Ludovico wrote on Oct 5
th, 2007 at 7:49pm:
Keep in mind that we have two theories here:
1) that countermeasures can defeat the test in a modern testing context (I think we all know that old studies don't cut it - the situation is changed now that George has initiated his campaign to educate and encourage every terrorist, psychopath, and sex offender to use countermeasures),
I don't know that "old studies don't cut it," as you aver. Could you explain why the studies by Honts et al. that I cited should be discounted?
As for your suggestion that I'm on a "campaign to educate and encourage every terrorist, psychopath, and sex offender to use countermeasures," 1) that's not the case: AntiPolygraph.org provides polygraph countermeasure information to the public in order to provide truthful persons with a means of protecting themselves against the significant risk of a false positive outcome and 2) even if our purpose
were to aid the guilty, it would have no bearing on the truth or falsity of the information presented. See my
"Response to Paul M. Menges Regarding the Ethical Considerations of Providing Polygraph Countermeasures to the Public." Quote:and
2) that countermeasures can be easily detected.
This is a postion that polygraphers such as Charles Honts and Gordon Barland are not taking.
Quote:Even your own digithead's favorite source of information - the NRC report - concurs that there is evidence that countermeasures don't help, and that claims that they do require supporting evidence.
You made this argument a few days ago, and as I
pointed out then, the study to which the NRC/NAS report refers in this regard was of "spontaneous" or untrained countermeasures, which are not comparable to the "point" countermeasures (applied timely with the control questions) described in
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. Quote:but this is noteworthy
Quote:Because it is possible that countermeasures can increase “failure” rates among nondeceptive examinees and because a judgment that an examineeis using countermeasures can have the same practical effect as the judgment that the test indicates deception, their use by innocent individuals may be misguided.
"failure" meaning, of course "not passing"
The foregoing passage, too, is made with reference to the same study of
untrained countermeasures: things that examinees without knowledge of polygraph procedure think up themselves in the hope of increasing their chances of passing. To cite this passage without the proper context is misleading. There is no evidence that the kind of countermeasures taught in
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector increase an innocent examinee's chances of a false positive result.
Quote:and finally,
Quote:...claims that it is easy to train examinees to “beat” both the
polygraph and trained examiners require scientific supporting evidence
to be credible. However, we are not aware of any such research.
While the studies by Honts et al. did not specifically address the ease with which countermeasures may be taught, it bears repeating that under the low motivational conditions of the laboratory (where examinees had minimal incentive to learn), half of deceptive subjects were able to pass the polygraph with a
maximum of 30 minutes of training, and trained and experienced examiners were unable to detect them. Of course, more research would be welcome, but this is an area of inquiry that
DACA, the main funding source for polygraph research, seems uneager to explore.
The NRC/NAS report's key conclusion (at p. 214) regarding polygraph countermeasures is that "the evidence does not provide confidence that polygraph accuracy is robust against potential countermeasures."
Pages: 
Ex-FBI Polygrapher Ron Homer Beaten (Read 15101 times)
