The more detailed Mother Jones magazine article on polygraph screening to which I referred is now available on-line. It's titled "Lie Detector Roulette" by Brendan I. Koerner.

It's interesting that publications with such disparate editorial outlooks as Mother Jones and the Washington Times seem to agree that polygraph screening is bad policy and should be stopped.

Skeptic,

That's right. Based on all accounts I've read, Hanssen was never polygraphed during his career with the FBI.

Marty,

The Philadelphia Inquirer ran an article this spring of 2002.  They quoted an FBI director of training at Quantico that stated that one in two applicants did not pass the polygraph portion of their background check.  Mr. Hannssen might have been stopped by the polygraph or he might have passed (50/50).  We can achieve the same result at significant savings to the taxpayers by flipping a penny and calling it.  I would be acceptable to that as long as the loser does not get a permanent negative entry in their personal file that would affect their federal employment (jab-jab!!!, I am getting a little personal, jab-jab!!!!!!) which cannot be appealed in a reasonable manner.

What kind of certification course should we create to assure a proper coin-flip?  Maybe something along the lines of the orgasm certification?  

We need some significant debate on this site.  I am going stir-crazy.

Fair Chance, Marty,

Of course, the chance that a spy would be detected by polygraph screening is much less than 50/50: it approaches zero. The only spies likely to be caught are those who are dumb enough to confess.

Nonetheless, retired FBI polygrapher and American Polygraph Association past president Richard W. ("Dick") Keifer last year told the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, "It is my opinion that in a security screening polygraph examination, Robert Hansen [sic] would have reacted with greater than 99% certainty." Keifer further opined that, "Based on the results of scientific studies, when conducting a screening polygraph, you will have high confidence (99.99 %) on decisions to clear people."

Such deluded thinking in high places is scary.

Marty,

Perhaps Dick Keifer dissembled in his Congressional testimony, but I would not necessarily conclude that such is the case.

The Final Report of the Attorney General's Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation reveals a disturbing belief in polygraphy (when it suits their purposes) among counterintelligence officials. A prime example is to be found in footnote 865 at p. 645 of Chapter 17, which describes an e-mail message about Dr. Wen Ho Lee's DOE polygraph interrogation, the author's name of which has been redacted, though I presume it was written by Department of Energy polygraph chief David M. Renzelman:

Quote:


As you can see, the author of this e-mail concluded beyond a doubt that Dr. Lee was not a spy and had not provided any classified weapons data to any unauthorized person based on polygraph results. Now, I'm not saying that Dr. Lee was a spy (having read extensively on the case, I don't believe he was), but the results of his polygraph interrogations provide no evidence whatsoever as to his guilt or innocence.

For more on the Bellows Report, see my earlier post, New Info on Wen Ho Lee's Polygraph Interrogations. Bellows himself seems to have been taken in by the pseudoscience of polygraphy.