Ex-FBI Polygrapher Ron Homer Beaten

[EosJupiter]

Ludovico,

Thank you for the references and sources.  
There is much to digest.
Even without my questions fully answered.

Till Next time !!

Regards ....

[Sergeant1107]

I guess it is easy to claim the polygraph is accurate and useful when you pass off any known inaccuracy as a "fluke" and point to any known accurate result as typical.

I noticed the conversation quickly moved away from the obvious failure of the polygraph in this case and into other areas, like dueling quotations and claims that each is being misused.


How do we know that she didn't use countermeasures?

For all the polygraph examiners on the board who have recently scored any charts as NDI, how do you know you weren't wrong?  I'm sure Ron Homer thought he was right when he scored her chart.  What is the difference between you and he?

[Wonder_Woman]

How do we know she was using CM's?  we don't.  Don't beat this one to death until we know what happened.  This morning there were comments she was taking 'flaxseed oil'.  Don't worry, I didn't believe that one either.  It will be interesting if we can find out what questions were asked.

Again, we have never claimed 100% accuracy.

[Ludovico]

Lesse now, I think it was your own EOS who first suggested it was a fluke.

Keep in mind. We really don't know everything about that test yet. It would be interesting to see it.

[George W. Maschke]

Keep in mind that we have two theories here:

1) that countermeasures can defeat the test in a modern testing context (I think we all know that old studies don't cut it - the situation is changed now that George has initiated his campaign to educate and encourage every terrorist, psychopath, and sex offender to use countermeasures),

I don't know that "old studies don't cut it," as you aver. Could you explain why the studies by Honts et al. that I cited should be discounted?

As for your suggestion that I'm on a "campaign to educate and encourage every terrorist, psychopath, and sex offender to use countermeasures," 1) that's not the case: AntiPolygraph.org provides polygraph countermeasure information to the public in order to provide truthful persons with a means of protecting themselves against the significant risk of a false positive outcome and 2) even if our purpose were to aid the guilty, it would have no bearing on the truth or falsity of the information presented. See my "Response to Paul M. Menges Regarding the Ethical Considerations of Providing Polygraph Countermeasures to the Public."

and

2) that countermeasures can be easily detected.

This is a postion that polygraphers such as Charles Honts and Gordon Barland are not taking.

Even your own digithead's favorite source of information - the NRC report - concurs that there is evidence that countermeasures don't help, and that claims that they do require supporting evidence.

You made this argument a few days ago, and as I pointed out then, the study to which the NRC/NAS report refers in this regard was of "spontaneous" or untrained countermeasures, which are not comparable to the "point" countermeasures (applied timely with the control questions) described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

but this is noteworthy

Because it is possible that countermeasures can increase "failure" rates among nondeceptive examinees and because a judgment that an examineeis using countermeasures can have the same practical effect as the judgment that the test indicates deception, their use by innocent individuals may be misguided.

"failure" meaning, of course "not passing"

The foregoing passage, too, is made with reference to the same study of untrained countermeasures: things that examinees without knowledge of polygraph procedure think up themselves in the hope of increasing their chances of passing. To cite this passage without the proper context is misleading. There is no evidence that the kind of countermeasures taught in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector increase an innocent examinee's chances of a false positive result.

and finally,

...claims that it is easy to train examinees to "beat" both the
polygraph and trained examiners require scientific supporting evidence
to be credible. However, we are not aware of any such research.

While the studies by Honts et al. did not specifically address the ease with which countermeasures may be taught, it bears repeating that under the low motivational conditions of the laboratory (where examinees had minimal incentive to learn), half of deceptive subjects were able to pass the polygraph with a maximum of 30 minutes of training, and trained and experienced examiners were unable to detect them. Of course, more research would be welcome, but this is an area of inquiry that DACA, the main funding source for polygraph research, seems uneager to explore.

The NRC/NAS report's key conclusion (at p. 214) regarding polygraph countermeasures is that "the evidence does not provide confidence that polygraph accuracy is robust against potential countermeasures."

[Ludovico]

George,

Old studies don't answer the question because the circumstances have evolved, since you have chosen to encourage every terrorist, criminal, and sex offender who uses the Internet to attempt to pass the polygraph while lying. You have also chosen to make fodder out of a lot of good people who would be better off without your advice.

You forgot the part on Page 151:

There is also evidence that innocent examinees using some countermeasures in an effort to increase the probability that  they will "pass" the exam produce physiological reactions that have the opposite effect, either because their countermeasures are detected or because their responses appear more rather than less deceptive. The available evidence does not allow us to determine whether innocent examinees can increase their chances of achieving nondeceptive outcomes by using countermeasures.

Have a nice day.