a reflection of the agencies that use them. You are absolutely right -- but poly's are an unfortunate method that is used to screen candidates for some very rewarding occupations (FD, PD, etc.). That is why the use of countermeasures is so important -- so people can work around some of the ridiculous obstacles placed in their path (i.e.: polygraphs). Sometimes it is a reflection of "the system" more than a particular agency.

Keep on fighting!
Posted by Mark Mallah
 - Dec 19, 2002, 10:31 PM
Skeptic/Anonymous/George:

Thanks for the comments; good points.

We apparently agree that it's the error rate--and not the examiner's lies--that is the decisive factor.

I don't believe the examiner's deception, or any amount of venality on the part of the examiner, justifies countermeasures.  But protecting oneself against the high risk of a false positive outcome is a persuasive argument for countermeasures, and on those grounds, are ethically justified.

Given the need to continually lie about having used countermeasures, it's probably not the tactic I would choose.  And it does, in some way, indulge the process.

The ethically best option, as The Lie... states, is to refuse to take the test.  I realize that this is not always possible, particularly for applicants.  Those applicants should be aware though that the use of the polygraph is a direct reflection of the agencies using them.
Posted by Anonymous
 - Dec 19, 2002, 12:01 PM
Mark,

You write:

Quote...If countermeasures are ethically justifiable, they should be so even if the examiner told no lies, but simply used a machine such as the polygraph that gets it wrong far too often.  Your thought on that, Anonymous? (and anyone else)
...

I couldn't agree with you more.  The reason and the justification for countermeasures stems from polygraphy's (screening's in particular)  lack of diagnostic validity and accompanying consequences which requires adopting a mode of self preservation (countermeasures) completely justified by the bedrock principle of self-defense as outlined by our friend, Skeptic.  The deception inherent in CQT polygraphpy is merely the icing on the cake if you will...just one more repugnant act which I suppose adds a degree of feeling as well as the obvious purpose to the required countermeasures.
Posted by George W. Maschke
 - Dec 19, 2002, 06:05 AM
Mark,

You wrote, among other things:

QuoteTurning that around a bit, what if the examiner was a liar but the test was as valid as a urine test?

If the polygraph "test" were as valid as a urine test, any discussion of the ethics of polygraph countermeasures would be rendered moot by the fact that it would be unbelievably stupid to employ such. Polygraphers would be able to detect countermeasures with a very high degree of confidence simply by asking, "Did you employ countermeasures?"  ;)
Posted by Skeptic
 - Dec 19, 2002, 05:18 AM
Quote from: Mark Mallah on Dec 19, 2002, 04:00 AM
In the Drew Richardson quote cited by Anonymous, Drew does indeed make a devastating indictment of the polygraph, with which I wholeheartedly agree.  And yet, I still believe that one's ethical choices must flow from bedrock principles, and not turn on whether others are ethical or not.

I agree.  But self-defense can be a bedrock principle, which would lead to the ethic that lying in order to defend oneself from fraud is an allowable, even necessary action (more on principles in a moment).

QuoteIf countermeasures are ethically justifiable, they should be so even if the examiner told no lies, but simply used a machine such as the polygraph that gets it wrong far too often.  Your thought on that, Anonymous? (and anyone else)

I believe it is not enough to say, "I won't lie because it's wrong" -- that's not a principle so much as an internalization of a rule.  I think one needs to look at underlying principles that lead to the notion that lying is wrong in a given context.  The purpose of a background check/polygraph is to determine the suitability of a candidate for a given position, which includes requisite skills and abilities, behavioral tendencies (e.g. committment to keeping a secret, willingness to inform the employer of security problems and attempts at subversion, etc.), and situational considerations (e.g. what could be used to put pressure on the candidate to break faith with the employer? etc.).

Thus, in the context of a background check/polygraph, I believe the ethical purpose of candidate truthfulness is twofold.  First, to facilitate judgement regarding the general suitability of a candidate for a position of trust.  Second, to demonstrate a behavioral tendency to not withold important, relevant information from the employer.

Now, consider a part of the hiring process (the polygraph) that tends to lead to incorrect conclusions regarding the suitability of a candidate for a given position.  In order to facilitate the original purpose of the background investigation, one could make a very strong argument that it is ethically necessary to do what is possible to ensure a correct outcome on the polygraph, just as it is necessary to answer all relevant questions truthfully in a security interview.  In doing so, not only are you facilitating a correct judgement regarding your suitability, but you are demonstrating that the employer can trust you to deliver important, relevant information accurately and truthfully, and to prevent misunderstandings.  

By correcting a highly-flawed information-gathering procedure through the use of countermeasures, you are fulfilling your ethical responsibility to facilitate and cooperate fully with the very purpose of the background investigation, including the polygraph.

Skeptic
Posted by Mark Mallah
 - Dec 19, 2002, 04:00 AM
In the Drew Richardson quote cited by Anonymous, Drew does indeed make a devastating indictment of the polygraph, with which I wholeheartedly agree.  And yet, I still believe that one's ethical choices must flow from bedrock principles, and not turn on whether others are ethical or not.

If countermeasures are ethically justifiable, they should be so even if the examiner told no lies, but simply used a machine such as the polygraph that gets it wrong far too often.  Your thought on that, Anonymous? (and anyone else)

Turning that around a bit, what if the examiner was a liar but the test was as valid as a urine test?

With that in mind, I think the strongest justification for countermeasures is not that the examiner is a liar, but the self-preservation approach.  Why should one use the total honesty approach and risk being a martyr?  I do think there is a case to be made for this.  However, I still think it is an ethical compromise.

As Anonymous points out, there are definitely times when one must and should lie.  An undercover operation itself is a lie about identity, and lying is part of the process.  As I mentioned before, when confronted by a criminal, any type of lie is appropriate.  Many polygraph situations are, I believe, different though.  And even within the polygraph, I think it's a different ethical scenario if given a polygraph as a falsely accused murder suspect versus as an applicant.
Posted by Anonymous
 - Dec 18, 2002, 04:43 PM
Skeptic,

I understand the point of view that Mark was expressing, but I must respectfully take exception to that point of view.  As Mark would know from his role as a former FBI agent, when an undercover agent works with thugs he may well (perhaps will be compelled to) have to adapt his own behavior in an otherwise unpleasant and unacceptable manner in order to associate with and interact successfully with such.  I would suggest that the role of a polygraph examinee who is familiar with the deception of polygraphy, has any sense of self preservation, and while interacting (i.e., taking a polygraph exam) with a polygraph examiner is not unlike that of the aforementioned undercover agent.