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I'm sorry you think so...I, of course, did not come here trolling for attention by simultaneously insulting a large number of good, patriotic people who have lost their livelihood and/or career dreams to a device the NAS recently derided as a detriment to national security.

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So do you see the recipients of those practices as "whiners" who "think the world owes them something", or not?  And if not, on what grounds do you differentiate between those situations and those falsely accused/disqualified due to the polygraph?

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No one here has ever claimed most people pass due to countermeasures, Fed-up.

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As the title of this thread indicates, it is hardly accurate to say that "so many" pass.  For the FBI, your odds are about as good as a coin flip.  For other agencies, that ratio is probably different, depending upon how "sensitive" they wish the "test" to be.

The NAS report discussed this in detail -- I invite you to read it.

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Let me help you out, then.  You claimed that "the logic of this site" indicates that "all 1000 applicants" to "25 federal positions" should get jobs.  I invite you to please post any statement from this site that says or implies this.

Of course, most applicants will not get jobs.  But the decision should be based on real qualifications, not on a thoroughly discredited process that falsely claims to detect "truthfulness", yet actually amounts to nothing more than a roll of the dice.

Why on earth would you want it otherwise?

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You are, of course, welcome to your opinion.  I am, of course, free to think that the sky in your world is a different shade of pink.

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May I suggest www.freerepublic.com.  No reasoning ability required, and you'll find lots of commiseration about all those "whiners" who want the world and the Government to give them a handout.

Skeptic

Skeptic wrote on Dec 31^st, 2002 at 10:40am:

Dear Skeptic,

Good words to live and post by.  I have been posting less due to the fact that some people just need to vent and really do not want, expect, or understand any opinion other then their own (this could be said about two polarized parties of any discussion).

Regards.

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Dear Fed-Up!,

Since we are talking about FBI polygraph policy, I propose that at a minimum, an investigation be performed on any allegations brought up by the polygraph procedure and the whole process be videotaped.

In the past, people have placed their feet or hands inside moving lawnmower blades.  Any normal person would argue that it takes a perfect idiot to do so.  The manufacturers tried placing decals on the housing warning a person not to do so.  This did not work so an automatic cut-off and brake were installed.  People can still bypass this system by wrapping the handle release with a bungee cord.  They at least tried to decrease the chance of injury.

Can we at least try to improve the current system?  Let's try to decrease the chance of injury to reputations and career aspirations.  The FBI is resistant to even the slightest change in their "fool proof" system.  They insist that it is 100% accurate in determining who they will and will not hire.  

Occasional, accidental, "friendly fire" is one thing. Repeating premeditated ignorance of known problems and shortcomings without re-evaluation of the process involved is stupidity 

Regards.

Fed-up,

You write in part:

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Many of us are eager to discuss polygraph matters on a rational level. But prior to your latest post, you seem to have limited yourself to ad hominem taunts.

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The question is not whether screening exams do any good. Certainly they do, in those cases where, for example, an unqualified applicant makes disqualifying admissions. This saves the hiring agency both time and money. The more appropriate question is, does the good done by screening exams outweigh the harm? I submit that it does not, and would echo Dr. Drew C. Richardson's testimony before the U.S. Senate that "claims of cost effectiveness, and the utility of polygraph screening are altogether wrong, reflect misplaced priorities, and lead to activities that are damaging to individuals and this country."

We've documented some of the harm that has resulted from misplaced governmental reliance of polygraphy in Chapter 2 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. Documenting such harm is also the purpose of this message thread: more than half of otherwise qualified FBI special agent applicants are being permanently disqualified (and blacklisted from other federal employment) based on a procedure that (as you know, having read the NAS report) has no validity. Doesn't this bother you?

Apparently not. It seems that it is instead our public documentation of the harm that polygraph screening is causing to individuals and our country that bothers you.

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Those of us who are involved in the antipolygraph movement are well aware that "life" is not always fair. But the unfairness associated with polygraph screening is completely unnecessary and avoidable (through the abolishment of polygraph screening).

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The National Academy of Sciences polygraph review panel found no evidence that any spy has ever been caught by a polygraph screening "test." This panel held a meeting (which was closed to the public) at the offices of the CIA polygraph unit. Given Dr. Katherine Laskey's emphatic statement at the NAS press conference held on 8 Oct. 2002 that no spy had ever been caught by a routine polygraph screening "test," it would seem that the CIA polygraph unit mentioned no such cases to the NAS.

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It is my general practice not to comment on the authorship of anonymous or pseudonymous writings. Feel free to draw your own conclusions.

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I can think of no good reason why the NAS, with several panel members possessing security clearances, would not have been given information that contradicted the notion the polygraph has never caught a spy.  Such information could easily have been boiled down to a statement in the NAS report that spies have been caught by the polygraph without violating any secrecy concerns.  Furthermore, it definitely would have been in the counterintelligence/DoDPI community's best interest to have refuted that particular line.

IMHO the fact that the NAS was not given this information makes any claim that spies have been caught extremely suspect.

Skeptic

Guest

Since I have not seen a responding post to my question that a lie was told to the NAS when asked about counter-countermeasures (yes, we have them but they are classified. Then when pressed, the answer was no, we do not have counter-countermeasures), can we guess that this classification falls into the realm of "yes we catch spies with the polygraph"? 

National Security LE expects applicants to tell the truth. Then after they are hired, they are requireed to lie to protect the masses??!! Give us a break. Why can't they be truthful? Lies to protect the masses is BS. Tell the truth and let the chips fall where they may. If people can't take the truth, they are wimps. I am damn tired of being lied to by people on our payroll.

So be as truthful to the applicant being polygraphed as you expect him to be with you and let the chips fall where they may. What's wrong with that picture??

 

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I admit I'm having a hard time following you.  Am I correct that you are basically saying the information was given to the NAS (under the stipulation that only general conclusions, not specific classified spy-catching details, should be made public) and the NAS lied about it?

That's a strong accusation, and one that, unfortunately, I would indeed require proof of one sort or another to support.

Alternatively, are you saying that the information was not passed on?  Several members of the NAS panel obtained security clearances precisely so they could view such classified material.  Could you explain for us why it would have been withheld from them anyway?

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No one is saying that information vital to national security should be made public.  However, as Twoblock has pointed out, far from merely "misstating" that the polygraph has never caught a spy, the NAS also specifically stated that they were misled about the existence of countermeasure studies supposedly classified at the "Secret" level.  I suppose this was also a lie?

IMHO, polygraphers seem to have a track record of bluffing, which doesn't help their credibility one bit in this regard.  The fact that polygraph methodology stipulates that polygraphers must be professional liars doesn't help, either.

The alternative is that the NAS has somehow managed to acquire a reputation of extreme respectability despite being stocked with liars who will forge science as it suits them.

Which should we believe?

Skeptic

Skeptic,

While the way the polygraph "works" is now an open secret, readily available to anyone interested, there is no such clarity re countermeasures, and that was certainly reinforced by the NAS report.

However, I do believe the study of countermeasure detection (or lack thereof) would be more amenable to measurement and scientific protocol. The only reason most of this is classified is that most is gov. funded and they are now predisposed (Kleiner, 2002) not to share the results with the wider polygraph community. There is nothing fundamental that prevents non classified CM research - other than funding.  Not all funds have to be government funds.

-Marty