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|
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Community Staff Washington, D.C. 20505 |
ICS 0858-90
12 April 1990
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Forum
FROM: [ ]
SUBJECT: Project SLAMMER Interim Report (U)
As members will recall, Project SLAMMER is an innovative
Community research program using state-of-the-art behavioral
science techniques. The intent is to better understand and
deter espionage through the direct assessment of convicted
American spies. The interim report attached reflects much of
the more recent work of the group engaged in the project. This
program is conducted under the sponsorship of the Personnel
Security Committee (PSC) of the Advisory Group/Security
Countermeasures (AG/SCM), with personnel from the various
Community organizations participating. The report is provided
to Forum members for information, with the permission of the
Chairman, PSC. Any comments you wish to offer are welcomed and
may be submitted to [ ] directly or through CCISCMO.
[ ]
ENCLOSURE
Attachment:
a/5
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Project Slammer Interim Progress Report
Submitted to [ ]
Chairman, Personnel Security Committee
15 December 1989
SLAMMER-GRAM
This is an interim presentation of observations developing in the progress
of Project Slammer, an Intelligence Community sponsored study of espionage.
This research examines espionage by interviewing and psychologically assessing
actual espionage subjects. Additionally, persons knowledgeable of subjects are
contacted to better understand the subjects' private lives and how they are
perceived by others while conducting espionage. This "Slammer-gram" briefly
shares subjects' self-perceptions and some of the implications that might be
considered in view of these insights. To date, cases studied have involved only
male subjects, the majority of whom were volunteers in initiating espionage.
The following observations are offered with the caveat that this is work in
progress, each issue is worthy of continuing study and will be reported in
greater depth in the next formal report scheduled for release in June, 1990.
HOW THE ESPIONAGE SUBJECT SEES HIMSELF (at the time he initiates espionage)
He believes:
- He is special, even unique.
- He is deserving.
- His situation is not satisfactory.
- He has no other (easier) option (than to engage in espionage).
- He is only doing what others frequently do.
- He is not a bad person.
- His performance in his government job (if presently employed)
is separate from espionage; espionage does not (really) discount
his contribution in the workplace.
- Security procedures do not (really) apply to him.
- Security programs (e.g., briefings) have no meaning for
him, unless they connect with something with which he can
personally identify.
[ ]
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He feels isolated from the consequences of his actions:
- He sees his situation in a context in which he faces
continually narrowing options, until espionage seems
reasonable. The process that evolves into espionage reduces
barriers, making it essentially "Okay" to initiate the crime.
- He sees espionage as a "Victimless" crime.
- Once he considers espionage, he figures out how he might
do it. These are mutually reinforcing, often simultaneous
events.
- He finds that it is easy to go around security safeguards
(he is able to solve that problem). He belittles the security
system, feeling that if the information was really important
espionage would be hard to do (the information would really
be better protected). This "Ease of accomplishment" further
reinforces his resolve.
He attempts to cope with espionage activity:
- He is anxious on initial HOIS contact (some also feel
thrill and excitement).
- After a relationship with espionage activity and HOIS develops,
the process becomes much more bearable, espionage continues
(even flourishes).
- In the course of long term activity subjects may reconsider
their involvement.
-- Some consider breaking their role to become an operative
for the government. This occurs when access to classified
information is lost or there is a perceived need to prove
themselves, or both.
-- Others find that espionage activity becomes stressful, they
no longer want it. Glamour (if present earlier) subsides.
They are reluctant to continue. They may even break contact.
-- Sometimes they consider telling authorities what they have
done. Those wanting to reverse their role aren't confessing,
they're negotiating. Those who are "Stressed out" want to
confess. Neither wants punishment. Both attempt to minimize
or avoid punishment.
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SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT IMPLICATIONS
- The security measure that was consistently most effective
was the polygraph.
- Aside from polygraph, security procedures are not viewed as
obstacles to espionage. Security procedures are seen by subjects
only as inconveniences.
- Changes in affluence or travel abroad are easily (although
falsely) explained. Explanations are rarely challenged; if
so the reasons given are accepted by those who inquire.
- Espionage subjects don't see themselves as traitors. Their
acts are usually sustained with some measure of comfort and
self justification.
- The security briefings that seem to have any impact on this
group have something in the message with which the subject
can personally identify. Among the areas subjects have
suggested are, the acknowledgment of espionage as appearing
reasonable to those who do it, that (in time) the honeymoon
is over and glamour turns to threat, and that some subjects
may want to come in from the cold, but they don't know how
to do that (without taking a deep plunge into punishment).
- It is not until after they have been apprehended that they
feel remorse, which is perceived in personal terms, such as
their own stress and pain caused to loved ones. National
security issues are of little or no relevance.
- Subjects sometimes do think about turning themselves in,
but they are not sure how to do that. Trying to find
out (how) has risks so high that they can be scared away.
The community may wish to consider procedures so that subjects
can (from their perspective) more readily approach authorities.
- Subjects often tell people close to them what they
are doing, and sometimes even engage associates in the process.
Former intimates (spouses, lovers, close friends - people with
whom they spent a good deal of time) are a potentially important
source of information in all investigations.
- Subjects almost invariably conceive of committing espionage
after they are in a position of trust. While initial
screening continues to be important, focusing on update
and monitoring procedures seems increasingly worthwhile.
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