L72cueak,

Thank you for providing the above citation from Confessions of a Spy. It suggests a possible resolution of the contradiction between the Senate report and Dr. Ryan's remarks: perhaps the Soviets only advised Ames with regard to behavioral countermeasures, and Ames did not regard that as "training on how to beat the polygraph" while Dr. Ryan did.

You also wrote:

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"Goes beyond the available evidence" merely means that the evidence was inadequate to support the conclusion, not that there was no evidence for it. The conclusion may or may not have been correct.

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Again, our conclusion that "John" would have passed had he not admitted his use of countermeasures goes beyond the available evidence and may or may not be the case. The reason I don't see an urgent need for a front page announcement or the immediate release of a new edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector is that the point, in my judgment, is relatively minor. The key point is that the London & Krapohl article provides no evidence that the federal polygraph community has come up with a better than chance methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in our book. Again, I'm grateful for your criticism, which will be reflected in the next edition.

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No, I don't agree that my behavior is hypocritical. With regard to Gordon Barland's comments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, I think his intent was clearly to scare his audience of scientists and engineers into believing that nowadays, polygraphers can detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. However, the London & Krapohl article to which he made reference provides no convincing evidence that such is the case. We'll continue to point out misrepresentations and occasional outright lies from those in the polygraph community. We will doubtless make mistakes of our own along the way, as we may have done in concluding that London & Krapohl's "John" would have passed had he not admitted to having employed countermeasures. But we have not intentionally misled anyone regarding polygraphy (as polygraphers do on a daily basis), and we continue to welcome criticism from those in the polygraph community.

We've provided, via this message board, an uncensored forum where all may post their comments and criticism. (Even this message thread was included as a "featured link" on the AntiPolygraph.org home page.)

Any further criticism you may have is welcome.

DoDPI hasn't set forth any reliable technique for the detection of deception. Nonetheless, DoDPI pretends to teach several such techniques. I suppose the same probably holds true with regard to the detection of countermeasures. 

I don't know what DoDPI is teaching in its countermeasures course. Perhaps you could enlighten us?

That said, I think the fact that no one in the federal polygraph community has accepted Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge speaks to that community's level of confidence in its ability to detect countermeasures.

Glaringly absent from the DoDPI countermeasure course description is any mention of any technique(s) for the detection of countermeasures.

George, you're correct - the course description does not discuss any specific "techniques."  Why would a course description specifically address and identify the techniques for you?  Doing so would be counterproductive for those in the polygraph community actively engaging in efforts to detect CM.  The description does however state: "This 40-hour course gives the PDD examiner the information and experience needed to DEAL with them in criminal and intelligence..."  Obviously we are dealling with them.  I know for a fact that more and more people are being caught engaging in CM.  Whether or not they confess or not has no bearing on whether they are caught or not.  You've identified CM techniques to your readers, we've developed counter-countermeasures to your techniques.  It would be stupid for us to disclose that to you so you could use that info to develop additional CM to our CCM.  I welcome the opportunity to go up against your readers in the real world.    

L72cueak,

You asked me why a course description would specifically address and identify for me any specific countermeasure techniques for the detection of countermeasures taught at DoDPI. I never suggested that it should. My observation is that the course description doesn't even mention any instruction in how to detect countermeasures. You seem to be suggesting that the DoDPI countermeasure course does indeed include instruction in how to detect countermeasures. Is that right?

If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that it would be stupid of you (meaning, I presume, the federal polygraph community) to disclose what counter-countermeasures you have developed, because that would enable us to develop additional countermeasures. That may be so, but I suspect that the real reason that DoDPI shrouds in secrecy everything having to do with countermeasures is that in reality, the federal polygraph community has no better-than-chance method for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described on AntiPolygraph.org.

That no one in the polygraph community has shown the requisite confidence in their ability to detect countermeasures to accept Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge tends to support this suspicion.

L72cueak,

You asked:

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For discussion of the questions you raise, see the message thread, What's more effective than the polygraph?, begun by Dr. Barland.

George,

In your chapter “Polygraph Countermeasures” - “What about the Relevant Questions?” you said, “Even if you produce a slight response when asked the accusatory relevant questions, you will have artificially produced stronger responses while answering the control questions.”   

How does one know they have produced a stronger response on the CQ than the RQ?  How do they know what they delivered on the RQ?  For example, if an examinee delivered an EDA response to a RQ that was 30mm in amplitude, how does one know how to artificially produce an EDA response that exceeds 30mm in amplitude and still be at the sub-maximal level?   

L72cueak,

You asked:

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Clearly, one cannot know with absolute certainty that one has produced stronger responses to the "control" questions than to the relevant questions. (However, the absence of a post-test interrogation will provide some indication that one has succeeded.)

Reactions can only be controlled directly with regard to the repiratory channels of the polygraph instrument. On the respiratory channels, one can be certain not to produce a scorable reaction with regard to any of the relevant questions while wilfully producing scorable reactions when answering the "control" questions.

It seems likely that any potential reactions to the relevant questions on the electrodermal and cardio channels will be attenuated when one understands the fraudulent nature of polygraph "testing," simply because one will understand that one need not fear them. As some who report having successfully employed countermeasures have observed, the hardest part may be not to laugh as the polygrapher goes through his monkey drill.

Those who wish to compare their relative responses to "control" vs. relevant questions on the electrodermal channel may do so by making a tape recording of a question series with a mix of relevant, irrelevant, and "control" questions at 20-30 second intervals and playing it back while monitoring their electrodermal responses with a galvanometer.

In any event, as I've mentioned before, in Honts' published research on countermeasures, some 50% of programmed guilty subjects were able to defeat the CQT with no more than 30 minutes of instruction, and even experienced polygraphers were not able to detect countermeasure attempts with better than chance levels of accuracy.

If you'd like me or other readers to believe that the federal polygraph community has developed a better than chance method for detecting countermeasures of the kind described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, please provide some evidence therefor.