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Posted by George W. Maschke
- Apr 25, 2014, 06:34 AMIn the polygraph community, any admission that the polygraph cannot actually detect deception is heresy. I wouldn't expect to find such a statement in any document originating from within a federal polygraph program. However, it's plausible that such an acknowledgement might be found in some higher level personnel security policy documents.
However, as Dr. Drew Richardson observed in his Senate testimony on polygraph screening, there is disinformation built into the system because policy makers turn to their polygraphers for advice on polygraph matters, and they are precisely the ones with the most to hide about polygraphy.
However, as Dr. Drew Richardson observed in his Senate testimony on polygraph screening, there is disinformation built into the system because policy makers turn to their polygraphers for advice on polygraph matters, and they are precisely the ones with the most to hide about polygraphy.
Posted by ptrck123
- Apr 25, 2014, 06:15 AMthe best leak i think would put an end to the polygraph is information just blatantly saying the polygraph is not a lie detector and is simply an interrogation device.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Apr 25, 2014, 05:37 AMI suppose the answer to that question would depend on what's in those documents. Since we don't know, it's hard to speculate on what the outcome of their disclosure might be.
Most information about polygraph procedure is unclassified, and for practical reasons, it needs to be unclassified. The basic polygraph techniques in existence today (the control question test and the relevant/irrelevant technique) were largely developed by people outside the U.S. government and their details have been widely published. Another factor that makes classifying a polygraph technique problematic is the (perceived) need to administer it to people without security clearances (for example, applicants and informants).
To the best of my understanding, most of what is now classified about polygraphy has to do with research into polygraph countermeasures. The government withheld such information from the National Research Council when it conducted its review of the scientific evidence on the polygraph ca. 2000-2002.
I suspect that that documentation would show that polygraph countermeasures of the type outlined in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector can influence polygraph outcomes and that they cannot be reliably detected.
If all classified information about polygraphy (including countermeasures) were to be publicly disclosed, I don't think America's national security would be significantly harmed. Rather, I think it might well enhance security to the extent that it were to cause reconsideration of our misplaced reliance on polygraphy for vetting applicants, employees, and informants.
Polygraph screening has a very poor track record when it comes to identifying spies, saboteurs, and terrorists.
As always, AntiPolygraph.org welcomes tips from members of the polygraph community about information that they believe should be made public. Pointers for communicating securely and anonymously may be found here.
Most information about polygraph procedure is unclassified, and for practical reasons, it needs to be unclassified. The basic polygraph techniques in existence today (the control question test and the relevant/irrelevant technique) were largely developed by people outside the U.S. government and their details have been widely published. Another factor that makes classifying a polygraph technique problematic is the (perceived) need to administer it to people without security clearances (for example, applicants and informants).
To the best of my understanding, most of what is now classified about polygraphy has to do with research into polygraph countermeasures. The government withheld such information from the National Research Council when it conducted its review of the scientific evidence on the polygraph ca. 2000-2002.
I suspect that that documentation would show that polygraph countermeasures of the type outlined in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector can influence polygraph outcomes and that they cannot be reliably detected.
If all classified information about polygraphy (including countermeasures) were to be publicly disclosed, I don't think America's national security would be significantly harmed. Rather, I think it might well enhance security to the extent that it were to cause reconsideration of our misplaced reliance on polygraphy for vetting applicants, employees, and informants.
Polygraph screening has a very poor track record when it comes to identifying spies, saboteurs, and terrorists.
As always, AntiPolygraph.org welcomes tips from members of the polygraph community about information that they believe should be made public. Pointers for communicating securely and anonymously may be found here.
Posted by ptrck123
- Apr 24, 2014, 10:08 PMIf a federal polygrapher were to become a whistleblower and share every single top secret polygraph document about it's policy and procedure, what do you think would come of the polygraph community and its effect as a whole?