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Posted by George W. Maschke
- Nov 23, 2003, 04:53 AMSkeptic,
I also suspect that you are correct in surmising that the report is referring to deterrence, rather than detection, of espionage. Ultimately, though, the deterrence value of an invalid technology like polygraph "testing" depends on public ignorance. For anyone seriously contemplating espionage nowadays, an hour of research on the Internet should go a long way toward dispelling any such ignorance.
Unfortunately, the interim Project Slammer report, which seems to be the only publicly-available one, does not explain in what sense the polygraph was "consistently most effective" or on what basis that conclusion was reached.
I also suspect that you are correct in surmising that the report is referring to deterrence, rather than detection, of espionage. Ultimately, though, the deterrence value of an invalid technology like polygraph "testing" depends on public ignorance. For anyone seriously contemplating espionage nowadays, an hour of research on the Internet should go a long way toward dispelling any such ignorance.
Unfortunately, the interim Project Slammer report, which seems to be the only publicly-available one, does not explain in what sense the polygraph was "consistently most effective" or on what basis that conclusion was reached.
Posted by Marty
- Nov 22, 2003, 04:34 PMQuote from: Skeptic on Nov 22, 2003, 01:51 PMSkeptic,
Thus, it looks to me like the performance of the polygraph is being reviewed for its effectiveness in keeping people in line, rather than actually catching spies. In other words, the assessment of the polygraph listed in this report appears to be as regards the fear it instills in employees, instead of its efficacy for catching spies.
Skeptic
I think you are interpreting it correctly. I am rather curious about how similar the mindset that triggers the decision to become a traitor is to the mindset of thieves. They too have a sense of entitlement, feel others are doing it, and even think of themselves as basically "good." The article suggests that the polygraph may be a sort of prophylactic, delaying or stopping the triggering into espionage. Could well be. There is no indication Nixon's observation about the polygraph (scares the hell out of folks) has significantly diminished.
-Marty
Posted by Skeptic
- Nov 22, 2003, 01:51 PMQuote from: George W. Maschke on Nov 21, 2003, 01:01 PMAlthough no convicted spy was caught by the polygraph, the report remarkably states, without further explanation, that "[t]he security measure that was consistently most effective was the polygraph" and that "[a]side from polygraph, security procedures are not viewed as obstacles to espionage."
Hmmm...in context, it would appear that this report may deal more with how spies or personnel view security measures, rather than the actual effectiveness of the security measures (in addition to other topics covered, such as typical characteristics of spies)
Thus, it looks to me like the performance of the polygraph is being reviewed for its effectiveness in keeping people in line, rather than actually catching spies. In other words, the assessment of the polygraph listed in this report appears to be as regards the fear it instills in employees, instead of its efficacy for catching spies.
Skeptic
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Nov 21, 2003, 01:01 PMProject Slammer is a CIA-sponsored study of Americans convicted of espionage against the United States. An interim report dated 12 April 1990 has been declassified (with redactions) and is now available here:
http://antipolygraph.org/documents/slammer-12-04-1990.shtml
A PDF version (125 kb) is available here:
http://antipolygraph.org/documents/slammer-12-04-1990.pdf
Although no convicted spy was caught by the polygraph, the report remarkably states, without further explanation, that "[t]he security measure that was consistently most effective was the polygraph" and that "[a]side from polygraph, security procedures are not viewed as obstacles to espionage."
http://antipolygraph.org/documents/slammer-12-04-1990.shtml
A PDF version (125 kb) is available here:
http://antipolygraph.org/documents/slammer-12-04-1990.pdf
Although no convicted spy was caught by the polygraph, the report remarkably states, without further explanation, that "[t]he security measure that was consistently most effective was the polygraph" and that "[a]side from polygraph, security procedures are not viewed as obstacles to espionage."