Very Hot Topic (More than 25 Replies) DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings! (Read 30922 times)
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
Global Moderator
*****
Online


Make-believe science yields
make-believe security.

Posts: 5935
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands
Joined: Sep 29th, 2000
DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Apr 14th, 2003 at 4:26pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
The Department of Energy was required by law to propose by 8 April 2003 modifications of its polygraph policy taking into account the findings of the National Academy of Sciences' polygraph review. DOE's notification of proposed rulemaking was published in the Federal Register today (14 April 2003).

Amazingly, DOE has rejected the NAS's findings and proposes to retain its existing polygraph program without change! The key finding of the NAS report, of course, is that polygraph screening is completely invalid as a diagnostic instrument for determining truth regarding terrorism, espionage, past activities of job applicants, and other important issues currently so assessed by our various federal, state, and local governments.



[Federal Register: April 14, 2003 (Volume 68, Number 71)]
[Proposed Rules]              
[Page 17886-17890]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr14ap03-12]                        

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

10 CFR Part 709

[Docket No. CN-03-RM-01]
RIN 1992-AA33


Office of Counterintelligence; Polygraph Examination Regulations

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking and opportunity for public
comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE or Department) publishes a
notice of proposed rulemaking to begin a proceeding to consider whether
to retain or modify its current Polygraph Examination Regulations. DOE
is undertaking this action, among other reasons, to satisfy the
directive of section 3152 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 that following issuance of the National Academy of
Sciences' Polygraph Review (NAS Polygraph Review), DOE is to prescribe
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program, whose
Congressionally-specified purpose is ``* * * to minimize the potential
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or
information.''

DATES: Written comments (10 copies) are due June 13, 2003.

ADDRESSES: You may choose to address written comments to U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of Counterintelligence (CN-1), Docket No.
CN-03-RM-01, 1000 Independence Avenue. SW., Washington, DC 20585.
Alternatively, you may e-mail your comments to: poly@hq.doe.gov. You
may review or copy the public comments DOE has received in Docket No.
CN-03-RM-01 and any other docket material DOE makes available at the
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room, Room 1E-190, 1000 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585. This notice of proposed rulemaking
and supporting documentation is available on DOE's internet home page
at the following address: http://www.energy.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Hinckley, U.S. Department of
Energy, Office of Counterintelligence, CN-1, 1000 Independence Avenue,
SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5901; or Lise Howe, U.S.
Department of Energy, Office of General Counsel, GC-

[[Page 17887]]

73, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-
2906.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

   Under section 3152(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002 (NDAA for FY 2002), DOE is obligated to prescribe
regulations for a new counterintelligence polygraph program the stated
purpose of which is ``* * * to minimize the potential for release or
disclosure of classified data, materials, or information'' (42 U.S.C.
7383h-1(a).) Section 3152(b) requires DOE to ``* * * take into account
the results of the Polygraph Review,'' which is defined by section
3152(e) to mean ``* * * the review of the Committee to Review the
Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph of the National Academy of
Sciences'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(b), (e)).
   Upon promulgation of final regulations under section 3152, and
``effective 30 days after the Secretary submits to the congressional
defense committees the Secretary's certification that the final rule *
* * has been fully implemented, * * *'' section 3154 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (NDAA for FY 2000) (42
U.S.C. 7383h), would be repealed by operation of law. (42 U.S.C. 7383h-
1(c).) The repeal of section 3154 would eliminate the existing
authority which underlies DOE's counterintelligence polygraph
regulations, which are codified at 10 CFR part 709, but would not
preclude the retention of some or all of those regulations through this
rulemaking pursuant to the later-enacted section 3152 of the NDAA for
FY 2002.
   In Part II of this Supplementary Information, DOE reviews
background information useful in understanding the existing statutory
and regulatory provisions applicable to DOE's current
counterintelligence polygraph examination program. In Part III of this
Supplementary Information, DOE discusses its preliminary views with
regard to the relevant factual and policy issues, including DOE's
evaluation of the NAS Polygraph Review which is entitled ``The
Polygraph and Lie Detection.'' That discussion explains why the
Secretary of Energy has approved today's preliminary proposal to retain
the regulations in 10 CFR part 709 as a balanced approach for the
carefully circumscribed use of polygraph examinations as a tool that
appears in current circumstances well-suited to accomplish the
Congressionally-specified purpose ``* * * to minimize the potential for
release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or information''
(42 U.S.C. 7383h-1).
   DOE invites interested members of the public to provide their views
on the issues in this rulemaking by filing written comments. With an
open mind, DOE intends carefully to evaluate the public comments
received in response to this notice of proposed rulemaking. DOE will
then consider whether to issue a supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking with additional policy options for public comment and
whether it is necessary and timely to hold a public hearing to provide
an opportunity for presentation of oral comments.

II. Background

   Consistent with section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000, DOE published
a notice of final rulemaking establishing 10 CFR part 709 on December
17, 1999 (64 FR 70975). The provisions of 10 CFR part 709 list the
types of employees and positions that are subject to polygraph
examinations. Under 10 CFR 709.4, the polygraph program applies to all
DOE employees and contractor employees, applicants for employment, and
other individuals assigned or detailed to positions in eight categories
which are discussed in detail in part III of this Supplementary
Information. Employees may request exculpatory polygraph examinations
to deal with unresolved counterintelligence or personnel security
issues. Part 709 also describes the polygraph examination protocols DOE
uses, the policies for safeguarding the privacy rights of employees,
and the requirements that apply to ensure well qualified and well
trained polygraph examiners.
   After DOE promulgated 10 CFR part 709, Congress amended section
3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000 by section 3135 in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Pub. L. 106-398). Section 3135
amended the earlier definition of ``covered persons'' contained in
section 3154 to include assignees, detailees and applicants. The
definition of ``high risk program'' was revised to include programs
using information known as Sensitive Compartmented Information, SAP,
PSAP, PAP, and any other program or position category specified in
section 709.4(a) of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations. Section 3135
amended section 3154(f) to add the terms ``terrorism'' after
``sabotage'' and ``deliberate damage to or malicious misuse of a United
States Government information or defense system'' to the statutory
definition of the scope of a counterintelligence polygraph examination.
Section 3135 also amended section 3154 by adding language that limited
the Secretary's authority to waive the examination requirement.

III. DOE's Proposal To Implement Section 3152(a) of the NDAA for FY
2002

   The focal point for analysis of the factual information and policy
considerations relevant to this rulemaking is the Congressionally
stated purpose of the counterintelligence polygraph regulations which
is ``* * * to minimize the potential for release or disclosure of
classified data, material, or information'' (42 U.S.C. 7383h-1(a)).
Given the nature of this directive--as a statement of the purpose of
the program, not as a standard that the program must meet--DOE does not
construe this directive as a mandate mechanistically to construct a
program that takes all steps to protect classified data, materials, or
information, no matter what the countervailing considerations.
Construing the directive in that fashion could lead to absurd results,
potentially requiring DOE to expend so much of its resources on
polygraphs and associated provisions that the program would
significantly detract from DOE's ability to accomplish its national
security mission. At the same time, however, DOE does believe that the
directive signals a Congressional hierarchy in the weighing of various
considerations, pursuant to which DOE must take potential jeopardy of
classified data, materials, or information very seriously in
considering the potential consequences that may flow from how it
constructs its program. DOE has evaluated the question whether to
retain or modify the list of positions currently set forth in its
regulations as subject to polygraph examinations over a five-year
period against this Congressionally-stated purpose so construed.
   As noted above, that list is set forth at 10 CFR 709.4. It
includes: ``(1) Positions that DOE has determined include
counterintelligence activities or access to counterintelligence sources
and methods; (2) positions that DOE has determined include intelligence
activities or access to intelligence sources and methods; (3) positions
requiring access to information that is protected within a non-
intelligence special access program (SAP) designated by the Secretary
of Energy; (4) positions that are subject to the Personnel Security
Assurance Program (PSAP); (5) positions that are subject to the
Personnel Assurance program (PAP); (6) positions that DOE has
determined have a need-to-know or access to information specifically
designated by the Secretary

[[Page 17888]]

regarding the design and operation of nuclear weapons and associated
use control features; (7) positions within the Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, or any successor thereto, involved
in inspection and assessment of safeguards and security functions,
including cyber security, of the Department; (8) positions within the
Office of Security and Emergency Operations, or any successor thereto *
* *'' This list reflects, but is not restricted to, the positions
listed in section 3154 of the NDAA for FY 2000. Consistent with section
3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE proposes to retain these eight
position categories because in each category there are individuals who
possess or have routine access to classified data, material, or
information that would likely be targeted for acquisition by foreign
powers. DOE has not reached a firm conclusion that all the position
categories on the list should be retained, or that all should be
retained in their current form, but it believes that a sufficient basis
for their retention exists that it is not prepared to propose the
modification or removal of any at this time. DOE accordingly
particularly invites comment on the question whether the list, or any
of the position categories on the list, is overinclusive or
underinclusive, and if so, how and on what basis the list, or any of
the position categories on the list, should be modified.
   The list of position categories in 10 CFR 709.4(a) also includes
two categories of individuals who volunteer for polygraph examinations.
There is a category of applicants for employment who opt for the
Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP) (10 CFR 709.4(a)(9)).
These applicants choose to be polygraphed in order to obtain expedited
interim ``Q'' clearances pending completion of field investigations.
There is also a category composed of incumbent employees who volunteer
for so-called exculpatory polygraph examinations to resolve questions
that have arisen in the context of counterintelligence investigations
or personnel security issues (10 CFR 709.4(a)(10).
   The NAS Polygraph Review examined the scientific evidence with
regard to the validity of polygraph examinations used for the screening
of applicants for employment and incumbent employees, as well as for
specific-event investigations (which include what DOE calls
``exculpatory polygraph examinations''). The NAS pointed out that the
available scientific evidence is generally of low quality and consisted
of 57 studies of which 53 are specific-event investigations and four
are flawed studies of employee screening. While noting that the
available empirical research has not established the underlying factors
that produce the physiological responses observed during polygraph
examinations, and that generalizing from such responses in research
settings to real world settings is hazardous, the NAS nevertheless
concluded that ``* * * specific-incident polygraph tests discriminate
lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below
perfection * * *'' (NAS Polygraph Review at p. 3). DOE is inclined to
accept this conclusion with regard to exculpatory polygraph
examinations under 10 CFR 709.4(a)(10), but given the limitations of
the tool, DOE does not treat the results of such examinations as
conclusive as to truthfulness or mendacity. Accordingly, DOE may follow
up an exculpatory polygraph result with additional investigative
activities if DOE considers that action appropriate. DOE does not now
contemplate any change in this policy.
   With regard to polygraph examinations for employee screening under
10 CFR part 709, the NAS takes a significantly different view. Against
the background of what it acknowledges is very sparse evidence, the NAS
is dubious about both the validity and the advisability of such
examinations.
   Validity. According to the NAS, the proportion of the employee
population at DOE that poses a major national security threat
(presumably including threats to classified information) is extremely
low. In the NAS's view, screening in a population with a very low rate
of target transgressions will necessarily yield, as a function of how
sensitively the polygraph test is set, either a large number of false
positives or a large of false negatives (NAS Polygraph Review at 4, 2-4
through 2-7, 2-20 though 2-21, and 7-2 through 7-4). On that basis, the
NAS concludes that polygraph examinations are too inaccurate to be used
for employee screening. (NAS Polygraph Review, p.4.)
   In reaching its negative conclusion, the NAS acknowledged that a
screening polygraph, even if set to reduce the number of false
positives, will identify true positives who are being deceptive.
Accordingly, DOE does not believe that the issues that the NAS has
raised about the polygraph's accuracy are sufficient to warrant a
decision by DOE to abandon it as a screening tool. Doing so would mean
that DOE would be giving up a tool that, while far from perfect, will
help identify some individuals who should not be given access to
classified data, materials, or information. DOE does not believe
wholesale abandonment of a tool that has some admitted value for that
purpose can be squared with Congress's overall direction to implement a
polygraph program whose purpose is `` * * * to minimize the potential
for release or disclosure of classified data, materials, or
information.''
   Advisability. The NAS's main conclusion is that lack of evidence of
validity and accuracy justifies not using polygraph examinations for
screening purposes. In arriving at this conclusion, the NAS also took
into account the expense associated with invalid polygraph results, the
potential loss of competent or highly skilled individuals due to false
positives or the fear of such a test result, and claims of adverse
impact on civil liberties. The NAS also acknowledged but considered
less significant the deterrent effect that the prospect of being
polygraphed could have on employment applicants who are national
security risks. In short, what NAS conducted was a cost-benefit
analysis that (given the nature of the costs and benefits) inevitably
rested in no small part on value judgments made by the NAS. There is
nothing inappropriate about this approach in light of the NAS's mission
and charge.
   DOE, however, has a significantly different mission--one that is
intimately involved in science, but directed to a particular end--the
national security of the United States; therefore, not surprisingly,
section 3152 gave the Department a particular charge for its polygraph
program. That charge was not to devise a program based on the NAS's or
the Department's own weighing of costs and benefits based on its own
value judgments. Rather, Congress directed DOE to develop a polygraph
program focused on minimizing the risk of release or disclosure of
classified information. That amounts to a Congressional specification
that the most important cost about which DOE should be concerned is the
risk of release or disclosure of classified information. DOE believes
that Congress's judgment in that regard was reasonable. Given that
DOE's classified information consists in significant measure of
information regarding nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the
consequences of compromise of that information can be profoundly
significant. Those consequences make it sensible for Congress to
conclude that DOE's priority should be on deterrence and detection of
potential security risks with a secondary priority of mitigating the
consequences of false positives and false negatives. Moreover, whatever
may be the importance of other

[[Page 17889]]

considerations, DOE believes that at this time, when the United States
is engaged in hostilities precisely in order to address the potentially
disastrous consequences that may flow from weapons of mass destruction
falling into the wrong hands, it is under a particular obligation to
make sure that no action that it takes be susceptible to
misinterpretation as a relaxation of controls over information
concerning these kinds of weapons. For all these reasons, while fully
respecting the questions the NAS has raised about the use of polygraphs
as a screening tool, DOE does not believe it can endorse the NAS's
conclusion that the tool should be laid down.
   Perhaps in recognition that its main conclusion was less tenable in
the context of Federal agencies with national security missions
established by law, the NAS went on to conclude in the alternative that
if polygraph screening is to be used at all, it should only be used as
a trigger for follow-up detailed investigations and not as a sole basis
for personnel action (NAS Polygraph Review, p. 5). This alternative
conclusion appears to DOE to be much more compatible with the priority
DOE is statutorily invited to place on minimizing the potential for
release or disclosure of classified information. It is also consistent
with the way DOE currently uses screening polygraphs.
   Under DOE's current regulations, neither DOE nor its contractors
may take an adverse personnel action against an individual solely on
the basis of a polygraph result indicating deception (10 CFR 709.25).
If, after an initial polygraph examination, there are remaining
unresolved issues, DOE must advise the individual and provide an
opportunity for the individual to undergo an additional polygraph
examination. If the additional polygraph examination is not sufficient
to resolve the matter, DOE must undertake a comprehensive investigation
using the polygraph examination as an investigative lead (10 CFR
709.15(b)). In DOE's view, this regulatory scheme is consistent both
with the NAS's alternative conclusion and with the statutory priority
on minimizing release or disclosure of classified information.
Therefore, pursuant to section 3152 of the NDAA for FY 2002, DOE today
proposes on a preliminary basis to retain the regulatory provisions in
part 709. DOE invites public comment on its evaluation of the NAS
Polygraph Review with regard to employee screening and on its
assessment that the existing provisions of part 709 are consistent with
the NAS's alternative conclusion.

IV. Regulatory Review

A. National Environmental Policy Act

   The proposed rule would retain the existing procedures for
counterintelligence evaluations to include polygraph examinations and
therefore will have no impact on the environment. DOE has determined
that this rule is covered under the Categorical Exclusion in DOE's
National Environmental Policy Act regulations in paragraph A.5 of
appendix A to subpart D, 10 CFR part 1021, which applies to rulemakings
amending an existing regulation that does not change the environmental
effect of the regulations being amended. Accordingly, neither an
environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is
required.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

   The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, requires
preparation of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for every
rule that must be proposed for public comment, unless the agency
certifies that the rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This
rulemaking will not directly regulate small businesses or small
governmental entities. It will apply principally to individuals who are
employees of, or applicants for employment by, some of DOE's prime
contractors, which are large businesses. There may be some affected
small businesses that are subcontractors, but the rule will not impose
unallowable costs. Accordingly, DOE certifies that the proposed rule,
if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

   DOE has determined that this proposed rule does not contain any new
or amended record-keeping, reporting or application requirements, or
any other type of information collection requirements that require the
approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the
Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq. The OMB has defined
the term ``information'' to exclude certifications, consents, and
acknowledgments that entail only minimal burden [5 CFR 1320.3(h)(1)].

D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

   The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.,
requires a Federal agency to perform a detailed assessment of the costs
and benefits of any rule imposing a Federal mandate with costs to
state, local, or tribal governments, or to the private sector of $100
million or more. The proposed rule does not impose a Federal mandate
requiring preparation of an assessment under the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995.

E. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999

   Section 654 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Act of 1999, (Pub. L. No. 105-277), requires Federal agencies to issue
a Family Policymaking Assessment for any proposed rule that may affect
family well being. This proposed rule will not have any impact on the
autonomy or integrity of the family as an institution. Accordingly, DOE
has concluded that it is not necessary to prepare a Family Policymaking
Assessment.

F. Executive Order 12866

   Executive Order 12866, 58 FR 51735 (October 4, 1993) provides for a
review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the
Office of Management and Budget of a ``significant regulatory action,''
which is defined as an action that may have an effect on the economy of
$100 million or more or adversely affect the economy, competition,
jobs, productivity, environment, public health or safety, or state,
local or tribal governments. DOE has concluded that this proposed rule
(10 CFR Part 709) is not a significant regulatory action. Accordingly,
this rulemaking has not been reviewed by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs.

G. Executive Order 12988

   Section 3(a) of Executive Order 12988, 61 FR 4729 (February 7,
1996) imposes on executive agencies the general duty to adhere to the
following requirements: (1) Eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity;
(2) write regulations to minimize litigation; and (3) provide a clear
legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard, and
promote simplification and burden reduction. Section 3(b) of Executive
Order 12988 specifically requires that executive agencies make every
reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) Clearly specifies
the preemptive effect, if any; (2) clearly specifies any effect on
existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard
for affected conduct while promoting simplification and burden
reduction; (4) specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately
defines key terms; and (6) addresses

[[Page 17890]]

other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship
under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General. Section 3(c) of
Executive Order 12988 requires executive agencies to review regulations
in light of applicable standards in section 3(a) and section 3(b) to
determine whether they are met or it is unreasonable to meet one or
more of them. DOE has completed the required review and determined
that, to the extent permitted by law, this proposed rule meets the
relevant standards of Executive Order 12988.

H. Executive Order 13084

   Under Executive Order 13084, 63 FR 27655 (May 19, 1998), DOE may
not issue a discretionary rule that significantly or uniquely affects
Indian tribal governments and imposes substantial direct compliance
costs. This proposed rulemaking would not have such effects.
Accordingly, Executive Order 13084 does not apply to this rulemaking.

I. Executive Order 13132

   Executive Order 13132, 64 FR 43255 (August 10, 1999), requires
agencies to develop an accountable process to ensure meaningful and
timely input by state and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have ``federalism implications.'' Policies
that have federalism implications are defined in the Executive Order to
include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the
States, on the relationship between the national government and the
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the
various levels of government.'' On March 14, 2000, DOE published a
statement of policy describing the intergovernmental consultation
process it will follow in the development of such regulations (65 FR
13735). DOE has examined this proposed rule and determined that it
would not have a substantial direct effect on the states, on the
relationship between the national government and the states, or on the
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of
government. No further action is required by the Executive Order.

J. Review Under Executive Order 13211

   Executive Order 13211 (Actions Concerning Regulations That
Significantly Affect Energy, Supply, Distribution, or Use), 66 FR 28355
(May 22, 2001) requires preparation and submission to OMB of a
Statement of Energy Effects for significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866 that are likely to have a significant adverse
effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. This rulemaking,
although significant, will not have such an effect. Consequently, DOE
has concluded that there is no need for a Statement of Energy Effects.

K. Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 1999

   The Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2001 (44
U.S.C. 3516, note) provides for agencies to review most disseminations
of information to the public under guidelines established by each
agency pursuant to general guidelines issues by OMB. OMB's guidelines
were published at 67 FR 8452 (February 22, 2001), and DOE's guidelines
were published at 67 FR 62446 (October 7, 2002). DOE has reviewed this
notice of proposed rulemaking under the OMB and DOE guidelines, and has
concluded that it is consistent with applicable policies in those
guidelines.

V. Opportunity for Public Comment

   Interested members of the public are invited to participate in this
proceeding by submitting data, views, or comments on this proposed
rule. Ten copies of written comments should be submitted to the address
indicated in the ADDRESSES section of this notice. Comments should be
identified on the outside of the envelope and on the comments
themselves with the designation ``Polygraph Examination Regulation,
Docket No. CN-03-RM-01.'' If anyone wishing to provide written comments
is unable to provide ten copies, alternative arrangements can be made
in advance with the DOE. All comments received on or before the date
specified at the beginning of this notice, and other relevant
information before final action is taken on the proposed rule, will be
considered.
   All submitted comments will be available for public inspection as
part of the administrative record on file for this rulemaking in the
DOE Freedom of Information Reading Room at the address indicated in the
ADDRESSES section of this notice. Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR
1004.11, anyone submitting information or data that he or she believes
to be confidential and exempt by law from public disclosure should
submit one complete copy of the document, as well as two copies, if
possible, from which the information has been deleted. The DOE will
make its determination as to the confidentiality of the information and
treat it accordingly.

List of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 709

   Lie detector tests, Privacy.

   Issued in Washington, DC on April 8, 2003.
Stephen W. Dillard,
Director, Office of Counterintelligence.

   For the reasons stated in the preamble, DOE hereby proposes to
amend 10 CFR part 709 to read as follows:

PART 709--POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION REGULATIONS

   1. The authority citation for 10 CFR part 709 is revised to read as
follows:

   Authority: 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq., 7101, et seq., 7383h-1.
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 03-9009 Filed 4-11-03; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450-01-P


« Last Edit: Apr 18th, 2003 at 7:41am by George W. Maschke »  

George W. Maschke
Tel/SMS: 1-202-810-2105 (Please use Signal Private Messenger or WhatsApp to text or call.)
E-mail/iMessage/FaceTime: antipolygraph.org@protonmail.com
Wire: @ap_org
PGP Public Key: 316A947C
PGP Public Key (offline): 2BF4374B
Personal Statement: "Too Hot of a Potato"
Back to top
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
Global Moderator
*****
Online


Make-believe science yields
make-believe security.

Posts: 5935
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands
Joined: Sep 29th, 2000
DOE Press Release
Reply #1 - Apr 15th, 2003 at 8:40am
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
The Department of Energy has issued a press release regarding its decision to retain without change its existing polygraph regulation:

http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/releases03/aprpr/pr03075.htm

The above press release misrepresents the findings of the National Academy of Sciences' report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection. For example, the DOE press release states:

Quote:
The NAS's main conclusion is that polygraph testing is accurate enough for event specific investigations but that its costs outweigh its benefits when used for employee screening.


The NAS report does not characterize polygraphy as "accurate enough for event specific investigations." The NAS's "main conclusion" was the following (p. 8-6):

Quote:
Use in DOE Employee Security Screening Polygraph testing yields an unacceptable choice for DOE employee security screening between too many loyal employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left undetected. Its accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies....


DOE has willfully ignored the main conclusion of the NAS report and continues its misrepresentation of it in its press release:

Quote:
However, in the alternative, the NAS report also concluded that if polygraph screening is used as a trigger for detailed follow-up investigation, and is not the basis for adverse personnel action, "there are good theoretical reasons to think appropriate procedures of this sort would improve detection of deception."


In the above passage, the DOE quotes the NAS report  (from p. 6 of the Executive Summary) completely out of context to give its words a meaning not intended. The quoted passage has absolutely nothing to do with use of polygraph screening "as a trigger for detailed follow-up investigation," and it is apparent that DOE has willfully misrepresented the quoted passage. Here is the quoted text, in context:

Quote:
The polygraph is only one of many possible techniques for identifying national security risks among federal employees. Other techniques attempt to detect deception from facial expressions, voice quality, and other aspects of demeanor; from measurements of brain activity and other physiological indicators; and from background investigations or questionnaires. Computerized analysis of polygraph records has the potential to improve the accuracy of test results by using more information from in polygraph records than is used in traditional scoring methods. This potential has yet to be realized, however, either in research or in practice.

We considered the potential to increase the capability to identify security risks by combining polygraph information with information from other screening techniques, for example, in serial screening protocols such as are used in medical diagnosis. There are good theoretical reasons to think appropriate procedures of this sort would improve detection of deception, but we found no serious investigations of such multicomponent screening approaches.


In the next paragraph of its press release, DOE repeats its misrepresentation of the NAS report in order to support its decision to ignore its main conclusion (emphasis added):

Quote:
The notice of proposed rulemaking proposes to retain DOE's existing regulations because they are consistent with the statutory purpose of minimizing the risk of disclosure of classified data and because they are compatible with the NAS's alternative conclusion that polygraph screening, if applied as a trigger for follow-on tools versus as a basis for personnel action, can improve detection of deception. DOE's regulations list eight categories of positions which are subject to mandatory polygraph screening of applicants for employment and employees.
  

George W. Maschke
Tel/SMS: 1-202-810-2105 (Please use Signal Private Messenger or WhatsApp to text or call.)
E-mail/iMessage/FaceTime: antipolygraph.org@protonmail.com
Wire: @ap_org
PGP Public Key: 316A947C
PGP Public Key (offline): 2BF4374B
Personal Statement: "Too Hot of a Potato"
Back to top
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box Fair Chance
God Member
*****
Offline



Posts: 551
Joined: Oct 10th, 2002
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #2 - Apr 15th, 2003 at 2:06pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
Dear George,

The spin that the DOD is placing upon the NAS report was not surprising nor unpredicted. 

Their foundation of argument that "security cannot be about money (i.e. is the polygraph cost effective?)" nicely distracted from their poor if not outright miserable interpretation of the NAS report.  As you have pointed out, it was not about money at all.  The NAS stated that pre-screening polygraph was ineffective and further huge amounts of money spent could not increase any likelyhood of polygraph usage becoming more effective.

No wonder the polygraph organizations are howling about this website.  They think that they can convince everyone that the polygraph is reliable despite lack of scientific evidence.  Anyone who would state that the "emporer is naked" is an extreme threat

The polygraph is a weak and blunt tool in the world of security.  Polygraph usage continues to be inappropriate in screening for employment (new and existing) and given an aura of invincibility that directly contradicts the NAS findings and conclusions.

Regards.
  
Back to top
 
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box PDD-Fed
Guest


Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #3 - Apr 16th, 2003 at 7:21pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
I believe it was Mark Twain who said, "The reports of my demise have been greatly exaggerated." Roll Eyes

PDD-Fed...




  
Back to top
 
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box The Shadow
User
**
Offline


Who knows what evil lurks
in the hearts of men?
 The Shadow knows

Posts: 29
Joined: Feb 27th, 2003
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #4 - Apr 16th, 2003 at 9:54pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
I must agree with PDD-Fred on this one.  It appears that the Federal government is not going to throw away the polygraph any time soon.  I'm curious, George et al, what is a possible alternative to the polygraph, besides background investigations, that could be used as a replacement?

With all the vast professional backgrounds that input to this web site, and all of the implied expertise on polygraph, we should be able to offer up a replacement solution to the polygraph (no getting rid of it is not an option in this scenario), or at least offer ways to improve upon it. 

It is apparent that the Government does not wish to do away with it, so why not change tactics and work with the polygraph field to create/improve upon the existing system?  I believe it was Sun Tzu who said, “Keep Your Friends Close, But Your Enemies Even Closer”.  What better way then to work together to fix a broken system!

Please don’t shoot the question asker on this one!
  
Back to top
 
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
Global Moderator
*****
Online


Make-believe science yields
make-believe security.

Posts: 5935
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands
Joined: Sep 29th, 2000
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #5 - Apr 16th, 2003 at 10:16pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
PDD-Fed,

I'm not aware that anyone had reported the death of polygraphy. But the sword of Damocles hangs over its head.
  

George W. Maschke
Tel/SMS: 1-202-810-2105 (Please use Signal Private Messenger or WhatsApp to text or call.)
E-mail/iMessage/FaceTime: antipolygraph.org@protonmail.com
Wire: @ap_org
PGP Public Key: 316A947C
PGP Public Key (offline): 2BF4374B
Personal Statement: "Too Hot of a Potato"
Back to top
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
Global Moderator
*****
Online


Make-believe science yields
make-believe security.

Posts: 5935
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands
Joined: Sep 29th, 2000
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #6 - Apr 16th, 2003 at 10:24pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
Shadow,

It appears that federal agencies will not voluntarily give up the polygraph so long as widespread public belief in the lie detector continues, and that a legislative solution is needed. Because of DOE's intransigence, there may well be new Congressional hearings into polygraph policy.

As for a replacement for the polygraph, the lie detector has yet to be invented, and the NAS found little reason to believe that additional research would significantly improve polygraph accuracy.

The best way to "improve the system" is for Congress to pass, and the President to sign, a Comprehensive Employee Polygraph Protection Act.
  

George W. Maschke
Tel/SMS: 1-202-810-2105 (Please use Signal Private Messenger or WhatsApp to text or call.)
E-mail/iMessage/FaceTime: antipolygraph.org@protonmail.com
Wire: @ap_org
PGP Public Key: 316A947C
PGP Public Key (offline): 2BF4374B
Personal Statement: "Too Hot of a Potato"
Back to top
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box Mark Mallah
Very Senior User
****
Offline



Posts: 131
Joined: Mar 16th, 2001
Gender: Male
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #7 - Apr 17th, 2003 at 1:10am
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
The DOE's spin on the NAS report is Orwellian.  It also reflects the mentality of the polygraph process itself, where truth is a malleable concept shaped to fit the examiner's and the institution's prejudices. 

Just as an examiner repackages a subject's statements to appear incriminating, the DOE has repackaged the NAS report to appear to support the polygraph.

Does anyone have an idea if we can get Stephen Feinberg or another NAS panel member to rebut the DOE?  Given that their report is being used to bolster the polygraph, they might have something to say about that.

  
Back to top
WWW  
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
Global Moderator
*****
Online


Make-believe science yields
make-believe security.

Posts: 5935
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands
Joined: Sep 29th, 2000
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #8 - Apr 17th, 2003 at 9:44am
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
Mark,

I will contact Professor Fienberg and other members of the NAS polygraph panel regarding this. In a recent article by Lisa Friedman, who reports for the Tri-Valley Herald, professor Fienberg remarked regarding DOE's stated plan to continue polygraph screening: "I think this is a misguided policy. It ignores the content of our report, it actually makes erroneous statements about what we concluded and didn't conclude."

I think it would be appropriate for members of the NAS panel to submit a formal response during the Energy Department's public comment period. Senator Domenici, who chairs the Senate committee that has oversight responsibility for DOE, is reportedly waiting to see the public comments before deciding whether to hold hearings on DOE's polygraph policy.

I've also been in touch with some scientists at the national laboratories, and would suggest to all who plan on submitting comments to DOE that they cc or forward their comments to info@antipolygraph.org. We'll publish comments received on AntiPolygraph.org so that they will be readily available for review by members of Congress, their staffs, the media, and other interested parties.

In addition, any who might wish to comment publicly on DOE's plan to continue polygraph screening, but who fear retaliation for expressing their views, may send their comments to AntiPolygraph.org with the request that their name be withheld. For further anonymity and security, comments may be sent through an anonymous remailer and/or with PGP encryption. AntiPolygraph.org's PGP public key is available here.
  

George W. Maschke
Tel/SMS: 1-202-810-2105 (Please use Signal Private Messenger or WhatsApp to text or call.)
E-mail/iMessage/FaceTime: antipolygraph.org@protonmail.com
Wire: @ap_org
PGP Public Key: 316A947C
PGP Public Key (offline): 2BF4374B
Personal Statement: "Too Hot of a Potato"
Back to top
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box Fair Chance
God Member
*****
Offline



Posts: 551
Joined: Oct 10th, 2002
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #9 - Apr 17th, 2003 at 3:24pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
Quote:
I believe it was Mark Twain who said, "The reports of my demise have been greatly exaggerated." Roll Eyes

PDD-Fed...

Dear PDD-Fed,

You quoted one of my favorite lines from Mark Twain.

I know that I did not expect the use of polygraph examinations to stop immediately with the issuance of the NAS report.  I did expect the DOE to read and use it in the context which it the report was written.  The use of polygraph machines in general for employment screening lends no predictive element to future security breaches.  My argument has been that a good professional interrogator would get almost as many confessions by just having a four hour period of cross examination on an applicant or employee.  The utility of the polygraph as a tool of law enforcement is given far too much weight and used as a crutch to assign blame if someone goes "bad."

Secondly and most important,  if a person "fails" a polygraph examination and I was the government, I would sure as heck want to know why and leave no stone unturned in my investigation especially if the subject is a current government employee.  Many have stated that this would cost too much money but I believe that the amount of actual "guilty" subjects would be so small (if non-existent) that the polygraph users would be embaressed to defend their accusations.

I am one of those subjects accused of using countermeasure.  My second examiner and the board of review in Washington, D.C., seemed absolutely convinced  that I was "not within acceptable parameters".  

Almost a year later and after another "roll of the dice" polygraph examination, I am found fully acceptable for employment.  My background investigation has been thorough (and from the people I have talked to after their interviews was also very "agressive").  I believe my background examination was agressive because there were still lingering doubts concerning my second polygraph.  The polygraph becomes the perfect "pass the buck" tool to escape accountability.  This is why so many agencies love it so and refuse to let it go.

The government has a perfect fall back excuse for any bad behavoir in the future.  They will go back and review my third polygraph and somehow make it appear that my second polygraph was the "real" polygraph and blame it on bad interpretation of the third polygraph (which in hindsight was really "deceptive").


I wonder how many "not within acceptable parameters" applicants would be denied empolyment if only a background investigtion was used?  

Why must a goverment agency hurt its appearence of integrity and reputations of the citizens it protects by blackmarking the future of many applicants only based on polygraph interpretation?

I believe the FBI to be a good organization or else I would have never applied for a position.  I hope I can get to a position of influence to stop the inappropriate use of it for employment pre-screening or decrease its permanent blacklisting on applicants.

Regards
« Last Edit: Apr 17th, 2003 at 6:06pm by Fair Chance »  
Back to top
 
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box Mark Mallah
Very Senior User
****
Offline



Posts: 131
Joined: Mar 16th, 2001
Gender: Male
I'm Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #10 - Apr 17th, 2003 at 7:27pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
Quote:
I'm curious, George et al, what is a possible alternative to the polygraph, besides background investigations, that could be used as a replacement?


Let's dispose of this argument once and for all:

"The greatest threat to the intelligence product's integrity comes from the tendency of collectors to accept bad sources of information in lieu of none, and of analysts to fill factual holes with their own prejudices."

Angelo Codevilla, "The Urgency of Offensive Counter-Terrorism", FrontPageMagazine.com, 2/13/03

This applies equally to a criminal investigation.  Better to have NO source of information than a BAD source, which is what the polygraph is.  In other words, better to start the race at the starting line, rather than ten feet behind it.

Getting rid of the polygraph does not require replacing it with something else.  The very act of getting rid of it will, by itself, improve the quality of screening investigations.
« Last Edit: Apr 17th, 2003 at 8:04pm by Mark Mallah »  
Back to top
WWW  
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box J.B. McCloughan
Very Senior User
****
Offline



Posts: 115
Location: USA
Joined: Dec 7th, 2001
Gender: Male
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #11 - Apr 18th, 2003 at 5:37am
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
Mark,

I disagree with some of your analysis.  The polygraph has been meticulously examined in actual criminal cases and done so more than any other forensic science.  Inasmuch as polygraph is one of the oldest and most readily available forensic tests, the amount of data available for analysis is stifling.  I opine that neither the NSA’s nor any other inquiry has ever shown that polygraph leaves criminal investigators at a disadvantage.  To the contrary, the available field research, even when using the Control Question Test (CQT), places polygraph at a level significantly above traditional investigative methods for criminal investigation.  Dr. David Lykken himself said he would use the polygraph, if he were a police investigator (most likely a GKT).   Most of the disdain toward polygraph found in quotes of notable individuals has been so directed toward specific formats and uses and not all inclusive.   

What I regard as the bottom line is does the instrument work adequately for its proposed use and does it do so at a level that is significantly above any past implemented methods?  One can argue either side of this and do so in many different facets when it comes to polygraph.  However, the polygraph is simply an instrument.  The format used with it and its intended use seems to be the major point of content. 
  

Quam verum decipio nos
Back to top
 
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
Global Moderator
*****
Online


Make-believe science yields
make-believe security.

Posts: 5935
Location: The Hague, The Netherlands
Joined: Sep 29th, 2000
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #12 - Apr 18th, 2003 at 9:11am
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
J.B.,

I think that when Mark spoke of "the polygraph," he was referring to polygraphic "lie detection," and not concealed information (guilty knowledge) tests, which are qualitatively different and seldom used in the United States.

I assume that in your post (except where otherwise indicated) you, too, were speaking of polygraphic "lie detection" when you referred to "the polygraph."

Quote:
The polygraph has been meticulously examined in actual criminal cases and done so more than any other forensic science.


The amount of peer-reviewed polygraph field research is actually quite small. To the best of my knowledge, only four such studies exist. What forensic sciences have been examined less meticulously than that?

Moreover, I must disagree with your characterization of polygraphy as a "forensic science." As explained in Chapter 1 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector and in William G. Iacono's article, "Forensic 'Lie Detection': Procedures Without Scientific Basis," polygraphy has no grounding in the scientific method. The National Academy of Sciences very diplomatically stated as much at p. 8-1 of its polygraph report:

Quote:
Theoretical Basis The theoretical rationale for the polygraph is quite weak, especially in terms of differential fear, arousal, or other emotional states that are triggered in response to relevant or comparison questions. We have not found any serious effort at construct validation of polygraph testing.

Research Progress Research on the polygraph has not progressed over time in the manner of a typical scientific field. It has not accumulated knowledge or strengthened its scientific underpinnings in any significant manner. Polygraph research has proceeded in relative isolation from related fields of basic science and has benefited little from conceptual, theoretical, and technological advances in those fields that are relevant to the psychophysiological detection of deception.


The NAS expressed a similar view somewhat less diplomatically (but quite cogently) in Chapter 1 of its report, where it likened the polygraph community to a shamanistic priesthood. (See the message thread The Cult of Polygraph for a full-text citation of the relevant passage.)

You also write:

Quote:
I opine that neither the NSA’s [sic] nor any other inquiry has ever shown that polygraph leaves criminal investigators at a disadvantage.


The NAS did allow that the polygraph may have some utility for eliciting admissions/confessions. But this is a far cry from saying that any reliance should be put on polygraph chart readings. With regard to utility, the NAS reports states at p. 8-3:

Quote:
Utility Polygraph examinations may have utility to the extent that they can elicit admissions and confessions, deter undesired activity, and instill public confidence. However, such utility is separate from polygraph validity. There is substantial anecdotal evidence that admissions and confessions occur in polygraph examinations, but no direct scientific evidence assessing the utility of the polygraph. Indirect evidence supports the idea that a technique will exhibit utility effects if examinees and the public believe that there is a high likelihood of a deceptive person being detected and that the costs of being judged deceptive are substantial. Any technique about which people hold such beliefs is likely to exhibit utility, whether or not it is valid. For example, there is no evidence to suggest that admissions and confessions occur more readily with the polygraph than with a bogus pipeline—an interrogation accompanying the use of an inert machine that the examinee believes to be a polygraph. In the long run, evidence that a technique lacks validity will surely undercut its utility.


And with regard to DOE's polygraph program, the NAS warns against attributing to polygraphy a diagnostic value that it does not possess (pp. 8-6 to 8-7):

Quote:
Danger of Overconfidence Overconfidence in the polygraph—a belief in its accuracy not justified by the evidence—presents a danger to national security objectives. A false faith in the accuracy of polygraph testing among potential examinees may enhance its utility for deterrence and eliciting admissions. However, we are more concerned with the danger that can arise from overconfidence in polygraph accuracy among officials in security and counterintelligence organizations, who are themselves potential examinees. Such overconfidence, when it affects counterintelligence and security policy choices, may create an unfounded, false sense that because employees have appeared nondeceptive on a polygraph, security precautions can be relaxed. Such overconfidence can create a false sense of security among policy makers, employees in sensitive positions, and the public that may in turn lead to inappropriate relaxation of other methods of ensuring security. It can waste public resources by devoting to the polygraph funds that would be better expended on developing or implementing alternative security procedures. It can lead to unnecessary loss of competent or highly skilled individuals because of suspicions cast on them as a result of false positive polygraph exams or because they avoid or leave employment in federal security organizations in the face of such prospects. And it can lead to credible claims that agencies that use polygraphs are infringing on individuals' civil liberties for insufficient benefits to national security.


You also write:

Quote:
To the contrary, the available field research, even when using the Control Question Test (CQT), places polygraph at a level significantly above traditional investigative methods for criminal investigation.


The NAS concluded otherwise, stating at p. 8-2:

Quote:
...There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods.


You continue:

Quote:
What I regard as the bottom line is does the instrument work adequately for its proposed use and does it do so at a level that is significantly above any past implemented methods?  One can argue either side of this and do so in many different facets when it comes to polygraph.


If the polygraph's proposed use were simply as a trick for obtaining admissions/confessions from the naive and gullible, I could agree that it might work adequately for some individuals. But as a diagnostic test for the detection of deception? No way.
« Last Edit: Apr 18th, 2003 at 9:28am by George W. Maschke »  

George W. Maschke
Tel/SMS: 1-202-810-2105 (Please use Signal Private Messenger or WhatsApp to text or call.)
E-mail/iMessage/FaceTime: antipolygraph.org@protonmail.com
Wire: @ap_org
PGP Public Key: 316A947C
PGP Public Key (offline): 2BF4374B
Personal Statement: "Too Hot of a Potato"
Back to top
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box Fair Chance
God Member
*****
Offline



Posts: 551
Joined: Oct 10th, 2002
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #13 - Apr 18th, 2003 at 2:20pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
Quote:
Mark,

What I regard as the bottom line is does the instrument work adequately for its proposed use and does it do so at a level that is significantly above any past implemented methods?  One can argue either side of this and do so in many different facets when it comes to polygraph.  However, the polygraph is simply an instrument.  The format used with it and its intended use seems to be the major point of content.  

Dear J. B.,

Your last line of this quote could very well be the key to my original and biggest heartache of my polygraph exposure.  The existing CQT format used in pre-screening is inappropriate at best.  Good independent research concerning polygraph is hard to find for I have looked for it.  The agency that I applied for uses the CQT format as if it were 100% infallible and ruins many potential careers by using it.  I am somewhat irritated that employees within the system are fully accepting of the fact that friendly fire occurs and that is just the cost of "doing business" with that agency.

I do realize that the environment of interrogation can be enhanced by the physical presence of the polygraph and thus obtain some confessions that would not otherwise be gained.   I just have a big problem with device and test method which has few studies that are repeatable without constantly having to have qualifiers about the operator.

I have read your discussions concerning GKT methodology.  I would at least like this more than what I went through if only for the aspect of needing to do investigation and have specific items of inquiry instead of general fishing expedition as it is currently done.

The pre-screening polygraph assumes guilt until proven innocence.  Why cannot law-abiding applicants have the same right as accused criminals to be innocent until proven guilty (and definitely not by pre-screening CQT polygraph being questioned about non-specific incidents)?

At least in this case with the DOE, the NAS specifically is stating that for the intended use of polygraph in pre-employment screening, there is no useful positive security outcome.

Why do they insist on using it?
  
Back to top
 
IP Logged
 
Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box Mark Mallah
Very Senior User
****
Offline



Posts: 131
Joined: Mar 16th, 2001
Gender: Male
Re: DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!
Reply #14 - Apr 18th, 2003 at 8:21pm
Mark & QuoteQuote Print Post  
J.B.,

I can't add much to George's comments, which I do believe very effectively rebuts some of your points.

I generally accept your formulation that the bottom line is whether the instrument works adequately for its proposed use.  In other words, ends and means.  Does the use of the polygraph (the means) achieve the desired ends (screening out spies, properly identifying criminals, et al.)?

If we just look at polygraph screening, I think the conclusion is clear that this particular "means" has failed to serve, and has actually sabotaged, the desired "ends".  Many innocent people have been erroneously screened out (a loss of valuable employees), some investigated, (a waste and diversion), and some guilty people have inflicted tremendous damage (Ames, Montes, Chin, et al.) after "passing" the polygraph and lulling investigators.

So the bottom line is that for the particular purpose of screening, it has been a costly failure.

The other ends for which the polygraph has been deployed as the means deserve a separate analysis.
  
Back to top
WWW  
IP Logged
 
DOE Rejects NAS Polygraph Report Findings!

Please type the characters that appear in the image. The characters must be typed in the same order, and they are case-sensitive.
Open Preview Preview

You can resize the textbox by dragging the right or bottom border.
Insert Hyperlink Insert FTP Link Insert Image Insert E-mail Insert Media Insert Table Insert Table Row Insert Table Column Insert Horizontal Rule Insert Teletype Insert Code Insert Quote Edited Superscript Subscript Insert List /me - my name Insert Marquee Insert Timestamp No Parse
Bold Italicized Underline Insert Strikethrough Highlight
                       
Insert Preformatted Text Left Align Centered Right Align
resize_wb
resize_hb







Max 200000 characters. Remaining characters:
Text size: pt
More Smilies
View All Smilies
Collapse additional features Collapse/Expand additional features Smiley Wink Cheesy Grin Angry Sad Shocked Cool Huh Roll Eyes Tongue Embarrassed Lips Sealed Undecided Kiss Cry
Attachments More Attachments Allowed file types: txt doc docx psd pdf bmp jpe jpg jpeg gif png swf zip rar tar gz 7z odt ods mp3 mp4 wav avi mov 3gp html maff pgp gpg
Maximum Attachment size: 500000 KB
Attachment 1:
X