Marty,

Perhaps Dick Keifer dissembled in his Congressional testimony, but I would not necessarily conclude that such is the case.

The Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation reveals a disturbing belief in polygraphy (when it suits their purposes) among counterintelligence officials. A prime example is to be found in footnote 865 at p. 645 of Chapter 17, which describes an e-mail message about Dr. Wen Ho Lee's DOE polygraph interrogation, the author's name of which has been redacted, though I presume it was written by Department of Energy polygraph chief David M. Renzelman:

Quote:


As you can see, the author of this e-mail concluded beyond a doubt that Dr. Lee was not a spy and had not provided any classified weapons data to any unauthorized person based on polygraph results. Now, I'm not saying that Dr. Lee was a spy (having read extensively on the case, I don't believe he was), but the results of his polygraph interrogations provide no evidence whatsoever as to his guilt or innocence.

For more on the Bellows Report, see my earlier post, New Info on Wen Ho Lee's Polygraph Interrogations. Bellows himself seems to have been taken in by the pseudoscience of polygraphy.

Quote:


In my opinion it is not deluded thinking but just a plain lie. There is simply no way I can conceive that a person with that background could truly believe such nonsense.

-Marty

Fair Chance, Marty,

Of course, the chance that a spy would be detected by polygraph screening is much less than 50/50: it approaches zero. The only spies likely to be caught are those who are dumb enough to confess.

Nonetheless, retired FBI polygrapher and American Polygraph Association past president Richard W. ("Dick") Keifer last year told the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "It is my opinion that in a security screening polygraph examination, Robert Hansen [sic] would have reacted with greater than 99% certainty." Keifer further opined that, "Based on the results of scientific studies, when conducting a screening polygraph, you will have high confidence (99.99 %) on decisions to clear people."

Such deluded thinking in high places is scary.

Fair Chance wrote on Oct 23^rd, 2002 at 3:32am:


Yes. There we get to the heart of the matter. Assuming there is in fact better than 50/50 odds that the polygraph can detect in advance a potential traitor, it is very clear such persons occur at exceptionally low rates and so in screening just one of them very large numbers of completely innocent, loyal, Americans have their records permanently blackened.

A big part of this is the widespread belief in the infallibility of the polygraph, something which no one  other than people purposely kept ignorant believe. After all, who would take as a black mark the fact one lost a coin toss?

-Marty

Marty,

The Philadelphia Inquirer ran an article this spring of 2002.  They quoted an FBI director of training at Quantico that stated that one in two applicants did not pass the polygraph portion of their background check.  Mr. Hannssen might have been stopped by the polygraph or he might have passed (50/50).  We can achieve the same result at significant savings to the taxpayers by flipping a penny and calling it.  I would be acceptable to that as long as the loser does not get a permanent negative entry in their personal file that would affect their federal employment (jab-jab!!!, I am getting a little personal, jab-jab!!!!!!) which cannot be appealed in a reasonable manner.

What kind of certification course should we create to assure a proper coin-flip?  Maybe something along the lines of the orgasm certification?  

We need some significant debate on this site.  I am going stir-crazy.

Hanssen was somewhat unique in that he wasn't recruited, nor did he expose himself to Soviet handlers. Therefore, he wouldn't have had countermeasure training as one would expect.

Prior to his case the FBI had not had regular polygraph screening and had no pre-employment screening in place at the time he was hired.  It's interesting to speculate as to whether screening would have caught him. Hanssen was a very strange bird, Opus Dei, close family, something of an oddball at work.  Traitor. Very strange dude.

Mother Jones, TNR, Reason, Foreign Affairs. They represent a good political reading spectrum with fairly independent thought. The last is an excellent broad overview on international relations. Especially  good are the back issues consequent to the fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc.

-Marty

Skeptic,

That's right. Based on all accounts I've read, Hanssen was never polygraphed during his career with the FBI.

The one error I've found is that the article claims Hanssen passed repeated polygraphs during his career.  IIRC, he did not have to take polygraphs.

Skeptic

The more detailed Mother Jones magazine article on polygraph screening to which I referred is now available on-line. It's titled "Lie Detector Roulette" by Brendan I. Koerner.

It's interesting that publications with such disparate editorial outlooks as Mother Jones and the Washington Times seem to agree that polygraph screening is bad policy and should be stopped.

MotherJones.com, the website of the bimonthly magazine Mother Jones (named for labor activist Mary Harris "Mother" Jones) discusses polygraphy in light of the National Academy of Sciences report in an on-line commentary titled "The Truth About Polygraphs."

Watch for a more detailed article about polygraphy in the Nov.-Dec. issue of Mother Jones for which I and others involved in the antipolygraph movement were interviewed.