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It's not my intent to misquote you.  I'm trying to get at what you were saying.

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I think one consideration that may cause some confusion on this issue is whether the polygraph itself has ever caught a spy.  This means that a person was screened, deception was indicated (when there was no other evidence prior to the screen indicating that the person was a spy) and subsequent investigation, based on the polygraph findings, verified that the screenee was indeed involved in espionage.   

For this I would not include pre-test admissions of involvement in espionage or admissions in post-test interrogations where no deception was actually indicated.  In these cases, the polygraph would be used not as a lie detector but as an interrogation prop -- certainly something for which it can be valuable, but a separate issue from whether the device itself has ever caught a spy.

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I believe a cost-benefit analysis would find otherwise, and I think this is the conclusion the NAS also came to.  In fact, they specifically found that reliance on the polygraph was a detriment to national security.

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Of course.  However, I don't think those are the only two choices we face.

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Actually, there's been some discussion here on that.  If you consider that statement in context, the NAS was not referring to the polygraph and any alternatives vis-a-vis counterintelligence in general; rather, it was specifically referring to methods of lie detection.  In other words, they were not attempting to say the polygraph must stay because there's no good alternative, or even whether better methods of counterintelligence exist; instead, they were narrowly addressing whether anything better has been found to detect lies.  They concluded that nothing has.

With regard to the polygraph's place in counterintelligence, they not only found that reliance upon it is a significant flaw in our national security, but also that it adds no incremental value to other counterintelligence methods.

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Of course.  I vastly prefer this to trading barbs.

Skeptic

I am not sure I am qualified to answer your question, but I will try nonetheless.  At the risk of sounding sarcastic myself, just who are these "many polygraph experts" who are saying this about research. There isn't (or shouldn't be) anything so secret about research to warrant such a statement.  It sounds as if you are encountering people who simply do not know the scope of research being done and are making such statements out of hand.  That being said, the follwing is offered for your information.


I can tell you that research i in the discipline of lie detection has been over the past fairly dismal, and probably (just my opinion here)  because no one ever saw a need to research something that had been relatively accepted.  I am guessing that anyone who expressed an interest in research (at least for the most part)came from within the practice. Notwithstanding what many of those who criticize polygraph would say, folks like Gordon Barland and Frank Horvath have done a lot to advance the concept of scientific inquiry in the field of lie detection.  My exposure to researchers has helped me learn that unless their JOB is research, unless there is something in it for them, they are unlikely to express any interest.  I guess I can see their point because it might be admirable to be philanthropic, but being so doesn't pay the bills or put food on the table.   

In trying to get some answers to your question, I learned that in 1994, there was a paper published. The title was "Redefining Security"  Particularly, you should read Chapter 4 and some of the personal statements in the appendices.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/jsc/

which was headed by a professor from USC named Dr. Jeffrey Smith.   

http://www.usc.edu/dept/ise/faculty/Smith.html

I also found it interesting to read his statement which he made before the Senate Judiciary Commitee in 2001.  He acknowledges then, as he did when he headed the Commission that the polygraph process is an imperfect science (there isn't much that IS perfect) but it appears that things have been done that perhaps weren't being done before.  Your question concerning research is answered in this study.  There was a recommendation of the Joint Security Commission that the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute is engaged in an active and robust research program. From what I was able to learn, they have been and are doing just that.  They actively solicit what are called Broad Area Grants for new and original research in the area of lie detection.  Sadly, there is little money available for such research and I would think that even the academic researchers would realize that no money = no research.  Unfortunately, I think that many of their efforst are stymied by the lack of funds.  In the early days of federal polygraph, there was no internal research program.  Slowly, but surely, a research entity was developed.  Yes, there were people like Shiela Reed employed there (there was a television show some time back that spoke of her being fired from that job) and Charles Honts (the professor who speaks of countermeasures and damns screening polygraph, but suppoorts use in the specific issue world (countermeassures notwithstanding) - perhaps because he has a business in this realm??  Gordon Barland brought a new dimension into federal polygraph and indeed today, many polygraph examiners ar being encouraged to seek higher academic degrees and are becoming more involved in research within their own field.  This concept that polygraph examiners are sitting back and doing nothing just isn't so and I for one think that (and there are exceptions to be sure) most polygraph examiners are enthused about participating in scientific inquiry of their choisen profession. Okay I have gone on much longer than I expected to. I hope I have provided you with some information that addresses your concerns.  Unfortunately, I have observed when people provide extended remarks (as I have), there are those who will dissect every word and "demand" reponses.   I do not have that luxury, but I think that all in all, polygraph is not getting a fair shake here and they do not seem to have a champion.
   
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/042501_smith.html

P.S. By the way, the Commissioners came from very respected backgrounds,(just like the NASpanel members) and were headed by a very respected USC professor named Dr. Jeffrey Smith, who addressed Congress during the Hansen debacle.  Oddly, I was unable to find anything on this site about that and reading it would show that there have been tremendous changes made to polygraph as a result of this study.  So for your reading enjoyment, here are the links for you to review. It is hoped, as I have tried to do, this will generate some meaningful dialogue and not, as Skeptic has said, trading barbs.

 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/2001/042501_smith.html

Guest,

First, I'd like to welcome you to this message board. You might wish to consider registering: it won't compromise your anonymity and will give you the option of editing your posts. You can create a free, anonymous e-mail account with ZipLip.com for this purpose if you like. Your views are very welcome here.

That said, I'd like to comment on something you wrote earlier that I find...troubling. Following my observation that National Academy of Sciences polygraph review panel member Dr. Katherine Laskey had emphatically stated that no spy had ever been caught through a routine polygraph screening "test," and my observation that the NAS panel had been briefed by the CIA's polygraph unit, you wrote:

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I think the above may well amount to libelous innuendo. You admit that you were not at the CIA briefing. And you maintain that you're not saying Dr. Laskey lied. Yet you strongly suggested it. Why did you put "misspoke" is quotation marks? I think the proper course of action would be for you to either substantiate your allegation against Dr. Laskey or retract it.

And who are these "much wiser people" who "KNOW she 'misspoke?'"

In the same post, you also wrote:

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I am perplexed by that last statement. Did you really mean to say that polygraphy "works as well as it does" (however well that may be) because proof is lacking?

Let's suppose that a CIA polygrapher had indeed caught a spy using the polygraph. Here's a scenario: a CIA polygrapher is called in to screen a 27-year-old Iraqi male who contacted the American Embassy in Amman, Jordan and offered his services to the CIA. The polygraph charts strongly indicate deception when the man is asked "Did anyone direct you to approach the Americans?" and in a post-test interrogation, the subject confesses to having been sent by the Iraqi Mukhabarat (intelligence) to feed disinformation to the CIA. The quick-thinking young CIA agent who has been handling this source thinks this would be a good opportunity to double the agent against the Mukhabarat. He draws up a plan and sells it to his station chief, who gets approval from Langley. The source is now in Baghdad and is providing critical intelligence information that is believed to be highly reliable, some of which has been independently corroborated. Of course, the details of this operation are highly classified (codeword), and properly so.

But what harm could there be in giving the National Academy of Sciences polygraph review panel this "sanitized" version?: "A foreign national contacted a US embassy offering to provide information to the CIA. A polygrapher was called in to verify the man's story, and the charts indicated deception. In a post-test interrogation, the subject confessed to having been sent by a foreign intelligence service."

And a quick note, the Jeffrey H. Smith who was a member of the Joint Security Commission and who testified at the 25 April 2001 Senate hearing on polygraphy (at which I was present) is not the University of Southern California adjunct professor of industrial and systems engineering to whose webpage you provided a link. The Jeffrey H. Smith in question is a lawyer, and a former CIA general counsel. He's now employed with the Washington law firm of Arnold & Porter:

http://www.arnoldporter.com/attorneys.cfm?attorney_id=394

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Really now. The legal comments (I don't think they rose to the level of threats)  are indeed largely spurious. As someone who knows a lawyer that has tracked down organized short sellers that grossly slandered a CEO in order to manipulate markets and has prosecuted john doe discovery to the poster's ISP back to their origin I can say showing libel on the net is a complex task and requires statements far more injurious than anything "guest" said - just to get discovery approved.

Secondly, reading "guest's" objectionable (if not realistically actionable) assertions, they seemed to me obvious opinion anyway. Given "guest's" checkered prior postings I was frankly surprised and pleased to see what later turned into a decent post. "Guest" should be encouraged to do more of that (absent the attacks and barbs which are somewhat fun but not really productive). It may be a while before we return to the quality of some of Barland's older posts but this site badly needs decent representation from the pro-polygraph community as George has done a pretty decent job on the "anti" side.

[added] Also, look at the attacks questioning George's patriotism and aluding to inside knowledge about his polygraph experiences. If one totes it up I think the pro-polygraph side comes out on the short end.

Also,  there is a pretty disgusting group of other folk that seem to come here looking for a fast way to "beat" the box.  My guess is that they are better "served" by Doug William's book which won't clutter their minds with technical or moral issues and get's right to the recipe in a jargon many may feel at home with.

-Marty

Guest,

I also feel compelled to say a word in defense of Sheila Reed and Charles Honts, both of whom were invited speakers at the NAS polygraph review panel's public hearings. You wrote:

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The television show you have in mind is no doubt the CBS 60 Minutes II segment "Final Exam" that aired on 12 December 2001. It said nothing of Dr. Reed having been fired. Here's the relevant excerpt from the transcript:

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You'll find the entire transcript posted in the message thread, Poly Segment on 60 Minutes II, 12/12/01.

With regard to Charles Honts, he doesn't just "speak" of countermeasures: he's one of a just handful of researchers to have done any meaningful research on countermeasures, and was the lead researcher of the only peer-reviewed studies on the subject. I don't see how his countermeasure research (including his finding that countermeasures can reduce the accuracy of the CQT) and his opposition to polygraph screening materially benefit his polygraph business. Moreover, I note that Dr. Honts left DoDPI (and went to the University of North Dakota) on grounds of principle, taking a substantial pay cut in the process.

If you disagree with anything that Drs. Reed or Honts have said with regard to polygraphy in general or polygraph screening in particular, then why not address these issues directly rather than calling into question their reputations and/or motives?

Johnn,

I doubt it was anything so sinister as that.   Many newspapers routinely remove their free on-line content after a period of time.

freaked-out wrote on Mar 23^rd, 2006 at 6:31pm:


I do not maintain that the FBI's false positive rate is 50%. Rather, it is the overall failure rate that has been authoritatively reported to stand near 50%. However, considering the fact that polygraphy has no scientific basis and is without validity as a diagnostic test for deception, it is clear that a sizable portion of those accused of deception are being falsely accused.

It is grossly unfair to accuse people of deception and permanently disqualify them from employment based on voodoo science such as the polygraph. Our government's continued reliance on the pseudoscience of polygraphy is a national disgrace.