[Federal Register: April 14, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 71)] 
[Proposed Rules]                
[Page 17886-17890] 
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] 
[DOCID:fr14ap03-12]                          
 
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
 
10 CFR Part 709 
 
[Docket No. CN-03-RM-01] 
RIN 1992-AA33 
 
  
Office of Counterintelligence; Polygraph Examination Regulations 
 
AGENCY: Department of Energy. 
 
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity for public  
comment. 
 
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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE or Department) publishes a  
notice of proposed rulemaking to begin a proceeding to consider whether  
to retain or modify its current Polygraph Examination Regulations. DOE  
is undertaking this action, among other reasons, to satisfy the  
directive of section 3152 of the National Defense Authorization Act for  
Fiscal Year 2002 that following issuance of the National Academy of  
Sciences' Polygraph Review (NAS Polygraph Review), DOE is to prescribe  
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program, whose  
Congressionally-specified purpose is ``* * * to minimize the potential  
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or  
information.'' 
 
DATES: Written comments (10 copies) are due June 13, 2003. 
 
ADDRESSES: You may choose to address written comments to U.S.  
Department of Energy, Office of Counterintelligence (CN-1), Docket No.  
CN-03-RM-01, 1000 Independence Avenue. SW., Washington, DC 20585.  
Alternatively, you may e-mail your comments to: poly@hq.doe.gov. You  
may review or copy the public comments DOE has received in Docket No.  
CN-03-RM-01 and any other docket material DOE makes available at the  
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room, Room 1E-190, 1000 Independence  
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585. This notice of proposed rulemaking  
and supporting documentation is available on DOE's internet home page  
at the following address: http://www.energy.gov. 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Hinckley, U.S. Department of  
Energy, Office of Counterintelligence, CN-1, 1000 Independence Avenue,  
SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5901; or Lise Howe, U.S.  
Department of Energy, Office of General Counsel, GC- 
 
[[Page 17887]] 
 
73, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586- 
2906. 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:  
 
I. Introduction 
 
    Under section 3152(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for  
Fiscal Year 2002 (NDAA for FY 2002), DOE is obligated to prescribe  
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program the stated  
purpose of which is ``* * * to minimize the potential for release or  
disclosure of classified data, materials, or information'' (42 U.S.C.  
7383h-1(a).) Section 3152(b) requires DOE to ``* * * take into account  
the results of the Polygraph Review,'' which is defined by section  
3152(e) to mean ``* * * the review of the Committee to Review the  
Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy of  
Sciences'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(b), (e)). 
    Upon promulgation of final regulations under section 3152, and  
``effective 30 days after the Secretary submits to the congressional  
defense committees the Secretary's certification that the final rule *  
* * has been fully implemented, * * *'' section 3154 of the National  
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (NDAA for FY 2000) (42  
U.S.C. 7383h), would be repealed by operation of law. (42 U.S.C. 7383h- 
1(c).) The repeal of section 3154 would eliminate the existing  
authority which underlies DOE's counterintelligence polygraph  
regulations, which are codified at 10 CFR part 709, but would not  
preclude the retention of some or all of those regulations through this  
rulemaking pursuant to the later-enacted section 3152 of the NDAA for  
FY 2002. 
    In Part II of this Supplementary Information, DOE reviews  
background information useful in understanding the existing statutory  
and regulatory provisions applicable to DOE's current  
counterintelligence polygraph examination program. In Part III of this  
Supplementary Information, DOE discusses its preliminary views with  
regard to the relevant factual and policy issues, including DOE's  
evaluation of the NAS Polygraph Review which is entitled ``The  
Polygraph and Lie Detection.'' That discussion explains why the  
Secretary of Energy has approved today's preliminary proposal to retain  
the regulations in 10 CFR part 709 as a balanced approach for the  
carefully circumscribed use of polygraph examinations as a tool that  
appears in current circumstances well-suited to accomplish the  
Congressionally-specified purpose ``* * * to minimize the potential for  
release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or information''  
(42 U.S.C. 7383h-1). 
    DOE invites interested members of the public to provide their views  
on the issues in this rulemaking by filing written comments. With an  
open mind, DOE intends carefully to evaluate the public comments  
received in response to this notice of proposed rulemaking. DOE will  
then consider whether to issue a supplemental notice of proposed  
rulemaking with additional policy options for public comment and  
whether it is necessary and timely to hold a public hearing to provide  
an opportunity for presentation of oral comments. 
 
II. Background 
 
    Consistent with section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000, DOE published  
a notice of final rulemaking establishing 10 CFR part 709 on December  
17, 1999 (64 FR 70975). The provisions of 10 CFR part 709 list the  
types of employees and positions that are subject to polygraph  
examinations. Under 10 CFR 709.4, the polygraph program applies to all  
DOE employees and contractor employees, applicants for employment, and  
other individuals assigned or detailed to positions in eight categories  
which are discussed in detail in part III of this Supplementary  
Information. Employees may request exculpatory polygraph examinations  
to deal with unresolved counterintelligence or personnel security  
issues. Part 709 also describes the polygraph examination protocols DOE  
uses, the policies for safeguarding the privacy rights of employees,  
and the requirements that apply to ensure well qualified and well  
trained polygraph examiners. 
    After DOE promulgated 10 CFR part 709, Congress amended section  
3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000 by section 3135 in the National Defense  
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. 106-398). Section 3135  
amended the earlier definition of ``covered persons'' contained in  
section 3154 to include assignees, detailees and applicants. The  
definition of ``high risk program'' was revised to include programs  
using information known as Sensitive Compartmented Information, SAP,  
PSAP, PAP, and any other program or position category specified in  
section 709.4(a) of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 3135  
amended section 3154(f) to add the terms ``terrorism'' after  
``sabotage'' and ``deliberate damage to or malicious misuse of a United  
States Government information or defense system'' to the statutory  
definition of the scope of a counterintelligence polygraph examination.  
Section 3135 also amended section 3154 by adding language that limited  
the Secretary's authority to waive the examination requirement. 
 
III. DOE's Proposal To Implement Section 3152(a) of the NDAA for FY  
2002 
 
    The focal point for analysis of the factual information and policy  
considerations relevant to this rulemaking is the Congressionally  
stated purpose of the counterintelligence polygraph regulations which  
is ``* * * to minimize the potential for release or disclosure of  
classified data, material, or information'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(a)).  
Given the nature of this directive--as a statement of the purpose of  
the program, not as a standard that the program must meet--DOE does not  
construe this directive as a mandate mechanistically to construct a  
program that takes all steps to protect classified data, materials, or  
information, no matter what the countervailing considerations.  
Construing the directive in that fashion could lead to absurd results,  
potentially requiring DOE to expend so much of its resources on  
polygraphs and associated provisions that the program would  
significantly detract from DOE's ability to accomplish its national  
security mission. At the same time, however, DOE does believe that the  
directive signals a Congressional hierarchy in the weighing of various  
considerations, pursuant to which DOE must take potential jeopardy of  
classified data, materials, or information very seriously in  
considering the potential consequences that may flow from how it  
constructs its program. DOE has evaluated the question whether to  
retain or modify the list of positions currently set forth in its  
regulations as subject to polygraph examinations over a five-year  
period against this Congressionally-stated purpose so construed. 
    As noted above, that list is set forth at 10 CFR 709.4. It  
includes: ``(1) Positions that DOE has determined include  
counterintelligence activities or access to counterintelligence sources  
and methods; (2) positions that DOE has determined include intelligence  
activities or access to intelligence sources and methods; (3) positions  
requiring access to information that is protected within a non- 
intelligence special access program (SAP) designated by the Secretary  
of Energy; (4) positions that are subject to the Personnel Security  
Assurance Program (PSAP); (5) positions that are subject to the  
Personnel Assurance program (PAP); (6) positions that DOE has  
determined have a need-to-know or access to information specifically  
designated by the Secretary 
 
[[Page 17888]] 
 
regarding the design and operation of nuclear weapons and associated  
use control features; (7) positions within the Office of Independent  
Oversight and Performance Assurance, or any successor thereto, involved  
in inspection and assessment of safeguards and security functions,  
including cyber security, of the Department; (8) positions within the  
Office of Security and Emergency Operations, or any successor thereto *  
* *'' This list reflects, but is not restricted to, the positions  
listed in section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000. Consistent with section  
3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE proposes to retain these eight  
position categories because in each category there are individuals who  
possess or have routine access to classified data, material, or  
information that would likely be targeted for acquisition by foreign  
powers. DOE has not reached a firm conclusion that all the position  
categories on the list should be retained, or that all should be  
retained in their current form, but it believes that a sufficient basis  
for their retention exists that it is not prepared to propose the  
modification or removal of any at this time. DOE accordingly  
particularly invites comment on the question whether the list, or any  
of the position categories on the list, is overinclusive or  
underinclusive, and if so, how and on what basis the list, or any of  
the position categories on the list, should be modified. 
    The list of position categories in 10 CFR 709.4(a) also includes  
two categories of individuals who volunteer for polygraph examinations.  
There is a category of applicants for employment who opt for the  
Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP) (10 CFR 709.4(a)(9)).  
These applicants choose to be polygraphed in order to obtain expedited  
interim ``Q'' clearances pending completion of field investigations.  
There is also a category composed of incumbent employees who volunteer  
for so-called exculpatory polygraph examinations to resolve questions  
that have arisen in the context of counterintelligence investigations  
or personnel security issues (10 CFR 709.4(a)(10). 
    The NAS Polygraph Review examined the scientific evidence with  
regard to the validity of polygraph examinations used for the screening  
of applicants for employment and incumbent employees, as well as for  
specific-event investigations (which include what DOE calls  
``exculpatory polygraph examinations''). The NAS pointed out that the  
available scientific evidence is generally of low quality and consisted  
of 57 studies of which 53 are specific-event investigations and four  
are flawed studies of employee screening. While noting that the  
available empirical research has not established the underlying factors  
that produce the physiological responses observed during polygraph  
examinations, and that generalizing from such responses in research  
settings to real world settings is hazardous, the NAS nevertheless  
concluded that ``* * * specific-incident polygraph tests discriminate  
lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below  
perfection * * *'' (NAS Polygraph Review at p. 3). DOE is inclined to  
accept this conclusion with regard to exculpatory polygraph  
examinations under 10 CFR 709.4(a)(10), but given the limitations of  
the tool, DOE does not treat the results of such examinations as  
conclusive as to truthfulness or mendacity. Accordingly, DOE may follow  
up an exculpatory polygraph result with additional investigative  
activities if DOE considers that action appropriate. DOE does not now  
contemplate any change in this policy. 
    With regard to polygraph examinations for employee screening under  
10 CFR part 709, the NAS takes a significantly different view. Against  
the background of what it acknowledges is very sparse evidence, the NAS  
is dubious about both the validity and the advisability of such  
examinations. 
    Validity. According to the NAS, the proportion of the employee  
population at DOE that poses a major national security threat  
(presumably including threats to classified information) is extremely  
low. In the NAS's view, screening in a population with a very low rate  
of target transgressions will necessarily yield, as a function of how  
sensitively the polygraph test is set, either a large number of false  
positives or a large of false negatives (NAS Polygraph Review at 4, 2-4  
through 2-7, 2-20 though 2-21, and 7-2 through 7-4). On that basis, the  
NAS concludes that polygraph examinations are too inaccurate to be used  
for employee screening. (NAS Polygraph Review, p.4.) 
    In reaching its negative conclusion, the NAS acknowledged that a  
screening polygraph, even if set to reduce the number of false  
positives, will identify true positives who are being deceptive.  
Accordingly, DOE does not believe that the issues that the NAS has  
raised about the polygraph's accuracy are sufficient to warrant a  
decision by DOE to abandon it as a screening tool. Doing so would mean  
that DOE would be giving up a tool that, while far from perfect, will  
help identify some individuals who should not be given access to  
classified data, materials, or information. DOE does not believe  
wholesale abandonment of a tool that has some admitted value for that  
purpose can be squared with Congress's overall direction to implement a  
polygraph program whose purpose is `` * * * to minimize the potential  
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or  
information.'' 
    Advisability. The NAS's main conclusion is that lack of evidence of  
validity and accuracy justifies not using polygraph examinations for  
screening purposes. In arriving at this conclusion, the NAS also took  
into account the expense associated with invalid polygraph results, the  
potential loss of competent or highly skilled individuals due to false  
positives or the fear of such a test result, and claims of adverse  
impact on civil liberties. The NAS also acknowledged but considered  
less significant the deterrent effect that the prospect of being  
polygraphed could have on employment applicants who are national  
security risks. In short, what NAS conducted was a cost-benefit  
analysis that (given the nature of the costs and benefits) inevitably  
rested in no small part on value judgments made by the NAS. There is  
nothing inappropriate about this approach in light of the NAS's mission  
and charge. 
    DOE, however, has a significantly different mission--one that is  
intimately involved in science, but directed to a particular end--the  
national security of the United States; therefore, not surprisingly,  
section 3152 gave the Department a particular charge for its polygraph  
program. That charge was not to devise a program based on the NAS's or  
the Department's own weighing of costs and benefits based on its own  
value judgments. Rather, Congress directed DOE to develop a polygraph  
program focused on minimizing the risk of release or disclosure of  
classified information. That amounts to a Congressional specification  
that the most important cost about which DOE should be concerned is the  
risk of release or disclosure of classified information. DOE believes  
that Congress's judgment in that regard was reasonable. Given that  
DOE's classified information consists in significant measure of  
information regarding nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the  
consequences of compromise of that information can be profoundly  
significant. Those consequences make it sensible for Congress to  
conclude that DOE's priority should be on deterrence and detection of  
potential security risks with a secondary priority of mitigating the  
consequences of false positives and false negatives. Moreover, whatever  
may be the importance of other 
 
[[Page 17889]] 
 
considerations, DOE believes that at this time, when the United States  
is engaged in hostilities precisely in order to address the potentially  
disastrous consequences that may flow from weapons of mass destruction  
falling into the wrong hands, it is under a particular obligation to  
make sure that no action that it takes be susceptible to  
misinterpretation as a relaxation of controls over information  
concerning these kinds of weapons. For all these reasons, while fully  
respecting the questions the NAS has raised about the use of polygraphs  
as a screening tool, DOE does not believe it can endorse the NAS's  
conclusion that the tool should be laid down. 
    Perhaps in recognition that its main conclusion was less tenable in  
the context of Federal agencies with national security missions  
established by law, the NAS went on to conclude in the alternative that  
if polygraph screening is to be used at all, it should only be used as  
a trigger for follow-up detailed investigations and not as a sole basis  
for personnel action (NAS Polygraph Review, p. 5). This alternative  
conclusion appears to DOE to be much more compatible with the priority  
DOE is statutorily invited to place on minimizing the potential for  
release or disclosure of classified information. It is also consistent  
with the way DOE currently uses screening polygraphs. 
    Under DOE's current regulations, neither DOE nor its contractors  
may take an adverse personnel action against an individual solely on  
the basis of a polygraph result indicating deception (10 CFR 709.25).  
If, after an initial polygraph examination, there are remaining  
unresolved issues, DOE must advise the individual and provide an  
opportunity for the individual to undergo an additional polygraph  
examination. If the additional polygraph examination is not sufficient  
to resolve the matter, DOE must undertake a comprehensive investigation  
using the polygraph examination as an investigative lead (10 CFR  
709.15(b)). In DOE's view, this regulatory scheme is consistent both  
with the NAS's alternative conclusion and with the statutory priority  
on minimizing release or disclosure of classified information.  
Therefore, pursuant to section 3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE today  
proposes on a preliminary basis to retain the regulatory provisions in  
part 709. DOE invites public comment on its evaluation of the NAS  
Polygraph Review with regard to employee screening and on its  
assessment that the existing provisions of part 709 are consistent with  
the NAS's alternative conclusion. 
 
IV. Regulatory Review 
 
A. National Environmental Policy Act 
 
    The proposed rule would retain the existing procedures for  
counterintelligence evaluations to include polygraph examinations and  
therefore will have no impact on the environment. DOE has determined  
that this rule is covered under the Categorical Exclusion in DOE's  
National Environmental Policy Act regulations in paragraph A.5 of  
appendix A to subpart D, 10 CFR part 1021, which applies to rulemakings  
amending an existing regulation that does not change the environmental  
effect of the regulations being amended. Accordingly, neither an  
environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is  
required. 
 
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act 
 
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, requires  
preparation of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for every  
rule that must be proposed for public comment, unless the agency  
certifies that the rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant  
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This  
rulemaking will not directly regulate small businesses or small  
governmental entities. It will apply principally to individuals who are  
employees of, or applicants for employment by, some of DOE's prime  
contractors, which are large businesses. There may be some affected  
small businesses that are subcontractors, but the rule will not impose  
unallowable costs. Accordingly, DOE certifies that the proposed rule,  
if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a  
substantial number of small entities. 
 
C. Paperwork Reduction Act 
 
    DOE has determined that this proposed rule does not contain any new  
or amended record-keeping, reporting or application requirements, or  
any other type of information collection requirements that require the  
approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the  
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq. The OMB has defined  
the term ``information'' to exclude certifications, consents, and  
acknowledgments that entail only minimal burden [5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1)]. 
 
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 
 
    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.,  
requires a Federal agency to perform a detailed assessment of the costs  
and benefits of any rule imposing a Federal mandate with costs to  
state, local, or tribal governments, or to the private sector of $100  
million or more. The proposed rule does not impose a Federal mandate  
requiring preparation of an assessment under the Unfunded Mandates  
Reform Act of 1995. 
 
E. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999 
 
    Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations  
Act of 1999, (Pub. L. No. 105-277), requires Federal agencies to issue  
a Family Policymaking Assessment for any proposed rule that may affect  
family well being. This proposed rule will not have any impact on the  
autonomy or integrity of the family as an institution. Accordingly, DOE  
has concluded that it is not necessary to prepare a Family Policymaking  
Assessment. 
 
F. Executive Order 12866 
 
    Executive Order 12866, 58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993) provides for a  
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the  
Office of Management and Budget of a ``significant regulatory action,''  
which is defined as an action that may have an effect on the economy of  
$100 million or more or adversely affect the economy, competition,  
jobs, productivity, environment, public health or safety, or state,  
local or tribal governments. DOE has concluded that this proposed rule  
(10 CFR Part 709) is not a significant regulatory action. Accordingly,  
this rulemaking has not been reviewed by the Office of Information and  
Regulatory Affairs. 
 
G. Executive Order 12988 
 
    Section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, 61 FR 4729 (February 7,  
1996) imposes on executive agencies the general duty to adhere to the  
following requirements: (1) Eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity;  
(2) write regulations to minimize litigation; and (3) provide a clear  
legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard, and  
promote simplification and burden reduction. Section 3(b) of Executive  
Order 12988 specifically requires that executive agencies make every  
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies  
the preemptive effect, if any; (2) clearly specifies any effect on  
existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard  
for affected conduct while promoting simplification and burden  
reduction; (4) specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately  
defines key terms; and (6) addresses 
 
[[Page 17890]] 
 
other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship  
under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General. Section 3(c) of  
Executive Order 12988 requires executive agencies to review regulations  
in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and section 3(b) to  
determine whether they are met or it is unreasonable to meet one or  
more of them. DOE has completed the required review and determined  
that, to the extent permitted by law, this proposed rule meets the  
relevant standards of Executive Order 12988. 
 
H. Executive Order 13084 
 
    Under Executive Order 13084, 63 FR 27655 (May 19, 1998), DOE may  
not issue a discretionary rule that significantly or uniquely affects  
Indian tribal governments and imposes substantial direct compliance  
costs. This proposed rulemaking would not have such effects.  
Accordingly, Executive Order 13084 does not apply to this rulemaking. 
 
I. Executive Order 13132 
 
    Executive Order 13132, 64 FR 43255 (August 10, 1999), requires  
agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure meaningful and  
timely input by state and local officials in the development of  
regulatory policies that have ``federalism implications.'' Policies  
that have federalism implications are defined in the Executive Order to  
include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the  
States, on the relationship between the national government and the  
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the  
various levels of government.'' On March 14, 2000, DOE published a  
statement of policy describing the intergovernmental consultation  
process it will follow in the development of such regulations (65 FR  
13735). DOE has examined this proposed rule and determined that it  
would not have a substantial direct effect on the states, on the  
relationship between the national government and the states, or on the  
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of  
government. No further action is required by the Executive Order. 
 
J. Review Under Executive Order 13211 
 
    Executive Order 13211 (Actions Concerning Regulations That  
Significantly Affect Energy, Supply, Distribution, or Use), 66 FR 28355  
(May 22, 2001) requires preparation and submission to OMB of a  
Statement of Energy Effects for significant regulatory action under  
Executive Order 12866 that are likely to have a significant adverse  
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. This rulemaking,  
although significant, will not have such an effect. Consequently, DOE  
has concluded that there is no need for a Statement of Energy Effects. 
 
K. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999 
 
    The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (44  
U.S.C. 3516, note) provides for agencies to review most disseminations  
of information to the public under guidelines established by each  
agency pursuant to general guidelines issues by OMB. OMB's guidelines  
were published at 67 FR 8452 (February 22, 2001), and DOE's guidelines  
were published at 67 FR 62446 (October 7, 2002). DOE has reviewed this  
notice of proposed rulemaking under the OMB and DOE guidelines, and has  
concluded that it is consistent with applicable policies in those  
guidelines. 
 
V. Opportunity for Public Comment 
 
    Interested members of the public are invited to participate in this  
proceeding by submitting data, views, or comments on this proposed  
rule. Ten copies of written comments should be submitted to the address  
indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this notice. Comments should be  
identified on the outside of the envelope and on the comments  
themselves with the designation ``Polygraph Examination Regulation,  
Docket No. CN-03-RM-01.'' If anyone wishing to provide written comments  
is unable to provide ten copies, alternative arrangements can be made  
in advance with the DOE. All comments received on or before the date  
specified at the beginning of this notice, and other relevant  
information before final action is taken on the proposed rule, will be  
considered. 
    All submitted comments will be available for public inspection as  
part of the administrative record on file for this rulemaking in the  
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room at the address indicated in the  
ADDRESSES section of this notice. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR  
1004.11, anyone submitting information or data that he or she believes  
to be confidential and exempt by law from public disclosure should  
submit one complete copy of the document, as well as two copies, if  
possible, from which the information has been deleted. The DOE will  
make its determination as to the confidentiality of the information and  
treat it accordingly. 
 
List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 709 
 
    Lie detector tests, Privacy. 
 
    Issued in Washington, DC on April 8, 2003. 
Stephen W. Dillard, 
Director, Office of Counterintelligence. 
 
    For the reasons stated in the preamble, DOE hereby proposes to  
amend 10 CFR part 709 to read as follows: 
 
PART 709--POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION REGULATIONS 
 
    1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 709 is revised to read as  
follows: 
 
    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq., 7101, et seq., 7383h-1. 
* * * * * 
[FR Doc. 03-9009 Filed 4-11-03; 8:45 am] 
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P