Lethe,

Yes, all of the government polygraph examiners are skilled investigators, but not all of the troops required to assess credibility are poly guys.  Also, curtural and language barriers make traditional assement techniques much harder to employ.  If PCASS increases their odds at all, it could save young lives.  Pragmatic usefulness can exceed scientific accuracy. 

Jacob, I have significant disagreements with Skip Webb over polygraph policies and proceedures, but he is not an idiot, and he is absolutely not evil.  Didn't the first century rabbi you often quote warn us about that sort of judgement?    Why not turn the other cheek?

One point of particular concern regarding the PCASS is that a red light on this "traffic light of truth" should not be taken as a green light for torture "enhanced interrogation techniques."

Hey Guys!  I have an idea.  

Take PCASS off the field.  Let's have the soldiers in harms way simply ask their detainees if they're linked or related to Al Queda.  If they say yes, because we know they'll be honest with us, then arrest them.  If they say no, just give them their weapons back and send them along their merry way.

Sounds like a plan, huh?!

Sackett

P.S.  Lethe and all you other human "rights" lemmings out there...  stop salivating!  It's not gunna happen!  

But had ya going there for a minute!!!   

You George, as always, have once again MISSED THE POINT!

What is your alternative suggestion to the problem; in the field?  You do not have one!  That is MY point!  I'd rather rely on something that works 80% of the time, than nothing that works none of the time...


Sackett

sackett wrote on May 7^th, 2008 at 6:50pm:

There is no logical requirement that a person have an alternative to an inaccurate instrument before stating that the instrument is, in fact, inaccurate.

You would rather have troops use a flawed machine and rely on possibly erroneous results than to use nothing?

Sackett, how accurate must a device be before it can be used?  Suppose the PCASS is accurate only 55% of the time (I'm not saying that's the case, but just for instance) would that be accurate enough to warrant using it?  If so, what if it were only 51% accurate?  If not, how accurate would it need to be in order to be used?

Also, I'm not sure that current research has addressed the susceptibility of the PCASS to countermeasures.  Former APA President Skip Webb appears pretty concerned that it can be beaten easily with CM and has tacitly implied that this is the case.  Given the probability that the very people that we'd most want to detect in deception (members of Al Qaeda and similar groups) are the most likely to know how to use CM, isn't this an important point to address?

Also, I'm not sure that you can do lab experiments with Americans and assume that the same accuracy will be obtained when using the PCASS on someone whose country you have invaded and occupied and who has had you stick a gun in his face.  A lot of these people in Afghanistan and Iraq probably don't really like our country nor trust our service members.  Given the importance of the subject believing at least some of what the polygrapher/PCASSer says, isn't it possible that this could impact accuracy?  I think these are all points worth at least investigating before giving the PCASS the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.

Given all of the unaddressed problems with the device, I think it is reasonable to call into question just how accurate it is going to be.  You claim it will be accurate enough, but just how accurate is that?

Also, regardless of what the accuracy level is, should our troops be given accurate information about the accuracy level?  Or should they just get the "it's very, very accurate" line that polygraphers like to give?

Also, George, I think it'd be a good idea to encourage soldiers who have access to the PCASS to try it out on each other and see if they can beat it.  Since it is the machine--and not the operator--who makes the determinations on deception, these informal experiments should be very easy to conduct.  They can help illustrate either the ease or difficulty with which the machine can be beaten; if they find it easy to beat they can decrease the confidence they put in it, if it is hard to beat they can increase such confidence.  In either case, people in harm's way have more information about their tools, which is a good thing.  Also, if it turns out to be easy to beat, hopefully word of this will filter out.

T.M. Cullen wrote on May 9^th, 2008 at 1:01am:


TC, I'm no expert on that angle of the business, but I doubt it.  Most decisions to use the polygraph are made by department heads and police chiefs, not by legislators.  This decentralization is helpful to the polygraph-industrial complex, as it leaves fewer traces of the debate on it's usefulness and allows them to get a few individual people aside and convince them that they need to cover their ass, regardless of how reliable the polygraph may be.  It also makes it easier to strong arm people with bandwagon tactics: c'mon, everyone else is doin' it, just try it, it won't hurt you the first time.   

If done at the legislative level, there'd be more questions about reliability and the assumptions about the polygraph would be questioned more in depth.  These proceedings would also leave records, which polygraphers want to avoid.  So I doubt they have a big lobbying arm--it's not needed.  They want to avoid that venue, if at all possible.  Remember, the polygraph thrives on secrecy, it can only exist in the dark, not in the Light.