NAS Polygraph Report

[Skeptic]

Interesting discussion.  You must remember that as much bias as there is to show that the polygraph works there is also just as much bias to show that it does not work.  Remember, that those very same evaluators at NAS are scientist that are in support of the scientists that complained at DOE.

I'm afraid you'll need to do better to make your case.  You can start by documenting the alleged biases you claim.  Names, please?  Documented sympathies?

You can follow up by demonstrating that any such bias skewed the results.  Refute the NAS report on the facts.

The instrument is nothing more then a recording device...period.  It records physiological responses.  You guys still don't get it.  The examiner is the key.  The training is critical and common sense approach to interpetation of the results is mandatory.  There is no clear cut reason for a person to respond to a particular question other then if the question creates concern in the person taking the test.

Perhaps you can back this assertion up with some evidence?  (Hint: those "biased" researchers couldn't find it.  Here's your chance to prove them wrong.)

 This site has got more people screwed up about taking such a test then you can imagine.  After testing people have stated that they should have never visited this site or other sites about polygraph because this site clouded their good judgement and created concerns when there were none.  Your site does more to support the use of polygraph then any other site because we get the opportunity to show people just how wrong you are about polygraph.  Please keep up the "good" work! :

Yeah, this site just takes the magic right out of the polygraph process, doesn't it?  At the risk of really rocking your world, Watcher, I'll also note that there is no Santa Claus, and the moon isn't made of green cheese, either.

Is it my imagination, or has the release of the NAS report coincided with a new tinge of desperation in the tone of pro-polygraph writers?

Skeptic

[Fair Chance]

I have been spending quite a bit of time the last two days trying to research the "art" and "science" of polygraph.  I have definitely seen extreme points of view on antipolygraph.org both for and against the use of polygraph.  I do not see such different points of views on "pro" polygraph sites.  

The true judgement of any scientific test or proceedure is its ability to withstand rigorous attacks from it detractors as well as accolades from its proponents.  

The use of polygraphs affects the citizens of our country in many ways.  All of us have a responsibility to constructively question anything in our society.  If the NAS report is based on improper science, the report will eventually be refuted by facts.  Mean spirited remarks do not change scientific fact.  Not having a "better" way of testing people is not a scientific way of challanging the report.  

Despite what is being quoted in the newspapers,  polygraph is being used as the starting point in security investigations.  Many polygraph sites even admit that it was designed more for "specific" incident testing which is more appropriately done at the end of a thorough background investigation.  Unfortunately, polygraph is being used as the start of the security process and never allows anyone to progress beyond that on "suspicion" based on physical response.

Good law enforcement work begins with many good suspicions or hunches but must be followed with proper investigative techniques leading to facts. I, as a law enforcement officer, am still utimately responsible to the taxpaying citizens for my actions.  Whether or not I believe that a citizen is "sophisticated" enough to understand a complex matter that is my specialty,  I must trust in them if I expect them to trust government.  I serve them, they do not serve me.

The NAS report is a foundation in which to review how this tool is being properly or improperly used.  The report is a light to illuminate a procedure and judge how "scientific" it is.

A previous posting states how important a skilled polygraph examiner is to the "results" of an exam.  Polygraph is often referred to as an "art" as much as a science.

If it is an "art," does the "art" of polygraph demand highly skilled "artist" which are few and far in between leaving us with "fingerpainters" who are ruining the reputation and aspirations of many citizens?

The NAS inquiry started out on a simple basis.  Does using polygraph examinations significantly deter the probability of detecting our enemies from our loyal employees?  

Their answer, "No."

[Public Servant]

No desperation here.  I will continue to work to protect society from criminals whether they take the investigative tool of polygraph away or not.

Perhaps, I read wrong, but my interpretation of the Executive Summary was that they recommended polygraph only be used as a small part of background investigations with an eye on the cited weaknesses.  (Forgive me for paraphrasing from memory--I read it yesterday and have little time to go quote hunting at the moment).  This agrees with some of the more constructive disscussions I had with Drew on this site.  It appears that while screening exams were dealt a blow in the findings, the committee, in the end, was hesitant to recommend complete abolishment of screenings exams.  Further (playing more into my area), the report seemed to support continuation specific issue LE polygraph stating it was used with much success and had a reliability of much greater than mere chance.

Here's the real question I'd like to pose:

George has asserted that his intent for this site was in no way to help criminals evade justice.  Drew says he is most concerned with the scourge of screening exams. So...

If the government banned screening exams but left the LE/SI polygraph system intact, would you close this site and be finished with this crusade, or would you continue to offer apparent methods to "beat" the polygraph?  

This question is not directed only to George and Drew.  The answer will obviously be quite revealing in regards to ethical questions I have previously posed.

[Marty]

No desperation here.  I will continue to work to protect society from criminals whether they take the investigative tool of polygraph away or not.
....
Further (playing more into my area), the report seemed to support continuation specific issue LE polygraph stating it was used with much success and had a reliability of much greater than mere chance.

That was my take from the report. By far the bigest objections related to the higher rate of false positives in screens, where there are low base rates. I think they even said it had demonstrated, if not scientifically validated, effectivity in specific issue testing such as occurs in criminal investigations.

I think the general phrase in those cases was "well above chance" and "well below 100%" The phrases (I am not certain about the exact words) seemed chosen so that the wording for the two cases was symetrical.

-Marty

[Fair Chance]

Dear Public Servent,

The report did agree that on specific issue testing, the results were better then chance but not perfect (as if any legal procedure can be absolutely 100%!).

My contention is that facts from an intensive background check are necessary to create the knowledge for a more then chance specific issue test.  Under the current  system, an applicant could be judged negatively by polygraph screening and the background check is never accomplished and their integrity is placed in question.  

I am requesting that the background check be performed first.  If there are any discrepencies that cannot be properly adjudicated, the applicant could be given the option of a specific issue test.  If the applicant refuses, he/she will probably be refused a security clearance but at least it will be based on research and facts (or lack of facts). There should be many background checks which can easily be adjudicated or not need any adjudication at all.  These checks would need no polygraph intervention at all.  On the surface, it is starting to look like a money issue to me (regarding time and manpower necessary for background checks) and the polygraph was forced to the front of the security process (am I wrong or is this the case?).

I realize that there is not currently a better "alternative" out there.   Even in cases of "friendly fire" in the military, they analyze what went wrong and try to do better and improve on their mistakes.  Will "friendly fire" occur in the future?  Most probably yes,  will the same mistakes be made, hopefully no.

Alot of good people and citizens are being hurt by the "friendly fire" of polygraph screenings.   The people holding and operating the weapons are the best people to come up with a "safety" on the trigger.  This issue seems to have been simmering for a long time and the pot just blew off the top with the NAS report.  The ball is in your court and everyone is looking for solutions.

[Fair Chance]

Good night gentleman,

I didn't realize what time it is!  I've got to set the coffee pot and get to bed or else I will be dragging tomorrow!

This discussion will have to wait for another day (or night!).

[Mark Mallah]

This is the beginning of the end for polygraph screening.  It may take a little while for the whole structure to go down, but it IS going down.  First the DOE will cease using them, because there's no way to justify them in light of the report.  The same will apply to other agencies too.  They'll probably resist for a while, and may be able to perpetuate polygraph screening for a bit, but the game is over.  The emperor has finally been pronounced naked.

As for specific issue testing, I did not get the impression that the committee endorsed it, only that it cautiously suggested higher accuracy rates.  I have not had a chance to review the report carefully yet, so perhaps I'm off.

In any event, specific issue testing is next.  It will eventually have to justify itself under the type of scientific rigor applied by NAS.  Whether it can do it or not remains to be seen.  It will, as the current saying goes, have to "make the case."

[George W. Maschke]

...

Here's the real question I'd like to pose:

George has asserted that his intent for this site was in no way to help criminals evade justice.  Drew says he is most concerned with the scourge of screening exams. So...

If the government banned screening exams but left the LE/SI polygraph system intact, would you close this site and be finished with this crusade, or would you continue to offer apparent methods to "beat" the polygraph?  

This question is not directed only to George and Drew.  The answer will obviously be quite revealing in regards to ethical questions I have previously posed.

As long as government continues to rely on pseudoscientific techniques such as "Control" Question "Test" and Relevant/Irrelevant polygraphy, and to pass off such charlatanry as science to the American people, you can expect AntiPolygraph.org to remain on-line.

[Anonymous]

Public Servant,

Note the concern for academic integrity and truth expressed by one of your colleagues (PolyDude) on the polygraphplace.com message board (yes, we do go their for occasional entertainment):

...Why is it that this very important report is issued by the NAS regarding the Polygraph and there is not one word or comment on this site. If we don't stick together as a group of professionals, who will be there to defend each of us in our own businesses.
We have to make a concerted effort to put this report in the best light possible. Where is the APA on this? Where are the state associations?
Let's get to work on this!...

Is there any question as to why polygraphy is the butt of a thousand jokes right now?  

[George W. Maschke]

This is the beginning of the end for polygraph screening.  It may take a little while for the whole structure to go down, but it IS going down....

Mark,

Here is one good sign: New York Times columnist William Safire--hardly a "bleeding heart" liberal--has come out strongly against polygraph screening in a column in today's (10 Oct.) paper titled "Lying 'Lie Detectors.'" He concludes:

Because professional spies are trained to defeat the device; because pathological liars do not cause its needles to spike; and because our counterspies relax when a potential suspect "passes" -- the system breeds the opposite of security.

Here's how I learned about that. In 1981 there was a brouhaha about the Reagan campaign having pilfered a briefing book used by Jimmy Carter to prepare for a debate. James Baker, to deflect suspicion from himself, hinted that it must have been the doing of the campaign chairman, Bill Casey.

Casey, just appointed C.I.A. chief, told me he was going to challenge Baker to a polygraph test to show who was lying. Figuring my old pal Casey was the culprit, I wondered why he would take the gamble. He reminded me he was an old O.S.S. spymaster, and that by using dodges like a sphincter-muscle trick and a Valium pill, he could defeat any polygraph operator. Baker wisely did not take Casey up on the challenge.

A more serious example of the foolishness of dependence on the machine: A national security adviser was suspected of leaking a secret to The New York Times. Though not our source, he flunked the exam, and was about to be fired and disgraced. He put President Reagan on the phone to The Times's publisher, who -- on a one-time basis -- confirmed that the adviser had not been our source. That was one fewer career lost to the predatory polygraph.

To such anecdotal evidence we now add thorough scientific refutation of the technique. As a result, polygraphing should be stopped not only at the Energy Department, which sponsored the Research Council study because it was losing scientists, but at the Defense Department, which subjects some 10,000 employees to the self-defeating display of distrust.

If unfairness to truth-tellers doesn't move you, try the hard-liner's reason: Bureaucratic reliance on today's fault-ridden system lets well-trained spies and terrorists penetrate our defenses.

[Public Servant]

As long as government continues to rely on pseudoscientific techniques such as "Control" Question "Test" and Relevant/Irrelevant polygraphy, and to pass off such charlatanry as science to the American people, you can expect AntiPolygraph.org to remain on-line.

So even if suspects of a crime, who can only be given an exam if they consent, are the sole possible examinees, you'd still seek to help people circumvent the process... and even with the NAS comments about the apparent value of such exams.  I'm still not buying the ethics here.  No doubt, at that point, more than half of this site's viewers would be criminals trying to escape justice.

However, tenacity is one trait I admire.  And I enjoy having a worthy opponent.

I'd be interested to see if Drew shares this hardline position.

[George W. Maschke]

What the NAS Report Says About the Accuracy of Specific-Incident Polygraph Testing

The following is an excerpt from the conclusions of the NAS polygraph report (p. 168 of the HTML version):

Estimate of Accuracy  Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research and the limited ability to generalize to real-world settings, we conclude that in populations of examinees such as those represented in the polygraph research literature, untrained in countermeasures, specific-incident polygraph tests for event-specific investigations can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection. Accuracy may be highly variable across situations. The evidence does not allow any precise quantitative estimate of polygraph accuracy or provide confidence that accuracy is stable across personality types, sociodemographic groups, psychological and medical conditions, examiner and examinee expectancies, or ways of administering the test and selecting questions. In particular, the evidence does not provide confidence that polygraph accuracy is robust against potential countermeasures. There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods.

Note that:

1) This estimate of accuracy does not specify what kind of polygraph tests, e.g., CQT vs. R/I vs. GKT "can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance."

2) The authors' conclusion that polygraph tests "can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance" is conditioned upon the subject population being similar to "those represented in the polygraph research literature," that is, ignorant of polygraph procedure and countermeasures. Such ignorance cannot be safely assumed, especially with information on both polygraph procedure and countermeasures readily available via the Internet.

3) If the authors' conclusion that "the evidence does not allow any precise quantitative estimate of polygraph accuracy..." is correct, then it (a fortiori) follows that software algorithms peddled by polygraph manufacturers such as Axciton and Stoelting that purport to determine with mathematical precision the probability that a particular individual is lying or telling the truth are worthless.

4) The authors conclude that "the evidence does not provide confidence that polygraph accuracy is robust against potential countermeasures."  It is not safe to assume that anyone passing a polygraph "test" has told the truth.

5) The last sentence of the above-cited paragraph is the key one with regard to polygraph validity (as opposed to accuracy): "There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods." What this means is that there is no evidence that polygraph "testing" provides greater predictive value than, say, interrogating a subject without the use of a polygraph, or with a colandar-wired-to-a-photocopier that is represented to the subject as being a lie detector.

The NAS's conlusion that "specific-incident polygraph tests for event-specific investigations can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection" with naive subject populations is hardly a vindication for the validity of CQT polygraphy, and those in the polygraph community are formally cautioned against publicly misrepresenting it as such, as you can expect to be publicly called out on it.

[George W. Maschke]

...

So even if suspects of a crime, who can only be given an exam if they consent, are the sole possible examinees, you'd still seek to help people circumvent the process... and even with the NAS comments about the apparent value of such exams.  I'm still not buying the ethics here.  No doubt, at that point, more than half of this site's viewers would be criminals trying to escape justice.

...

Public Servant,

My advice to anyone considering submitting to a polygraph interrogation regarding a crime would continue to be to refuse to submit and to seek competent legal counsel.

You and your fellow polygraphers should be under no illusion that information about polygraph procedure and countermeasures is now forever public and will remain within the easy grasp of anyone who seeks such information. Indeed, this information is now to be found in the NAS report itself. There's no way this toothpaste is going back into the tube. The polygraph community had best wake up to this reality.

[George W. Maschke]

The polygraph community's public relations campaign against the NAS report has begun. See the Statement of the American Polygraph Association Pertaining to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report on the Use of the Polygraph.

[Drew Richardson]

Public Servant,

There are two issues related to present polygraph practices which are of great and continuing concern to me: (1) ending that which you rightly characterize as the scourge of polygraph screening and (2) ensuring that every other polygraph exam conducted in this country is audio/video taped that examinees might be protected from abusive behavior to include the recently discussed issue of fabricated admissions/confessions.  I will not be satisfied and will crusade as necessary till these two goals are accomplished.  

You will note that my short list does not include anything about countermeasures, although I am somewhat associated with the issue through "the challenge."  Nor does it include immediate rectification of the problems associated with CQT/RI/other lie detection formats.  Although I completely agree with George about the factual considerations involved, because that which drives my public expressions is the large scale victimization of individuals and harm to national security that rests with polygraph screening, I will likely return to working behind the scenes to correct the problems of specific issue testing once the scourge has ended.  This will largely depend upon how responsibly organized polygraphy acts in ending that which can no longer be justified in any sense--polygraph screening.

And with regard to the aforementioned watch for responsible behavior, George's last post including a statement from the APA would not suggest a good start.  Its claim that it was not invited to the party is silly and immaterial.   The chiefs of the federal polygraph programs who were in attendance at every public meeting (and even many for which antipolygraph critics were not invited) are all associated and presumably members of the APA.  No resource that the APA might have provided was likely withheld and certainly no pro-polygraph evidence within the federal polygraph community not generally available to the APA would have been withheld from panel members.  

The situation that existed for the NAS panel and does now exist is that every scientist in the country not on the polygraph payroll (and even some important ones who previously were) are solidly opposed to polygraph screening.  Even those from the research staff at DoDPI could do nothing but ask for forgiveness for the absence of even a scintilla of evidence in the peer reviewed literature supporting present polygraph screening practices and plead for more time and resources.  With regard to the apparent weaknesses associated with polygraph screening (particularly susceptibility to countermeasures) if I understand that which is contained in the panel's report and previously cited on this message board, not only was there no meaningful answer for many of these issues, but there may well have been obfuscation and willful obstruction to prevent the panel from fully assessing matters and conducting its work.  The APA and the rest of organized polygraphy needs to realize this issue is over and act responsibly to restore order and dignity within its house.  If it does not, specific issue testing will likely be the proverbial baby in the bath water.