DoDPI Polygraph Handbook FOIA Appeal

The polygraph handbook which is the subject of this FOIA request is unclassified and sets forth the U.S. Government's standardized techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations. Click here (1.04 mb PDF) to download those portions of the handbook which DSS has thus far released. For discussion of the implications of DSS's withholding this document from the public, see the AntiPolygraph.org message board thread, Can a Forensic Test Be Secret?

Portions of the 20 pages thus far released have been redacted, while 53 pages have been withheld in their entirety. In his letter dated 9 April 2002 withholding these portions of the PDD Examiner Handbook, Mr. Leslie R. Blake, Chief of the Office of Freedom of Information and Privacy, cites Exemption (b)(2), which applies to "a document which, if released, would allow circumvention of an agency rule, policy, or statute, thereby impeding the agency in the conduct of its mission" and (b)(7)(E), which applies to "information compiled for law enforcement purposes which, if released, would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions." More to the point, Mr. Blake notes that "DSS is not going to release any information that could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Mr. Blake also cites case law where the withholding of polygraph-related information has been upheld.

First, as I mentioned previously in a supplement to my original request, the Department of Defense states in its Polygraph Program Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2000 that the Handbook "sets forth standardized techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations." And DoDPI publicly represents polygraphy to be a forensic technique, dubbing it "forensic psychophysiology." It bears repeating that the "standardized techniques and procedures" of any genuine forensic test cannot legitimately be withheld from the public. The very term "forensic" is derived from the Latin forensis, meaning "public." The term connotes openness, not secrecy. As defined in Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, "forensic" means "belonging to, used in, or suitable to courts of judicature or to public discussion and debate." Indeed, public release of the information contained in the Handbook (and the Handbook itself) could be compelled through the discovery process in any court of law where federal polygraph procedure is at issue. For this reason alone, the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

DSS argues that "the information contained in the PDD Examiner Handbook...is not generally known to the public." And DSS (or DoDPI) evidently wants to keep things that way. But as we shall see, the essential elements of the polygraph techniques outlined in the PDD Examiner Handbook were originally developed outside of the federal government and documentation regarding them has been made publicly available by the polygraph community itself. Moreover, federal polygraphers have regularly published detailed information about the very techniques described in the Handbook, apparently unconcerned that public disclosure of them "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." It seems that it is only when a critic of polygraphy requests such information that a need for secrecy is invoked.

Despite DSS's claimed need for secrecy, extensive information about the procedures outlined in the Handbook has been published in Polygraph, the quarterly publication of the American Polygraph Association, most of whose editors have been senior members of the federal polygraph community. Polygraph is available to anyone who cares to subscribe to it, and a 30-year CD-ROM archive may be purchased from the American Polygraph Association. In addition, Polygraph may be perused in numerous libraries.

DSS also claims that the Handbook does not "regulate the public." However, based on the "standardized techniques and procedures" outlined in the Handbook, the U.S. Government purports to determine whether thousands of federal employees and applicants for employment (as well as thousands of contractors) are spies, saboteurs, terrorists, drug abusers, or drug traffickers. These members of the public are indeed regulated by the standardized techniques and procedures outlined in the Handbook. Without access to the information in the Handbook (all of which is unclassified), they are left unable to independently verify whether any polygraph examination was conducted in accordance with DoDPI standards.

Chapter VI of the PDD Examiner Handbook is titled "Test Data Analysis" and presumably concerns the scoring of polygraph charts. In 1999, DoDPI instructor Jimmy Swinford published in Polygraph an article titled, "Manually Scoring Polygraph Charts Utilizing the Seven-Position Numerical Analysis Scale at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute" (Polygraph, Vol. 28 [1999], No. 1, pp. 10-27). This article begins:

Swinford's article includes official DoDPI illustrations of scorable polygraph reactions. Clearly, DoDPI did not believe that publication of this detailed, 17-page article "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." It is hard to see how release of the Handbook's 3-page minichapter on test data analysis would do so. Chapter VI of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter VII concerns the "acquaintance test." Again, the essential elements of the acquaintance test are no secret. Ronald E. Decker, then director of the Army Polygraph Course (DoDPI's forebear), described the numerical stimulation (or acquaintance) test then in use by most federal polygraphers in an article titled, "The Army Stimulus Test - A Control Procedure" (Polygraph, Vol. 7 [1978], No. 3, pp. 176-77). Decker notes in part:

Clearly, the director of the U.S. Army Polygraph Course did not believe that publicly releasing detailed information about the current stimulation or acquaintance test "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter VII of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter VIII concerns the Zone Comparison Test (ZCT). The ZCT was devised by Cleve Backster, then a private polygrapher, circa 1961. He still teaches the technique at The Backster School of Lie Detection in San Diego, California. The ZCT is similarly taught at private polygraph schools across the country (and indeed, the world). Moreover, DoDPI has previously publicly released detailed information regarding its version of the ZCT. For example, DoDPI provided private polygrapher James Allan Matte with the following document:

This document is cited at p. 369 of Matte's book, Forensic Psychophysiology Using the Polygraph (J.A.M. Publications, 1996). In Chapter 11 of that book, Matte provides the precise question order of both the DoDPI Tri-Spot Zone Comparison Technique and the DoDPI Bi-Spot Zone Comparison Technique, along with sample relevant, control, and irrelevant questions.

In addition, Norman (Norm) Ansley, the former director of the NSA's polygraph research program, described the ZCT in some detail in his article, "The Zone Comparison Test" (Polygraph, Vol 27 [1998], No. 2, pp. 108-122). In this 15-page article, Ansley provides the precise question order for DoDPI's ZCT, including sample relevant, control, and irrelevant questions. Norm Ansley -- who in addition to having directed the NSA's polygraph research is also a past president of the American Polygraph Association and for many years served as Polygraph's editor -- apparently did not believe that this information "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter VIII of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter IX of the Handbook concerns the "You Phase Zone Comparison Test." Again, this technique was originated by Cleve Backster, not DoDPI. Documentation of it is publicly available in Chapter 11 of Matte's Forensic Psychophysiology Using the Polygraph, where Backster's instructional handouts for the "You Phase" are reproduced. This was done with Backster's approval: he even wrote an introduction for the book. It is inconceivable that Cleve Backster, who in 1948 established the CIA's polygraph program, would have allowed these materials to be made public if he thought they "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter IX of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter X of the Handbook concerns comparison test formats. Note that the comparison ("control") question test was developed not by anyone in the U.S. government, but by John E. Reid, a private polygrapher, who described it more than 50 years ago in an article titled, "A Revised Questioning Technique in Lie-Detection Tests," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1947, 37, 542-547. There are two basic kinds of comparison questions, "probable-lie" and "directed-lie." Most polygraph techniques in use today are some form of comparison or "control" question "test." There is little, if anything, about them that is not documented in the open literature. Chapter X of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter XI of the Handbook covers the peak of tension test. This technique, too, was not developed by the U.S. Government. It was developed some seventy years ago most notably by Leonard Keeler, who described it in his 1938 book, The Detection of Deception. More recently, Norm Ansley, the former head of the NSA polygraph research program, published a 66-page article on the peak of tension test ("The History and Accuracy of Guilty Knowledge and Peak of Tension Tests," Polygraph, Vol. 21 [1992], No. 3, pp. 174-247). In this article, Mr. Ansley details several U.S. Government versions of the peak of tension test. For example, he describes the FBI's version, based on a 5-page FBI handout that was circulated at a 1985 seminar of the American Polygraph Association. (Note that attendance at these seminars is not limited to federal employees, or even to APA members: non-members may also attend.) Ansley also describes the "standard Army method" based on a November 1984 lesson plan, in addition to a DoDPI revision to the peak of tension test, based on a 1991 memo by the DoDPI director. Ansley even provides a sample DoDPI question series for the peak of tension test. Clearly, the former head of the NSA polygraph research program did not believe that publication of this information "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter XI of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Polygraph Test," Polygraph, Vol. 3 [1974], No. 2, pp. 119-166 and "Some Principles of Question Selection and Sequencing for Relevant-Irrelevant Testing," Polygraph, Vol. 5 [1976], No. 3, pp. 207-222). It is inconceivable that Weir would have published these articles on the relevant/irrelevant screening test if he believed that publication of such information "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter XII of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter XIII covers the specific issue relevant/irrelevant test. The principles outlined in former NSA polygraph program director Weir's articles would apply with equal force to specific issue testing. In addition, Leonard H. Harrelson, the longtime director of the Keeler Polygraph Institute in Chicago (where Weir received his polygraph training) has detailed the specific issue application of the relevant/irrelevant technique in his recent book, Lietest: Deception, Truth and the Polygraph (Fort Wayne, Indiana: Jonas Publishing, 1998). There is no reason to believe that release of this chapter "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter XIII of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter XIV covers the Test for Espionage and Sabotage (TES). DoDPI itself has publicly documented this technique in the recent past. For example, in 1995, the DoDPI Research Division staff published "A Comparison of Psychophysiological Detection of Deception Accuracy Rates Obtained Using the Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph and the Test for Espionage and Sabotage Question Formats," the text of which is available on AntiPolygraph.org at:

Additional details of the TES are included in the DoDPI study protocol, "Psychophyiological Detection of Deception Accuracy Rates Obtained Using the Test for Espionage and Sabotage: A Replication," which DSS previously (and properly) released under the Freedom of Information Act. It is available on AntiPolygraph.org at:

Clearly, DoDPI and DSS themselves do not believe that public release of this kind of information "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter XIV of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter XV covers law enforcement applicant screening. DoDPI routinely provides training in law enforcement applicant screening to non-federal personnel. For example, on 10 June 2002, the Hartford Courant newspaper published a feature article by Roger Calip titled "True Fit: Polygrapher a Puzzle Solver," which highlighted West Hartford, Connecticut police sergeant Paul Melanson. The article describes how Sgt. Melanson received his polygraph training at DoDPI in 1999 and now conducts pre-employment polygraph screening for his department. DoDPI regularly disseminates information on law enforcement applicant screening outside federal channels when it trains police officers like Sgt. Melanson, who is now at liberty to share what he learned at DoDPI (as well as any publications he received while there) with whomever he pleases. Chapter XV of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter XVI addresses the "counterintelligence scope polygraph test." This kind of test is typically a variation of the Modified General Question Test adapted for counterintelligence screening. There is nothing mysterious about it, and high-ranking members of the federal polygraph community have in the past not refrained from discussing it in the open literature. For example, NSA polygraphers Richard S. Weaver and Marcia Garwood, Ph.D., discussed counterintelligence screening methods in their article, "Comparison of Relevant/Irrelevant and Modified General Question Technique Structures in a Split Counterintelligence-Suitability Phase Polygraph Examination" (Polygraph, Vol. 14 [1985], No. 2, pp. 97-107). And in the unclassified 1989 DoDPI report "Studies of the Accuracy of Security Screening Polygraph Examinations" by Gordon H. Barland, Charles R. Honts, and Steven D. Barger, a sample counterintelligence-scope test question sequence is even provided (at p. 47). Chapter XVI of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

Chapter XVII of the handbook covers the "field rank order scoring system." Rank order scoring has been discussed in detail in the open polygraph literature. Charles R. Honts and Lawrence N. Driscoll discussed it in their article, "A Field Validity Study of the Rank Order Scoring System (ROSS) in Multiple Issue Control Question Tests" (Polygraph, Vol. 17 [1988], No. 1, pp. 1-15). More recently, Polygraph published a paper by Kathleen Miritello titled, "Rank Order Analysis" (Polygraph, Vol. 28 [1999], No. 1, pp. 74-76). This paper, which is archived among the holdings of the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, provides explicit instructions for conducting rank order analysis for multiple-issue examinations. Clearly, DoDPI itself does not believe that publicly releasing this kind of information "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection." Chapter XVII of the Handbook should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act.

While DSS has released the majority of the Handbook's glossary of terms, it has curiously withheld the definitions of five terms. Because DSS redacted not just the definitions, but also the terms themselves, I cannot provide specific arguments as to why each term should properly be released under the Freedom of Information Act. However, it seems ludicrous for DSS to argue that public knowledge of the definitions of terms used in polygraphy (and indeed, even the terms themselves) "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection."

The argument that public disclosure of the kinds of standardized techniques and procedures contained in the Federal PDD Handbook "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection" is one that the federal polygraph community itself obviously does not believe. As we have seen, the federal polygraph community itself has released a great deal of such information. In this light, DSS's claim that releasing such information "could possibly benefit those attempting to reduce the effectiveness of the polygraph or violate the law and avoid detection" does not pass the "giggle test."

Please release the withheld portions of the Federal PDD Examiner Handbook. If, however, you determine that DoDPI's unclassified standardized techniques and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations are somehow too dangerous for the American people to know, then I suggest that you order the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute to promptly cease and desist from representing polygraphy to be a "forensic" technique, for by withholding those standardized techniques and procedures, you will have tacitly acknowledged that "psychophysiological detection of deception" is not a forensic science, but a pseudoscientific fraud.