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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #30 - Apr 3rd, 2002 at 9:46pm
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L72cueak,

Thank you for providing the above citation from Confessions of a Spy. It suggests a possible resolution of the contradiction between the Senate report and Dr. Ryan's remarks: perhaps the Soviets only advised Ames with regard to behavioral countermeasures, and Ames did not regard that as "training on how to beat the polygraph" while Dr. Ryan did.

You also wrote:

Quote:
George, you said:

“I agree with you that our conclusion that London & Krapohl’s “John” would have passed is he had not admitted to using countermeasures goes beyond the available evidence.”  

What does ‘goes beyond the available evidence’ mean?  Is that an evasive way of saying there is no evidence?  If it was not based on evidence, do you concede it was a misleading statement?  If not, please explain.


"Goes beyond the available evidence" merely means that the evidence was inadequate to support the conclusion, not that there was no evidence for it. The conclusion may or may not have been correct.

Quote:
In response to my position that you provided false and misleading information and that you should notify your readers now, you stated its not ‘of such great importance’ to notify your readers now.  Do I understand you correctly that you don’t think its important to notify your readers in a timely manner that you provided them false and misleading information?  Why don’t you think it is not ‘of such great importance’ to tell them now?


Again, our conclusion that "John" would have passed had he not admitted his use of countermeasures goes beyond the available evidence and may or may not be the case. The reason I don't see an urgent need for a front page announcement or the immediate release of a new edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector is that the point, in my judgment, is relatively minor. The key point is that the London & Krapohl article provides no evidence that the federal polygraph community has come up with a better than chance methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in our book. Again, I'm grateful for your criticism, which will be reflected in the next edition.

Quote:
I understand your hesitation in acknowledging in a timely manner to your readers that you have provided them with false and misleading information.  Doing so now speaks directly to your credibility.  You have no evidence to back up your claim that he would have passed (the same thing you criticize the polygraph community of doing – making statements without any evidence to back it up).  Again sir, I submit to you that your behavior is hypocritical.  Also, you’re not acting in a very objective manner.  Do you agree that your behavior is hypocritical?  If not, please explain.


No, I don't agree that my behavior is hypocritical. With regard to Gordon Barland's comments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, I think his intent was clearly to scare his audience of scientists and engineers into believing that nowadays, polygraphers can detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. However, the London & Krapohl article to which he made reference provides no convincing evidence that such is the case. We'll continue to point out misrepresentations and occasional outright lies from those in the polygraph community. We will doubtless make mistakes of our own along the way, as we may have done in concluding that London & Krapohl's "John" would have passed had he not admitted to having employed countermeasures. But we have not intentionally misled anyone regarding polygraphy (as polygraphers do on a daily basis), and we continue to welcome criticism from those in the polygraph community.

We've provided, via this message board, an uncensored forum where all may post their comments and criticism. (Even this message thread was included as a "featured link" on the AntiPolygraph.org home page.)

Any further criticism you may have is welcome.

« Last Edit: Apr 3rd, 2002 at 10:26pm by George W. Maschke »  

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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box L72cueak
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #31 - Apr 12th, 2002 at 8:55pm
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George, I was curious about your thoughts concerning DoDPI's countermeasure course?  If they haven't devloped techniques to detect countermeasures, what would be the purpose of the course?
  
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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #32 - Apr 12th, 2002 at 9:23pm
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DoDPI hasn't set forth any reliable technique for the detection of deception. Nonetheless, DoDPI pretends to teach several such techniques. I suppose the same probably holds true with regard to the detection of countermeasures.

I don't know what DoDPI is teaching in its countermeasures course. Perhaps you could enlighten us?

That said, I think the fact that no one in the federal polygraph community has accepted Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge speaks to that community's level of confidence in its ability to detect countermeasures.

  

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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #33 - Apr 13th, 2002 at 5:13pm
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Below is a copy of the course description from DoDPI's web site.  

COUNTERMEASURES (40 CEH)

This 40-hour course gives the PDD examiner the information and experience needed to deal with countermeasures in criminal and intelligence (human intelligence, offensive counterintelligence, and security screening) environments. The course presents concepts, theories, research data, laboratory exercises, and case histories involving criminal and intelligence testing, including the Ames case. Detailed information is included on countermeasure programs and operations conducted by hostile intelligence services during the Cold War, and current foreign polygraph capabilities. This course devotes more time to counter-measures than the Operational Source Testing course described below. As such, it is intended as the primary countermeasures course for criminal and security screening PDD examiners, or as a periodic refresher course for examiners experienced in human intelligence and offensive counterintelligence PDD operations. The course includes daily homework assignments followed the next day by classroom seminars and quizzes. The course includes a final examination.
  
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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #34 - Apr 13th, 2002 at 8:56pm
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Glaringly absent from the DoDPI countermeasure course description is any mention of any technique(s) for the detection of countermeasures.
  

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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #35 - Apr 14th, 2002 at 8:16am
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It is clear that the individual who employed the countermeasure made the mistake of not keeping careful track of the intensity he put forth.

This can be easily avoided by practicing a specific countermeasure (a number of times) before going in for the exam.

It seems logical that a tremendous response (tremendous in the sense that it is dramatically different) might raise suspicion.  Again, practice makes perfect.

I believe that biting the tongue,  and other painful countermeasures, are much easier to self-monitor during an exam since the employment is much more basic.  I also believe that "flexing the pucker" might interfere with an inexperienced individual's breathing pattern (baseline, for example) due to it being an unatural contraction.

L2zeak (sp?):

You are making a huge argument out of an easily preventable error that the person made.

« Last Edit: Apr 15th, 2002 at 1:55am by MissionPoly-ban »  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #36 - Apr 18th, 2002 at 5:09pm
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George, you're correct - the course description does not discuss any specific "techniques."  Why would a course description specifically address and identify the techniques for you?  Doing so would be counterproductive for those in the polygraph community actively engaging in efforts to detect CM.  The description does however state: "This 40-hour course gives the PDD examiner the information and experience needed to DEAL with them in criminal and intelligence..."  Obviously we are dealling with them.  I know for a fact that more and more people are being caught engaging in CM.  Whether or not they confess or not has no bearing on whether they are caught or not.  You've identified CM techniques to your readers, we've developed counter-countermeasures to your techniques.  It would be stupid for us to disclose that to you so you could use that info to develop additional CM to our CCM.  I welcome the opportunity to go up against your readers in the real world.    
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #37 - Apr 18th, 2002 at 5:32pm
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L72cueak,

Considering you have remained anonymous (and, granted, there may be legitimate reasons for doing so) you have not even met any challenges to your credentials on a message board let alone in the "real world" you speak of.  Perhaps if you care to reveal yourself and you satisfy Dr. Richardson's challenge qualifications of being "...from the ranks of federal polygraph instructors or operators, leading civilian polygraphers or any other group whose credentials and experience would be deemed impeccable in polygraph circles..." you might care to accept his challenge.  If not, don't continue to bluster about "willing to go up against" anything or anybody.
  
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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #38 - Apr 18th, 2002 at 10:20pm
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L72cueak,

You asked me why a course description would specifically address and identify for me any specific countermeasure techniques for the detection of countermeasures taught at DoDPI. I never suggested that it should. My observation is that the course description doesn't even mention any instruction in how to detect countermeasures. You seem to be suggesting that the DoDPI countermeasure course does indeed include instruction in how to detect countermeasures. Is that right?

If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that it would be stupid of you (meaning, I presume, the federal polygraph community) to disclose what counter-countermeasures you have developed, because that would enable us to develop additional countermeasures. That may be so, but I suspect that the real reason that DoDPI shrouds in secrecy everything having to do with countermeasures is that in reality, the federal polygraph community has no better-than-chance method for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described on AntiPolygraph.org.

That no one in the polygraph community has shown the requisite confidence in their ability to detect countermeasures to accept Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge tends to support this suspicion.
  

George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #39 - Apr 22nd, 2002 at 8:24pm
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The course description does say that it teaches one how to "deal" with countermeasures.  I respect your opinion as to why you believe DoDPI does not disclose counter-countermeasure information.  The fact is that in the real-world, federal polygraph examiners are taught how to "deal" with countermeasures.  Federal examiners detect people engaging in countermeasures all of the time.  Do some slip through - yes, I'm sure they do.  One thing is for sure, if countermeasures are detected (even without a confession) the chance of one "passing" a polygraph is pretty slim.  If you believe polygraph should be eliminated what do you suggest the Government do instead?  Normal "background" investigations surely have failed to detect spies in the past.  Should we do away with background investigations as well?      
  
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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #40 - Apr 22nd, 2002 at 8:34pm
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L72cueak,

You asked:

Quote:
If you believe polygraph should be eliminated what do you suggest the Government do instead?  Normal "background" investigations surely have failed to detect spies in the past.  Should we do away with background investigations as well?


For discussion of the questions you raise, see the message thread, What's more effective than the polygraph?, begun by Dr. Barland.
  

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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #41 - Apr 23rd, 2002 at 5:07pm
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Thank you for think to the thread.  As evidenced by Dr. Barland's statement recruiting spies/defectors doesn't happen that often and most spies are caught via someone defecting.  Your position is that polygraph is ineffective at catching spies.  Background investigations are not effective either at "catching" spies.  Should the Government do away with background investigations as well since they are also ineffective at catching spies?  The Government obviously does make attempts to recruit spies/defectors - is that your only solution?
  
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #42 - Apr 23rd, 2002 at 5:14pm
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George,

In your chapter “Polygraph Countermeasures” - “What about the Relevant Questions?” you said, “Even if you produce a slight response when asked the accusatory relevant questions, you will have artificially produced stronger responses while answering the control questions.” 

How does one know they have produced a stronger response on the CQ than the RQ?  How do they know what they delivered on the RQ?  For example, if an examinee delivered an EDA response to a RQ that was 30mm in amplitude, how does one know how to artificially produce an EDA response that exceeds 30mm in amplitude and still be at the sub-maximal level? 
  
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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #43 - Apr 23rd, 2002 at 7:35pm
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L72cueak wrote on Apr 23rd, 2002 at 5:07pm:
Thank you for think to the thread.  As evidenced by Dr. Barland's statement recruiting spies/defectors doesn't happen that often and most spies are caught via someone defecting.  Your position is that polygraph is ineffective at catching spies.  Background investigations are not effective either at "catching" spies.  Should the Government do away with background investigations as well since they are also ineffective at catching spies?  The Government obviously does make attempts to recruit spies/defectors - is that your only solution?  


No, I don't think the government should do away with background investigations. There is an important distinction to be made between a background investigation and a polygraph "test." The former is not a pseudoscientific fraud.
  

George W. Maschke
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Paste Member Name in Quick Reply Box George W. Maschke
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Re: Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector
Reply #44 - Apr 23rd, 2002 at 9:34pm
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L72cueak,

You asked:

Quote:
How does one know they have produced a stronger response on the CQ than the RQ?  How do they know what they delivered on the RQ?  For example, if an examinee delivered an EDA response to a RQ that was 30mm in amplitude, how does one know how to artificially produce an EDA response that exceeds 30mm in amplitude and still be at the sub-maximal level?


Clearly, one cannot know with absolute certainty that one has produced stronger responses to the "control" questions than to the relevant questions. (However, the absence of a post-test interrogation will provide some indication that one has succeeded.)

Reactions can only be controlled directly with regard to the repiratory channels of the polygraph instrument. On the respiratory channels, one can be certain not to produce a scorable reaction with regard to any of the relevant questions while wilfully producing scorable reactions when answering the "control" questions.

It seems likely that any potential reactions to the relevant questions on the electrodermal and cardio channels will be attenuated when one understands the fraudulent nature of polygraph "testing," simply because one will understand that one need not fear them. As some who report having successfully employed countermeasures have observed, the hardest part may be not to laugh as the polygrapher goes through his monkey drill.

Those who wish to compare their relative responses to "control" vs. relevant questions on the electrodermal channel may do so by making a tape recording of a question series with a mix of relevant, irrelevant, and "control" questions at 20-30 second intervals and playing it back while monitoring their electrodermal responses with a galvanometer.

In any event, as I've mentioned before, in Honts' published research on countermeasures, some 50% of programmed guilty subjects were able to defeat the CQT with no more than 30 minutes of instruction, and even experienced polygraphers were not able to detect countermeasure attempts with better than chance levels of accuracy.

If you'd like me or other readers to believe that the federal polygraph community has developed a better than chance method for detecting countermeasures of the kind described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, please provide some evidence therefor.
  

George W. Maschke
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