This message thread is for discussion of the National Academy of Sciences polygraph report and press conference, which took place at 11:00 A.M. Eastern. A recording of the conference is available at the NAS website in RealPlayer format at:
http://video.nationalacademies.org/ramgen/news/100802.rm
The full text of the NAS polygraph report may be read on-line here:
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html/
Although there is much to be absorbed and gleaned from the NAS report and press conference over the coming days and weeks, there are a few take home points that are immediately available to us on face value:
(1) The committee distinguished between specific issue testing (criminal testing) and screening applications, specifically the counterintelligence screening exams used by various federal agencies for employees and prospective employees.
(2) The committee suggested that there was a great need for basic and applied research, but very clearly indicated that it should not be conducted by those who had any connection or vested interest in polygraphy.
(3) Although the committee did allow that specific issue testing had an accuracy somewhat greater than chance and substantially less than perfection, it was clear that it associated absolutely no validity with polygraph screening.
(4) Of great significance to the readers of this site, the panel suggested that there was no basis for any agency using polygraph screening as a diagnostic instrument for screening job applicants. Although they were hesitant to put a number on the number of false-positive stung victims, they suggested it could be a substantial number of the tens of thousands of people subjected yearly to this form of testing.
(5) The committee was particularly concerned with the damage likely being done to national security by relying on polygraph results in terms of catching spies. It clearly stated that no spy had ever been caught through the use of polygraphy and there was no reason to believe that any ever would be so identified. It further expressed concern that a spy who had passed a polygraph exam would, in essence, be given a free pass to commit additional acts of espionage due to agency overconfidence given to polygraph results.
(6) The committee discussed the notion of polygraph utility and deterrence. Although they indicated that there was some anecdotal suggestion of such, that it was not supported an any way in the research literature, it was not/had not been quantified, and that it was dependent (at least in the long term) on the concept of validity which was lacking for this application (polygraph screening). Presumably even their press conference reduced the utility and deterrent factor by letting the public know in unmistakable terms that polygraphy (screening) was not a valid instrument for detecting lies.
(7) The committee was very careful, in following its original charter, not to tell federal and other agencies what to do with their individual programs. They were also very diligent to make the scientific considerations abundantly clear. The conclusions to be drawn and actions to be taken are unmistakable. Polygraph screening should be discontinued and never should have been a sole basis for denying employment, placing employment in jeopardy, or of implicating or clearing an individual with regard to espionage or any other activity for which polygraph screening has been used as a diagnostic instrument.
I believe the ultimate take-home message will be that polygraphy should be limited to specific issue testing, polygraph screening should be eliminated as any sort of diagnostic tool/instrument and that considerably more effort and monies should be expended upon research (basic science and applied) and that these efforts should in no way be associated with the polygraph community. The one suggested source for coordination and funding of these research activities was the National Institutes for Health.
Drew Richardson
No surprises other than the GKT seems to have less significance than I expected, but then the research there is pretty skimpy.
I was curious about the very small group that is doing research on countermeasures (Honts). Research in that area is even more confounded by uncontrolled variables and having a small number of researchers makes bias, even unintentional bias, a more likely component. The report noted the need for independent lab confirmations here to assess countermeasure impact.
I completely agree with the need to do serious, non-incestuous research which is so typical of marginally scientific processes. Look what we have today. People take homeopathic medicine seriously and it is total garbage. Chiropractic isn't much better. They both tend to produce such "research."
How about magnet therapy?
-Marty
Dr. Richardson
I haven't read all or begun to digest this report but, it appears to me that the NAS is saying, even in a criminal issue test, that polygraphy is valid only if the examinee is naive or dumb enough to believe lies told to him/her by the operator and gives a confession. (I have difficulty labeling them interrogators). If an examinee maintains innocence, then there is no validity given to the machine or it's operator. Guilt still cannot be proven by polygraphy. Voo-doo is still voo-doo.
Your comments please.
Drew, thanks for the quick take on the report. I only scanned the executive summary so far, but I think you hit the salient points. The polygraph community will probably claim victory because specific issue testing was "vindicated", albeit cautiously.
There may be a way for them to get around the unsupportable use of screening: a screening followed by a "specific issue" exam. They do a general screening on the employee population. Let's say they get 1,000 deception indicated results. Then they give all of those 1,000 what they call a specific issue test, say on espionage.
Are those follow up tests truly "specific issue" tests, or are they screening tests masquerading as specific issue tests? Your comments Drew, would be appreciated.
I note that, in an AP report on the subject, Prof. Frank Horvath desperately tried to change the subject with the following quote:
"I would have to ask what tool they have in mind to replace polygraph screening,'' Horvath said. ``If we wanted to catch a spy or an applicant bent on spying, what would we do? What technique would we use to do that? There is no alternative right now to polygraph testing, and that's why it is used in spite of its shortcomings.''
(U.S. Advised Against Polygraphs--AP (http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/national/AP-Lie-Detectors.html))
One might as well justify Tarot card readings for applicant screening on the grounds that "we have nothing better". What a specious thing to say, especially since the report specifically recommended alternatives to continued polygraph screening. Horvath obviously hasn't even read that on which he's commenting.
It's a bad day for polygraph proponents.
I also noticed the AP story got several facts wrong, including the statements:
"Polygraphs measure heartbeat, blood pressure and other factors that are known to change when people are under stress, as they are when they lie."
(Certainly, this may happen, but people don't necessarily react with stress when they lie, nor do they fail to do so when they don't.)
"Most uses involve examining individuals about a specific crime, and in those cases the machines can tell the difference between lies and truth 'at rates well above chance, though well below perfection,'' the panel concluded."
(The vast majority of polygraphs given in this country are for security screening purposes, not specific-issue testing.)
At least they did mention that no spy has ever been caught by the polygraph.
Skeptic
Twoblock,
I believe you are correct in your recollection that Dr. Fienberg did in this morning's press conference mention that the validity of specific issue (criminal) testing might be affected by examiner and examinee perceptions. As I have opportunity to read the report (largely and properly focused on polygraph screening), I will try to revisit and answer your question more completely.
Mark,
That which distinguishes a specific issue test from a screening test is whether or not the issues covered by the polygraph exam are known to have occurred. If not, the exam is a screening exam or fishing expedition. A second or any number of subsequent examinations that focus on one or more issues (still) not known to have occurred would still amount to nothing but a fishing expedition and certainly not a confirmatory test in any recognized form.
Quote from: Drew Richardson on Oct 08, 2002, 06:09 PM
That which distinguishes a specific issue test from a screening test is whether or not the issues covered by the polygraph exam are known to have occurred. If not, the exam is a screening exam or fishing expedition. A second or any number of subsequent examinations that focus on one or more issues (still) not known to have occurred would still amount to nothing but a fishing expedition and certainly not a confirmatory test in any recognized form.
Dr. Richardson,
The only change I could see is that your breakdown test may now involve a population with a higher percentage of truly deceptive people (higher false positive than false negative rate). If this is true, then by default you should now improve the number of people falsely flagged as deceptive.
Of course, your test also now involves a population of innocent people who have had their confidence in the machine and their ability to pass a polygraph shaken. Those innocent people may also now feel that they are under suspicion or that fingers are being pointed in their direction. Additionally, a breakdown test may ask questions that are more emotionally charged than the initial polygraph.
Skeptic
Drew, George,
Did anyone notice that the report pointedly opposed employee screening? Please note, this was not prospective employee screening, where different statistics apply, as Martin and Terris(1981) pointed out.
-Marty
Pages 93 through 95 of the NAS report were especially telling (transcribed here in part):
"In the course of our study we have seen or heard numerous disturbing allegations about the way polygraph research decisions have been made, particularly in federal agencies that have supported this reasearch. We have seen or heard reports of researchers being prohibited from presenting studies at professional society meetings (see, e.g., Honts, 1994: Note 5); a report of a researcher being required to remove his name from a refereed journal article, apparently because the content displeased his employer (Furedy, 1993); a report of potentially inflammatory findings being suppressed and recalled from distribution; and various reports of researchers having been removed summarily from their duties or their positions, with reasons to believe that this might have been done because of the directions or results of their research. These reports are not ancient history, though they are not current either: most appear to have dated from the early 1990s...
"Also, we were adivsed by officials from DOE and DoDPI that there was information relevant to our work, classified at the secret level, particularly with regard to polygraph countermeasures. In order to review such information, several committee members and staff obtained national security clearances at the secret level. We were subsequently told by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and DoDPI that there were no completed studies of polygraph countermeasures at the secret level...
"These experiences leave us with unresolved concerns about whether federal agencies sponsoring polygraph research have acted in ways that suppress or conceal research results or that drive out researchers whose results might have questioned the validity of current polygraph practice. If the agencies have done or are doing these things, the result would be to introduce a pro-polygraph bias into polygraph research in general...
"Issues of conflict of interest reflect a serious structural problem with polygraph research. For the most part, the scientists involved in this area and the agencies involved in sponsoring and funding this research have a vested interest in supporting particular sets of conclusions about the reliability and validity of the polygraph (Levey, 1988)...
"We find the general quality of research on the criterion validity of the polygraph to be relatively low. This assessment agrees with those of previous reviewers of this field."
Skeptic,
Quote from: Skeptic on Oct 08, 2002, 07:27 PM
Pages 93 through 95 of the NAS report were especially telling (transcribed here in part):
"Also, we were adivsed by officials from DOE and DoDPI that there was information relevant to our work, classified at the secret level, particularly with regard to polygraph countermeasures. In order to review such information, several committee members and staff obtained national security clearances at the secret level. We were subsequently told by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and DoDPI that there were no completed studies of polygraph countermeasures at the secret level...
This is entirely consistent with the belief that the effectivity of the polygraph depends on widespread, public acceptance of it as being nearly 100% accurate. Probably medical doctors would feel the same about placebo in the absence of more effective modalities.
-Marty
Quote from: Marty on Oct 08, 2002, 07:20 PM
Drew, George,
Did anyone notice that the report pointedly opposed employee screening? Please note, this was not prospective employee screening, where different statistics apply, as Martin and Terris(1981) pointed out.
-Marty
Marty,
I think the NAS report was intended primarily to address DOE screening of existing employees. However, they did write in their conclusion (page 170, transcribed here in part):
"
Preemployment Screening The relevance of available research to preemployment polygraph screening is highly questionable because such screening involves inferences about future behavior on the basis of polygraph evidence about past behaviors that are probably quite different in kind. The validity for such inferences depends on specifying and testing a plausible theory that links evidence of past behavior, such as illegal drug use, to future behavior of a different kind, such as revealing classified information. We have not found any explicit statement of a plausible theory, let alone evidence appropriate for judging either construct or criterion validity for this application. Conclusions about polygraph accuracy for these applications must be drawn by educated extrapolation from research that addresses situations that differ systematically from the intended applications."
Thus, while they attacked polygraph screening in general for its lack of validation, they went further and called into question the entire rationale for polygraph interrogations as typically used in pre-employment screening.
However, they do point out that false positives in preemployment screening are likely to cost both government and applicant less money.
Skeptic
Quote from: Marty on Oct 08, 2002, 07:43 PM
Skeptic,
This is entirely consistent with the belief that the effectivity of the polygraph depends on widespread, public acceptance of it as being nearly 100% accurate. Probably medical doctors would feel the same about placebo in the absence of more effective modalities.
That last sentence is key -- "in the absence of more effective modalities". Furthermore, if your placebo is killing off a good chunk of the people on whom you're using it, perhaps secrecy wouldn't be the best idea...
Skeptic
Skeptic, that is one powerful excerpt. I love it.
Skeptic,
"killing off a large portion..." ROFLMAO. True. This is yet another reason why it is much more harmful for current employees. False positives have very real consequences to many innocent loyal employees. OTOH, screening of prospective employees is seen as less damaging.
The need for secrecy is a hysteretic phenomina. So long as the polygraph is seen as more effective if the public is deceived about it's effectiveness, the secrecy is continued. Were secrecy to be dropped presumable the polygraph, in all it's applications, would become a lot less effective. Perhaps that is why they are fighting so hard to maintain the illusion. Still, that horse is in the process of exiting the barn.
-Marty
Skeptic,
The excerpt from the NAS report is somewhat disingenuous.
Quote from: Skeptic on Oct 08, 2002, 07:49 PM
"Preemployment Screening The relevance of available research to preemployment polygraph screening is highly questionable because such screening involves inferences about future behavior on the basis of polygraph evidence about past behaviors that are probably quite different in kind. The validity for such inferences depends on specifying and testing a plausible theory that links evidence of past behavior, such as illegal drug use, to future behavior of a different kind, such as revealing classified information. ....
The attack here is on the hiring policy re prior drug use rather than the polygraph. It seems to me that if an agency wants to establish such policy they have every right. Clandestine drug use could be leveraged by an adversary to compromise an employee, even if it did not correlate with a proclivity to compromise classified info.
-Marty
Quote from: Marty on Oct 08, 2002, 08:03 PM
Skeptic,
"killing off a large portion..." ?ROFLMAO. True. This is yet another reason why it is much more harmful for current employees. ?False positives have very real consequences to many innocent loyal employees. ?OTOH, screening of prospective employees is seen as less damaging.
The need for secrecy is a hysteretic phenomina. So long as the polygraph is seen as more effective if the public is deceived about it's effectiveness, the secrecy is continued. ?Were secrecy to be dropped presumable the polygraph, in all it's applications, would become a lot less effective. Perhaps that is why they are fighting so hard to maintain the illusion. Still, that horse is in the process of exiting the barn.
-Marty
Marty,
One of this website's objectives is to pierce the veil of secrecy that has surrounded polygraphy. Any educated person who gets on the Internet to research polygraphy is now likely to quickly find information on both polygraph procedure and countermeasures. And there's nothing the polygraph community can do to stop it.
Quote from: Marty on Oct 08, 2002, 09:22 PM
Skeptic,
The excerpt from the NAS report is somewhat disingenuous.
The attack here is on the hiring policy re prior drug use rather than the polygraph. It seems to me that if an agency wants to establish such policy they have every right. Clandestine drug use could be leveraged by an adversary to compromise an employee, even if it did not correlate with a proclivity to compromise classified info.
-Marty
Under the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, governmental agencies do have a
legal right to screen for past or present drug use using a completely invalid methodology: polygraph screening. But it is immoral and irresponsible (some might say un-American) to do so. Based on their misplaced faith in polygraphy, agencies like the FBI are falsely branding many as drug users and/or traffickers and denying them due process -- there's no appealing the verdict of the "magic spirit box."
Recent drug use may be screened for with urinalysis test. Indications of past drug use may be gleaned through thorough background investigations.
I agree, both that they have the right to look into past drug use and that it's a rather stupid exercise. You can't always expect governments to act rationally. They tend to take on public fads and fears.
My point about the NAS report was that it was condemning the drug history questions usefulness more than the polygraph's value. I gather from NAS's argument that were the polygraph 100% effective they would object even more. They have a point, it's just not particularly related to the polygraph's accuracy in that example.
-Marty
Quote from: George W. Maschke on Oct 09, 2002, 05:02 AM
One of this website's objectives is to pierce the veil of secrecy that has surrounded polygraphy. Any educated person who gets on the Internet to research polygraphy is now likely to quickly find information on both polygraph procedure and countermeasures. And there's nothing the polygraph community can do to stop it.
And I thank you for providing that information. I had always been curious about how polygraphs worked and kinda thought there must be some sort of comparison question deception ever since I saw a TV program where a woman was incorrectly accused of taking money from a bank by an examiner who assumed she was a lesbian as a result of interviewing her. That was when I first had an inkling that the examiners were trying to get you to lie to a question they didn't really care about in order to calibrate the real question.
One day I recalled that show and was just surfing and that's how I had found your site. You have really done a good job putting together a lot of facts and links and exposing the secrets. One doesn't cure stupidity by propogating ignorance.
What the polygraph community can do though is encourage rather than hinder higher quality research such as NAS recommends and hope they can improve/change the technology to something that actually works and doesn't operate on the placebo effect.
-Marty
Who's lying?!From the NAS/NRC polygraph report (graciously transcribed by Skeptic):
Quote"Also, we were adivsed by officials from DOE and DoDPI that there was information relevant to our work, classified at the secret level, particularly with regard to polygraph countermeasures. ?In order to review such information, several committee members and staff obtained national security clearances at the secret level. ?We were subsequently told by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and DoDPI that there were no completed studies of polygraph countermeasures at the secret level...
From the polygraph committee's 17 October 2001 public meeting (http://antipolygraph.org/nas/richardson-transcript.shtml#challenge):
QuoteDAVID M. RENZELMAN (DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLYGRAPH PROGRAM CHIEF): I'd just like to make an observation. All of our examiners went through the countermeasures [unclear] and Dr. Barland and his staff, who is the recognized countermeasures person in this country [unclear] he trained our examiners, and I alluded to this when you came to [unclear] facility. And they taught our examiners how to practice countermeasures. And we tested each other. I don't have a person on my staff that's not an experienced examiner. We caught every one. Every one that was practicing [countermeasures]. A hundred percent. You then--
RICHARDSON: Are you willing to take my challenge? (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=418.msg1942#msg1942)
RENZELMAN: I didn't interrupt you. And I told you this before. And there are studies, but they are classified, for obvious reasons. Because if they were unclassified, they'd be on AntiPolygraph.org, and that doesn't make sense. But I think you were offered the opportunity to go to the place where they are, and you were offered an opportunity to have that briefing, and I recommend that you get that.
Perhaps the classification level of these supposed countermeasure studies was raised from secret to keep them away from the National Academy of Sciences?
Quote from: Drew Richardson on Oct 08, 2002, 04:07 PM
...Although the committee did allow that specific issue testing had an accuracy somewhat greater than chance and substantially less than perfection...
Drew,
I believe the committee said specific issue polygraph exams discriminated at levels "well above chance."
Just thought I would correct a little "spin" here...:)
Polycop...
Quote from: polycop on Oct 09, 2002, 10:39 AM
Drew,
I believe the committee said specific issue polygraph exams discriminated at levels "well above chance."
Just thought I would correct a little "spin" here...:)
Polycop...
Rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.......... gosh they're nice and straight now.
Polycop,
No spin intended or needed, but thank you for any warranted correction(s)... The report was an overwhelming confirmation of many things I have been saying for years, particularly as to the lack of validity associated with polygraph screening applications, susceptibility of polygraph lie detection formats to countermeasure efforts, and a need for independent research. I would agree with this panel that certain specific issue polygraph exam formats have greater validity and show far more promise. If you care to read my opening statement (http://www.antipolygraph.org/hearings/senate-judiciary-1997/richardson-statement.shtml) made before the U. S. Senate some five years ago, you will note that I made all of these points (and others) at that time. Regards,
Drew Richardson
Former CIA and DOE counterintelligence boss Ed Curran, who brought greatly expanded reliance on polygraph screening to both organizations, has once again shown that intelligence is not necessarily a prerequisite for rising to the highest levels of the counterintelligence community.
The following is an excerpt from Shankar Vedantam's article "
Can Polygraphs Detect Spies?" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A62948-2002Oct8?language=printer) in today's (9 Oct. 2002)
Washington Post:QuoteEdward J. Curran, a former director of counterintelligence for the Energy Department, disputed the findings. "To have them say it's ineffective is irresponsible," Curran said. "You can ask the prisoners in the jail what they think of the jail and you will get the same answer. You are asking scientists who don't want to take the tests" to evaluate them.
Mr. Curran didn't even have a clue that the scientists who conducted the National Academy of Sciences research review were not themselves subject to being polygraphed! (Or perhaps he thinks of scientists as interchangeable parts, like nuts and bolts?)
::)
Quote from: George W. Maschke on Oct 09, 2002, 01:33 PM
Mr. Curran didn't even have a clue that the scientists who conducted the National Academy of Sciences research review were not themselves subject to being polygraphed! (Or perhaps he thinks of scientists as interchangeable parts, like nuts and bolts?)
::)
Oh, yeah. Scientists look out for each other, you know. It's all about avoiding the polygraph.
I didn't realize Curran was such a fool. He sure don't like them durn high-falutin' scientists, though. Polygraph 'em all!
Skeptic
I just started to read this website after two unsucessful attempts to pass the FBI pre-employment screening polygraph test. My first one was inconclusive and my second one came back "not withing acceptable parameters." I am appealing the decision via certified return receipt mail. I realize the chance of appeal is slim to none but this will begin the process of clearing any "suspicions" which might be cast upon my integrity. I have never read this site until yesterday. During my second polygraph, the operator was almost ranting and raving on how I must confess to visiting such websites because of my polygraph results. Now I finally know what he was talking about concerning "countermeasures." I also stayed very calm and told the truth. I now know why my examiner was so angry with me, it was all a show and I did not "confess" to any of his allegations. Needless to say, ignorance is not bliss. When my appeal is over, I will describe my ordeal in detail. I am also a federal law enforcement officer.
My point of my first log-in. After digesting many pages of the NAS report, one aspect strikes me very clearly. If problems are encountered during the polygraph process, IT SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED. No conclusions of guilt or negative employment decisions should be base only on polygraph interpretation. I have read in the papers about the polygraph being part of a "total fabric of security" which also includes intensive background checks. If I am so suspicious and untrustworthy, why am I still in my present sensitive position in the Department of Justice. I am in my position because I have passed three intensive background checks in both the Department of Defense and Department of Justice. I am reinvestigated every five years. I have always performed with the highest sense of integrity and I am well respected by my peers. I invite the FBI to do their intensive investigation and see if I live up to my billing. Unfortunately, I will never be given the chance because I am considered to be part of the acceptable "friendly fire" losses because "no better choice is available." Why not do what they used to do before 1994? Trust in a good old fashion hard nosed background investigation. I am the same person I was before the test. I am now going to be very interested in the uses of polygraph in the future. I cannot condemn all polygraph for there are aspects represented in the report that leave specific uses possible with more research to measure their usefulness. I just concur that if it is going to be used as a "pre-screening tool", any discrepencies should be investigated and adjudicated one way or another, not just throw away the applicant because it is too much bother or money. The applicant's integrity is also being thrown away without any method of appeal under current policies. I look forward to educating myself on the polygraph now. I intentionally did not read anything about it before my interviews so I could honestly state that I did not research it. I was still accused anyway. If I am asked during the appeal, I will truthfully state that I have researched and not hide in the closet. I know that I will be kissing my employment opportunity good-bye by at what price do I start to sell my soul? I am used to doing the right thing, even if it is hard and cost me money or opportunity. I do not have any bad feelings toward the FBI, just a little disappointment in the system. I have a great job and I will be retiring in ten years under federal law enforcement retirement. I will never regret applying because at least I tried to join the system to improve it. I hope to help improve the system so that my children can enjoy a different type of application process should they want to apply to the FBI or any government agency in the future.
P.S. No one in our organization is required to pass a lie detector for employment. We have our fair share of people who do wrong things. As we investigate their failings, it has been the conclusion that a polygraph would not have prevented or foreseen their problems. Many of those problems are found during background reinvestigations which occur on a regular basis. Our organization also has a tremendous amount of loyal, ethical, and trustworthy individuals who I trust with my life everyday. We are proud to serve the American public without much fanfare.
Interesting discussion. You must remember that as much bias as there is to show that the polygraph works there is also just as much bias to show that it does not work. Remember, that those very same evaluators at NAS are scientist that are in support of the scientists that complained at DOE. The instrument is nothing more then a recording device...period. It records physiological responses. You guys still don't get it. The examiner is the key. The training is critical and common sense approach to interpetation of the results is mandatory. There is no clear cut reason for a person to respond to a particular question other then if the question creates concern in the person taking the test. This site has got more people screwed up about taking such a test then you can imagine. After testing people have stated that they should have never visited this site or other sites about polygraph because this site clouded their good judgement and created concerns when there were none. Your site does more to support the use of polygraph then any other site because we get the opportunity to show people just how wrong you are about polygraph. Please keep up the "good" work! :
Quote from: Fair_Chance on Oct 09, 2002, 09:20 PM
During my second polygraph, the operator was almost ranting and raving on how I must confess to visiting such websites because of my polygraph results. Now I finally know what he was talking about concerning "countermeasures."...... When my appeal is over, I will describe my ordeal in detail. I am also a federal law enforcement officer.
First, do not take the accusations during interrogation personally. Examiners are rated on their confession rate which is one of the few things that are at all reliable about the polygraph. And yes, for applicants to new positions they tolerate and rationalize a high false positive rate. It's too bad the process is so abusive. Thank you for your sevice in the DOJ though.
=Marty
Quote from: Watcher on Oct 09, 2002, 11:27 PM
Interesting discussion. You must remember that as much bias as there is to show that the polygraph works there is also just as much bias to show that it does not work. Remember, that those very same evaluators at NAS are scientist that are in support of the scientists that complained at DOE.
I'm afraid you'll need to do better to make your case. You can start by documenting the alleged biases you claim. Names, please? Documented sympathies?
You can follow up by demonstrating that any such bias skewed the results. Refute the NAS report on the facts.
QuoteThe instrument is nothing more then a recording device...period. It records physiological responses. You guys still don't get it. The examiner is the key. The training is critical and common sense approach to interpetation of the results is mandatory. There is no clear cut reason for a person to respond to a particular question other then if the question creates concern in the person taking the test.
Perhaps you can back this assertion up with some evidence? (Hint: those "biased" researchers couldn't find it. Here's your chance to prove them wrong.)
Quote This site has got more people screwed up about taking such a test then you can imagine. After testing people have stated that they should have never visited this site or other sites about polygraph because this site clouded their good judgement and created concerns when there were none. Your site does more to support the use of polygraph then any other site because we get the opportunity to show people just how wrong you are about polygraph. Please keep up the "good" work! :
Yeah, this site just takes the magic right out of the polygraph process, doesn't it? At the risk of really rocking your world, Watcher, I'll also note that there is no Santa Claus, and the moon isn't made of green cheese, either.
Is it my imagination, or has the release of the NAS report coincided with a new tinge of desperation in the tone of pro-polygraph writers?
Skeptic
I have been spending quite a bit of time the last two days trying to research the "art" and "science" of polygraph. I have definitely seen extreme points of view on antipolygraph.org both for and against the use of polygraph. I do not see such different points of views on "pro" polygraph sites.
The true judgement of any scientific test or proceedure is its ability to withstand rigorous attacks from it detractors as well as accolades from its proponents.
The use of polygraphs affects the citizens of our country in many ways. All of us have a responsibility to constructively question anything in our society. If the NAS report is based on improper science, the report will eventually be refuted by facts. Mean spirited remarks do not change scientific fact. Not having a "better" way of testing people is not a scientific way of challanging the report.
Despite what is being quoted in the newspapers, polygraph is being used as the starting point in security investigations. Many polygraph sites even admit that it was designed more for "specific" incident testing which is more appropriately done at the end of a thorough background investigation. Unfortunately, polygraph is being used as the start of the security process and never allows anyone to progress beyond that on "suspicion" based on physical response.
Good law enforcement work begins with many good suspicions or hunches but must be followed with proper investigative techniques leading to facts. I, as a law enforcement officer, am still utimately responsible to the taxpaying citizens for my actions. Whether or not I believe that a citizen is "sophisticated" enough to understand a complex matter that is my specialty, I must trust in them if I expect them to trust government. I serve them, they do not serve me.
The NAS report is a foundation in which to review how this tool is being properly or improperly used. The report is a light to illuminate a procedure and judge how "scientific" it is.
A previous posting states how important a skilled polygraph examiner is to the "results" of an exam. Polygraph is often referred to as an "art" as much as a science.
If it is an "art," does the "art" of polygraph demand highly skilled "artist" which are few and far in between leaving us with "fingerpainters" who are ruining the reputation and aspirations of many citizens?
The NAS inquiry started out on a simple basis. Does using polygraph examinations significantly deter the probability of detecting our enemies from our loyal employees?
Their answer, "No."
No desperation here. I will continue to work to protect society from criminals whether they take the investigative tool of polygraph away or not.
Perhaps, I read wrong, but my interpretation of the Executive Summary was that they recommended polygraph only be used as a small part of background investigations with an eye on the cited weaknesses. (Forgive me for paraphrasing from memory--I read it yesterday and have little time to go quote hunting at the moment). This agrees with some of the more constructive disscussions I had with Drew on this site. It appears that while screening exams were dealt a blow in the findings, the committee, in the end, was hesitant to recommend complete abolishment of screenings exams. Further (playing more into my area), the report seemed to support continuation specific issue LE polygraph stating it was used with much success and had a reliability of much greater than mere chance.
Here's the real question I'd like to pose:
George has asserted that his intent for this site was in no way to help criminals evade justice. Drew says he is most concerned with the scourge of screening exams. So...
If the government banned screening exams but left the LE/SI polygraph system intact, would you close this site and be finished with this crusade, or would you continue to offer apparent methods to "beat" the polygraph?
This question is not directed only to George and Drew. The answer will obviously be quite revealing in regards to ethical questions I have previously posed.
Quote from: Public Servant on Oct 10, 2002, 01:37 AM
No desperation here. I will continue to work to protect society from criminals whether they take the investigative tool of polygraph away or not.
....
Further (playing more into my area), the report seemed to support continuation specific issue LE polygraph stating it was used with much success and had a reliability of much greater than mere chance.
That was my take from the report. By far the bigest objections related to the higher rate of false positives in screens, where there are low base rates. I think they even said it had demonstrated, if not scientifically validated, effectivity in specific issue testing such as occurs in criminal investigations.
I think the general phrase in those cases was "well above chance" and "well below 100%" The phrases (I am not certain about the exact words) seemed chosen so that the wording for the two cases was symetrical.
-Marty
Dear Public Servent,
The report did agree that on specific issue testing, the results were better then chance but not perfect (as if any legal procedure can be absolutely 100%!).
My contention is that facts from an intensive background check are necessary to create the knowledge for a more then chance specific issue test. Under the current system, an applicant could be judged negatively by polygraph screening and the background check is never accomplished and their integrity is placed in question.
I am requesting that the background check be performed first. If there are any discrepencies that cannot be properly adjudicated, the applicant could be given the option of a specific issue test. If the applicant refuses, he/she will probably be refused a security clearance but at least it will be based on research and facts (or lack of facts). There should be many background checks which can easily be adjudicated or not need any adjudication at all. These checks would need no polygraph intervention at all. On the surface, it is starting to look like a money issue to me (regarding time and manpower necessary for background checks) and the polygraph was forced to the front of the security process (am I wrong or is this the case?).
I realize that there is not currently a better "alternative" out there. Even in cases of "friendly fire" in the military, they analyze what went wrong and try to do better and improve on their mistakes. Will "friendly fire" occur in the future? Most probably yes, will the same mistakes be made, hopefully no.
Alot of good people and citizens are being hurt by the "friendly fire" of polygraph screenings. The people holding and operating the weapons are the best people to come up with a "safety" on the trigger. This issue seems to have been simmering for a long time and the pot just blew off the top with the NAS report. The ball is in your court and everyone is looking for solutions.
Good night gentleman,
I didn't realize what time it is! I've got to set the coffee pot and get to bed or else I will be dragging tomorrow!
This discussion will have to wait for another day (or night!).
This is the beginning of the end for polygraph screening. It may take a little while for the whole structure to go down, but it IS going down. First the DOE will cease using them, because there's no way to justify them in light of the report. The same will apply to other agencies too. They'll probably resist for a while, and may be able to perpetuate polygraph screening for a bit, but the game is over. The emperor has finally been pronounced naked.
As for specific issue testing, I did not get the impression that the committee endorsed it, only that it cautiously suggested higher accuracy rates. I have not had a chance to review the report carefully yet, so perhaps I'm off.
In any event, specific issue testing is next. It will eventually have to justify itself under the type of scientific rigor applied by NAS. Whether it can do it or not remains to be seen. It will, as the current saying goes, have to "make the case."
Quote from: Public Servant on Oct 10, 2002, 01:37 AM
...
Here's the real question I'd like to pose:
George has asserted that his intent for this site was in no way to help criminals evade justice. Drew says he is most concerned with the scourge of screening exams. So...
If the government banned screening exams but left the LE/SI polygraph system intact, would you close this site and be finished with this crusade, or would you continue to offer apparent methods to "beat" the polygraph?
This question is not directed only to George and Drew. The answer will obviously be quite revealing in regards to ethical questions I have previously posed.
As long as government continues to rely on pseudoscientific techniques such as "Control" Question "Test" and Relevant/Irrelevant polygraphy, and to pass off such charlatanry as science to the American people, you can expect AntiPolygraph.org to remain on-line.
Public Servant,
Note the concern for academic integrity and truth expressed by one of your colleagues (PolyDude) on the polygraphplace.com message board (yes, we do go their for occasional entertainment):
Quote...Why is it that this very important report is issued by the NAS regarding the Polygraph and there is not one word or comment on this site. If we don't stick together as a group of professionals, who will be there to defend each of us in our own businesses.
We have to make a concerted effort to put this report in the best light possible. Where is the APA on this? Where are the state associations?
Let's get to work on this!...
Is there any question as to why polygraphy is the butt of a thousand jokes right now?
Quote from: Mark Mallah on Oct 10, 2002, 02:40 AM
This is the beginning of the end for polygraph screening. It may take a little while for the whole structure to go down, but it IS going down....
Mark,
Here is one good sign:
New York Times columnist William Safire--hardly a "bleeding heart" liberal--has come out strongly against polygraph screening in a column in today's (10 Oct.) paper titled "Lying 'Lie Detectors.'" (http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/10/opinion/10SAFI.html?ei=5062&en=815564d727839c68&ex=1034827200&partner=GOOGLE&pagewanted=print&position=top) He concludes:
QuoteBecause professional spies are trained to defeat the device; because pathological liars do not cause its needles to spike; and because our counterspies relax when a potential suspect "passes" -- the system breeds the opposite of security.
Here's how I learned about that. In 1981 there was a brouhaha about the Reagan campaign having pilfered a briefing book used by Jimmy Carter to prepare for a debate. James Baker, to deflect suspicion from himself, hinted that it must have been the doing of the campaign chairman, Bill Casey.
Casey, just appointed C.I.A. chief, told me he was going to challenge Baker to a polygraph test to show who was lying. Figuring my old pal Casey was the culprit, I wondered why he would take the gamble. He reminded me he was an old O.S.S. spymaster, and that by using dodges like a sphincter-muscle trick and a Valium pill, he could defeat any polygraph operator. Baker wisely did not take Casey up on the challenge.
A more serious example of the foolishness of dependence on the machine: A national security adviser was suspected of leaking a secret to The New York Times. Though not our source, he flunked the exam, and was about to be fired and disgraced. He put President Reagan on the phone to The Times's publisher, who -- on a one-time basis -- confirmed that the adviser had not been our source. That was one fewer career lost to the predatory polygraph.
To such anecdotal evidence we now add thorough scientific refutation of the technique. As a result, polygraphing should be stopped not only at the Energy Department, which sponsored the Research Council study because it was losing scientists, but at the Defense Department, which subjects some 10,000 employees to the self-defeating display of distrust.
If unfairness to truth-tellers doesn't move you, try the hard-liner's reason: Bureaucratic reliance on today's fault-ridden system lets well-trained spies and terrorists penetrate our defenses.
Quote
As long as government continues to rely on pseudoscientific techniques such as "Control" Question "Test" and Relevant/Irrelevant polygraphy, and to pass off such charlatanry as science to the American people, you can expect AntiPolygraph.org to remain on-line.
Quote
So even if suspects of a crime, who can only be given an exam if they consent, are the sole possible examinees, you'd still seek to help people circumvent the process... and even with the NAS comments about the apparent value of such exams. I'm still not buying the ethics here. No doubt, at that point, more than half of this site's viewers would be criminals trying to escape justice.
However, tenacity is one trait I admire. And I enjoy having a worthy opponent.
I'd be interested to see if Drew shares this hardline position.
What the NAS Report Says About the Accuracy of Specific-Incident Polygraph TestingThe following is an excerpt from the conclusions of the NAS polygraph report (p. 168 (http://books.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html/168.html) of the HTML version):
QuoteEstimate of Accuracy Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research and the limited ability to generalize to real-world settings, we conclude that in populations of examinees such as those represented in the polygraph research literature, untrained in countermeasures, specific-incident polygraph tests for event-specific investigations can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection. Accuracy may be highly variable across situations. The evidence does not allow any precise quantitative estimate of polygraph accuracy or provide confidence that accuracy is stable across personality types, sociodemographic groups, psychological and medical conditions, examiner and examinee expectancies, or ways of administering the test and selecting questions. In particular, the evidence does not provide confidence that polygraph accuracy is robust against potential countermeasures. There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods.
Note that:
1) This estimate of accuracy does not specify what kind of polygraph tests, e.g., CQT vs. R/I vs. GKT "can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance."
2) The authors' conclusion that polygraph tests "can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance" is conditioned upon the subject population being similar to "those represented in the polygraph research literature," that is,
ignorant of polygraph procedure and countermeasures. Such ignorance cannot be safely assumed, especially with information on both polygraph procedure and countermeasures readily available via the Internet.3) If the authors' conclusion that "the evidence does not allow any precise quantitative estimate of polygraph accuracy..." is correct, then it (a fortiori) follows that
software algorithms peddled by polygraph manufacturers such as Axciton and Stoelting that purport to determine with mathematical precision the probability that a particular individual is lying or telling the truth are worthless.4) The authors conclude that "the evidence does not provide confidence that polygraph accuracy is robust against potential countermeasures." It is not safe to assume that anyone passing a polygraph "test" has told the truth.
5) The last sentence of the above-cited paragraph is the key one with regard to polygraph validity (as opposed to accuracy): "There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods."
What this means is that there is no evidence that polygraph "testing" provides greater predictive value than, say, interrogating a subject without the use of a polygraph, or with a colandar-wired-to-a-photocopier that is represented to the subject as being a lie detector.The NAS's conlusion that "specific-incident polygraph tests for event-specific investigations can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection" with naive subject populations is hardly a vindication for the validity of CQT polygraphy, and
those in the polygraph community are formally cautioned against publicly misrepresenting it as such, as you can expect to be publicly called out on it.
Quote from: Public Servant on Oct 10, 2002, 04:57 AM...
So even if suspects of a crime, who can only be given an exam if they consent, are the sole possible examinees, you'd still seek to help people circumvent the process... and even with the NAS comments about the apparent value of such exams. I'm still not buying the ethics here. No doubt, at that point, more than half of this site's viewers would be criminals trying to escape justice.
...
Public Servant,
My advice to anyone considering submitting to a polygraph interrogation regarding a crime would continue to be to refuse to submit and to seek competent legal counsel.
You and your fellow polygraphers should be under no illusion that
information about polygraph procedure and countermeasures is now forever public and will remain within the easy grasp of anyone who seeks such information. Indeed, this information is now to be found in the NAS report itself. There's no way this toothpaste is going back into the tube.
The polygraph community had best wake up to this reality.
The polygraph community's public relations campaign against the NAS report has begun. See the Statement of the American Polygraph Association Pertaining to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report on the Use of the Polygraph (http://www.polygraph.org/APA%20statement%20to%20NAS.htm).
Public Servant,
There are two issues related to present polygraph practices which are of great and continuing concern to me: (1) ending that which you rightly characterize as the scourge of polygraph screening and (2) ensuring that every other polygraph exam conducted in this country is audio/video taped that examinees might be protected from abusive behavior to include the recently discussed issue of fabricated admissions/confessions. I will not be satisfied and will crusade as necessary till these two goals are accomplished.
You will note that my short list does not include anything about countermeasures, although I am somewhat associated with the issue through "the challenge." Nor does it include immediate rectification of the problems associated with CQT/RI/other lie detection formats. Although I completely agree with George about the factual considerations involved, because that which drives my public expressions is the large scale victimization of individuals and harm to national security that rests with polygraph screening, I will likely return to working behind the scenes to correct the problems of specific issue testing once the scourge has ended. This will largely depend upon how responsibly organized polygraphy acts in ending that which can no longer be justified in any sense--polygraph screening.
And with regard to the aforementioned watch for responsible behavior, George's last post including a statement from the APA would not suggest a good start. Its claim that it was not invited to the party is silly and immaterial. The chiefs of the federal polygraph programs who were in attendance at every public meeting (and even many for which antipolygraph critics were not invited) are all associated and presumably members of the APA. No resource that the APA might have provided was likely withheld and certainly no pro-polygraph evidence within the federal polygraph community not generally available to the APA would have been withheld from panel members.
The situation that existed for the NAS panel and does now exist is that every scientist in the country not on the polygraph payroll (and even some important ones who previously were) are solidly opposed to polygraph screening. Even those from the research staff at DoDPI could do nothing but ask for forgiveness for the absence of even a scintilla of evidence in the peer reviewed literature supporting present polygraph screening practices and plead for more time and resources. With regard to the apparent weaknesses associated with polygraph screening (particularly susceptibility to countermeasures) if I understand that which is contained in the panel's report and previously cited on this message board, not only was there no meaningful answer for many of these issues, but there may well have been obfuscation and willful obstruction to prevent the panel from fully assessing matters and conducting its work. The APA and the rest of organized polygraphy needs to realize this issue is over and act responsibly to restore order and dignity within its house. If it does not, specific issue testing will likely be the proverbial baby in the bath water.
I am not sure if this is the right forum for this post but, here goes anyway.
Having little technical knowledge of the polygraph, I have a few questions for the propolygraph posters:
1. Since LE personnel possess a punitive mentality (not knocking LE), do any of you honestly know any polygraphers who are shy of this trait? Doesn't this trait preclude an honest test?
2. Since specific issue (criminal) polygraphs cannot be required and lawyers advise their clients not to submit to one, why do you think criminals would volunteer to take one?
3. Do you think an innocent person can be jacked up (your term "stimulated") to a point where it is impossible for them to pass a polygraph? Isn't this part of the game you play?
4. Since 12 of Batman's idiots occasionally screw up, do you think you are singularly qualified to hold a person's life or livelyhood in your hands? This is a big problem for me.
5. Have ANY of you ever decided deception/non-deception before you administer the actual test? If so, do you think that test is fair?
Be completely honest now because I personally know of #3 and #5 to have happened.
My personal opinion is that even the specific issue polygraph is going by the way of the doo-doo bird (wrong terminology - these birds still exist) dodo bird. Because of the media attention being given the NAS report, criminals will refuse to be polygraphed
George,
Safire has been an opponent of the polygraph for a long time, and has written about its charlatanry before. The unnamed national security advisor in the Safire passage you quoted was Robert McFarland. I don't know why he didn't name him, since he named him before. You'll recall McFarland as a colleague of Oliver North and John Poindexter.
David Lykken mentions Robert McFarlane's polygraph unpleasantness in Chapter 15 of
A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector:QuoteToward the end of 1982, a Marine colonel, Robert McFarlane, failed a lie detector test seeking the source of a leak to the New York Times about a British spy scandal known to the American, British, and Soviet governments but which our National Security Council, for which McFarlane worked, wanted to conceal from the public. McFarlane managed to persuade the Times publisher, himself a former Marine, to assure Reagan by telephone that McFarlane was not the source.
General Note: I sent my appeal to the FBI three days before the NAS report was released. It will be interesting to read their response since my discussion paralleled the NAS pre-screening statement that the results of the polygraph (not withing acceptable parameters) did not agree with known facts about me (my many acceptable years of military service and law enforcement service in sensitive positions).
My current agency has already assured me that my background checks and performance over a ten year period will overide any suspicions cast upon me by a polygraph. It reminds me that my current agency has a little more common sense then the FBI or values their employees more. I am more fortunate then most.
I only applied to the FBI because I am currently an electronics security specialist with multiple degrees and thought that I could make America safer for my children. I was not going to make any more salary then my current federal postition. I know it sounds corny but I also volunteered for the military because I thought that I owed something back for what I enjoy in my life in America. I would have never thought that I would have been attacked verbally and been subjected to psychological abuse in the FBI application process. All of that and my integrity left in question on a hidden shelf by a hidden committee in Washington, D.C.. There was a commision on trying to recruit high quality people into the government last July, 2002. I do not think that they ever talked about this.
Now, after engaging in useless banter on other threads, back to some serious (or at least semi serious) discussion. I will first address George's so boldly emblazoned post:
First of all, if you review most of my posts on previous threads, you'll see the main theme of my assertions was that criminal investigative, specific issue exams were reliable at levels much greater than chance. I also said it was not perfect (few things in this world, even in more scientifically accepted forensic sciences). I even engaged in discussion on possible causes of false positive results. Clearly the quote you posted is not far off from my assertions on reliability. It just scores points for you here because of the added questioning of validity.
Secondly, my take is that the Exec Summary does not say research shows SI polygraph is invalid; rather it says the research does not prove validity. Again it restates my previous assertions (albeit in a much more scholarly manner) that ground truth is nearly impossible to establish in field studies, and realism equally difficult to produce in the lab. In regards to reliability if a Missourian said show me, that I could do – my hundreds of successes in obtaining corroborated NDI or DI results. If a scientist said show me, empirically, I don't know that a study could ever be created that could prove validity, either way.
It is ironic that you sharply criticize computerized algorithms. Near the end of the Exec Summary, they are touted as one of the possible mechanisms to improvement. Equally ironic, is that most poly program supervisors consider them experimental and do not allow them to be used in final decision-making. So you agree with the poly program heads on this issue; while I believe that since JHU was a major contributor to at least one of the algorithms, it likely has promise, and thus agree with the NAS report on this point.
It is amazing how close the assertions of the NAS report were to most of what Drew has asserted on this site. I'd almost believe he was a co-author. If you look back at my discussions with Drew, you will likely see that we were not far separated on many issues. Mostly contentions on whether my successes (and those of my peers) really indicated reliability and other issues over art, science, etc. Clearly Drew and I are the centrists on opposite sides of the aisle. Thus I am not shocked by the contents of this report.
I will concede that this report has dealt a serious blow to polygraphy as a whole, though mostly to screening. However, the report even concedes that there is a need for some type of screening tool. It says polygraph could be used as a pre-screening tool (note the allusion to less reliable pre-screening medical diagnosis methods) or part of what would be a more holistic screening approach. That combined with the slowness of government agencies to change, don't expect any form of polygraph to just go away. There will likely be initial changes in how it is used in screening and less use in making final determinations in the screening area, just as the NAS report suggests.
But this might be the beginning of the end for polygraph in all areas, as you say. This does not concern me for my profession, as my assignment as an examiner is just a sidebar to my continuing career as a criminal investigator. My overall concern is this, bottom line:
The polygraph, as it is used by many investigative agencies, has resolved many investigations. Many a mere suspect has been identified as the actual perpetrator of felony offenses. Often, a confession may have otherwise not been obtained, and often the confession was necessary (or the key evidence) in conviction. Likewise, many a person, falsely accused has been vindicated by examination, where it was their word against that of another with little other evidence to assist them. All in voluntary exams wherein the exam itself could not be used against them. The loss of such an investigative tool will surely hinder efforts of law enforcement to serve justice effectively.
This is the sole reason I am a polygraph proponent and why I feel we must work to improve this tool (or come up with alternatives) before we surgically remove it.
Drew,
I again commend you for being the more open-minded of the polygraph opponents. I believe you see the value of some sort of investigative tool that can be used for the purpose for which SI polygraph was designed. I trust you will seek to improve rather than remove, not only through the new CNS technique you advocate, but also in advocating research in determining validity and improving methodolgies/technologies.
Do you intend to become one of the independent researchers suggested by the NAS report?
In regards to reponsible behavior, I do not believe you should use the APA response as a litmus test. Such an organization is charged with defending all of its constituents at all cost. It's like expecting the NRA not to oppose every gun control bill regardless of how moderate. Yet not all members necesarily agree with the party line. True indicators of how much consideration is given to the NAS report where it counts will be the actions of government agencies. And for the record, to avoid such a question, I do not belong to any association such as the APA or the AAPP. No problems with either, just never found it necessary.
Regards
Twoblock,
Wow, you're line of questioning really shows a distrust for law enforcement. Not offended, since TV shows, news, and perhaps your own experiences with the wrong person, could perpetrate such views. I'll try to address al of your questions.
Quote1. Since LE personnel possess a punitive mentality (not knocking LE), do any of you honestly know any polygraphers who are shy of this trait? Doesn't this trait preclude an honest test?
I hope we are all free of a punitive mentality -- not just in poly but as investigators. Perhaps I am a poor misguided idealist but I stil believe that effective LE demands you are a neutral seeker of truth. Seeking punitive action is for prosecutors, judges, and juries to handle. I'd cause myself undue stress and become a cynic if I worried about what punishment came as a result of my investigation. Only rookies get upset if a perp gets a light sentence or gets off. You do your job and move on. But, yes, someone with such a personality wherein they saw themselves as the punisher may lead to bias against all prospective examinees.
QuoteSince specific issue (criminal) polygraphs cannot be required and lawyers advise their clients not to submit to one, why do you think criminals would volunteer to take one?
Actually lawyers often ask me to perform exams on their clients. Exculpatory in nature, the attorney would not allow a post exam interview if other than DI results occur. Perpetrators often volunteer, hence my gainful employment with many DI exams. Some may think agreeing to an exam is enough to end it, others, thinking it won't work, come in thinking they can be calm and get by undetected. I think this also answers your final assertion that I will have no business. Additionally, I have yet to see much attention to the NAS report in the pop media (I saw a little blurb on CNN HN, nothing else, even on TV news websites I found nothing--of course I am isolated from much of our U.S. news media)
Quote3. Do you think an innocent person can be jacked up (your term "stimulated") to a point where it is impossible for them to pass a polygraph? Isn't this part of the game you play?
The only pretest stimulation I work on is for the person who is truthful to the relevant issue. The perpetrators who committed the relevant offense, need no assistance in being stimulated to that issue. Which brings me to another point. Many outh there seem to think LE tries to trick anyone into being impicated so they can solve a case. Take the DC area sniper as an example. Lots of pressure to solve it, but would LE have anything to gain by framing someone to get a solve. The next incident would just create more discrediting of the agency. LE has a great amount of motivation to get it right, in regards to polygraph or otherwise.
Quote4. Since 12 of Batman's idiots occasionally screw up, do you think you are singularly qualified to hold a person's life or livelyhood in your hands? This is a big problem for me.
I am neither judge or jury and would never want to be. I would probably resign before I would allow someone to make me such. The exam is vountary, the results are inadmissible, and regardless of what I collect as a result, the suspect is entitled to due process. I am sworn to be a defender of the constitution and the rights of all, not just the victims of crime.
Quote5. Have ANY of you ever decided deception/non-deception before you administer the actual test? If so, do you think that test is fair?
I may have had some ideas, but I still give everyone the same test. There is no manipulation, psychologically or otherwise, to get the result I may expect. I have been surprised by NDIs and after the exam treated the examinee just like the innocents who I believed from the start. That has also worked in reverse on numerous occasions, often a more difficult situation for me personally. I can only speak for myself. Contrary to popular belief examiners are individuals. And, I am quite isolated from other examiners, being the only one supprting a large geographic area.
Hope these answers were helpful.
Fair Chance and Marty,
Did not mean to slight you by not responding in length to your posts to me. Mostly agree with what each of you said and saw no questions.
Fair Chance I especially agree with your assertion about using SI exams to resolve questionable aspects of a thorough background investigations. Some federal agencies already operate in that manner and I advocated such practice in previous threads.
I also like your analogy with friendly fire (although as a former combat arms service member, I shudder at the thought). In the end, it's a question of does the result justify the means (and the risks involved). I think in this day and age, law enforcement and national security are priorities and should not be crippled by removal of tools on hand.
Thanks.
Public Servant,
With regard to my post on "What the NAS Report Says About the Accuracy of Specific-Incident Polygraph Testing" you write:
QuoteFirst of all, if you review most of my posts on previous threads, you'll see the main theme of my assertions was that criminal investigative, specific issue exams were reliable at levels much greater than chance. I also said it was not perfect (few things in this world, even in more scientifically accepted forensic sciences). I even engaged in discussion on possible causes of false positive results. Clearly the quote you posted is not far off from my assertions on reliability. It just scores points for you here because of the added questioning of validity.
Actually, my post was not in direct response to anything you've posted here. But a careful reading of the NAS report's conclusions indicates that the panel members
did not conclude that specific-incident polygraph examinations are reliable at levels much greater than chance, as you have asserted. What the NAS concluded was this:
"...we conclude that in populations of examinees such as those represented in the polygraph research literature, untrained in countermeasures, specific-incident polygraph tests for event-specific investigations can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection."A population of examinees naive as to polygraph procedure and untrained in countermeasures is assumed. This is a very important caveat that you seem to ignore. In practice, a polygrapher cannot really know whether this condition applies with regard to any particular examinee. The panel apparently says nothing to support the notion that the results of specific-incident CQT or R/I polygraph results are "reliable" (or imbued with any predictive value) to any knowable extent under field conditions.
QuoteSecondly, my take is that the Exec Summary does not say research shows SI polygraph is invalid; rather it says the research does not prove validity. Again it restates my previous assertions (albeit in a much more scholarly manner) that ground truth is nearly impossible to establish in field studies, and realism equally difficult to produce in the lab. In regards to reliability if a Missourian said show me, that I could do - my hundreds of successes in obtaining corroborated NDI or DI results. If a scientist said show me, empirically, I don't know that a study could ever be created that could prove validity, either way.
In the absence of proof, there is no reason to assume validity. Again, I call your attention to the panel's finding that there is no evidence that polygraph "testing" provides greater predictive value than, say, interrogating a subject
without the use of a polygraph, or with a colandar-wired-to-a-photocopier that is represented to the subject as being a lie detector.
QuoteIt is ironic that you sharply criticize computerized algorithms. Near the end of the Exec Summary, they are touted as one of the possible mechanisms to improvement. Equally ironic, is that most poly program supervisors consider them experimental and do not allow them to be used in final decision-making. So you agree with the poly program heads on this issue; while I believe that since JHU was a major contributor to at least one of the algorithms, it likely has promise, and thus agree with the NAS report on this point.
My criticism of computerized algorithms is not per se. What I'm pointing out is that it follows directly from the NAS panel's conclusion that "the evidence does not allow any precise quantitative estimate of polygraph accuracy..." that these algorithms' calculations of the probability that a particular person was telling the truth or not (stated as a percentage) are
completely bogus.
Congraulations George. You have shown the polygraph community that there is no fury greater than one who has been victimized.
The NAS, has validated your site and has raised awareness to the serious threat polygraph screening poses to our national security.
This ones for you ;D
Public Servant,
There is much I would like to comment upon (how the ethics equation will change for countermeasure assistance with the demise of polygraph screening, future mechanisms and personal involvement in research, etc) in your last notes to me, but because I will be traveling shortly and over the next few days, I thought I would limit present commentary to just one issue. I will pick up next week with other thoughts upon my return. Till then have a pleasant holiday weekend, Drew
You write in part:
Quote...In regards to responsible behavior, I do not believe you should use the APA response as a litmus test. Such an organization is charged with defending all of its constituents at all cost...
I suspect that you are correct. The downside to this is that an uneducated lay public seeking the truth on various matters cannot trust the APA to put forward reliable and trustworthy public service information of any kind if it cannot trust the whole of what it puts forth. If the APA is, as often claimed by detractors, nothing but a trade union blindly supporting any and every position of every constituency, then both it and the public are shortchanged through any mutual interaction. This is both sad and unfortunate--both deserve better.
The APA (and other similar groups) is well positioned at this critical juncture in time and circumstance (NAS polygraph report release) and has the perfect opportunity to establish/restore the trust needed to merit the reputation of an organization that earnestly seeks to provide a public service in addition to whatever business opportunities and financial gains are merited for its members. The world will be watching in the near future. It/they will either clean its house, sift the grain from the chaff, i.e., separate polygraph screening from its midst and remaining worthwhile specific-issue testing or it will be reduced to nothing but a meaningless and irrelevant entity from the public's perspective. Organized polygraphy either provides a public service or it provides no service and no value at all.
George,
QuoteA population of examinees naive as to polygraph procedure and untrained in countermeasures is assumed. This is a very important caveat that you seem to ignore. In practice, a polygrapher cannot really know whether this condition applies with regard to any particular examinee.
I did not ignore this. You keep putting out this info and yet I continue to have corroborated evidence of success. To discuss this further would go back into the "I can catch countermeasures, no you can't argument" (while neither argument is likely 100%) or something that started the thread about "reading this site could cause you to fail".
QuoteIn the absence of proof, there is no reason to assume validity.
Nor is there reason to assume absence of validity. I have reiterated over and over, the reason validity is hard to establish with polygraph (see above or various other threads I've posted on).
And lastly, for the reason I came back to this site. When I last posted, I had only read the excerpt from the APA statement you posted out of context and then responded to Drew's assertion that it indicated an irresponsible response. The fact that they were excluded seems only to be a matter of distancing themselves from the study. It goes on to stress that this study is only an evaluation of some of the previous polygraph studies and not new research. It does not seem that critical and seems to welcome many of the recommendations of the panel. So I ask you and Drew, what is so irresponsible about the response?
In a show of fairness, would you post a link to the full statement. For me to do so would appear self serving.
Also, why did you not comment on my bottom line statement in bold print?
Drew,
It appears we were posting at the same time. I look forward to your further comments and your reply to the one I just posted, especially since it expounded upon an issue I just re-addressed.
Enjoy your travel and holiday as well. I may be out of the loop for a while as well. 'til then...
Public Servant
Thanks for your fast response to my questions.
If you practice what you preach, and I have no reason to believe otherwise, you are to be commended. By your posts, you seem to be a levelheaded LE officer, doing the best job he can and admitting to some of the fallacies of the polygraph. However, you will have to also admitt there are "rogues in your ranks" as I have previously posted. I do believe that most polygraphers enjoy the power that they have over their subjects.
My experience with the polygraph -- In the 1960's I took a pre-employment polygraph. The job was a fill-in while waiting for the job that I wanted so, having never believed in the "lie detector", I decided to use the opportunity as a test. I lied like a dog and passed. Many years later I decided to test it again.(at my expense). I told the complete truth and failed. That made up my mind forever. I believe it's usefulness hangs, only, on being able to bang out a confession and some of those have proven to be "false confessions" by subjects scared sh--less.
I would like answers from others. Maybe even someone in the APA. Fat chance.
Thanks again for your honest answers.
Public Servant,
The point I've been trying to make is that the NAS report does not support the validity of CQT polygraphy as a diagnostic tool, even with regard to specific incidents in event-specific investigations.
In response to my statement that in the absence of proof, there is no reason to assume validity, you reply, "Nor is there reason to assume absence of validity." Respectfully, I think you miss the point. Absent any convincing proof, there is no more reason to believe that polygraphers can detect deception using CQT polygraphy than there is to believe that self-styled clairvoyants can communicate with the dead. (That it has not been proven that clairvoyants
can't communicate with the dead lends no credibility to the notion that they
can.)You write:
Quote... When I last posted, I had only read the excerpt from the APA statement you posted out of context... In a show of fairness, would you post a link to the full statement. For me to do so would appear self serving.
What do you mean when you say I posted the American Polygraph Association statement "out of context?"
I didn't post any excerpt from it, out-of-context or otherwise: I posted it's title with a
direct link to it. Here it is again: "Statement of the American Polygraph Association Pertaining to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) Report on the Use of the Polygraph" (http://www.polygraph.org/APA%20statement%20to%20NAS.htm).
QuoteSo I ask you and Drew, what is so irresponsible about the response?
The responsible response would be for the American Polygraph Association, as an organization that professes to be "Dedicated to Truth," to renounce polygraph screening forthwith.
QuoteAlso, why did you not comment on my bottom line statement in bold print?
I agree with you that CQT polygraphy has had some utility in obtaining confessions and admissions. (On the other hand, reliance on polygraph results has led to the misdirection of many investigations, causing great harm to innocent persons.) But such utility does not lend any validity to the procedure. After more than 50 years, and "more than 1,000 research studies" (as the American Polygraph Association claims), the National Academy of Sciences concluded that "[t]here is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods."
This being the case, I support immediate reliance on "other methods" instead of the pseudoscientific fraud that is CQT polygraphy.
Public Servant:
I could be missing something, but i believe this site is dealing with polygraph screening tests used by the FBI, CIA and DOE for employment purposes and to catch a spy.
Nothing on this site has attacked Law enforcements use of the polygraph in an active on going criminal investigation. I believe once someone gives up their right remain silent than LE has the right and obligation to take the gloves off and use whatever means necessary... "Whatever works"
It is also the responsibility of LE, however; to ensure that any confession or admission of guilt is validated by hard evidence. One should never be convicted and punished solely on the basis of polygraph results nor should one be less suspect because he "Passed".
Yeah, its a tool. But if its not used properly someone can be hurt.
Keep up the good boys and go get'em. ;)
George,
I stand corrected. I was writing from memory and did not look back to see who commented on a portion of the APA response or to recognize that you had already linked it. It was actually a comment from Drew that was taken out of context:
QuoteAnd with regard to the aforementioned watch for responsible behavior, George's last post including a statement from the APA would not suggest a good start. Its claim that it was not invited to the party is silly and immaterial. The chiefs of the federal polygraph programs who were in attendance at every public meeting (and even many for which antipolygraph critics were not invited) are all associated and presumably members of the APA. No resource that the APA might have provided was likely withheld and certainly no pro-polygraph evidence within the federal polygraph community not generally available to the APA would have been withheld from panel members.
My point was that yes the APA did distance themselves from the report in this way, yet I saw little that could be considered irresponsible. I saw little that seemed to be an attempt to debunk or discredit the report, and there was a seeming approval of the call for further research and development. My question should have been directed to Drew, so I could get more specifics on what he disliked so I could re-read more critically.
Lastly, George, the NAS report said validity was neither proven or disproven, we each could spin it either way, but I think it's a little extreme to spin it thus:
QuoteAbsent any convincing proof, there is no more reason to believe that polygraphers can detect deception using CQT polygraphy than there is to believe that self-styled clairvoyants can communicate with the dead. (That it has not been proven that clairvoyants can't communicate with the dead lends no credibility to the notion that they can.)
When you get me a clairvoyant to have as much success as I have in resolving criminal investigations then I'll agree to your correlation. Until then you might consider contributing spin material to James Carville.
Regards
TwoBlock and Mriddle6,
First of all, thanks for the kind comments.
TwoBlock, I am sorry to hear of your poor first impression with poly. Two comments: Likely you responded little to the relative questions if you purposely lied to them, since you obviously felt little concern about any consequences to the lie (or you were given a CQT and you actually lied about the comparisons which you told were relevant). Also, I'd like to think we've come a long way, in Polygraph, in Law Enforcement, and as a people, since the 1960's.
Mriddle6, don't be duped into believing George, and many others on this site, exclude SI LE exams from their attacks. Read thoroughly past threads, and this one. They seek to remove screening first (easier to attack) and then eliminate any lie detection method available to the government in any form, for any purpose. George makes no apologies that if his techniques work, a criminal may allude suspicion or an innocent person may intensify suspicion by being caught using such techniques. And don't worry, in the country for which I work, admissible evidence is everything -- even confessions must be corrorated with further evidence to obtain a conviction.
The beauty of our constitution is that you can argue either side of an issue regarding rights quaranteed by it, and not necessarily be wrong either way. It's just which side of an argument best protects, or most benefits, the people. That's why I don't argue regarding the motivations of this site. I just feel the methodology and even some of the results sought, could be quite detrimental.
Thanks again!
Public Servant,
You write in part:
QuoteWhen you get me a clairvoyant to have as much success as I have in resolving criminal investigations then I'll say agree to your correlation. Until then you might consider contributing spin to James Carville.
The point I'm trying to make is that if those making a positive assertion (e.g., polygraphers who assert that CQT polygraphy is a valid test for deception) wish to be believed, then it is incumbent on them to prove the assertion, and not on others to disprove it.
Such success as you may have had in resolving criminal investigations using CQT polygraphy may demonstrate its utility, but it does not provide any evidence for its validity.
George,
Point taken. And I have discussed the reasons for difficulty in proving validity, extensively on various occasions here.
However, success in SI exams such as those I conduct, must show it is much more reliable than TV gimmickry or anyone simply claiming clairvoyancy. Thus there is a much higher chance of validity for SI polygraph than clairvoyancy. This indicates an intentional attempt, on your part, to attach the same credibility of "Miss Cleo" or one of the speaking to the dead shows, to an accepted investigative tool and the sworn officers who utilize it. A bit of a radical deviation from fact, I'd say. And adding this metaphor...
Quote(That it has not been proven that clairvoyants can't communicate with the dead lends no credibility to the notion that they can.)
insinuates the NAS report said that it had proven polygraph invalid and unreliable. It said no such thing. And it definitely put SI poly infinitely above such things as talking to the dead. Of course since it made no specific mention of clairvoyancy, I am assuming the NAS has the same opinion as you and I do about such things.
Signing off now. Enjoy.
Public Servant writes in part:
QuoteMriddle6, don't be duped into believing George, and many others on this site, exclude SI LE exams from their attacks. Read thoroughly past threads, and this one. They seek to remove screening first (easier to attack) and then eliminate any lie detection method available to the government in any form, for any purpose.
I have certainly been critical of law enforcement's reliance on polygraphy in criminal investigations such as the FBI's ongoing anthrax investigation, or its abortive investigation into the matter of the missing hard disks at Los Alamos National Laboratory, or the Department of Energy and FBI's polygraph interrogations of Wen Ho Lee (see Chapter 2 of
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector for critical commentary on the latter case.)
But I am not seeking to "eliminate any lie detection method available to the government in any form."
No method of lie detection is known to exist. Instead, we have pseudoscientific nonsense such as CQT polygraphy and voice stress analysis, techniques that rely for their utility on public belief in the unfounded notion that they can detect lies. When a genuine method of lie detection is invented, I'll have no quarrel with it. But for as long as I am able, I'll continue working to expose CQT polygraphy for the fraud that it is. I believe that society will benefit when mention of a polygraph "test" evokes universal laughter, and the pseudoscience of polygraphy takes its rightful place next to phrenology and graphology in the trash heap of abandoned quackeries.
Public Servant,
With regard to the shortcomings of my comparison of polygraphy to clairvoyancy, I agree with you to some extent. The analogy is wanting in two important respects:
1) CQT polygraphy purports to be a diagnostic test; clairvoyancy does not.
2) Practioners of CQT polygraphy makes no claim to supernatural powers, whereas clairvoyants clearly do. (Nonetheless, when polygraphers claim they have the ability to detect deception, they are in effect claiming to be "mind readers.")
Extraordinary claims (like the claimed ability to detect deception) demand extraordinary proof. There is no such proof for polygraphy: we are left with no reason to believe that polygraphers have any ability to actually detect deception through CQT polygraphy, or that they ever will.
It's distressing to note the latest news story in the L.A. Times regarding many agencies still refusing to abandon polygraph screening. I suppose it will take a bunch of lawsuits (possibly on due process/equal protection grounds?) or the actions of lawmakers to force security personnel to "do their jobs".
(That last remark really isn't intended to be as scathing as it sounds, BTW. I really do understand why polygraph screening is used. Security personnel, like everyone else, want to get the "most bang for the buck", and the most efficiency possible -- especially in an era of politicians who have sold the public on the idea that government services should just happen for free. Unfortunately, polygraph screening simply doesn't work. As they say, "you get what you pay for", and unfortunately, polygraph screening is cheap snake oil. It's no substitute for the drudgery, expense and time investment of more thorough background checks.)
Skeptic
Skeptic,
Quote from: Skept
ic link=topic=0.0 date=1034734167
It's distressing to note the latest news story in the L.A. Times regarding many agencies still refusing to abandon polygraph screening.
Can't say I'm surprised. In fact I don't believe the pro-polygraph community were much surprised by the specifics of the NAS report. From what I see it is pretty close to what was actually previously known by them. What was resented was the dissemination of these facts broadly to the public. It has long been in the interest of the polygraph community to project a far greater public perception of reliability than exists. Much like the "Magic Ass" several millenia ago, it works largely because people believe it works.
The triage will no doubt be at the level of DOE post employment screens which are now mandated by law. That area now seems like a Chinese fire drill where everyone involved knows the "drill." Until Congress reverses the legal mandate there will be little incentive to change practice elsewhere.
-Marty
An especially relevant quote:
"No matter how disastrously some policy has turned out, anyone who criticizes it can expect to hear: 'But what would you replace it with?' When you put out a fire, what do you replace it with?" ~ Thomas Sowell
A very fitting quotation, beech trees! :)
Public Servant:
I feel some (including you) are missing an important conclusion of the NAS regarding Specific Incident testing. That is, results are "well below perfect." To me, that means "well below 100%."
So...maybe one quarter of the time, people telling the truth are falsely accused of lying? That's certainly "well above chance" (50% accuracy), but would you like to be forced to take that chance on something that can really impact your life?
Now, here's another crucial tidbit that an LE officer should know. POLYGRAPH EXAMS ARE NOT ALWAYS VOLUNTARY!!! If you are on probation FOR ANY REASON, your probation officer may require you to submit to a polygraph.
Although the results of a polygraph are not admissable in court, they are admissable as evidence in a probation violation hearing, where the judge must simply determine it is LIKELY that you violated your probation, not that you violated it beyond a reasonable doubt.
Now, agreed, when one is convicted of a crime, one is justifiably forced to give up some of the rights guaranteed by our constitution. HOWEVER, is being subject to the whims of unreliable ("well below perfect") science in determining our fate really consistent with this?
My fiance is on probation for a nonviolent crime. He was falsely accused of threatening someone with a gun. (He does not own or have access to a handgun, the accuser is a homeless con man that tried to extort money from us, and the guy served time a few years ago in CA for, coincidence, waving a flare gun in someone's face)
Rather than truly investigate, the PO required a polygraph, and my guy reacted w/more physiological stress to the relevant questions than to a poorly constructed control question. (Did you point a gun at the guy vs. Have you ever lied to law enforcement about a major crime?) The PO is going forward with a PV based on the poly and accusation alone. (He did no further investigation). My fiance faces prison time over this, which will assuredly destroy our lives and livelihood. (and our ability to pay taxes and educate his sons - for you pragmatists out there)
Sure, we're just one sad anecdotal example of the evils of frequent false positives. but....
Answer me this: Is society really better off with someone off the streets who may have pointed a gun at someone (a test with "Well below perfect" reliability said so)?
In all honesty, if I had known about probation requirements and the unreliability of polygraphs, I wish I had sold my car and given the man the $8500 he attempted to extort from us.
Instead, we trusted the myth that the poly is accurate, and that "the truth will out".
LE officers - is that really your interpretation of the constitution? If you mess up and find yourself on probation, you had better pay off anyone who tries to extort from you because if you don't, they could make a false accusation. Then you'll be forced to take a poly, which you have say a 20-40% chance of flunking even if you're honest.
That's not my America. IS it yours??
Our one chance is to perhaps take a 2nd poly. It's been offered by a prominent academic. However, I know my guy well. With all that we'd have riding on it, I can't fathom a control question that would stress him out more than "Did you point a gun at that guy?" (A requirement for "passing" the test.) How can I trust a guy who doesn't even know him to come up with one?
"Our one chance is to perhaps take a 2nd poly."
Because yours is an event specific investigation " Did you point a gun at this guys head" perhaps you could inquire about submitting to a GKT.
There is a lot of negativity posted here about CQT being empolyed in empolyee and preemployment screenings yet the same experts seem to believe the GKT holds promise yet not infallible.
I'm not an expert but why not ask:
1) What is the GKT?
2) How does it work?
3) Can it be manipulated by the examinee or examiner as the CQT
4) Is it being empolyed presently by law enforcement?
sie,
Answers to the questions you raised:
1 & 2) Regarding what the GKT (Guilty Knowledge Test, also called a "Concealed Information Test") is and how it works, you'll find it briefly explained in Chapter 3 of
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector (http://antipolygraph.org/pubs.shtml). A much more detailed explanation may be found in the 2nd edition of David T. Lykken's book,
A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector (Plenum Trade, 1998). Here is the NAS report's explanation, cited from Appendix A, p. A-4 (http://books.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html/210.html#pagetop):
QuoteCONCEALED INFORMATION TEST
Concealed information tests (more often called guilty knowledge or concealed knowledge tests) present examinees with sets of very similar items, much in the manner of stimulation tests, except that the similar items include one true and several (usually, four) false details of some aspect of an incident under investigation that has not been publicized, so that the true answer would be known only to the investigators and to those present at the incident. In a burglary, examiners might be asked about several possible points of entry into the house, one of which the burglar actually used. (For more detail about question construction and administration of concealed information tests, see Nakayama [2002]). When an examinee is asked whether he or she used each of these routes, the answer is expected to be negative regardless of the examinee's innocence or guilt. Guilty examinees are expected to reveal their concealed knowledge by responding more strongly to the true item than to the others.
Concealed infonnation tests are applicable only under restricted conditions: when there is a specific incident, activity, or thing that can be the subject of questioning and when there are several relevant details that are known only to investigators and those present at the incident. Thus, these tests are not applicable in typical screening situations in which the only possible relevant questions concern generic events, such as unspecified acts of espionage that may or may not have occurred.
3) Yes, the GKT/CIT can be manipulated by either the examiner or the examinee.
4) The GKT is being employed by law enforcement, but not to a great extent.
It's doubtful that a meaningful Guilty Knowledge Test could be constructed for the behavior of which chicbette's fiance stands accused.
I agree with George's comments re GKT. However, let me expand on them. The GQT is the strongly favored form of LE polygraph in Japan. So much so that many polygraphers have never even given a CQT.
-Marty
Here's a question for those with the time:
I haven't had a chance to read the whole NAS report word for word. Can anyone discern whether the NAS combined GKT tests with specific-issue tests of the CQT variety in their conclusions regarding the efficacy of specific-issue testing?
I know they did note the different types in the body of the report, and I think they remarked on the better false-positive characteristics of GKT's, but I'm not sure whether they differentiated between them in the conclusion nor whether they found any differences in accuracy.
Skeptic
From the NAS report:
Background Investigation Not Good Enough to Replace the Polygraph
"Available evidence does not suggest that any direct investigation method is likely to provide a reasonable and valid alternative to the polygraph."
touche,
The claim "Background Investigation Not Good Enough to Replace the Polygraph" is your own; that headline does not appear in the NAS report. While the NAS report does indeed state at p. 6-17 that "[a]vailable evidence does not suggest that any direct investigation method is likely to provide a reasonable and valid alternative to the polygraph," neither does the report conclude that polygraph screening is reasonable and/or valid. Indeed, quite the opposite. The report notes with regard to polygraphy in general (and not just screening) at p. 8-2: "There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods."
Sorry touche, you're grasping at straws. There is no life ring for polygraph screening to be found in the NAS report. :'(
Quote from: George W. Maschke on Oct 22, 2002, 02:26 PM
touche,
The claim "Background Investigation Not Good Enough to Replace the Polygraph" is your own; that headline does not appear in the NAS report. While the NAS report does indeed state at p. 6-17 that "[a]vailable evidence does not suggest that any direct investigation method is likely to provide a reasonable and valid alternative to the polygraph," neither does the report conclude that polygraph screening is reasonable and/or valid. Indeed, quite the opposite. The report notes with regard to polygraphy in general (and not just screening) at p. 8-2: "There is essentially no evidence on the incremental validity of polygraph testing, that is, its ability to add predictive value to that which can be achieved by other methods."
Actually, Touche took the quote out of context, too. The section from which he lifted the quote was not referring to the general efficacy of BI's; rather, it was talking specifically about alternative methods of detecting deception.
Skeptic
The polygraph proponents are trying to test some headlines on this website before putting them out on the net. I guest they wanted to see how well the NAS report has been read.
I have to thank touche for the bad quote. It has brought back focus to the debate.
Background investigations were the only method used for all FBI veteran employees hired before 1994.
Would those employees want to be subjected to tests during their next five year background check?
If not, why?
Because they are a poor predictor of future behavior according to the NAS.
That is why their next five year check will be a background check and it will be acceptable to the FBI without polygraph "approval." The background check IS an acceptable means according to FBI policy (as long as you have a job already).
Seems to be a very confusing and illogical arguement in light of mandatory employee pre-screening polygraph.
George, this posting is primarily for your information. I do not care to engage in any discussions with anyone else on this matter, which is why I am not detailing it here. It would seem that you engage in considerable research and I would like to BEGIN to bring something to your attention. I do not do this to generate any argument, rather to BEGIN to refute a statement that has been made and proliferated on this site. I DO realize that YOU were not the one who made the statement, yet, the challenge will now be to you to acknowledge an error. This error will become evident to you when you read the following:
"Lie Detectors - Their History and Use", ; Eugene Block; 1977, page 117-21 ISBN 0-679-50755-0
I look forward to your response.
touche,
Could you fax me a copy of these pages at (206) 666-4271, or perhaps e-mail me scanned images?
Unfortunately, at this time I have neither capability. Inasmuch as the statement at issue appears in the much vaunted NAS report AND additionally attibuted to Mr. Mallah by Mr. Park and the American Physical Society, perhaps he (Mallah) can assist you in reviewing and providing you with a copy. Remember, this is but the first one.
touche,
Since it may be a while before I obtain the pages you've referenced, could you post a synopsis?
Unfortunately, no, I cannot assist. I am in an airport on a laptop and do not have the material with me. Suggest interlibrary loan
QuoteUnfortunately, at this time I have neither capability. Inasmuch as the statement at issue appears in the much vaunted NAS report AND additionally attibuted to Mr. Mallah by Mr. Park and the American Physical Society, perhaps he (Mallah) can assist you in reviewing and providing you with a copy. Remember, this is but the first one.
I'm not exactly sure what you are referring to, but I have a guess: the statement that the polygraph has never caught a single spy in all its history.
If that is the statement you are referring to, bear in mind that none other than Ed Curran, on 60 Minutes II, said that even
he was not aware of any spies caught by the polygraph.
Touche, it would really be so much easier and convenient and courteous if you facilitated discussion by summarizing the information contained within those pages. If you do not want others to see it, you can send George and/or I a private message through this web site with that summary.
Mark....Now why should I do that? You and your friends would not believe me. Actually, I fully expect you to attack the authenticity of the book, when and if you ever read it. But that is okay, because many will go to the source and read it. It has nothing to do with what Curran said. It is what you said to Park and what has been perpetuated on this site. I would appreciate it if you wouldnot lecture me on the iossue of coutesy. If you cannot keep up on the statements you make to people, perhaps you should not make them. I merely asked you to assist your friend George because of his physical location and because I anticipated an attack should it come from anyone other than you allies. If you cannot, or will not, that is between you and him. It may take some time, but sooner of later, he will obtain it and the statement is irrefutable. I am not in a hurry, this book has been in print since 1977 and apparently neither you, George or the NAS took the time to read it or research their claims in the manner which one would expect scientists working on behalf of the government should. I certainly hope that your readers will not think that other things you say may be less than precise?
Quote from: touche on Dec 01, 2002, 09:30 PM
Mark....Now why should I do that? You and your friends would not believe me. Actually, I fully expect you to attack the authenticity of the book, when and if you ever read it. But that is okay, because many will go to the source and read it. It has nothing to do with what Curran said. It is what you said to Park and what has been perpetuated on this site. I would appreciate it if you wouldnot lecture me on the iossue of coutesy. If you cannot keep up on the statements you make to people, perhaps you should not make them.
What a silly thing to say, given that you don't even have the courage to clarify to which statement you're referring. Are you that afraid of fair debate?
This hit-and-run argument by innuendo is, indeed, very discourteous.
QuoteI merely asked you to assist your friend George because of his physical location and because I anticipated an attack should it come from anyone other than you allies. If you cannot, or will not, that is between you and him. It may take some time, but sooner of later, he will obtain it and the statement is irrefutable.
Your clear reluctance to present it here so readers may discuss it and judge for themselves belies your claims of confidence.
QuoteI am not in a hurry, this book has been in print since 1977 and apparently neither you, George or the NAS took the time to read it or research their claims in the manner which one would expect scientists working on behalf of the government should. I certainly hope that your readers will not think that other things you say may be less than precise?
Another comical statement, given your deliberate vagueness here.
Either present your evidence or retract your statements, Touche. You're not going to win any debate with arguments you never make and evidence you won't provide.
Skeptic
See George/Mark, this is exactly what I mean. I was having a discussion with the two of you, and Skeptic somehow found it necessary to horn in and offer the same kind of...what did you guys call it..."ad hominem" arguments. Skeptic: if it bothered you THAT much, the citation was there for all to obtain. George couldn't get it because of HIS physical location and I suggested thatMark provide it for him. No offense Mark and George because I believe you read and understood my posting where I commented that given my physical location, I was unable to get my hands on the source for George's purposes. In time, I am sure you will get it and see to what I am referring. Mark, you are correct, it outlines a detailed use of the polygraph in WWII concerning the discovery of a Nazi spy. I just wanted you to read it completely, have an opportunity to check the sources and respond. Skeptic, mind your own business.
Quote from: touche on Dec 02, 2002, 01:07 AM
See George/Mark, this is exactly what I mean. I was having a discussion with the two of you, and Skeptic somehow found it necessary to horn in and offer the same kind of...what did you guys call it..."ad hominem" arguments.
Touche, if you want a private conversation on these boards you can send a direct message. You, on the other hand, have been posting publicly.
I'm sorry to burst your bubble, but if you post something on a public bulletin board, by convention it's pretty much fair gaime for anyone.
QuoteSkeptic: if it bothered you THAT much, the citation was there for all to obtain.
Unfortunately, it's not. The book appears to be out of print and not even available in my local University library (a fairly comprehensive source).
Furthermore, it's your evidence; present it! I simply have little wish to buy a used, out-of-print book through Amazon to read one passage.
Good Lord, man: if the evidence is "irrefutable" as you say, you should have no qualms presenting it here.
QuoteGeorge couldn't get it because of HIS physical location and I suggested thatMark provide it for him. No offense Mark and George because I believe you read and understood my posting where I commented that given my physical location, I was unable to get my hands on the source for George's purposes. In time, I am sure you will get it and see to what I am referring. Mark, you are correct, it outlines a detailed use of the polygraph in WWII concerning the discovery of a Nazi spy. I just wanted you to read it completely, have an opportunity to check the sources and respond. Skeptic, mind your own business.
I'm sorry you felt your posts were visable only to George and/or Mark. If you post something publicly, however, you really have no reasonable expectation of a private conversation, and what you're posting is of potential interest to everyone here.
Skeptic
I might agree with you, except for the fact that I specifically addressed my posting to George and Mark.....ever hear of interlibrary loan.
Quote from: touche on Dec 02, 2002, 01:38 AM
I might agree with you, except for the fact that I specifically addressed my posting to George and Mark.....ever hear of interlibrary loan.
I don't buy it for a second, Touche. I'm sure you are well aware of the private messaging capability on this board, and George and Mark's private email addresses are available here, as well. It's obvious you publicly posted on this board precisely because you wanted to draw public attention to your claims of damning "evidence". You admitted as much when you said:
Quote from: touche on Dec 01, 2002, 09:30 PM
I certainly hope that your readers will not think that other things you say may be less than precise?
You are therefore in no position to complain about public commentary, and frankly I find your pretensions to offense over having your "private conversation" interrupted insulting.
I'm equally certain that if you were truly confident in your evidence, you'd summarize it here. When I get the time, I'll look into an interlibrary loan, because I value the truth and go out of my way to debate issues honestly. IMHO, however, your unwillingness to simply present your "evidence", preferring instead to loudly make vague pronouncements, speaks volumes.
Skeptic
Touche,
I largely agree with the views posted by Mark and Skeptic. I do think you've been unnecessarily coy up to this point.
Thank you for finally telling us what the pages you referenced are about: "it outlines a detailed use of the polygraph in WWII concerning the discovery of a Nazi spy."
For those who may still be mystified by your reference to Dr. Bob Parks and the American Physical Society (http://www.aps.org), I assume you are referring to the following passage from the 25 June 1999 installment (http://www.aps.org/WN/WN99/wn062599.html) of Dr. Parks' weekly
What's New commentary:
Quote2. SPY DETECTOR: DOE PREPARED TO BEGIN POLYGRAPH SCREENING.
An estimated 5000 nuclear weapons scientists and other employees will be tested. Yet, "There is almost universal agreement that polygraph screening is completely invalid," FBI polygraph expert Dr. Drew Richardson asserts. (Richardson taught his 10-year-old son to beat the test.) In 1997 Senate testimony, Richardson warned, "To the extent that we place any confidence in the results of polygraph screening, and as a consequence shortchange traditional security vetting techniques, I think our national security is severely jeopardized." Critics contend that the test measures general anxiety, nothing more. In addition, there is a potential for false confessions from traumatized examinees. Mark Mallah, a former FBI agent deemed deceptive by a polygraph exam and cleared after a 2-year investigation, says, "In all its history, the polygraph has not detected one single spy. Ever."
As for Dr. Parks' views being those of the APS, I suppose you missed his famous tagline with which he concludes each issue of
What's New: "Opinions are the author's and are not necessarily shared by the APS, but they should be." :)
Quote from: George W. Maschke on Dec 02, 2002, 05:20 AM
Touche,
I largely agree with the views posted by Mark and Skeptic. I do think you've been unnecessarily coy up to this point.
Thank you for finally telling us what the pages you referenced are about: "it outlines a detailed use of the polygraph in WWII concerning the discovery of a Nazi spy."
For those who may still be mystified by your reference to Dr. Bob Parks and the American Physical Society (http://www.aps.org), I assume you are referring to the following passage from the 25 June 1999 installment (http://www.aps.org/WN/WN99/wn062599.html) of Dr. Parks' weekly What's New commentary:
As for Dr. Parks' views being those of the APS, I suppose you missed his famous tagline with which he concludes each issue of What's New: "Opinions are the author's and are not necessarily shared by the APS, but they should be." :)
Just can't get a break can I? I am beginning to see what the pro-poly people say when they comment that it is useless to engage you folks in any discussion. I post something for you to review and I get attacked and accused of "lacking courage", being discourteous, engaging n a "hit and run argument", and being deliberately vague (all courtesy of Skeptic) Then you choose to agree with Skeptic and accuse me of being coy! I told you that I lacked the ability to get the material to you at that time. I understand the problems associated with your physical location and thought that Mr.Mallah would eagerly assist you. I guess I was wrong. How did he respond? Instead of accepting responsibility for what he is attributed with saying; the word "never" comes to mind, he not so cleverly shifts the blame by reminding people that Ed Curran said "he was not aware..." C'mon guys! When I told you that I did not have the capability to provide you with what you wanted, that can hardly be referred to as coy. Aren't you reading a bit into that. I told you that I wanted to provide you with the information and that I would await your response. I was less than surprised when your friends initiated the attack..it showed me a lot about your group. The material is rather lengthy, but I will try to get it nonetheless and type it into a posting. And as for Skeptic, I do not care yif you join in the argument or not, I sort of expected a response first from George....you sound too much like a watch dog. Chill Dude!
Touche,
I'm not going to respond to all the retorts you've made, just these points:
If you have a point to make, then make it. I'm sure it's within your capability to summarize the information and cite the source. Any responsible attempt at refutation would require us to review the source and the information contained therein. But it is, I say again, lacking in etiquette to merely give us a citation and say, essentially, "you're wrong about a particular point. I will not mention what that point is, but if you go to the library and read the pages I told you about, then you'll know."
I'd be happy to assist George with the information contained within the book you cite. The next time I am at the library, which should be sometime this month, I will check to see about the book you mentioned.
The fact that I cited Ed Curran in support of the contention that the polygraph has never caught a single spy is not responsibility-shifting. It shows that if I am laboring under a misconception, it is a widespread misconception held even by one of the paladins of the pro-polygraph community. If it turns out I am wrong, I will correct my personal statement on this web site, which is from where Dr. Park presumably quoted me. I have never spoken to Dr. Park in my life.
Chapter 16
(Some paragraphs are shortened for space considerations. Some text has ben paraphased, but no meaning has been changed).
For more than four years, the shrewdest agents in American and allied military intelligence crried on a top secret investigation on two continents. The investigfation focused on Frank Hirt, a man suspected of being a Nazi spy, who later proved to be operating under the direct orders of the Reich.
Credit for this achievement goes to a retired Berkley police lieutenant, Albert E. Riedel.
A native born American, Hirt spent much of his life in Germany. He eventually became a solider in the United States Air Force and might have succeeded in continuing his espionage if not for the results of a lie detector test.
Hirt's activities began before the U.S. entered WW II. British intelligence officers first became suspcious of his movement and shadowed him when he left Germany and began wandering through Switzerland.
After th U.S. entered the war against Germany and Japan, American intelliegcne agents joined the British in keeping a watchful eye on Hirt, but they lacked substantative evidence against him.
Intelligence agents trailed Hirt to Bermuda and observed him flashing laerge sums of money and later discovered that at one time, Hirt held the rank of corporal in Hitler's army. He was questioned by the British and soon left, arriving in Miami, where the FBI pickedup the trail. It was then learned that Hirt had been drafted into the Air Force and worked as a mechanic on a number of bases, but apparently because he was disliked, he was frequently transferred.
A high ranking officer called for Hirt to be arrested, yet the agents felt they needed more proof. Someone suggested Riedel and a "lie detector" test. Shortly thereafter, Hirt was arrested and brought to Riedel's office in California to have the test administered to him.
Despite the fact that he believed he would be vindicated by taking the test, Hirt was questioned by Riedel during the test.
When confronted with the deceptive results of the test, Hirt stated: "Hell, I see I can't get away with it. I might as well tell you the truth".
The story that the man slowly unfolded - a full confession - was startling. Not only did he frankly admit to spying for the Reich, but he also revealed every detail of his travels and his work under direct orders from Germany.
(A lengthy discussion takes place here where Hirt details how he performed his espionage activities, what his targets were (high altitude bombers) and how he communicated with his handlers in Germany using invisible ink letters)
After the details of Hirt's confession had been put on paper, he was returned to miltary custody and confined in an American military prison. He remained there long after the Nazi empire had collapsed. A trial was considered after the war,but higher military authorities realized it would be useless to attempt a formal trial because the principal corroborating witnesses were either dead in Germany or in prison as war criminals. Hirt was finally returned to Germany, and he quickly vanished.
Okay, there it is.
Quote from: touche on Dec 02, 2002, 07:44 PM
A high ranking officer called for Hirt to be arrested, yet the agents felt they needed more proof. Someone suggested Riedel and a "lie detector" test. Shortly thereafter, Hirt was arrested and brought to Riedel's office in California to have the test administered to him.
Despite the fact that he believed he would be vindicated by taking the test, Hirt was questioned by Riedel during the test.
When confronted with the deceptive results of the test, Hirt stated: "Hell, I see I can't get away with it. I might as well tell you the truth".
The story that the man slowly unfolded - a full confession - was startling. Not only did he frankly admit to spying for the Reich, but he also revealed every detail of his travels and his work under direct orders from Germany.
(A lengthy discussion takes place here where Hirt details how he performed his espionage activities, what his targets were (high altitude bombers) and how he communicated with his handlers in Germany using invisible ink letters)
After the details of Hirt's confession had been put on paper, he was returned to miltary custody and confined in an American military prison. He remained there long after the Nazi empire had collapsed. A trial was considered after the war,but higher military authorities realized it would be useless to attempt a formal trial because the principal corroborating witnesses were either dead in Germany or in prison as war criminals. Hirt was finally returned to Germany, and he quickly vanished.
Okay, there it is.
Touche,
Thank you for posting the information. It may indeed be more accurate to say that the polygraph has not caught a spy since World War II.
A question I'd like cleared up would have to do with whether the results of the polygraph alone were truly indicative of deception by objective standards (most likely R/I standards, given the time period we're talking about) -- it's obvious Hirt was already suspected of being a spy. Unfortunately, there's not enough information to gauge, based upon what you've quoted here, whether the confrontation/post-test interrogation was a bluff or the real thing (IOW, did the polygraph truly catch this man's deception, or was it used effectively as an interrogation prop?).
One thing that seems clear from the account, though, is that Hirt was not caught by a routine polygraph screening. In fact, they might have had enough info by the time the polygraph was administered to give a concealed-knowledge test.
I'll have to look up other information on Hirt, if it's available.
Skeptic
Touche,
Thanks for the summary.
Based on your summary and looking at this in the light most favorable to the polygraph, one would have to conclude that the polygraph extracted valuable information which was of potentially great assistance in the war effort, and but for the polygraph, we would not have uncovered it.
Skeptic's point must be remembered though, that it was not a polygraph screening that caught Hirt. You would not consider his polygraph test to be a screening, would you?
Accepting your information and in the interest of fairness and avoiding confusion, it would probably be more accurate to say that polygraph screenings have never caught a single spy in all its history.
It is also worth noting that this test was administered in the 1940's, before, I believe, the public had much information about the polygraph. It's clear from your description that Hirt believed in the power of the polygraph, and confessed accordingly.
Worth understanding here is how much his confession is attributable to good interrogation skills. "Deceptive charts" plus poor interrogation skills generally equal no confession. NDI charts plus good interrogation skills may still equal a confession. My guess is that with all the information against Hirt, the polygraph examiner was going to take a shot at him no matter what the charts looked like. What was there to lose?
It would also be interesting to know whether the polygraph falsely accused any suspected Nazi agents, and in so doing, sabotaged the war effort by misleading investigators.
Finally, a key question is this (as George has simiilarly asked): what is the value of the polygraph when the subject does not believe in it, and will not confess based on its "findings"? That brings us to the pure diagnostic value of the charts, and on that score, the NAS has spoken quite clearly.
Touche,
As Mr. Mallah has well articulated, polygraph screening (I assume that you understand that your recent offering has nothing to do with polygraph screening and were not representing it as such) has no diagnostic value or validity. It has utility only to the extent that the affected public is either stupid or ignorant. Neither this site nor the NAS polygraph panel study/report can relieve stupidity, but both (through the continued dissemination of the NAS report and the daily activity connected with this site) are reducing ignorance on a daily basis. To the extent that the truth is known (ignorance abated), any prior utility associated with polygraph screening is completely going down the tubes...
Touche,
Thank you for abridging and posting the excerpt from Eugene B. Block's Lie Detectors: Their History and Use for our review.
Some troubling questions remain. If Hirt gave a full confession to being a Nazi spy, why was he never charged with espionage (and/or treason)? Block explains that "higher military authorities realized it would be useless to attempt a formal trial because the principal corroborating witnesses were either dead in Germany or in prison as war criminals." But I find this explanation hard to believe. Presumably, testimony could easily have been sought from any potential witnesses imprisoned as war criminals. Moreover, the alleged full confession to wartime espionage should have been enough for a conviction on treason charges without any corroborating witnesses. And it should have been possible to independently corroborate at least some details of the alleged full confession.
Was Hirt's confession genuine? Or was it like that of U.S. Navy petty officer Daniel M. King, who, during a coercive polygraph interrogation, falsely confessed to sending a computer disk to the Russian Embassy? Or the Marine embassy guards in Moscow who, during coercive polygraph interrogations falsely confessed to espionage? Or Egyptian student Abdallah Higazy, who falsely confessed to owning an aviation radio that was not his after an FBI polygrapher allegedly threatened his family?
On what charge(s) was Frank Hirt "confined in an American military prison?" Was he ever charged with and/or convicted of any crime by any military (or civilian) court? And why was Hirt, a U.S. citizen by birth, "returned to Germany?"
Could you tell us what source(s) Block cites for his information on the Hirt case? I'd be interested in any further details about this case that you (or anyone else) may be able to provide.
Quote from: George W. Maschke on Dec 03, 2002, 04:52 AM
Was Hirt's confession genuine? Or was it like...the Marine embassy guards in Moscow who, during coercive polygraph interrogations falsely confessed to espionage?
Wow! I did not know that Clayton Lonetree "Falsely Confessed." Gee, all those years he spent in prison, all the cooborating information gleened from former Soviet intelligence officials and his Russian Spy girlfriend (obviously falsley obtained, maybe through the use of one or more of those "coercive polygraphs.") I am SHOCKED, and APPALLED! All those judges and juries, WRONG! All those congressmen and Senators, briefed in scores of open and closed door sessions, WRONG! The entire American criminal justice and political systems, WRONG! I am sooo glad to have found this website. The ONE source for all truth and knowledge on this and all other topics. George, you are a PRINCE! and a real American hero....Bravo!
PDD-Fed
Quote from: PDD-Fed on Dec 03, 2002, 03:32 PM
Wow! I did not know that Clayton Lonetree "Falsely Confessed." Gee, all those years he spent in prison, all the cooborating information gleened from former Soviet intelligence officials and his Russian Spy girlfriend (obviously falsley obtained, maybe through the use of one or more of those "coercive polygraphs.") I am SHOCKED, and APPALLED! All those judges and juries, WRONG! All those congressmen and Senators, briefed in scores of open and closed door sessions, WRONG! The entire American criminal justice and political systems, WRONG! I am sooo glad to have found this website. The ONE source for all truth and knowledge on this and all other topics. George, you are a PRINCE! and a real American hero....Bravo!
PDD-Fed
PPD-Fed,
If you're going to take the time to write up such long pieces of sarcastic fluff, you should at least register and have the post count towards your board seniority :)
Skeptic
PDD-Fed,
The Marine embassy guards in Moscow who falsely confessed to espionage, and to whom I referred in my reply to Touche above, are Corporals Arnold Bracy and Robert Williams, and Sergeant Vincent Downes, USMC. Their ordeal at the hands of Naval Criminal Investigative Service (then Naval Investigative Service) polygraphers is one of the more shameful chapters in the history of polygraphy. You will find it summarized at pp. 245-46 of the 2nd edition of David T. Lykken's A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector. Lykken's account is also cited in full beginning at p. 49 of the 2nd edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.
Quote from: George W. Maschke on Dec 03, 2002, 06:20 PM
PDD-Fed,
The Marine embassy guards in Moscow who falsely confessed to espionage, and to whom I referred in my reply to Touche above, are Corporals Arnold Bracy and Robert Williams, and Sergeant Vincent Downes, USMC. Their ordeal at the hands of Naval Criminal Investigative Service (then Naval Investigative Service) polygraphers is one of the more shameful chapters in the history of polygraphy. You will find it summarized at pp. 245-46 of the 2nd edition of David T. Lykken's A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector. Lykken's account is also cited in full beginning at p. 49 of the 2nd edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.
Wasn't that the same NCIS team that so successfully resolved the extent of Lonetree's betrayal against his fellow Americans? You also might want to do some more research into Bracy's case. He might have "got off", but that by no means proves he suffered any "ordeal" at the hands of NCIS. In fact, I understand that debriefs of former KGB support his original arrest and prosecution. It is one of the great mistakes of justice that he not only got off, but ended up as the dependant husband of a woman Marine, living in Marine housing at Quantico, Va., shopping at the commissary, and being cared for by the same military health care system provided by the heroes who protect us all AGAINST leeches like Bracy... >:(
PDD-Fed
PDD-Fed,
If you truly believe what you said regarding Mr. Bracy then accuse him publicly and openly and be prepared to support your statements. Otherwise your commentary appears to be nothing but cowardly libel stemming from backroom polygraph gossip...
Quote from: Anonymous on Dec 03, 2002, 07:25 PM
PDD-Fed,
If you truly believe what you said regarding Mr. Bracy then accuse him publicly and openly and be prepared to support your statements. Otherwise your commentary appears to be nothing but cowardly libel stemming from backroom polygraph gossip...
Anonymous,
That happens?? I thought polygraphers were connsumate professionals, deeply respectful of their duty towards confidentiality...
(Since sarcasm seems to be the dominant mode today)
Skeptic
Today, 8 October 2003, marks the first anniversary of the public release of the National Academy of Sciences's landmark report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection (http://www.nap.edu/books/0309084369/html/). Regrettably, in the year since the report was published, its conclusions have been almost completely ignored by federal, state, and local agencies that rely on polygraphy...