This Friday, 13 June, is the last day to submit comments on DOE's proposed rulemaking on polygraph policy. I sent my comments today by e-mail to poly@hq.doe.gov. They're posted here:

http://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-035.shtml

Los Alamos National Laboratory's Daily News Bulletin Reader's Forum includes some pointed commentary on the DOE's decision to ignore the NAS report:

• The National Academy on the polygraph (Bernard R. Foy -- 5/22/03)
• DOE - Short on trust, but long on faith (Ken LaGattuta -- 5/21/03)
• More on DOE earning our trust (Joe Martz -- 5/16/03)

Ben,

You really should have posted your question in a new message thread. The short answer to your question is yes, the polygraph can be beaten. See Chapters 3 & 4 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector to learn how. More importantly, however, your idea of having your girlfriend submit to a lie detector test is misguided. Polygraph "testing" has no scientific basis whatsoever, and actually has an inherent bias against the truthful. Whatever questions you may have about your girlfriend's honesty, the answers are not to be found in a polygraph chart reading. You might as well consult Miss Cleo.

For examples of the harm that misplaced faith in the polygraph has caused for others' relationships, see the message thread Domestic relations polygraph.

IS IT ANYONE OUT THERE THAT CAN TELL ME HOW OR IF IT'S A WAY TO BEAT A POLYGRAPH TEST??? 
NOT THAT I HAVE LIED ABOUT ANYTHING BUT I WANTED MY GIRL FRIEND TO TAKE ONE AND SHE SAID SHE WOULD BUT I WOULD LOVE TO KNOW IF IT CAN BE BEAT??? ALL OF YOUR INPUT WOULD BE VERY APPRECIATED... MY EMAIL IS : BOWENS001@HOTMAIL.COM   IF YOU WOULD WRITE TO ME PLEASE IF YOU KNOW ABOUT MY QUESTION? 

SINCERE REGARDS,
BEN ~~

Quote:


Not really, Vance. I didn't think that DOE would propose that its polygraph program be completely scrapped, but I didn't expect that it would completely disregard the findings of the NAS report, either. In a recent interview with a Los Alamos newspaper, I said that DOE had thumbed its nose at Congress; a better metaphor would have been to say that DOE has held up a middle finger to Congress, the National Academy of Sciences, and the loyal scientists and engineers who are subjected to the quackery of polygraph screening.

Quote:


DOE's decision has more to do with bureaucratic incompetence and corruption. Do you think that the DOE's response is really in the best interest of U.S. national security?

Quote:


You've made a complete non sequitur here, Vance. That good investigators "do not use the squigglies produced by a polygraph to infer deception" is not the reason why "Canadian courts do not accept polygraph test results as forensic evidence." Canadian courts, like virtually all courts of law, reject polygraph test results because they are unreliable.

I agree with you that good investigators don't use polygraph results to infer deception, but U.S. counterintelligence officials clearly do.

Quote:


Because without validity, polygraphy offers only make believe security. As Professor Stephen Fienberg, who headed the NAS polygraph review panel put it, "National security is too important to be left to such a blunt instrument."

Quote:


You can count on that.

Dear George,

I have been visiting this site for a couple of months now. I originally ran into the site through word of mouth while discussing polygraph experiences with co-workers. I find your site very informative and I wish you luck in abolishing the polygraph. It is merely an interrogation tool that allows unethical polygraphers to arbitrarily accuse people of dishonesty often times because of a persons attitude, appearance or a mere "hunch" on the part of the examiner. 

I am a 7 year Police Officer,  I have worked for 2 departments, I am a Defensive Tactics Instructor and Firearms Instructor. I am thankful every day that I have been given the opportunity to work in this field. I was afraid when I began the process, in 1995, that I would be DQ'd for violating the "Drug/Substance Use" policy of the department. I was well outside the timeframe for use of marijuana (5 years) but I had exceeded the number of uses (20 times or less). I could not recall the number of times I had used marijuana, but between the ages of 17 and 20 I knew I had used it more than 20 times. I had no other violations or criminal conduct that result in being DQ'd, so I decided to give it a try. During my process, I had several friends from high school that also applied with local PDs shortly before I did. These gentlemen were, to my knowledge, not guilty of anything too horrible in their backgrounds that would have removed from the eligibility. Nothing aside from some high school pot use and maybe some underage drinking, but nothing "serious". All 4 of these individuals were DQ'd after the polygraphs. This made me very nervous and I considered withdrawing from consideration as my polygraph was going to be within the next 30 days. 

However, before I took my first poly I had the incredible luck of running into a friend of the family from years past who was a former Police Officer and had become a PI and a poly examiner. I began to explain to him my dilemma and boy did he open my eyes! He was VERY honest with me about the machine's flaws as well as the prospect of unethical examiners and even took me to his office to further acquaint me with the machine. He explained control, relevant, irrelevant questions, etc. We even conducted a couple of mock exams.

I took my first "official" poly about 3 weeks later and totally blew it away. I  started out with a smaller department (about 80 officers) to get my foot in the door and about a year later applied with a large municipal department (about 3400 officers) and the Highway Patrol in my state. After processes with both agencies, which included polygraphs, I was offered a position with both but elected to work for the city as the Highway Patrol wanted to relocate me about 250 away from my home. Both of these agencies had guidelines similar to the original department I worked for. Yes, when it boils down to it, I LIED. However, I decided to do so KNOWING I would make an outstanding officer and also KNOWING I would serve my community with integrity and honesty. I was not about to let a couple bad decisions I made when I was "young and dumb" stop me from pursuing my goals.

To date I have received several letters of commendation, made countless arrests, gotten many of society's undesireables off the street and have served my community and profession with pride and integrity. To think this all may never have happened if, like so many others, I had walked into the examiner's office as his or her pigeon and spilled my guts, only to be told "no" is almost sickening to me. 

I would encourage anyone who is considering a pre-employment polygraph to educate themselves, so as not to become a poly examiners "victim". The polygraph is NOT accurate and should be trashed as a pre-employment screening tool. 

Good luck all!

Keep up the good work George!

PK

Vance,

If the squigglies (as you say) don't mean anything, then there's ultimately no pressure.  The bluff (trolling for any available confessions) requires having people believe the squigglies do mean something.  Whether it be the NAS report or the continued good work of this site, ignorance is being reduced over a period of time with the result being the huff and puff bluff of polygraphy will simply follow the laws of physics (3rd law of Thermodynamics-entropy) and be nothing but a flat tire with no pressure... The day for your "I told you so" comment is definitely not here, and don't be surprised to eventually find yourself on the receiving end at some point.  cheers...

Vance,
What you say is somewhat true in criminal cases. But we are talking about employee screening here. The court admissibilty of a polygraph is moot. People are losing their jobs and security clearances soley on the basis of those "squiggly lines". More important though is the possibility that the DOE may be relying on the polygraph so much that the real spies (who know how to manipulate the test) are slipping through unnoticed.

Well, Cats & Kittens,

I really hate to say "I told you so", but I think we all knew this day would come.  Like many applied topics in Psychology, the issue of polygraphy has much more to do with social and political realities than scientific support.

Good investigators do not use the squigglies produced by a polygraph to infer deception; they use them as a way of applying psychological pressure that can sometimes result in useful information.  That is why, for example, Canadian courts do not accept polygraph test results as forensic evidence, yet nearly every police department has a polygraph and a videocamera.  The videocamera is to record the confessions which ARE admissable evidence (Supreme Court of Canada: R. v Oickle, 200?).  The polygraph charts go in the file cabinet where they belong.

So, why would you expect the scientific status of polygraphy to have any bearing whatsoever on the political status of polygraphy, particularly in the wake of 09/11?

Still, you did your best and that's all any of us can do.   

Keep on truckin'!

-Vance

George and Friends
Well it appears things have not gone quite as you think they should, but you might remember I told you this would happen, I also told you that the "pool" of examinees will shrink in the DOE, this will also happen in time.
A bit of reality for you from someone who has been involved with the DOE community for over a decade.  DOE made a decision that was thiers to make, as the requesting agency and the one footing the bill.  The Secretary takes all information into account, such as the political aspects of why this review was even conducted, and the blatant anti-polygraph bias existing within the panel, looks at the practical reality in the form of congressional mandates,and made a decision.   
The Secretary of Energy knows that he has many PHD researchers that would tear down fences, welcome the Chinese into design areas in the name of academic freedom, institute tye dye shirts as the uniform of the day and generally create a friendly campus type atmosphere free from the nasty inconvienience of security measures.
Generally speaking, this community chafes at the requirements placed on them by the department.  As contractors fresh from academia in some cases, or insulated from the real world in others, this group requires special handling.  Perhaps including having a group of scientists look at the source of thier concerns.
Some of these scientists will never accept the idea that someone with a bachelors degree can have a possible impact on thier careers.  In some cases this fear is justified as this crew is notoriously sloppy with security and the protection of classified.
So George, dont be upset.  Your boat may be going sideways, but it has not capsized yet.

Dr. Al Zelicoff, a senior scientist at Sandia National Laboratories, made a cogent observation on the conclusions of the NAS report. He is quoted an article published in the 18 October 2002 issue of Sandia's Lab News publication (emphasis added):

"In consensus scientific statements, it doesn't get any clearer: polygraphs are not worthless, they are worse than worthless, and it is deeply gratifying as well that the Academy echoed the conclusions of the 1999 Sandia Senior Scientists' report on polygraphs."

J.B.,

While the focus of the NAS report was indeed on polygraph screening, the polygraph review panel did make conclusions with regard to polygraphy in general. These conclusions are enumerated at the beginning of Chapter 8 of the report, before the conclusions regarding polygraph screening in particular.

I do not wish to be argumentative, but I think it is important to emphasize that  the NAS's conclusion that "...[t]here is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods" was made with regard to polygraphy in general, and not just screening, as you (incorrectly) assumed. This fact may easily be checked by referring to the context in which the foregoing conclusion appeared.

The NAS concluded that there is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing in general. This is a key conclusion that you cannot gainsay.

George,

I see no point in debating the issue of the NAS report, in view of the extensive body of research which is readily available for discerning individuals to view and decide for themselves what Chapter 8 was intended to address.

Reference Link:
http://www.nap.edu.openbook/0309084369/html/167.html

I opine that instrumentation much like the current polygraph instrumentation will prove to be most accurate for use with a GKT/CIT.  Considering the fact that Drew has conducted much research in this area and may be considered more of a neutral third party, maybe he would wish to expound upon the area of utilizing ANS and CNS for the detection of concealed information. 

J.B.,

Quote:


I agree with you that more general terms like "polygraph," or "the polygraph" are often used when a more specific application is actually intended.

Quote:


I suspect you are right, though I also suspect that the polygraph is not the best instrument for conducting such tests. It should be noted that concealed information tests are not suitable for screening purposes.

Quote:


J.B., in your earlier post, you made the positive assertion that, "The polygraph has been meticulously examined in actual criminal cases and done so more than any other forensic science." My point is that most of the field research on polygraphy (the thousands of cases of which you speak) has not been "meticulous" enough for publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals, and that the limited research which has been so published does not establish that CQT polygraphy reliably works at better-than-chance levels under field conditions.

It is my understanding that with most genuine forensic tests (e.g., urinalysis for metabolites of various drugs), laboratory conditions more closely approximate field conditions than is the case with CQT polygraphy (such that laboratory studies may be relied upon), that test procedures are well-defined and standardized (unlike CQT polygraphy), that appropriate control measures exist (such control is completely absent with regard to CQT polygraphy), and that, with regard to diagnostic tests, sensitivity and specificity are knowable (which is not the case with any application of CQT polygraphy).

Quote:


Not so! The NAS conclusion that "...There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods" appears in its conclusions regarding polygraphy in general.

George,

My last post was simply pointing to the fact that polygraph is often generalized when it is not.

My opinion is that concealed information testing can provide a great amount of diagnostic value to the criminal investigator. 

I was generalizing about polygraph, when I talked of field research, for it is generally known by those whom have researched polygraph that the majority of research subsists of criminal specific issue testing using the CQT.  I guess I was guilty of not being more specific considering the intent of the message.

I am unaware of any other forensic science that has compiled research based on thousands of actual field criminal investigations.  The NAS even used medical diagnosis for its comparison of field research, which faired far worse then polygraph. I would be interested for you to point me to the field research conducted on other forensic sciences?  Also in your search, please provide me with the number of actual criminal cases analyzed in comparison to the thousands of polygraph cases.  

The quote you used from the NAS about the polygraphs ability to achieve better results of that of other methods was most certainly directed toward screening examinations and not specific issue criminal testing.  Moreover, the NAS also made it quite clear that their review was focused toward screening and thus did not expound on specific issue but to use its studies for the lack there of in the intended inquiry.  The beginning of the chapter you quoted (8) begins with;

Quote:

J.B.,

I can't add much to George's comments, which I do believe very effectively rebuts some of your points.

I generally accept your formulation that the bottom line is whether the instrument works adequately for its proposed use.  In other words, ends and means.  Does the use of the polygraph (the means) achieve the desired ends (screening out spies, properly identifying criminals, et al.)?

If we just look at polygraph screening, I think the conclusion is clear that this particular "means" has failed to serve, and has actually sabotaged, the desired "ends".  Many innocent people have been erroneously screened out (a loss of valuable employees), some investigated, (a waste and diversion), and some guilty people have inflicted tremendous damage (Ames, Montes, Chin, et al.) after "passing" the polygraph and lulling investigators. 

So the bottom line is that for the particular purpose of screening, it has been a costly failure. 

The other ends for which the polygraph has been deployed as the means deserve a separate analysis.

Quote:

Dear J. B.,

Your last line of this quote could very well be the key to my original and biggest heartache of my polygraph exposure.  The existing CQT format used in pre-screening is inappropriate at best.  Good independent research concerning polygraph is hard to find for I have looked for it.  The agency that I applied for uses the CQT format as if it were 100% infallible and ruins many potential careers by using it.  I am somewhat irritated that employees within the system are fully accepting of the fact that friendly fire occurs and that is just the cost of "doing business" with that agency.

I do realize that the environment of interrogation can be enhanced by the physical presence of the polygraph and thus obtain some confessions that would not otherwise be gained.   I just have a big problem with device and test method which has few studies that are repeatable without constantly having to have qualifiers about the operator. 

I have read your discussions concerning GKT methodology.  I would at least like this more than what I went through if only for the aspect of needing to do investigation and have specific items of inquiry instead of general fishing expedition as it is currently done.

The pre-screening polygraph assumes guilt until proven innocence.  Why cannot law-abiding applicants have the same right as accused criminals to be innocent until proven guilty (and definitely not by pre-screening CQT polygraph being questioned about non-specific incidents)?

At least in this case with the DOE, the NAS specifically is stating that for the intended use of polygraph in pre-employment screening, there is no useful positive security outcome.

Why do they insist on using it?

J.B.,

I think that when Mark spoke of "the polygraph," he was referring to polygraphic "lie detection," and not concealed information (guilty knowledge) tests, which are qualitatively different and seldom used in the United States.

I assume that in your post (except where otherwise indicated) you, too, were speaking of polygraphic "lie detection" when you referred to "the polygraph."

Quote:


The amount of peer-reviewed polygraph field research is actually quite small. To the best of my knowledge, only four such studies exist. What forensic sciences have been examined less meticulously than that?

Moreover, I must disagree with your characterization of polygraphy as a "forensic science." As explained in Chapter 1 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector and in William G. Iacono's article, "Forensic 'Lie Detection': Procedures Without Scientific Basis," polygraphy has no grounding in the scientific method. The National Academy of Sciences very diplomatically stated as much at p. 8-1 of its polygraph report:

Quote:


The NAS expressed a similar view somewhat less diplomatically (but quite cogently) in Chapter 1 of its report, where it likened the polygraph community to a shamanistic priesthood. (See the message thread The Cult of Polygraph for a full-text citation of the relevant passage.)

You also write:

Quote:


The NAS did allow that the polygraph may have some utility for eliciting admissions/confessions. But this is a far cry from saying that any reliance should be put on polygraph chart readings. With regard to utility, the NAS reports states at p. 8-3:

Quote:


And with regard to DOE's polygraph program, the NAS warns against attributing to polygraphy a diagnostic value that it does not possess (pp. 8-6 to 8-7):

Quote:


You also write:

Quote:


The NAS concluded otherwise, stating at p. 8-2:

Quote:


You continue:

Quote:


If the polygraph's proposed use were simply as a trick for obtaining admissions/confessions from the naive and gullible, I could agree that it might work adequately for some individuals. But as a diagnostic test for the detection of deception? No way.

Mark,

I disagree with some of your analysis.  The polygraph has been meticulously examined in actual criminal cases and done so more than any other forensic science.  Inasmuch as polygraph is one of the oldest and most readily available forensic tests, the amount of data available for analysis is stifling.  I opine that neither the NSA’s nor any other inquiry has ever shown that polygraph leaves criminal investigators at a disadvantage.  To the contrary, the available field research, even when using the Control Question Test (CQT), places polygraph at a level significantly above traditional investigative methods for criminal investigation.  Dr. David Lykken himself said he would use the polygraph, if he were a police investigator (most likely a GKT).   Most of the disdain toward polygraph found in quotes of notable individuals has been so directed toward specific formats and uses and not all inclusive.   

What I regard as the bottom line is does the instrument work adequately for its proposed use and does it do so at a level that is significantly above any past implemented methods?  One can argue either side of this and do so in many different facets when it comes to polygraph.  However, the polygraph is simply an instrument.  The format used with it and its intended use seems to be the major point of content.   

Quote:


Let's dispose of this argument once and for all:

"The greatest threat to the intelligence product's integrity comes from the tendency of collectors to accept bad sources of information in lieu of none, and of analysts to fill factual holes with their own prejudices."

Angelo Codevilla, "The Urgency of Offensive Counter-Terrorism", FrontPageMagazine.com, 2/13/03

This applies equally to a criminal investigation.  Better to have NO source of information than a BAD source, which is what the polygraph is.  In other words, better to start the race at the starting line, rather than ten feet behind it.

Getting rid of the polygraph does not require replacing it with something else.  The very act of getting rid of it will, by itself, improve the quality of screening investigations.

Quote:

Dear PDD-Fed,

You quoted one of my favorite lines from Mark Twain.

I know that I did not expect the use of polygraph examinations to stop immediately with the issuance of the NAS report.  I did expect the DOE to read and use it in the context which it the report was written.  The use of polygraph machines in general for employment screening lends no predictive element to future security breaches.  My argument has been that a good professional interrogator would get almost as many confessions by just having a four hour period of cross examination on an applicant or employee.  The utility of the polygraph as a tool of law enforcement is given far too much weight and used as a crutch to assign blame if someone goes "bad."

Secondly and most important,  if a person "fails" a polygraph examination and I was the government, I would sure as heck want to know why and leave no stone unturned in my investigation especially if the subject is a current government employee.  Many have stated that this would cost too much money but I believe that the amount of actual "guilty" subjects would be so small (if non-existent) that the polygraph users would be embaressed to defend their accusations.

I am one of those subjects accused of using countermeasure.  My second examiner and the board of review in Washington, D.C., seemed absolutely convinced  that I was "not within acceptable parameters".  

Almost a year later and after another "roll of the dice" polygraph examination, I am found fully acceptable for employment.  My background investigation has been thorough (and from the people I have talked to after their interviews was also very "agressive").  I believe my background examination was agressive because there were still lingering doubts concerning my second polygraph.  The polygraph becomes the perfect "pass the buck" tool to escape accountability.  This is why so many agencies love it so and refuse to let it go.

The government has a perfect fall back excuse for any bad behavoir in the future.  They will go back and review my third polygraph and somehow make it appear that my second polygraph was the "real" polygraph and blame it on bad interpretation of the third polygraph (which in hindsight was really "deceptive").


I wonder how many "not within acceptable parameters" applicants would be denied empolyment if only a background investigtion was used?  

Why must a goverment agency hurt its appearence of integrity and reputations of the citizens it protects by blackmarking the future of many applicants only based on polygraph interpretation?

I believe the FBI to be a good organization or else I would have never applied for a position.  I hope I can get to a position of influence to stop the inappropriate use of it for employment pre-screening or decrease its permanent blacklisting on applicants.

Regards

Mark,

I will contact Professor Fienberg and other members of the NAS polygraph panel regarding this. In a recent article by Lisa Friedman, who reports for the Tri-Valley Herald, professor Fienberg remarked regarding DOE's stated plan to continue polygraph screening: "I think this is a misguided policy. It ignores the content of our report, it actually makes erroneous statements about what we concluded and didn't conclude."

I think it would be appropriate for members of the NAS panel to submit a formal response during the Energy Department's public comment period. Senator Domenici, who chairs the Senate committee that has oversight responsibility for DOE, is reportedly waiting to see the public comments before deciding whether to hold hearings on DOE's polygraph policy.

I've also been in touch with some scientists at the national laboratories, and would suggest to all who plan on submitting comments to DOE that they cc or forward their comments to info@antipolygraph.org. We'll publish comments received on AntiPolygraph.org so that they will be readily available for review by members of Congress, their staffs, the media, and other interested parties.

In addition, any who might wish to comment publicly on DOE's plan to continue polygraph screening, but who fear retaliation for expressing their views, may send their comments to AntiPolygraph.org with the request that their name be withheld. For further anonymity and security, comments may be sent through an anonymous remailer and/or with PGP encryption. AntiPolygraph.org's PGP public key is available here.

The DOE's spin on the NAS report is Orwellian.  It also reflects the mentality of the polygraph process itself, where truth is a malleable concept shaped to fit the examiner's and the institution's prejudices.   

Just as an examiner repackages a subject's statements to appear incriminating, the DOE has repackaged the NAS report to appear to support the polygraph.

Does anyone have an idea if we can get Stephen Feinberg or another NAS panel member to rebut the DOE?  Given that their report is being used to bolster the polygraph, they might have something to say about that.

Shadow,

It appears that federal agencies will not voluntarily give up the polygraph so long as widespread public belief in the lie detector continues, and that a legislative solution is needed. Because of DOE's intransigence, there may well be new Congressional hearings into polygraph policy.

As for a replacement for the polygraph, the lie detector has yet to be invented, and the NAS found little reason to believe that additional research would significantly improve polygraph accuracy.

The best way to "improve the system" is for Congress to pass, and the President to sign, a Comprehensive Employee Polygraph Protection Act.

PDD-Fed,

I'm not aware that anyone had reported the death of polygraphy. But the sword of Damocles hangs over its head.