QuoteAre you stating that it is your belief that countermeasures will not help guilty people defeat the polygraph and your only intent is to ensure that innocent people pass by augmenting their naturally occuring responses?
QuoteI also noted that you mentioned in an earlier post that some countermeasures may be counterproductive to helping those innocent people. I certainly agree with that and I commend you for your candor. As Dr Barland noted in the "To those who have tried countermeasures" thread, there are risks. Certainly neither you nor I want to have an innocent person countermeasuring their way into a false positive.
QuoteThough I disagree with your basic premise that innocent people need to augment their responses in order to pass a polygraph, I acknowledge that you believe it and your stated intent is genuine, in my opinion.
QuoteI'm also glad you acknowledge that the implementation of countermeasures is not easy and requires extensive study and practice.
QuoteIn the laboratory studies by Honts et al., about half of programmed guilty subjects were able to beat the polygraph after no more than 30 minutes of training (and, as I mentioned earlier, experienced polygarphers were not able to detect the countermeasures at better than chance levels). For persons who face a polygraph interrogation in the real world, the stakes are typically high. A person's career or even his liberty may depend on the outcome. Hence, it is, in my opinion, only prudent that someone planning to use countermeasures to protect himself against a false positive outcome should invest more than 30 minutes studying and practicing.
Quote from: Examiner on Sep 06, 2001, 11:32 PM
Psuedo Relevant:
A very good choice of screen name, very appropriate. Bring something of substance to the discussion and I'll be happy to comment.
Quote
Yes, an examiner lies during the conduct of an interview. Every investigator I have ever known or heard of, from law enforcement to insurance to private lies during the interview process. The United States Supreme Court sanctioned this type of activity decades ago. This is an appropriate and accepted aspect of law enforcement. Its not like its any secret, I fail to understand why this is such a significant issue here.
QuoteLies! Lies! Lies!
One important point about the various lie detection methods that we have only touched upon in passing deserves explicit emphasis in this summing up. All of these techniques fundamentally depend on deception -- not just in one way and not just in little ways. The theory and assumptions of polygraphic interrogation require the examiner to successfully deceive each subject that he tests in several basic ways. First, he must persuade the subject that being untruthful or even unsure about his answers to the control questions may cause him to fail the test, although in fact the opposite of this is true. Second, when he administers the "stim" test in order to impress the subject with the accuracy of the technique, the examiner has two choices, both of them deceptive. He can use the original Reid "pick-a-card" method in which the deck is either stacked or marked so that the examiner can be sure to guess the right card. Alternatively, he can use the Raskin "pick-a-number" method in which he deceitfully explains that he is "determining what your polygraphic response looks like when you lie." The truth is, of course, that individuals do not show characteristic physiological response patterns when they lie that they do not also show when telling the truth. Third, throughout his interactions with the subject, the examiner must convey the impression of virtual infallibility. The stimtest is just a component of this basic deception. The purpose is benign enough; if guilty subjects are convinced the polygraph will reveal their guilt, then they are more likely to respond strongly to the relevant questions. If innocent subjects are similarly convinced, then they will tend not to respond so strongly. Moreover, because most examiners truly believe in their near-infallibility, because as we have seen they are the victims of their own deceptive art, they may convey this needed impression not only effectively but also without conscious guile. Nonetheless, the polygraph test, as we have seen, has an accuracy closer to chance than to infallibility; the innocent suspect being tested by the police faces worse odds than in a game of Russian roulette. The fact that most polygraph examiners are not aware of these facts (indeed, they may be the last to know) is not an adequate excuse. Fourth, when the subject is interrogated after a polygraph test, he may be the victim of repeated deceptions. "This unbiased, scientific instrument is saying that you're not telling the truth about this, John!" "Why don't you tell me whatever it is that you feel guilty about, Mary, then maybe you will do better on the next test." "With this polygraph chart, George, no one is going to believe you now. The best thing you can do is to confess and make the best deal you can."
I will confess here that I do not personally object to certain harmless deceptions of criminal suspects that might lead to verifiable confessions and a quick and easy solution to a criminal investigation. But a procedure that claims to be a genuine test for truth that cannot hope to succeed even by its own theory and assumptions unless the subject is successfully deceived in certain standard ways is an invitation to abuse, abuse by examiners and especially by sophisticated criminals and spies. I submit that it is madness for courts or federal police and security agencies to rely on polygraph results for this reason alone. As we have seen, of course, there are many other reasons for this same diagnosis.
Quote from: The Examiner on Sep 01, 2001, 04:44 PM
The problem that existed for both of the individuals being discussed here, is the case facts showed their involvement. When the commander has no information as to the circumstances which lead these individuals to commit criminal acts, the only option is to err on the conservative side and assume they acted deliberately.
QuoteThe 17 individuals I spoke of all were unsuccessful in their efforts to employ countermeasures. All confessed to commiting the crimes they were suspected of. All admitted to obtaining your download and practicing and then employing the countermeasures described in the text. These, by no means represent the total number of people I have detected performing countermeasures. This thread originated from a discussion of two additional cases, which are not included in that 17.
QuoteIn the last several weeks I have encountered numerous DI subjects, who abruptly terminated their interviews at the 40-60 minute mark. I spoke with you briefly about this at DoDPI. Per your suggestion I "studied" George's book and sure enough at the top of page 81, he instructs them to do exactly what I had experienced.
QuoteAnd I do find this confusing, George you cite peer-reviewed research that people with not more than 30-minutes training in the type of countermeasures you describe can easily defeat a polygraph. But now you say that anyone planning to utilize this approach is well advised to spend more than 30-minutes training. If this is true, how is that paticular research project applicable in supporting what you advocate. It appears to me that you do not believe that the polygraph can be easily defeated.
QuoteMy comments are regarding criminal testing only, as I previously stated these two areas of polygraphy are completely different and mixing them in the discussion is not an accurate way to address the topic.
QuoteI personally know of 17 people who would disagree with the guidance provided on this site, that performing countermeasures as describe in the download makes it easy to pass a polygraph. They tried, they failed. Yes, they confessed.
QuoteThey must have just been inept because its obvious anyone who spends 30 minutes prepping can beat a poly, right George?
QuoteI really expected better from you than this. I do not "simply" decide to pass or fail people who take polygraph examinations. I know that is what you want people to believe, but in my agency at least, it doesn't work that way.
QuoteI think wannabe and others refer to "coin flip" accuracy as meaning "no better than chance." While polygraphy has not been shown to work better than chance, the "coin flip" metaphor may be misleading to the extent that it suggests that polygraphers are wrong half the time. This need not be the case. For example, when you polygraph a servicemember who has tested positive on a urinalysis test, you have strong presumptive evidence that the person knowingly used an illegal drug. If you simply decided to "fail" all such persons when they come to you for a polygraph "test," you'll likely be right much more than half the time, even though such a methodology is completely invalid from a scientific standpoint. Similarly, in the case of counterintelligence-scope polygraph screening, if you simply decide to "pass" everyone, you'll be right almost all the time, because almost no one is a spy or saboteur. And yet again, this technique is completely invalid.
QuoteI appreciate your clarification of the information in your download, obviously I did have the options in the wrong order. I was happy to note that your advice to criminals is do not take a polygraph and it ends there. I would agree that countermeasures will not mitigate their result.