The truth didn't work for me, but my best friend lied on her exam and it worked for her.   Can you explain this to me?

Torpedo wrote on Dec 9^th, 2003 at 1:03am:


My consistent position has been that truthful individuals should make an informed choice regarding whether to employ polygraph countermeasures to protect against the risk of a false positive outcome.

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I'm certainly not upset with you for citing the NAS report. For the benefit of those who don't have the PDF or paper copy, here is a link to p. 139 (from which one can also navigate to p. 140):

http://books.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html/139.html

The relevant passage states (at p. 140):

"Some examinees who have not committed crimes, security breaches, or related offenses, or who have little to hide, might nevertheless engage in countermeasures with the intent to minimize their chances of false positive test results (Maschke and Scalabrini, no date). This strategy is not risk-free for innocent examinees. There is evidence that some countermeasures used by innocent examinees can in fact increase their chances of appearing deceptive (Dawson, 1980; Honts, Amato, and Gordon, 2001)." (emphasis added)

Not having read Dawson's article, I cannot comment on it. However, it should be noted that the article by Honts, Amato, and Gordon ("Effects of spontaneous countermeasures used against the comparison question test." Polygraph Vol. 30 [2001], No. 1, pp. 1-9) deals with "spontaneous" or untrained countermeasures, that is, things that people ignorant of polygraph procedure might do on their own in an attempt to improve their chances of passing.

The countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector are qualitatively different from the spontaneous countermeasures that are the subject of the article by Honts, Amato, and Gordon. No polygrapher has ever demonstrated any ability to reliably detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

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As noted earlier, the "evidence that some countermeasures used by innocent examinees can in fact increase their chances of appearing deceptive" cited in the NAS report apparently refers to countermeasures other than those suggested by AntiPolygraph.org.

I find it ironic that you, as a practitioner of a trade that depends on lies, deceit, and public ignorance of how polygraphy "works," would characterize those who come to this site seeking to educate themselves as "faithful sheep."

I also find it ironic that you (and a number of other polygraph proponents who have posted on this message board) would liken me to some kind of cultic religious figure. As you peruse your copy of the NAS report, you may care to take a look at the section of Chapter 1 titled "The Lie Detection Mystique," in which the polygraph community is likened to a shamanistic priesthood that keeps its rites secret to protect its power.

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To paraphrase David Lykken, that which is not rocket science, and indeed, not science at all, is polygraphic lie detection.

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Many who have taken your advice and simply told the truth have been surprised to find themselves wrongly branded as liars by your voodoo science. Just food for thought.

Marty,

You write, among other things:

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I think you overlook a key difference: polygraphic lie detection has no sound theoretical basis, and with some agencies, the risk of failing may be 50-50 or worse.

By contrast the methodology of CQT polygraphy is well known and well documented, making the employment of countermeasures, in my estimation, a considerably safer bet than simply hoping that the polygraph will get it right.

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Marty,

Because polygraphic lie detection has no scientific basis and no diagnostic value, your foregoing argument has little relevance for the truthful applicant weighing the risks of employing countermeasures versus doing nothing and hoping that an invalid test will yield accurate results. Let's suppose that the pre-employment polygraph failure rate at a particular agency is about 50%, and that about half of those who fail are in fact deceptive. It does not follow that a truthful applicant has only about a 25% chance of failing. His chances are closer to 50%. Which was my point.

Marty,

Again, a key difference between the use of CQT polygraphy to detect deception and the use of countermeasures to influence the outcome of a CQT polygraph examination is that while the CQT has no sound theoretical basis, countermeasures to the CQT do have a sound theoretical basis that is consistent with known facts about CQT methodology. Which speaks to why of the 96% of Society for Psychophysiological Research members surveyed who had an opinion, 99% agreed that "the CQT can be beaten by augmenting one's responses to the control questions." (See, W.G. Iacono and D.T. Lykken, "The Validity of the lie detector: Two surveys of scientific opinion," Journal of Applied Psychology, 1997, 82, 426-433; discussed also in Chapter 12 of Lykken's A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector, 2nd ed., 1998.)

Marty,

My point was with regard to countermeasures to the CQT having a sound theoretical basis despite the lack of any such basis for the CQT itself. Do you agree?