Responses of Richard W. Keifer to the written questions
Of Senator Charles E. Grassley of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Regarding the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
"Issues surrounding the use of Polygraphs"
April 25, 2001

1. Deceptive with No Admissions of Guilt or an inconclusive result. I have been in the private sector since 1996, and am not certain what individual agencies do now. I am certain most individuals would initially be offered a reexamination. If these individuals continued to react I would suspect the employees [sic] past work product and access would be closely reviewed, and checked against internal espionage investigations for suspicious patterns. What additional proactive investigative steps would then be conducted, I do not know. There should be a defined adjudication process in place. Some agencies do a modest amount of investigation, and if they can't resolve the matter, refer these cases to the FBI for adjudication.
    
2. Most examiners in law enforcement are GS 12 and GS 13's. These agents now conduct investigations of corruption involving the highest levels of the government and also conduct internal investigations. I believe the examiners need to be assigned in a separate administrative division to maintain their independence. Examiners should not test anyone they know. Audit and compliance will insure the correct policies are being followed.
    
3. Will there be adverse consequences for not taking the examination, and would this create an uncooperative condition that could affect the results of an examination? From my past experience I would think there would be administrative consequences to anyone who refuses to follow agency policies. Therefore people could be ordered to take an examination. I believe these conscientious objectors should be prepared for the consequences. Internal security cannot be perceived as a game. If any testing was conducted, a recorded record should be maintained. Non-cooperation could influence the results but may not. I would then judge these matters on a case-by-case basis.
    
4. Regarding FBI Regulations. I am not a current FBI employee. FBI Polygraph Reg: 13-22.299(2) was the standard that was used in criminal specific testing and is a policy I support. I do not know what policies are now in effect in applicant and security testing. In the area of employee testing there is an important distinction between those who react to questions and those who are concluded to be deceptive. I would interpret the history of the use of the polygraph in the FBI and our current knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the polygraph to mean that adverse action will not necessarily result.
    

Responses of Richard W. Keifer to the written questions
Of Senator Patrick Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Regarding the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
"Issues surrounding the use of Polygraphs"
April 25, 2001

1. The Department of Defense Study DOD P194-R-0009 [sic correct DoDPI94-R-0009] provides an accuracy of 98% with programmed guilty and 83.3 % programmed innocent. Testimony at the hearing was provided indicating laboratory studies might not generalize to real life testing.
    
2. Confidence levels can be established to estimate the probabilities that you will get certain results in certain populations. Therefore an estimate of the accuracy of any individual can be established. Studying the results of actual testing can then check the reliability of these estimates. The key word is "reacted", and I am confidant [sic] Hansen [sic] would have reacted. Whether or not he would have been identified as a spy is up to the agency to determine. The use of Ames not being caught on a polygraph is a good example of the difficulty of espionage cases. It is my understanding Ames was identified during polygraph testing as having problems and was cleared by the CIA's adjudication process.
    
3. My assumptions of 3 in 10,000 was used in 1994 as a model for the conduct of examinations for the FBI so we could anticipate results and define resources we would need to manage the program. Your assumption in 3a. is correct regarding the first polygraph examination. It is my opinion that reexaminations will reduce the false positives and it is my understanding from agencies that conduct this testing this is the case. Because some agencies could be lax, and simply "pass everyone", and [sic] independent audit must be conducted. How investigators uncover the real spies and not unfairly cast suspicion on the false positives is the some [sic] problem these investigators face with the entire agency. The polygraph has reduced the numbers in that pool significantly. What you know with 99.9% confidence is the spy is in that pool.
    
4. For pre-employment polygraph examinations, I do not believe anyone should be excluded based solely on the results of the polygraph. The use of the polygraph as an aid to investigations and not a substitute for it is a policy I support. To ensure this policy is in effect I would establish written policies for each agency and audit their results. Since a polygraph report is part of their personnel file, I would have the report state that reactions were noted or not noted. Deception or non-deception is a conclusion about what these reactions mean. Most agencies have written guidelines in these matters.
    
5. Being told you have failed questions could cause reactions to further testing on the same questions. If interrogated in a strong manner, and if innocent, a sensitization could occur. There are methods that are effective in retesting and I use them frequently.
    
6. The key to polygraph is that we are monitoring relative differences between reactions. Even if a drug stabilized blood pressure and minimized that change possible in blood pressure, it would do so throughout the entire test. The relative comparisons between questions are still there. Study to date show [sic] drugs do not affect the accuracy of the polygraph. I don't have the research available but I believe it was conducted by Dr. Drew Richardson of the FBI and some may be available at the DODPI. If drugs are suspected they are easily detected.
    
7. There is research by Raskin and Hare on prison populations of diagnosed psychopaths that indicates they are detectable at approximately the same levels as the general population.
    

Responses of Richard W. Keifer to the written questions
Of Senator Patrick Leahy of the Senate Judiciary Committee
Regarding the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
"Issues surrounding the use of Polygraphs"
April 25, 2001

8. See Department of Defense studies regarding race and gender difference in polygraph testing. It appears there are no relative differences in rates of detection. Further, polygraph is used in Israel, Singapore, Japan, Mexico, and Canada.
    
9. To insure polygraph does not probe into private matters, you could record sessions. I believe the privacy concern should outweigh the burdensome records keeping requirements now in place. Written policies have been in effect my entire government career in the FBI Manual of instructions regarding prohibited questioning. These questions ranged from religion, sexual preference, union activities, etc. Management rigorously enforced these privacy concerns.
    

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