AntiPolygraph.org Message Board

I am new to this site and to date, have read through roughly 30-40 messages posted here so please correct me if any of my assesments are incorrect.

First, my own position on the validity of polygrapgh is favoring the pro-polygraph side, though I have only recently been introduced to polygraph from a low-level research and development point of view. Second, skeptics, in any scientific endeavor, are absolutely vital so long as they are capable of making the distinction between examining the premise and examining the procedure.

Most messages posted to this board are in some way related to the question, 'Are the current methods for conducting a Polygraph examination valid?' However, it seems that before we can answer this question we must ask another more fudamental question 'Is it possible to determine a subjects guilt or innocence based solely on the subjects response to a series of prepared questions?' In other words, can any polygraph type system work?

In the attempt to answer this large question, let's first ask a series of smaller questions

1. 'Does a guilty conscience, or fear of repurcussions cause stress?'

I believe almost everyone will agree the answer here is yes.

2. 'Is there a difference between nervous stress and stress due to guilt or fear of repurcussions?'

The magnitude of stress should increase when associated with something concrete. For instance, being afraid of enclosed spaces versus being afraid of enclosed spaced while you are trapped in a packing crate.

3. 'Is there a consistent physiological response to stress?'

The answer to this intuitively seems to be yes, most of us have experienced stress and realise that it ocan cause an involuntary constriction of muscles, increased heart rate and alter breathing.

4. ' Can we detect this physiological response?'
Here I'm afraid some of you will have to believe me on faith or check it out for yourselves, the answer is yes, it is a simple task to detect altered heart rate, breathing and skin conductivity (sweat).

The conclusion then seems to be that guilt causes stress, we can detect stress or increases in stress, therefore we should be able to detect guilt.

Someone may counter, taking an exam causes stress. My response here is, as far as I understand it, this is what the control questions are for. Control questions, if worded properly, are meant to induce some stress based on abstract notions. In a relevant question, the stress level should increase if the subject is guilty and remain constant otherwise.

Now, is there something I am missing from the above premises, is there a Polygraph analysis cannot work or are you arguing only about its current methodoligies?

Inquest,

Welcome to the message board.  The currently and most widely used polygraph formats (control question tests)  seek to allow a polygraph examiner to make determinations about the presence or absence of examinee deception (actually not a determination of guilt).  The generally offered polygraph community explanation of how this works is based on the concept of "fear of detection."  I have previously posted material (part of a thread on underlying theory) for why I believe this to be an inadequate/incorrect explanation for what transpires and for what I believe actually does occur.  I will repost here that post and a preceding one that was posted by Anonymous (Addressed to Dr. Gordon Barland, formerly Chief of Research at the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute (DoDPI)).  I hope you will find this material useful in your analysis.  I would be happy to discuss it further when you have had an opportunity to read it.  I apologize for its length, but I'm afraid this is only the beginning...


First Post By Anonymous:

Gordon,

While I have enjoyed our exchanges regarding countermeasures/counter-countermeasures involving the CQT polygraph exam and don't in any way want to discourage you from continuing that thread (responding to the numerous outstanding questions/comments put to you as well as adding your own additional thoughts), I thought I'd introduce another fundamental line of discourse regarding the CQT. That would be to take a look at the fundamental theory of its practice. Although many theories have been offered over the years, it appears that polygraphers seem to return over and over again to the notion involving "Fear of Detection" on the part of both guilty and innocent (of relevant issues) examinees. Theory has it that, following the proper "setting" of test questions (a very subjective pre-test procedure worthy of its own discussion--another post) guilty subjects, upon in-test presentation, will respond most strongly to relevant questions and innocent subjects to control questions, thereby giving a basis for the general overall and spot scoring used (scoring, yet another future topic for our consideration) in evaluating CQT polygraphy.

The notion that I would like to raise at this point is a diametrically opposing theory for why CQT polygraphy would NOT be expected to work (would be expected to result in false positives): "Fear of Consequences." I am not suggesting that there are not other reasons (anger, surprise, revulsion, etc.) for why the "test" might be confounded on any given use, but I believe the suggested general mechanism is why one would question its working in a large number of situations.  I think it is quite reasonable to believe that anyone would react to being asked about involvement in certain crimes, not because of fear of being caught in a lie, but because of a fear of the consequences of having been so branded, independent of and regardless of whether that one (the polygraph examinee) had actually told the truth or told a lie during a polygraph exam regarding matter(s) under investigation.

Is it not reasonable to expect an examinee to respond to the relevant question "Did you rob the bank?" physiologically because he knows that deception-indicated polygraph results may lead to prosecution and conviction, denial of freedom, access to family, friends and worldly resources, etc.?  Furthermore, is this not even successively more and more likely in the case involving a capital crime, and one in which the examinee's being subject to the death penalty may have been mentioned in the course of the investigation prior to an exam? Perhaps the worst real-case scenario relates to a well-publicized case in which a CQT polygraph exam was given to a death row inmate within hours of the administration of his death penalty sentence. Is there any sane rationale for such an action, and, with the obvious psychological pressures commensurate with such a scenario, is there any way one could reasonably expect an innocent polygraph examinee, under such conditions, to focus on control questions (via some fear of detection mechanism) as opposed to the relevant questions that directly relate to his imminent demise (via a fear of consequences mechanism)? I think not.

Admittedly, I have gone from a rather commonplace criminal investigation (bank robbery) to what to me is one of the most egregious uses of CQT polygraphy on record, but one can imagine the same issues applied to a job applicant having an offer of employment riding solely on a polygraph exam or even look to a rather routine non-criminal setting to see evidence of what I am suggesting.  It is not uncommon for an individual who is having his blood pressure measured to respond with a sudden increase in systolic blood pressure (as much as 30 mm Hg), not because he is necessarily hypertensive but because he may well be hyper-reactive. The nature of this hyper-reactivity, the so-called "white coat effect," may well stem from a fear of consequences, i.e., the inability to maintain a certain job, inability to get or maintain life insurance, inability to participate in certain athletic activities, etc., following a determination of hypertension.  Is not this sort of phenomenon that we see fairly routinely evidenced with blood pressure readings (perhaps occurring through the suggested mechanism via the same autonomic response system in play with CQT polygraphy) actually what may well be happening with polygraphy? I would appreciate your thoughts on these issues.

Note: I expect to be preoccupied with other matters over the next several days, but do look forward to continuing our discussion(s).


Second Post by Drew Richardson:

The theory of "fear of consequences" for why a polygraph exam does NOT work may have some additional important ramifications beyond what Anonymous has already provided us with.  If the real-life consequences of relevant question material are what is driving polygraph results, this would tend to make the test more accurate for guilty people (who would be identified through present polygraph scoring if they are focused and respond more strongly to relevant-question consequences than control) and less accurate for innocent (whose focus and response to relevant-question consequences would be a confound for present polygraph formats and scoring stratagems).  It could well be that polygraph accuracy and paradigm validity is greater for guilty subjects than innocent subjects (perhaps the latter being accurately claimed by Lykken and Iacono to be somewhere near fifty percent (random chance) and zero (or completely lacking), respectively).

This would also explain why criminal polygraph examiners might be at least partially blind to the error they propagate.  In a real field criminal setting polygraph examiners do not develop their own cases.  Investigating case agents present them with cases and polygraph examinees.  A high percentage of those cases brought are from case agents who believe the suggested examinee is guilty of a crime and, in fact, are likely correct as evidenced through their investigation(s).  This phenomenon (a disproportionately high number of guilty subjects), the "fear of consequences" effect, plus any bias developed by the polygraph examiner as a result of having the case agent's investigative hypothesis would all tend to produce a higher degree of accuracy for the preponderance of criminal tests (those given to guilty subjects), but would leave examiners completely blind to and surprised by the error they produce with innocent criminal suspects and the legions of screening examinees who are largely innocent of relevant matters examined.

The theory of "fear of consequences" also has great implications for polygraph research.  Any paradigm which did not have sufficient consequences to invoke this phenomenon (assuming it to be a valid explanation) would have very little external validity and would tend to underestimate false positive results.  A typical polygraph screening study of the past would be a simulated crime scenario having college students or military recruits play the roles of programmed guilty or innocent subjects.  I strongly believe that neither the crimes nor the polygraph exams would have sufficient consequences to invoke such a reaction and physiological response and therefore be largely meaningless.  Let me explain.  A typical crime would be something like a theft of $10.00 from a desk drawer (again of no particular consequence--I have witnessed participants even laugh at the notion of such a crime and that an FBI agent would be investigating such).  Typically, examinees would be given some sort of financial reward (perhaps even $100.00) if they could pass the polygraph exam related to the simulated crime.  This latter exercise not only does not represent the consequences associated with real life polygraph exams, but also in fact is quite the opposite--a reward for some sort of achievement.  Following the polygraph exam, both guilty and innocent subjects leave the suite not to be further contacted, investigated or to have any further involvement with those who conducted the exercise---again, all this having been accomplished in the absence of any true consequences.  

All of this put together would lead to a variety of absurdities--not only the reward (as opposed to punishment/consequences) associated with polygraph decisions but the notion of having the would-be criminal committing a crime, not for the spoils of the crime, but for the privilege of entering the polygraph lottery where the rewards might be ten times as great as those associated with the original crime.  People do not commit crimes for the opportunity to profit from polygraph exams.  Aside from all the humor involved in such an exercise, the serious downside and flaw is that the lack of any consequences would result in an underestimate of the true rate of false positives in the real world and be severely lacking in external validity as a test paradigm.  Bill Iacono has quite correctly pointed out how field-based polygraph research that utilizes confessions for determining ground truth about subject guilt would also lead to the underestimation of the rate of false positives occurring in real life polygraph exams.  Polygraph research and how we fundamentally view polygraphy may well need to go back to the drawing board...

Drew Richardson,

Thank you for your reply.

As I understand it, what you are saying is that there are people who are afraid of a false positive and this fear in itself therefore causes a false positive. Please let me know if this interpretation is incorrect.

My respone to the above is that this may certainly be the case. However, pardon me for being so callous, these people are statistically in the minority. That is, the majority of people will have a greater response if their is some concrete association with the question. It is true that this is not good enough to be used in court, and it is not. A polygraph exam seems to acheive far greater accuracy than chance. It is even possible to minimize the number of false possitives through statistical analysis and acheive accuracies greater than 80 % for both di and ndi ( you can look this up http://www.dodpi.army.mil/research/95r0001.htm). Actually, the algorithm used to acheive the above accuracy is not optimized and much can be done to improve upon it. Yes there are many who are hurt by this currently insufficient accuracy, however, there are many more who are caught by it and therefore prevented from hurting others and the fact that it can already acheive greater than 80% seems to imply that the theory is sound though it is far from optimization.

Quote from: Inquest on Jul 31, 2002, 03:59 PM
Drew Richardson,

Thank you for your reply.

As I understand it, what you are saying is that there are people who are afraid of a false positive and this fear in itself therefore causes a false positive. Please let me know if this interpretation is incorrect.

My respone to the above is that this may certainly be the case. However, pardon me for being so callous, these people are statistically in the minority. That is, the majority of people will have a greater response if their is some concrete association with the question. It is true that this is not good enough to be used in court, and it is not. A polygraph exam seems to acheive far greater accuracy than chance. It is even possible to minimize the number of false possitives through statistical analysis and acheive accuracies greater than 80 % for both di and ndi ( you can look this up http://www.dodpi.army.mil/research/95r0001.htm). Actually, the algorithm used to acheive the above accuracy is not optimized and much can be done to improve upon it. Yes there are many who are hurt by this currently insufficient accuracy, however, there are many more who are caught by it and therefore prevented from hurting others and the fact that it can already acheive greater than 80% seems to imply that the theory is sound though it is far from optimization.

It should be noted that such claims of accuracy are themselves highly suspect.  As is pointed out in TLBTLD, you have to consider the basis for the claim: if you have 100 subjects, with 99 being innocent and one guilty, you can attain a "99% accuracy rate" by simply declaring all subjects innocent.

You need to be very careful how accuracy claims are determined, as the above statements aren't terribly specific.  If you are innocent or guilty, what are the chances of being correctly categorized by the polygraph?  If the chances are low for either (for a given test group), or vary depending upon the percentage of innocent or guilty subjects in the test group, you have a little problem with the test itself.  Unfortunately, that seems to be the case with the polygraph.  When I get the time, I'll look up the link you have provided.

I would suspect that the majority of people who are "caught" by the polygraph are actually those who are persuaded by the polygrapher's interrogation skills to make voluntary confessions.  Such confessions have nothing to do with the accuracy of the polygraph itself.

Additionally, what is the basis for your claim that "the majority of people will have a greater response if their is some concrete association with the question"?  What do you mean by a "concrete association", and why would you not consider "fear of consequences" to fall into this category?

Skeptic

Inquest,

You write:

Quote...As I understand it, what you are saying is that there are people who are afraid of a false positive and this fear in itself therefore causes a false positive. Please let me know if this interpretation is incorrect...

Actually no, this is not quite correct.  Fear of consequences does not imply that an examinee is "afraid of a false positive" but that he/she is concerned about the consequences of a positive result (either true or false).  As I believe I indicated these consequences might range from further investigation, conviction, imprisonment, etc in a criminal matter to denial of employment, embarrassment with friends and family, etc with an administrative matter.

The distinction between what you said above and what fear of consequences actually is has very important ramifications to correcting a second and related misconception you offered:

You said :

Quote...However, pardon me for being so callous, these people are statistically in the minority. That is, the majority of people will have a greater response if  [Sic] their  is some concrete association with the question...

If you understand what fear of consequences really is then you will appreciate that consequences are consequences are consequences, i.e., a prison cell is as confining and cold for a wrongly found deceptive and subsequently found guilty (but in fact innocent polygraph examinee) as it is for the guilty polygraph examinee who is subsequently convicted and who has the "association" you speak of with regard to relevant question material.  This association neither augments nor diminishes the severity of the consequence(s) of a deceptive polygraph result nor an examinee's perception of those consequences.   Best,

Drew Richardson

Drew Richardson,

Thank you for your replies. I see that there is some room for argument here which it seems could only be resolved by psychological research. My own background is in physics and, happily from my point of view, most of the signal processing aspect of polygraph can be easily verified including the statistical accuracy figures.

However, you have certainly made some valid arguments which I believe cannot be easily refutted or verified though, as psychology is not my field, I may be wrong on this point. If there is any literature you could recomend on this point I would be interested.

Inquest

Inquest,

Actually I began my journey with polygraphy from a perspective not too different from the one I perceive you now have.  I began with the notion that a new dependent variable (at the time I was looking at systolic time intervals and impedance cardiography measures), or a data transformation (involved with various time series modifications), or general signal processing, etc would be the Holy Grail for increased diagnostic validity with polygraphy.  The last dozen years or so has largely led me to believe this is not the case.  

The problem with control question test (CQT) polygraphy and in particular its use in a screening context is not with the dependent variable(s) but with the independent variable.  The underlying theory for this particular application (screening) and various formats utilized for this application is so flawed...no tinkering with dependent variables (to include the CNS measures, e.g., P300, etc that I am now looking at) will add to the validity of these techniques.  I do believe that the CNS measures as well as several of the more traditionally used ANS measures will prove useful with concealed information tests though.  Best,

Drew Richardson

Quote from: Drew Richardson on Aug 02, 2002, 01:33 PM
Inquest,


The problem with control question test (CQT) polygraphy and in particular its use in a screening context is not with the dependent variable(s) but with the independent variable.

Yes, exactly. In fact, with the CQT test, the better one quantifies responsiveness the worse off a totally honest people is. The GKT (much more accepted in Japan, BTW) conversely, would benefit from a lowered variance. It seems to me that in the current anthrax investigation that GKT tests might be more revealing and accurate yet they likely are falling back to what they are used to, CQT's.

The basic problem is how does the FBI hire anyone? Few would fail to do minimal internet research and if they did, how would they answer the question about telling the truth knowing the examiner expects them to lie to the control questions?   It doesn't take much reading to understand quite intuitively how that test works.

-marty-

Drew,

Could you reference the thread from which you quoted the above posts?  I'm sure I have viewed it previously, but I do not recall. I'm sure Inquest and others (myself included) would like to see the postings of Dr. Barland regarding this topic.

I think you make a valid point regarding the source of false positives.  However, I would agree with Inquest, that these are greatly in the minority--especially when the art is applied properly.  

Yes, I believe Polygraph is an art.  Obviously there has to be a scientific basis, but applying it correctly (my job) is an art.  As you may have noted from the thread I began, I am a believer in psychological set.  My job, is to ensure that the control material poses a bigger threat to an innocent individual than the fear of the consequences of my misinterpreting his reponse to relevant issue (as you say many do).  What I must do is make the control material seem relevant to the investigation.  It could be argued that properly applying "psychological set" not only adds power to control material, but could lessen the fear (maybe detract from is more appropriate) of relvant material (in the mind of the person innocent of the relevant issue).  The art of the pre-instrument phase of CQT, does not differ greatly, in my opinion, from other psychological counseling.  The therapist applies his art, using methods for which he has scientific support, in order to manipulate the patient's psychology to the patient's benefit.

I would also agree with your point about the weakness of studies.  It is nearly impossible to duplicate the real world application in the clinical setting.  Likewise, it is difficult to quantify success rates in the real world, because establishing ground truth is very difficult.  Your qote from the previous thread ridiculed (perhaps rightfully so) the methodolgy used in some studies of "mock crime" studies.  The difficulty in these types of studies is getting the examinee to beleive their are consequences to the mock crime.  Often false negatives occur in these settings, because the examinee has absolutely no fear of being punished for assaulting a mannequin, or stealing a fake credit card, within a controlled environment, at the direction of an authority figure.  Yet, he or she may have real fear of the control material, as it covers acts they have committed of their own volition.  Perhaps an effective study could be made where a subject is tricked into doing what he believes is an actual crime.  However this type of study (I have heard of it being attempted to a certain degree) would be difficult to achieve, and would have some moral and ethical implications, as well.  

The difficulty in establishing ground truth in "real world" application, and the difficulty in achieving realism in lab studies, are the reasons that the argument over validity and accuracy of polygraph continue.

Oh, and to end on another note of agreement, I too like the GKT in theory.  And, I would love to see CNS methods added to the investigative tools of law enforcement and intelligence communities.  However, the main weakness of the GKT, regardless of whether it is a CNS or ANS data collection method, is the plethora of information often made public by the media; or to suspects, prior to examination, in attempts to obtain information from the suspect.  For GKT to be possible, the cards have to be held close, prior to the examination.

Thanks for enduring my ramblings.

--Public Servant

Public Servant,

Thank you for the time you expended on your last post.  You asked about the thread I previously referred to and provided two posts from.  That thread was begun approximately 15 months (on 5/11/2001 by Anonymous) ago and has not yet been substantively responded to by Dr. Barland; it is for that reason that I did not include his preliminary responses.  That thread can be found at https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=150.msg587#msg587

With regard to control question testing and art, I, although nary a producer of art, am an admirer of such and those whose talents and inspiration produce it.  I hope to spend some time this weekend at galleries in Washington D.C. enjoying various examples.  The ability to enjoy that art comes from an ability to witness it and to critique it, if not to share in its production.  

This is where I believe your analogy with polygraphy and control question setting falls apart.  Although you may have the best of intentions in the "art" of setting control questions, neither you nor anyone else can objectively and quantitatively describe what constitutes this process.  Even more problematic is the fact that no one can objectively describe when it has been accomplished or whether it has been accomplished or offer evidence of either.

For a given relevant question/control question comparison that has resulted in a greater relevant than control question response, you can not know whether (1) this is indicative or a deceptive response to a relevant question, (2) an innocent individual reacting to the consequences of the relevant question, or (3) an innocent examinee for whom you did not "set" control questions properly (again, an unspecified activity) or as you had hoped to do.  Neither you, nor I, nor anyone else can know by looking at the charts which has occurred, yet this portion of an exam would contribute to an overall deceptive score.  It is this phenomenon which makes control question test polygraphy wishful thinking at best and hucksterism in the hands of the unscrupulous.  I'm sorry that I don't see the connection with the world of art.  The absence of science is not the evidence of art.  Perhaps you might try again to convince me.  Until such time as you can clearly describe what it is you hope to do with your art of control question setting and offer objective evidence that it has been accomplished, I'm afraid I see no basis for recognizing it as such nor as a basis for making important decisions that affect either individuals or society.

Yes, we are in agreement about concealed information tests.  I believe they do have great potential--their results can be statistically defended; they will not be viewed by examinees as offensive as is the case with the control question "setting" process in a CQT exam; they will not invade the purview of judge and jury; and, they can be followed with the same strong interrogations of deemed "to be knowledgeable" individuals as is the case with those deemed to be deceptive individuals following a CQT exam.  You are also correct inasmuch as these tests do require (amongst other things) that  investigators to collect, preserve, and properly protect probe information.  This, of course, should be standard procedure now and clearly a responsibility of every investigator and those entrusted with investigative information.  Regards,

Drew Richardson

Drew,

Thanks for the reference.  I do recall reading this thread now.  Unfortunately for us, Dr. Barland was unable to contribute further.

Surely, you did not think I was comparing the technique used to the visual or musical arts.  And surely, you know that the term "art" is not restricted to them.  Hence the term, BA and MA attached to degrees in areas unrelated to visual arts, or music.  And, as the spouse of a highly educated and accomplished visual artist, the types of art you speak of are not always produced for others "to witness it and to critique it, if not to share in its production."  It is a creative outlet for self expression, often not needing, or wanting, any outside witness or critique.

For my broader use of the term, I will use an analogy to something else in which, as an experienced criminal investigator, I have experience.  The crime scene technician,  or investigator working in that capacity, is an artist for the most part, not a scientist.  His training is to locate and preserve evidence from a scene so the scientists can analyze the evidence for anything from latent prints to DNA.  There are guidelines for ensuring objective preservation is met.  But, every scene is different, and it takes a certain amount of creativity to get to this end in differing situations.  This is what makes it an art -- an art that has a goal of achieving the ability of the science to be utilized successfully.  

Your list of possible reasons for the DI result to an exam are likely correct.  However you do not provide a probability that either will occur more frequently than the other.  I would argue that (in criminal specific examination) the probabilities would overwhelmingly favor the first reason your provided -- deception to the relevant question.  You are correct, I do not know for sure from the charts alone which is the reason (I will not insult clairvoyants as you seem to believe I insulted artists).  However, I know that the probability is on the side of deception to relevant issues.  

The overwhelming number of exams I have run (and those run by the other examiners in my agency) have been corroborated by either confession, other investigative evidence, or both.  I am unaware of any scientific quantification of my own exams or those of my peers. I have seen one study where criminal attorneys reviewed cases for evidential merit (absent polygraph results) with comparison made to polygraph result, in attempt to establish ground truth. The results, as I recall, were similar to my lay observations.  Of course you and George (using a quote from Lykken, I believe), say examiners are deluded by success (confessions, corroborating evidence, etc).  The argument is, I believe, that the high rate of success is still only by chance. This argument is rooted in the inability to scientifically quantify success rate (the old what is ground truth thing, again).  To me, you can't argue with success.  And I'll take successful application of justice, stemming both from DI and NDI exams, anyday.  And, if a DI does results from one of the other possibilities you list, then no confession or corroborative evidence would be available to result in any derogatory action.  The exam alone is not admissible (in general in most jurisdictions, and none that I know of, for anything other than exculpation), which makes criminal specific polygraphy a highly effective investigative tool with little risk in the vein that is less than 100% accurate.  

Quote

hucksterism in the hands of the unscrupulous.  

Quote

I'm glad to see you are not completely generalizing, unless you believe all who apply this technique are unscrupulous.  As in any field, some unscrupulous examiners might exist.  However, I'd say it would be hard for them to survive for long in the government arena.  There might be persons out there who do not necessarily hire out polygraph services, but sell the result the customer requests.  These, I would argue are the only examiners to be characterized as "hucksters."  

As to concealed information exams, there are formats which use photographs.  Do you believe a false positive could result from shock value of a photo (or even a phrase used in a verbal exam)?  Those monitoring CNS, I would assume would be less susceptible, since it's premise is to determine if the person is cerebrally accessing memory when analyzing something they see or here.  The trick to validating this process, it would seem, would to be to prove that all persons' brains act in the same way (as it appears on the monitoring equipment) when accessing memory, as opposed to mere analysis of a given stimulus.  I'd like to hear to your comments on this (and anyone else who has more information to share), as my own knowledge of CNS concealed knowledge research, does not go far beyond the 60 Minutes piece some time back.

Thanks,

Public Servant

Public Servant,

I would agree with you that both crime scenes differ as well as do polygraph examinees/polygraph examinations.  That is where I believe the analogy ends though with CQT examinations (there are considerably greater parallels with concealed information testing).  What a crime scene technician does, whether it be the collecting of DNA evidence or latent fingerprints is very intuitive, is easily documented and verified, and can be so sufficiently described in detail, as to be evaluated in terms of results and compliance with proper procedure.  I do not believe this to be the case with the setting of control question material in a polygraph exam (in spite of the fact that virtually every polygraph school would claim that it teaches its students how to do this).  

The problem with the setting of control questions in a CQT exam is not that it differs for various examinees, but that it largely cannot be described, defined, and defended for any one examinee.  Again, I repeat, what is necessary to convince me is not to suggest that this is art, but to describe for me and others what constitutes the proper setting of a control question with objective standards for allowing a neutral observer to evaluate whether and when this process has been completed for a given examinee.  And speaking of neutral observers, do you believe, for the purpose of an examinee who claims to have been wrongly found deceptive, that he/she and his attorney should be given audio/video tapes (you do record yours, yes?) of his/her pretest to allow for the expert evaluation of whether control questions were properly set (as well as a host of other issues which might be evaluated)?

I am glad we agree on the possible interpretations for a polygraph result which includes a greater physiological response for a relevant question in a given relevant/control question comparison.  I see no reason though to accept your probability assessment for the likelihood of the various explanations.  I suspect that "the consequences of a deceptive polygraph finding" is what has caused the plethora of false positives testified to on this site with regard to polygraph screening.  I don't even find likely that this outcome has anything in particular to do with polygrapher error (the improper/incomplete setting of control question material, etc), although because this process is not sufficiently well defined it would be hard to disprove this explanation.  And no, I don't believe polygraphers to be universally or even largely disingenuous (let alone unscrupulous), but largely sufficiently lacking in relevant formal education as to be able to adequately evaluate the assumptions and theoretical underpinnings of their practice.

I am now working with Dr. Larry Farwell, who is the examiner/researcher who conducted the exam that was featured on the CBS 60 Minutes piece you referred to.  Both he and I would be happy to provide cites from the peer reviewed literature regarding the many issues you might care to explore regarding P300 evaluations or to discuss the principles of "brain fingerprinting" and its utility for specific issue testing and in narrowly focused screening applications (e.g. which of a group of a thousand detainees might have connections to al Qaeda, etc).  He and I have in recent months spoken to several groups of investigators, chiefs of police, etc. regarding this technology.  We would be happy to do any of the aforementioned for you and your organization as well.  Perhaps you might care to begin with the following article published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Forensic Science and authored by Dr. Larry Farwell and Ms. Sharon Smith (FBI Supervisory Special Agent and Instructor, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI Academy).  The bibliography of this article will provide you with numerous additional literature cites. 

cite:

Farwell, L. A. and Smith, S. S. (2001).  Using Brain MERMER Testing to Detect Concealed Knowledge Despite Efforts to Conceal.  Journal of Forensic Sciences 46,1:1-9.

You can find an on-line preprint version (does not include figures) of this article at

http://www.brainwavescience.com/FBILFSmithAsPubFigs.htm

Drew/Public Servant:

I'd like to throw another factor into the mix besides fear of consequences as a cause for a false positive outcome.  What about "desire to succeed?"

In other words, could it not be the case that in a specific issue criminal exam (or screening), the innocent subject, wanting to get through the procedure (it's inherently stressful and unpleasant, even for the innocent) and be vindicated, somehow focuses on the relevant question(s) as the one(s)where the examiner wants to see the least physiological response?  And knowing that, naturally reacts most strongly there, despite not wanting to do so.  Again, not out of fear of consequences or being disbelieved, but just wanting to pass.

Mark, et al.,

Speaking from direct experience with specific-issue CQT testing, I certainly feel that "fear of consequences" and "desire to succeed" are both very real, not to mention problematic, factors. It's beyond me how the polygraph community simply dismisses the fact that the examinee (even one with no polygraph knowledge) knows full well what the most important question(s) is (are) in the exam, and that this would translate to enhanced anxiety transcending any that might be produced during control questions.

I can directly attest to this, as when the relevant question came up on my poly, I would think "ok, this is the one, the most salient question, here we go". I could even feel myself getting tense when it came up. I sooooo wanted to show/prove that I was being forthright. Yet in the back of my mind I knew full well there's absolutely no way of physically proving the issue. All this totally contributed to my anxiety, and, you know what, it's a completely natural human reaction, manifested I'm sure by multitudes of other polygraph victims.  Of-course, having truthfully answered all control questions certainly didn't help.

False +

False +,

Thanks for your response.  Your experience very much echoes mine, including the post-test.

If I had more time when I wrote the last post, I would have added that this is the way I felt, that I wanted to pass, and focused on the relevant questions as the ones that were the most important to pass.

Public Servant,

From my own personal experience, that of False +, and it seems to me, common sense, the CQT format seems to suffer from an excess of arrogance in presupposing that the polygrapher can get the innocent subject to be more concerned about the control question than the relevant question.  I'm sure it happens, but people have myriad conscious and subconscious reasons for thinking a certain way, and if a relevant question strikes a subject as the critical question on the test, then the polygrapher can talk all day long, and may not be able to convince the subject, at the cellular level, to be more concerned about the comparison question.

As I think you'll agree, convincing a person to change their mind is a considerable challenge.  The CQT again seems to suffer from not being able to really know if a subject is more concerned about the relevant than the comparison because of fear of consequences/desire to succeed/other reason.  It just assumes that the polygrapher will do the job in convincing the innocent subject to be more concerned about the relevant question, and that's that.  There is no attempt to verify that this succeeded, or take account if it did not succeed.

As False + mentioned, attributing a higher response to the relevant question to some reason other than deception never even gets considered.

And finally, at least with the FBI, I always wondered why if they say the polygraph is 98% accurate, they never produce examples of the 2%, and certainly refused to consider that I (or others on this site) might fall into that 2%. The investigation proceeded as if the polygraph were 100% accurate.

Mark,

Yes, a desire to succeed can obviously be of paramount importance to a polygraph examinee.  This is largely the flip side of a desire not to fail or to be penalized.  I see these as inseparable sides of the same coin and both largely a reflection of examinee concern about the consequences related to the relevant issues of a polygraph exam.  I think however, the semantics and nomenclature are less important than the critical role this phenomenon likely plays in control question tests.  It would be unlikely that a polygraph examiner from his chart recordings alone could ever demonstrate that this was not the operative and affective driving force for his CQT examination.

I think I may have some empirical (albeit anecdotal) evidence for you about "Fear of Consequences"
I've already posted the detailed scenario on a nother thread on this bulletin board, but thought I would reiterate to this mroe relevant discussion.

My fiancee was accused of threatening someone with a gun from his vehicle.  He fully admits driving by the area where the accuser was, at the time indicated, but adamantly denies he had a weapon, or threatened the guy in any way.  I'm sure he was telling the truth.  When he found out that there were video cameras recording the area where the incident occurred (where he drove by), he begged the police to obtain and screen the tapes to see that the accusation was false.  He is on probation for a completely unrelated and non-violent crime.  But rather than truly investigate, his probation officer asked him to take a polygraph.  HE was eager to do so voluntarily to prove his innocence.  

He took the test and flunked it, much to his horror, astonishment and dismay.  He was asked only 3 relevant  questions (5 irrelevant, and 2 control).  The examiner ascertained that he was truthful to one question, and lied in the other two.  The problem is that if he was lying to the two questions (as per the examiner), he could not have been telling the truth to the third one, and vice versa.  He is very nervous by nature, and was so stressed out when he took the test that his vision blurred.  I think the consequences of faiing the test completely freaked him out when the first two relevant questions were asked.  We are still trying to get our hands on those video tapes (or at least preserve them for future inspection), but our lawyer is seriously lame.     If the video tapes show, as we are certain they will, that he did not wave a gun at anyone as he drove by, then this will be strong evidence that a polygraph does NOT work.  

Do you know anywhere that I can find some serious research on this "Fear of Consequences" theory?  (if my fiance's probation is violated, he wil go to prison.  (a polygraph IS admissable in court for the purposes of a probation violation hearing)  This will cause him to lose his small business (can't function w/o him), prevent his son from returning to boarding school, and perhaps lose his house and our relationship.  His employees will also be out of jobs.  Talk about some grim, scary consequences!

Mark, et al,

This thread, and some posts to previous ones surely has covered very reasonable theories regarding why false positives occur.  It does not establish, however, that false positives occur as frequently as this site maintains.  And it does not mean that a good examiner can not minimize the possibilities of these theoretical problems causing a false positive.  This site says the CQT works at a rate not better than chance.  I know better from experience, and as Drew so frequently says to me, you have not convinced me.

Mark, I would be more than happy to include you in the 2% (I'd even expand it to 5% or so in a broad scope exam arena).  The fact that a thorough investigation cleared you, to me, says one of the theories listed here worked against you.  But as awful as it was, I believe your experience (I am not intentionally excluding any one else here) is very much the exception, not the norm.

Chicbette -- You are correct that your story is anectdotal.  However, it does not take Dr. Drew to see that it is not empirical.  Not only is it a singular account, your belief in your fiance is hardly sufficient to establish ground truth.  Ultimately, if there is video evidence, any true LE organization will thoroughly review it.  If sufficient video exists and your fiance is being truthful, he will be exhonerated.

Drew,

I finally read the article on CNS exams.  Good stuff.  I think CNS monitoring is the logical next step.  If you'll forgive the cliche, finding a valid way to determine what brain activities occur with memory, creativity (ie creating a lie), etc, would be getting the information straight from the horse's mouth.  

Just a few points/questions, not necessarily for answer (I know this is very much in the early stages), but for discussion.

This has been very successful in lab studies, with willing participants.  Do you think a less than willing examinee(a guilty person in a real life criminal investigative setting), would pay attention or concentrate sufficiently?  Since it is about thoughts while viewing phrases or photos, could allowing your thoughts to stray to topics other than the screen be a possible CM?  I often can be so caught up in outside thought that I have no idea what someone said to me or what I am apparently watching on TV.

You and your colleagues have apparently isolated EEG patterns consistent with memory access.  If you could also isolate creativity patterns, would it be possible, in theory, to identify deception?  It would seem that if you could ask questions, and monitor brain activity, creativity patterns when answering questions would indicate deception and memory patterns would indicate truthfulness.

In the present form, if validated in the field, would you agree a positive on this type of test (like DNA, FP) does not indicate guilt, just places the examinee at the scene? -- Perhaps a poor question since this was covered in the discussion in the article.

Do you forsee this developing into admissible evidence or a tool used similarly to present specific issue polygraph?  Do you believe a post exam interrogation should follow positive results?  If not, would a rights advisement still be needed to conduct the exam?  

Would consent or a warrant be needed if the test alone was going to be used as evidence?  Some things considered unintrusive (such as fingerprints) often do not require warrants or consent.  The article describes this test as unintrusive, however, while it lacks the physical intrusiveness of drawing blood, many would argue it is very intrusive to attempt to monitor and interpret one's thought processes.

Many persons oppose polygraph merely because they feel it violates a right to privacy.  It would be easy to argue this is far greater a threat in that vein.  Do you forsee attacks on the ethical principles from civil liberties advocates?  How would you address them?

Finally, I commend you for making public your finacial interest in the development of a possible replacement to present polygraph (on another thread).  While I do not question the sincerety of your assertions against the use of CQT polygraphy, you obviously could benefit from it being discredited, since you are involved in the development of an alternative.  

However, I did suggest constructive pursuits of alternatives to the purveyors and contributors of this site.  I am still appalled at the attempts to help anyone circumvent justice and/or security measures via countermeasures.  But, at least one person from the anti side on this site supports the development of better technology to aid in the pursuit of national defense and justice.  But then, why must it be accompanied with attempts to undermine exisiting technology and techniques aimed at the same goals?

Regards,

Public Servant

Public Servant,

Thank you very much for your reply and for having taken the time to read the material I suggested to you.  You raise some very good points and ask some excellent questions regarding mechanism of action, countermeasure attempts, possibility of including deception paradigms, interpretation of results, etc. related to the CNS work I am now involved with.  I'm also glad you asked the question regarding my publicly voiced criticisms of polygraph screening at the time I am now involved (on several fronts) with new technology.  I very much look forward to addressing all of the issues you raised.  Unfortunately several appointments and interviews later today prevent me from answering in detail your questions now but do look for a reply from me later this evening.  Best regards and until later,

Drew Richardson

Public Servant -

You said:

Chicbette -- You are correct that your story is anectdotal.  However, it does not take Dr. Drew to see that it is not empirical.  Not only is it a singular account, your belief in your fiance is hardly sufficient to establish ground truth.  Ultimately, if there is video evidence, any true LE organization will thoroughly review it.  If sufficient video exists and your fiance is being truthful, he will be exhonerated.
[/quote]


Although of course my theory of ground truth is colored by my trust in my fiance, I assert his innocence as ground truth based on the following:
1) The strangeness of the man that accused him.  (Homeless, no money, no credit cards, no vehicle, estranged from his own family w/a history of drug/alcohol problems)
2) The fact that the accuser served 30 days in jail several years ago on the charge of displaying a weapon (which he claims were fabricated by his accusers)
3) The fact that the accuser filed a patently fraudulent lien on my fiance's commercial property in an attempt to extort nearly $9,000 from us.
4)  The assertion by a business associate that when he requested the accuser to sign a lien release document, that the accuser told him that for $1700 cash he would sign it and go away.  And if we did not come up with money for him, he would find a way to make things much worse for us.
5) My fiance's repeated insistence that the police should view the video tapes before sending him off for a polygraph
6) The fact that my fiance would have had to jump through a lot of very convoluted hoops to gain access to a gun of any kind (when this incident occurred, he was serving a short jail sentence on work release for completely unrelated infraction)

The police, on the other hand, have based their case on the folllowing:
1) The accusation independant of any character assessment of the accuser.
2) The theory that perhaps my fiance obtained a plastic toy gun from his 11 year old son (who was staying, with all his toys, at his mother's house.)  
3) The fact that my fiance admitted to being in the location the alleged crime took place
4) The fact that it was 10 days between the alleged incident and when the police got around to searching our home/vehicles for a gun, in which we would have had plenty of time to get rid of it.....
5) And perhaps most disturbingly - the marriage of a police deputy to a disgruntled former employee of my fiance.  Together this couple owns and runs a competing business (with the help of funds, samples and computer software she stole from my fiance)These people are close personal friends of my fiance's probation officer.

SO, in a case where there is little evidence, why not roll the dice and require the probationer to take a polygraph at his own expense?  This way, they don't have to spend more police time and money on investigation, or truly evaluating the circumstances of the case.  And it's also nice to give the Examiner, a retired county sherriff who is an old friend of the PO, a little boost to his income, since he's only been doing this for less than a year.  The PO tried to get this guy $200 in "expense money" (from my fiance) to come to our small, lovely mountain resort town for the night to administer the test the following morning, and my fiance said he preferred to get up early and drive the 2.5 hours to this guy's place of business - This probably made the examiner mad to begin with - his free little mini-trip to go visit old friends got squashed.  

A weak and irrelevant control question is created, either intentionally or due to lack of experience, and SURPRISE!  my guy fails the test.  This then gives the "system" the opportunity to rip his life apart.

I call this an ABUSE, and the very fact that this can happen, makes me ashamed of a justice system I used to be so proud of.  There is almost NOTHING to prevent this from happening.  I bet there are dozens, if not hundreds of LE departments across our country filled with uneducated yokels making barely more than minimum wage (as ours is), who would of course prefer to rely on a polygraph rather than get their butts off the stools in the donut shop to perform a truly vigorous investigation.  It's easy to believe the polygraph infallible when 1) one's physiology education doesn't extend beyond 7th grade health science, 2) one's understanding of psychology is based on TV talk shows, and 3) one's superior officers indicate a folkloric-like belief in the polygraph that has been passed down from generation to generation.  

Sure, a polygraph is supposed to be only one facet of an investigation when all other avenues have perhaps been exhausted.  And the examiner is supposed to follow rigorous procedures.  HOWEVER, the fact of the matter is that both of the above are unenforceable, under the current system.  

I fully support the idea that law enforcement needs to be a bit more suspicious of people on probation.  IF, in the above case, an independant review panel (eg the state corrections board) had to give approval to require a polygraph from a probationer, based on all other investigative channels being exhausted.    AND IF, polygraph examiners had to have an undergraduate degree in psychology, plus a 2 year educational program, plus at least one year of apprenticeship prior to becoming licensed, we might have something more than a voodoo science being manipulated for personal gain.  

In order to make similar money to polygraph examiners, I had to obtain a 4 yr degree in a related discipline, an MBA, and perform several years of "apprenticeship" before I could take a series of rigorous exams to obtain my licenses.  Polygraph examiners have a far greater impact on the lives of the people they examine than I do on the lives of my clients.  I don't think this is too much to ask, do you?  

        
  


  

Public Servant,

Again, thank you for your interest and recent time involvement with this thread.  And now to your questions and comments.  Because of the space requirement involved in their complete answering, I will separate answers for the various logical subject areas you provided: (area #1)

You write:

Quote...This has been very successful in lab studies, with willing participants.  Do you think a less than willing examinee (a guilty person in a real life criminal investigative setting), would pay attention or concentrate sufficiently?  Since it is about thoughts while viewing phrases or photos, could allowing your thoughts to stray to topics other than the screen be a possible CM?  I often can be so caught up in outside thought that I have no idea what someone said to me or what I am apparently watching on TV....

Excellent comments/questions.  Let me explain a little bit about how the test works in order to place my response in some meaningful (I hope) context.  There are three types of stimuli involved: probes (the concealed information we are probing for), targets (positive controls), and irrelevants (negative controls).  All stimuli are reviewed with the examinee.  Any probes that he/she claims to innocently be familiar with (e.g. read about in a newspaper) are not used (innocent exposure verified later).  He is asked to memorize the list of targets and to push a certain computer mouse button each time he sees one of these items(all stimuli are presented to examinee on a computer monitor, all are visual,  and the test does not involve the asking of any questions).  He is further instructed to push the other mouse button each time he sees one of the other stimuli (irrelevants or probes).  The stimuli are presented to the subject approximately every two seconds.  Ultimately through bootstrapping analysis we determine if the responses (P300 and MERMERs) to the probes look more like the responses to targets or to the irrelevants.  If the former is the case the individual is deemed to be knowledgeable (or information present) and with the latter situation the examinee is deemed to be not knowledgeable (or information absent).  A statistical confidence limit is associated with every determination.  

Although the subject can refuse to take the test, if he decides to participate, for the following reasons we believe we can assure participation which includes both subject concentration and the absence of any viable countermeasures: (1) the short interstimulus spacing would not logically lead to a "wandering mind," (2) the examinee is forced to concentrate to complete the aforementioned mouse button task (which we monitor real time for degree of successful completion), (3) the EEG monitoring we do, gives us a real time monitor for eye movement and other artifacts as well as the P300 responses we seek to record, and (4) the responses we seek to measure occur beginning approximately 300 milliseconds after stimulus presentation (before a guilty examinee can even begin to think "other distracting thoughts").  I can honestly say I do not know how to successfully apply countermeasures to the exam.  I believe the same to be true for Dr. Larry Farwell (my colleague and the inventor of "brain fingerprinting") and others we have worked with in developing software for the data acquisition and analysis.

Public Servant,

(area #2):

You write:

Quote...You and your colleagues have apparently isolated EEG patterns consistent with memory access.  If you could also isolate creativity patterns, would it be possible, in theory, to identify deception?  It would seem that if you could ask questions, and monitor brain activity, creativity patterns when answering questions would indicate deception and memory patterns would indicate truthfulness...

As you allude to our work has focused on the presence or absence of information (often and variously characterized as concealed, privileged, or guilty) but has not heretofore dealt with issues of deception or guilt.  We believe we may have identified a new paradigm which will allow us to deal with the concept of guilt.  I can only characterize it at this point as in a preliminary research stage with patents pending.

Public Servant,

(area #3):

You write:

Quote...In the present form, if validated in the field, would you agree a positive on this type of test (like DNA, FP) does not indicate guilt, just places the examinee at the scene? -- Perhaps a poor question since this was covered in the discussion in the article...

This is not a poor question at all.  In fact, it is one that has to be explained carefully to anyone who might use our services.  You are completely correct in your characterization of the significance of this type of exam result and how you relate brain fingerprinting to other routinely utilized forms of forensic evidence.  One clear benefit of this form of exam/result (as opposed to that which is obtained from lie detection exams and quite apart from whether these exams are valid) is that it does not invade the purview of judge and jury (an obvious problem with an exam that seeks to determine if the defendant is deceptive when he denies involvement with the crime for which he has been charged).

Fascinating stuff.  One of the weaknesses of the CQT is it's dependence on some degree of deception. This interferes with a good quality academic review as it's general effectivity is presumable higher when the examinee is ignorant of its workings. Also, the presumption that an examinee will concern themselves more with a properly constructed control question than with the relevant one seems pretty iffy. And if they understand what is being done how can they possibly be tested? Who tests the testers? They obviously can't be given a CQT in the normal sense.

With your approach this issue should be a smaller factor. Also, quality control can be more easily done with larger numbers of test subjects without the questionable ethics of creating realistic test environments. I certainly hope your efforts prove worthwhile.  The problem with the polygraph isn't what it does to the guilty, it's what it does wrongly to the innocent.

I look forward to the day that polygraphy moves out of it's semi-mystical origins much like surgeons transitioned from bloodletting not much more than a century ago.

BTW, I'm a EE with fairly good sig proc background so I am most intrigued by what you have written here and would like to learn more.

-Marty

Public Servant,

You wrote in part:

QuoteThis thread, and some posts to previous ones surely has covered very reasonable theories regarding why false positives occur.  It does not establish, however, that false positives occur as frequently as this site maintains.

How frequently does "this site" maintain that false positives occur? I'm not aware that we've made any estimate of how frequently false positives occur.

The false positive rate will be limited by the overall failure-to-pass rate of the polygraph program in question. In the Department of Defense's counterintelligence-scope polygraph polygraph program, that limiting rate is on the order of 2%. But with regard to the FBI's pre-employment polygraph program, the corresponding rate is reportedly on the order of 50%.

You also write:

QuoteThis site says the CQT works at a rate not better than chance.

No. What we say is that the CQT has not been proven through peer-reviewed research to work better than chance under field conditions.

Moreover, no meaningful validity rate is knowable for CQT polygraphy because the procedure lacks both standardization and "control" (within the scientific meaning of the word).

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Aug 15, 2002, 05:40 AM

...In the Department of Defense's counterintelligence-scope polygraph polygraph program, that limiting rate is on the order of 2%. But with regard to the FBI's pre-employment polygraph program, the corresponding rate is reportedly on the order of 50%.

Is it that the FBI's pre-employment polygraph false positive rate is 50%, or is it the DI rate that is 50%?  There is a LARGE difference between a DI rate and a FP rate.

PDD-Fed

PDD-Fed,

It is the FBI's failure-to-pass rate that is on the order of 50%. This would presumably include "deception indicated," inconclusive, as well as "I-think-you-used-countermeasures" outcomes, all of which have the same consequence: the applicant does not get hired.

It is this ~50% failure-to-pass rate that limits the false positive rate in the FBI pre-employment polygraph screening program: it cannot be more than about 50%.

I agree with you that there is a large difference between a "deception indicated" rate and a false positive rate, qualitatively speaking, but on a quantitative level, the difference between these two rates may not be so large. It seems reasonable to suppose that that difference is proportional to the base rate of deception with regard to the relevant questions asked: as the base rate of guilt approaches zero, so, too, would the difference between the DI rate and the FP rate.

Public Servant,

(area #4):

You write:

Quote....Do you forsee this developing into admissible evidence or a tool used similarly to present specific issue polygraph?  Do you believe a post exam interrogation should follow positive results?  If not, would a rights advisement still be needed to conduct the exam?  

Would consent or a warrant be needed if the test alone was going to be used as evidence?  Some things considered unintrusive (such as fingerprints) often do not require warrants or consent.  The article describes this test as unintrusive, however, while it lacks the physical intrusiveness of drawing blood, many would argue it is very intrusive to attempt to monitor and interpret one's thought processes.

Many persons oppose polygraph merely because they feel it violates a right to privacy.  It would be easy to argue this is far greater a threat in that vein.  Do you forsee attacks on the ethical principles from civil liberties advocates?  How would you address them? ...

The technique has previously been offered through expert testimony once (state district court (post conviction hearing) in Iowa) and was found to meet the Daubert standards (Has the technique been tested? Peer reviewed/published? Has a known rate of error? Has standards controlling the technique's operation? Is there general acceptance in the relevant scientific community?) for admissibility of such evidence.

I see no reason whatsoever to preclude an examinee from being interrogated following a positive result regarding the circumstances of his concealed knowledge.  Assuming we are talking about a criminal matter, yes, a rights advisement would be quite in order prior to the conduct of an exam by a law enforcement employee.  The necessity for consent to examine is a legal issue not a scientific one.  I suspect the issue would be treated similarly to the present polygraph examination.  As a practical consideration, whether such was the case or not, we would not likely want to or be able to examine an individual who was not at least superficially willing to be examined.

I fully expect (in fact have already heard) that civil libertarians and others because we are dealing with brain activity might ask or even ignorantly suggest that we are in the business of reading minds.  In fact we depend upon known information and in essence see if there exists evidence that that information is stored in the human brain.  We have no ability or desire to independently develop previously unknown/unrevealed information of either a personal or other nature.  (This in part is why we never could and never will never be involved in the general screening applications (fishing expeditions) which are the focus of this site and are so offensivie and have been so injurious to so many over several years...)  Such a question I have found largely stems from ignorance and not willful misrepresentation on the part of the party offering such a notion.

More to follow this evening...

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Aug 15, 2002, 10:44 AM
PDD-Fed,

It is the FBI's failure-to-pass rate that is on the order of 50%. This would presumably include "deception indicated," inconclusive, as well as "I-think-you-used-countermeasures" outcomes, all of which have the same consequence: the applicant does not get hired....

It seems reasonable to suppose that that difference is proportional to the base rate of deception with regard to the relevant questions asked: as the base rate of guilt approaches zero, so, too, would the difference between the DI rate and the FP rate.

George,

"Inconclusive" is not a final call on a federal exam.  The subject is tested until he is either DI or NDI.  That leaves DI  or purposeful non-cooperation as the basis for dismissal of a candidate.

Secondlly, the question of base rate takes us back to an old arguement.  My personal DI rate for screening tests is probably over 50% (on criminal issues).  However, I would guess that 85%-90% subsequently admit to the disqualifying behavior specifically indicated on the test results.  That indicates to me that I have a pretty high true positive (TP) rate.  Am I wrong?

PDD-Fed

PDD-Fed,

Thank you for clarifying the point that "inconclusive" is not a final call on a federal polygraph examination.

If the percentages you cite are accurate, I would agree that you seem to have a pretty high true positive rate (as a percentage of total DI outcomes). The base rate for deception amongst the population group you have polygraphed also seems pretty high. (It would be interesting to see what level of admissions to disqualifying conduct would be obtained from NDI subjects by administering "post-test" interrogations to them.)

A point to bear in mind, however, is that because the CQT lacks both standardization and control, absent an admission, you cannot know with any statistically quantifiable degree of confidence that any particular subject you call deceptive was actually deceptive (or that any particular subject you call non-deceptive was in fact non-deceptive).

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Aug 15, 2002, 03:06 PM
PDD-Fed,

...you cannot know with any statistically quantifiable degree of confidence that any particular subject you call deceptive was actually deceptive (or that any particular subject you call non-deceptive was in fact non-deceptive).

George,

I agree on one of your points and disagree on another.  As far as DI outcomes, I believe that based on the high percentage of post-test admissions, I can put a high level of confidence on the validity of the DI cases.  However, I must admit that since the true base rate of NDI subjects in screening cases is not known, it is entirely possible that some false negative (FN)  subjects are getting by.  

PDD-Fed

PDD-Fed,

You wrote in part:

QuoteI agree on one of your points and disagree on another.  As far as DI outcomes, I believe that based on the high percentage of post-test admissions, I can put a high level of confidence on the validity of the DI cases.

Precisely what level of confidence (as a percentage) can you put on the validity of any particular one of your DI cases (absent any admission on the subject's part)? And how did you calculate that confidence level?

George,

You asked...

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Aug 15, 2002, 05:42 PM

Precisely what level of confidence (as a percentage) can you put on the validity of any particular one of your DI cases (absent any admission on the subject's part)? And how did you calculate that confidence level?

Gee George, I don't know.  I have never calculated that.  I just know that the vast majority of the time I run a DI test, the subject confesses to the specific area he/she was DI to.  I then send him/her on their way and test the next person.  I decided long ago to leave the calculations to you "scientific" types... 8)

PDD-Fed
  

Quote from: PDD-Fed on Aug 15, 2002, 06:29 PM
Gee George, I don't know.  I have never calculated that.  I just know that the vast majority of the time I run a DI test, the subject confesses to the specific area he/she was DI to.  I then send him/her on their way and test the next person.  I decided long ago to leave the calculations to you "scientific" types... 8)

PDD-Fed
 

PDD-Fed,

That's a copout. You said you disagreed with my assertion that, absent an admission on the subject's part, "you cannot know with any statistically quantifiable degree of confidence that any particular subject you call deceptive was actually deceptive..."

But now you say you've never calculated such a probability. Instead, since, as you say, "the vast majority of the time [you] run a DI test, the subject confesses to the specific area he/she was DI to," then those who don't confess must similarly be deceptive. But there is no logical basis for this belief. How do you know, for example, that such persons were not simply truthful persons more worried about the consequences of not being believed with regard to the relevant questions than they were with regard to the "control" questions? The truth of the matter is that in any particular DI examination where no confession is obtained, you have no way of knowing whether such is the case. This is but one manifestation of the lack of scientific control that besets CQT polygraphy.

On a final note, you described me (rather flippantly, it seems) as a "'scientific' type." For the record, I'm not a scientist. My formal education in science and math does not extend beyond freshman inorganic chemistry and calculus. I do, however, try to think critically.

Public Servant,

(area #5 (final)):

You write:

Quote...Finally, I commend you for making public your finacial interest in the development of a possible replacement to present polygraph (on another thread).  While I do not question the sincerety of your assertions against the use of CQT polygraphy, you obviously could benefit from it being discredited, since you are involved in the development of an alternative.  

However, I did suggest constructive pursuits of alternatives to the purveyors and contributors of this site.  I am still appalled at the attempts to help anyone circumvent justice and/or security measures via countermeasures.  But, at least one person from the anti side on this site supports the development of better technology to aid in the pursuit of national defense and justice.  But then, why must it be accompanied with attempts to undermine exisiting technology and techniques aimed at the same goals? ...

Yes, as you report, I did previously generally disclose my financial relationship with Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc (BFLI).  Specifically, I am an employee and a minor stockholder.  I did this, not because of any conflict I might have in regard to my critical commentary of various aspects of polygraphy (particularly polygraph screening), but because as a spokesperson for BFLI, I want those who might read my thoughts regarding brain fingerprinting (e.g., posts #1 -#4) to evaluate this information knowledgeably and critically, fully aware of any potential conflict of interest I might have as a result of my present professional association.  Although I had several opportunities for differing types of employment following my Bureau career, I chose to do what I am now doing in part because I believe very strongly in the technology and services we are and will provide and also because I believe that as I criticize, I have a responsibility to help develop and offer what I believe to be a positive and valid alternative approach to some of the problems facing us.

With regard to my criticism of various aspects of polygraphy in light of my connection to an alternative technology, I feel not only justified but also compelled to continue these criticisms and related activities.  My rationale is as follows:  

1.      My criticisms predate (and have been consistently made) my financial interest in an alternative technology by  approximately a decade.

2.       My severest criticisms on this site and elsewhere have been reserved for general polygraph screening.  This is an application that brain fingerprinting is not designed for nor will be used for, in concert with or as a replacement for current polygraph procedures.

3.      It could well be argued that criticizing polygraph techniques is neither in either my personal nor BFLI's direct financial interest.  The large government agencies that have polygraph screening programs might well be less inclined to support brain fingerprinting research and operational practice as a result of my critical commentary of  their existing practices and  programs.  AND

4.      The PRINCIPAL REASON  that I have publicly and loudly voiced these criticisms is that I am completely convinced that the nation's security is compromised through present polygraph screening practices and that thousands of individuals have been victimized in the wake of these programs over the decade I have voiced these concerns. I believe my views are fairly adequately summarized in a post I recently made in another thread:

Quote... It is not any given anecdotal story that has convinced me and led me to arrive at the conclusions and positions (regarding polygraph screening) that I have shared on this message board and elsewhere.  It is the overwhelming impression obtained through several hundred personal contacts from polygraph examinees (or friends, relatives, co-workers, or attorneys representing them) over the last ten years who have universally alleged that they were wrongly found to be deceptive in a polygraph screening examination.  Further credence is given this group testimony inasmuch as many of these people are willing to tell their story publicly (in the media, before Congress, in a court proceeding accompanied by cross examination).  Furthermore many of these people have sought background investigations (which they were denied) to demonstrate the absence of any evidence of wrong doing in those areas for which they were found to be deceptive.  Additionally, as George pointed out in a recent reply, this examination procedure has no support whatsoever in the scientific community and is completely bankrupt in terms of any theoretical underpinnings and basis for practice...

Regards,

Drew Richardson

Drew,

Thanks for your responses.  I may post further regarding some of the specific issues from my previous post, strictly for discussion and possibly for obtaining further insight.  I have a sincere interest in any technology that could improve our ability to identify criminal perpetrators and eliminate innocent suspects.  

Quote

I believe that as I criticize, I have a responsibility to help develop and offer what I believe to be a positive and valid alternative approach to some of the problems facing us.

Quote

This was precisely one of the the points I was trying to make in my very first post to this site and I again commend you for this.  Instead of trying to undermine existing techniques and technologies, do something to improve or replace them.  I know not all contributors to this site have your scientific background, but why can't they support changes and call for new technology/techniques, instead of providing information they believe could help criminals and spies as easily as innocents looking to avoid the possibility of false positive?  More proactive constructive work like this could better suit the cause of this site than providing advice to anyone (not knowing which category of guilt/innocence in which they fall, and without informing them that it could bring more suspicion upon them) to attempt countermeasures.

To clarify the last point you addressed, I did not mean to insinuate your participation here was based upon assisting your present business.  I believe your assertions about polygraph (though we often disagree), are sincere.  That entire last post was simply a listing of all topics that came to mind after reading about brain fingerprinting.

Thanks again,

Public Servant

Quote from: Public_Servant on Aug 16, 2002, 01:12 AM
Drew,

Thanks for your responses.  I may post further regarding some of the specific issues from my previous post, strictly for discussion and possibly for obtaining further insight.  I have a sincere interest in any technology that could improve our ability to identify criminal perpetrators and eliminate innocent suspects.  

I believe that as I criticize, I have a responsibility to help develop and offer what I believe to be a positive and valid alternative approach to some of the problems facing us.

This was precisely one of the the points I was trying to make in my very first post to this site and I again commend you for this.  Instead of trying to undermine existing techniques and technologies, do something to improve or replace them.  I know not all contributors to this site have your scientific background, but why can't they support changes and call for new technology/techniques, instead of providing information they believe could help criminals and spies as easily as innocents looking to avoid the possibility of false positive?  More proactive constructive work like this could better suit the cause of this site than providing advice to anyone (not knowing which category of guilt/innocence in which they fall, and without informing them that it could bring more suspicion upon them) to attempt countermeasures.

P.S.,
To my mind, the two are not mutually exclusive.  One may certainly promote forms of recognition testing (useful in conjuction with decent police work, and with built-in protections for the innocent) while, at the same time, acknowledging the glaring, dangerous and harmful flaws with current polygraph screening practices--and trying to ameliorate them.

Basically, it all comes down to protecting our society through due process and scientifically valid testing.

Skeptic

Public Servant,

Skeptic is quite correct.  One cannot meaningfully promote good/valid while ignoring bad/invalid.  It is impossible to successfully cultivate a garden in the midst of weeds, and likewise, it is impossible to restore health in the midst of festering pathology.  As I have said before, and no doubt will say again, the polygraph community must remove the cancer of polygraph screening from its midst before it can restore public trust and confidence and reap any benefits from technological/scientific advances in the realm of specific-issue polygraph testing.  Any promotion of scientific and technological change in the midst of such, is little more than scientific window dressing and glitz, a cover for the unseemly, and largely doomed to failure.

Unbeknown to most in this community, Dr. Bill Yankee in the early 1990's (certainly to the horror of those in the polygraph community now hearing such a thing for the first time) discussed with me the notion of recommending me as his successor as Director at DoDPI.  Bill realized many of the same problems with polygraphy as I do (although he was not in a position to publicly discuss these issues), but encouraged my patience as he had exercised his.  Needless to say, although remaining friends, and even later publicly debating differences through mutual respect, the aforementioned scenario did not and could not take place.  Although I had the greatest of respect for Bill and do now wish several of his efforts had proceeded more fully beyond his tenure, I could only tell him then what I would tell you now...my patience with these shortcomings is largely someone else's victimization.  I am afraid that is not something I can offer...

Drew and Skeptic,

I believe I was unclear in my last post.  I meant to commend Drew for his constructive pursuits in improving/ replacing existing investigative technology and techniques.  While I disagree with much of his criticism of the polygraph and feel the advocation of countermeasures is ethically flawed, I was commending him for actually doing something constructive.  My main criticism from the last post was directed not at Drew, but at those who seek to undermine existing technology and techniques, yet offer no suport or effort to improving available technology so it meets the needs of law enforcement and national security while further reducing the chances of false positives.

Drew, you have suggested in previous posts that, as a specific issue examiner, I should join you in calliing for the end to screening exams.  First of all, I am in no position to do so --far less so than Dr. Yankee was.  Secondly, my experience as a specific issue examiner tells me the exam is very effective (though I have acquiesed that as the issues get broader, more problems could arise).  Lastly, as I see it, you have not offered any alternative to the screening exam, as either investigative tool or deterrent.

Since I like to bring up ideas to evoke thoughtful discussion, here's a hypothetical to which I would love to hear Drew's response:  If Dr. Yankee's suggestion that you succeed him had come into fruition, what do you envision the path taken by DoDPI, and federal polygraph policy as whole, would have been?

Regards,

Public Servant

Public Servant,

You wrote:

QuoteMy main criticism from the last post was directed not at Drew, but at those who seek to undermine existing technology and techniques, yet offer no suport or effort to improving available technology so it meets the needs of law enforcement and national security while further reducing the chances of false positives.

This is of course the ideal.  However, when we admonish someone to quit smoking, we know that if they listen, their health will improve.  We don't have to offer any alternatives to replace smoking.  Same, I submit, with polygraph screening.

Public Servant,

You pose an interesting question whose answer allows for some important distinctions.  You ask me to speculate if I were (had been) Director of DoDPI what path(s) would I envision DoDPI and the federal polygraph community might have taken.  You couch your question in a brief anecdotal story I mentioned involving Dr. Bill Yankee.  Let me answer by beginning with another featuring another well known former DoDPI employee (former Chief of Research) and occasional contributor to this message board, Dr. Gordon Barland.

The first time I met Gordon was in the mid 1980s at what I believe was then called an Advanced Polygraph Seminar.  This was a month long school, then hosted by the FBI and held at the University of Virginia at its main campus in Charlottesville, Virginia.  During that month, Gordon taught a weeklong block of instruction of psychophysiology to mid-career federal polygraph examiners.  I attended his presentation and amongst other things recall a portion of Gordon's final comments to the class.  After having been  highly complemented by one of the students regarding his teaching and subject matter knowledge, Gordon, with the rather appealing dry sense of humor and self deprecating wit that I would see many times in subsequent years, indicated that "In the valley of the blind the one-eyed man is king."  At the time I merely thought his comment to be a rather clever quick-witted response and an appropriately modest one.  Only sometime later would I consider the comment a bit more figuratively.  The valley of the blind has in years gone by come to represent to me the lack of education within one of Gordon's main valleys, the world of polygraphy.

And now back to your question.  Although I suspect you would have expected me to answer focusing on the abolishment of polygraph screening and the considerably greater use of information-based formats with specific-issue testing (clearly things I would not object to :) ), I think I would have been more than happy to have seen the groundwork laid for the badly needed enhancement of basic scientific education for polygraph examiners.  That enhancement would not and could not have come solely or even largely through DoDPI resources (personnel and facilities), but through the very simple but sorely needed changes in the matriculation requirements for the basic examiner course.  Because I have discussed this topic at length within other posts and specifically with regard to what I believe is necessary, I won't restate the particulars.  That particular change though, I believe, is foundational to all other meaningful change(s) that might occur and any new paths that might be undertaken.

And this leads us to one final related topic.  Perhaps I can do a favor for those at DoDPI who might not expect one and who, for obvious political considerations, are unable to openly address the issue themselves.  When I last had association with DoDPI, its Director, Dr. Bill Yankee had no less desire to see these basic educational changes than I did or do now.  The problem in attaining these goals was in no way Bill Yankee's lack of desire or with DoDPI's personnel (instructional staff), but that DoDPI was not sufficiently the master of its own fate.  The federal polygraph community, acting through its various program heads, both in terms of this community's formal review of DoDPI's curriculum and through the educational background of the student's sent by its  individual agencies for basic training, all but undermined any effort to make serious educational enhancements.  Although Dr. Yankee had hoped curriculum review would be performed by those with the background for such review (i.e., the celebrated academic review panel he assembled), that never really came to fruition, and as far as I know, has completely gone by the wayside in subsequent years.  That led to (from my perspective) a very untenable and unworkable situation largely blocking any real progress and almost guaranteeing maintenance of the status quo for another generation of polygraph examiners.  I don't pretend to know if that interaction (DoDPI Director/Staff and the operational program heads of the federal agency polygraph programs) remains, but until it changes and the tail is no longer wagging the dog in the world of polygraph academics, little would have or will change.  The awarding of unearned degrees and even the real enhancement of DoDPI staff credentials will not suffice for  and eliminate the need for the aforementioned change in professional entry level requirements for polygraph examiners.

In fairness to the heads of the federal polygraph programs, I should acknowledge that they are (in part) absolutely no more able to determine the background of employees they send to DoDPI for basic examiner training than is DoDPI able to determine whom they receive.  This of course is due to the overall hiring practices of the federal agencies themselves.  I would suggest two possible alternatives to remedy this ongoing problem.  

When I was hired by the FBI as a Special Agent, it was within the scope of what was then referred to as the "Science Program."  I was hired with the notion that I would eventually work, following an initial field investigative assignment, as a forensic chemist and agent examiner in the FBI Laboratory.  As the Bureau would not consider having someone representing it as a forensic chemist who did not have a background in chemistry, I suggest that likewise any agency/bureau that has individuals acting as "forensic psychophysiologists" not do so without requisite background in psychophysiology (and that a program be created in order to fulfill this specialty hiring need).  In order to handle the immediate lack of (what I consider to be) well qualified candidates for basic polygraph examiner training, I would suggest that DoDPI require remedial training/education (what would amount to at least a full load semester of basic psychology, physiology, statistics, research design) that would be both rigorously taught and whose successful completion be requisite for matriculation into basic examiner training.  DoDPI could likely be staffed to teach such a program itself or to evaluate certification from recognized major universities with psychology, physiology, and statistics departments that might be contracted to offer such remedial education.

And finally to answer your question...  Although I don't feel myself to be lacking in either vision or clearly defined goals, because of the structure that existed at the time, I would surmise very little would have changed due to any involvement I might have had.  In other words, I don't believe the Director of DoDPI had the needed authority that should properly accompany the serious responsibilities that he is tasked with.  I hope this situation has or will be remedied and that someone of Dr. Yankee's capabilities and vision will ultimately occupy the position.

Drew,

Thanks for humoring me by responding to my hypothetical question.  As I understand it, the bottom line is that you believe the bureaucracy has blocked progress and you are not sure that you could have overcome that for any meaningful change.  I'm at least glad to see that you would not have immediately initiated sweeping elimnations of whole programs upon which national security programs have relied.  Perhaps you would have advocated close research to find the most effective formats for screening (and specific issue for that matter), develop new methodologies, and maybe adjust the application and role upon exams in the screening arena.  Contrary to what is often stated on this site and message board, those processes have occurred and are ongoing at DoDPI.  And, of course, you and the purveyors of this site have provided a mission for DoDPI researchers detracting from the aforementioned -- determining the effectiveness of counter-measures, how to identify them, and developing counter-countermeasures.  (With all that on their plate who has time to answer silly challenges from this web site. :))

I've read the thread placed (inappropriately I would say) under non-poly forums - military.  First of all the term forensic psychophysiologist was kicked around a few years ago, but was shot down because, for the most part, polygraphers do not hold doctorates (as anything -ologist implies).  However, Forensic Psychophysiological Detection of Deception, though absurdly cumbersome, is accurate.  It is obviously forensic (since it is for the purpose of resolving an investigation), and the instrument monitors physiology to diagnose psychological set as it pertains to whether a person is truthful to a relevant issue.  Of course, I'll stick with polygraph examiner/examination.

If you re-examined the DoDPI curriculum, I believe you would see the psychology and physiology (and basic scientific research) are quite demanding and taught at the 500 level.  The washout rate during this period is quite high (considering the money spent by agencies to send people here). The "art" portions (please excuse my use of this term again) are also quite demanding and many who excelled in the science portions wash out here, because they lack the interpersonal skills to perform effective pre- and post-exam tasks.

I think your scientific background lends some bias to your opinions regarding what academic background an examiner in the field needs.  He is a technician (is that better than artist?).  He needs a sound understanding of the scientific basis of the exam and an expertise at the art (there I go again) that makes it effective.  But,why must he need to know how to set up good research and statistically analyze it if he is not doing research.  The PhD's provide that service and give the guidelines for the technician to follow in order to apply the most effective exams in the most effective way.  Like the radiology tech who does just fine (often with a two year degree), taking X-rays without the radiologist (MD) being present.  I would agree however, that researchers, DoDPI instructors, and perhaps agency supervisors, need advanced education in this field (and today most do).

And why should it be required that an applicant to DoDPI has an extensive scientific background.  The BS/BA is required.  The standards are set and if a student can not maintain those standards they are dropped from the course.  You could raise the standards and raise the bar on the amount of material to learn while in the course.  But like many reputable graduate programs, prior specialization in the field as an undergraduate is not required.  The person without the relevant undergraduate training will just have to work harder to attain the required level of knowledge in the field.

And lastly, I would argue that it would be more dangerous to have a scientist with no experience in investigations, run exams.  While he might better understand what processes are at work internally, he may not have the interpersonal skills necessary to ensure the examination works or amounts to anything useful (that art thing again).  To me it takes a good cop, with good interview skills, and above average intelligence (with good comprehension of the basic psychology/physiology involved) to run an effective exam.  But it does not take a PhD, MD, JD, PsyD, or even a psychophysiologist.  And as you know a scientist does not necessarily make a good cop, examiner, or supervisory special agent.

Which brings me to another question...  (Do not construe this as a personal attack, as I think I have made it clear that I do not question your credentials or abilities.)  How does a person with a chemistry background end up in the polygraph field?  Why did the FBI hire you as a scientist, but place you in the field as a special agent first?  Few labs require you to be an agent before you work as a forensic chemist.  What type of work did you do with the bureau before going into the lab and poly?  I ask, because it would seem odd to me to send you to work as an examiner if you had little experience (or success) with suspect/subject interviews.  And, I have seen persons who are not good interviewers, question the validity of the exam because they are not successful at validating their results with admissions/confessions.  I'm not saying that is the case with you.  I don't even know how many, what type, or what results came of, the exams you ran.  I'm also not saying its bad for a good investigator to not be a highly skilled in interview techniques.  Each agent brings his or her own talents to the table. Most who become examiners and question the test for the mentioned reason, do so because they were so good at investigation as a whole and could not understand any shortcomings in successful interviewing at this level (the DI ones are the ones that lied to other cops).  

Again just a few thoughts that came up in reading your post.  
Thanks once again for enduring my long-windedness.

Public Servant

Public Servant,

As always, thank you for your latest reply.  Needless to say, my response to your treatise would be likewise lengthy, so I will try to break down that response by subject and largely in the order in which you presented various issues.

Quote...I'm at least glad to see that you would not have immediately initiated sweeping elimnations of whole programs upon which national security programs have relied.  Perhaps you would have advocated close research to find the most effective formats for screening (and specific issue for that matter), develop new methodologies, and maybe adjust the application and role upon exams in the screening arena...

If I have in any way suggested to you that I would support the continuation of general polygraph (applicant and employee) screening examinations under the guise of "research is ongoing", I have been more unclear and arcane than I previously thought possible.  Under no circumstances would I suggest citizens continue to be victimized while DoDPI (or anyone else) plays in a laboratory with these fishing expeditions.  These tests are completely without any theoretical support and should be immediately  stopped.  Once this has been done, a serious debate should take place as to what is in the interest of national security (not the same as in the interest of national security programs).  

Should further research be merited (very doubtful at this point) dealing with a process which completely lacks (and holds no particular promise for) any theoretical basis as a diagnostic tool, that research should likely be done by a group other than DoDPI (an entity which has way too heavily depended upon the existence and continuation of polygraph screening over the years to be considered sufficiently non-biased to lead such research).  Any research performed should be considered ONLY after having been published in a peer-reviewed journal. Again, first things first though...Present polygraph screening programs should immediately be stopped.  If I accomplish nothing else through this exchange, I hope that I have eliminated any confusion I might have created with regard to my position on this last point...

Regards,

Drew Richardson

Public Servant,

You write:

Quote...Contrary to what is often stated on this site and message board, those processes have occurred and are ongoing at DoDPI.  And, of course, you and the purveyors of this site have provided a mission for DoDPI researchers detracting from the aforementioned -- determining the effectiveness of counter-measures, how to identify them, and developing counter-countermeasures.  (With all that on their plate who has time to answer silly challenges from this web site. )...

You indicate some familiarity with and/or connection to DoDPI's polygraph research.  Perhaps the taxpayers who support this research might benefit from this connection.  Might you see if you can provide a list of all the research that has been published in the peer-reviewed psychophysiological literature by that group since say 1995 and the research budgets for these years.  As George pointed out in a recent post, I don't believe citing the public literature should compromise national security, but should give us some idea as to the parent scientific body's (psychophysiology) acceptance of such research.  I suspect that this list will not support any notions of general acceptability in the main nor, and most particularly, with regard to any validity whatsoever associated with polygraph screening.  

With regard to challenges, the only one I'm aware that I have issued was/is not to DoDPI's research community (though we are glad to hear that we have provided some meaning and significance to their corporate lives through our humble efforts :) ) but to the world of operational polygraphy to demonstrate it's oft stated ability to detect countermeasures.  I offered the challenge because I believe the claims to be little more than empty disinformation.   I believe this research will likely demonstrate the "between a rock and a hard place" position a polygraph examiner will find himself when guessing in the midst of two possible sources of error that might occur with NDI charts...a false negative regarding test issues and a false positive regarding any allegations of examinee countermeasure use.  As I have said before, I believe it will be very useful for both the NAS panel members and others to see this.  If DoDPI's research community has offered you some useful tools, I suggest there is no time like the present to demonstrate such and to prove me wrong.   In addition to the NAS participation /simulated crime scenario that I previously suggested, I'd be happy to offer some ideas for field testing of your tools as well.  

As I have indicated directly and indirectly through my challenge, I don't believe for a minute that viable polygraph counter-countermeasures exist.  But for the sake of further conversation, let's briefly assume they do and as a result of the busy beaver work you suggest we have caused at DoDPI.  In the super super secret squirel world of polygraph counter-countermeasures, clearly this information would be classified at the highest levels and the federal polygraph community would be unable to share these state secrets with its colleagues in state, local, and international governments.  But strangely enough, they too all claim to be able to detect countermeasures.  Does this mean that they are bluffing, that a leak/espionage investigation should be launched, or that the federal polygraph community and DoDPI is wasting untold resources doing what the resource-poor state and local entities have come up with on their own???  Hmmmm.....  :)  Best Regards,

Drew Richardson

Public Servant,

You wrote in part:

QuoteAnd, of course, you and the purveyors of this site have provided a mission for DoDPI researchers detracting from the aforementioned -- determining the effectiveness of counter-measures, how to identify them, and developing counter-countermeasures.  (With all that on their plate who has time to answer silly challenges from this web site. :))

While Drew has addressed this point, I would just suggest that your casual dismissal his serious (and thus-far unanswered) polygraph countermeasure challenge (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=418.msg1942#msg1942) (207 days and counting) as "silly" is nothing but a self-serving rationalization for the cowardice of the polygraph community. You will recall that Drew only restated his challenge on this website. He first presented this challenge (http://antipolygraph.org/nas/richardson-transcript.shtml#challenge) at a public meeting of the National Academy of Sciences polygraph review committee. It is hardly "silly."

A more plausible explanation for the unwillingness of anyone in the polygraph community to accept his challenge is that you (the polygraph community) privately believe that you  are not up to the task, and that to accept Dr. Richardson's challenge would publicly expose you as the charlatans (however well-meaning) that you are.

Public Servant,

You write:

Quote...First of all the term forensic psychophysiologist was kicked around a few years ago, but was shot down because, for the most part, polygraphers do not hold doctorates (as anything -ologist implies).  However, Forensic Psychophysiological Detection of Deception, though absurdly cumbersome, is accurate.  It is obviously forensic (since it is for the purpose of resolving an investigation), and the instrument monitors physiology to diagnose psychological set as it pertains to whether a person is truthful to a relevant issue.  Of course, I'll stick with polygraph examiner/examination...

You are indicating that the polygraph community has evolved from using an imaginary title (forensic psychophysiologist) to a similarly fanciful description of activity (forensic psychophysiological detection of deception).  You are correct in describing this as an improvement, though I don't believe your rationale to be correct.  It is largely an improvement in the sense that the former requires credentials and educational background that, by and large, (as you state) do not exist within the polygraph community, but, with the latter, there is no implied requirement for successful and long-term completion of the stated activity.  CQT polygraph screeners are involved in the forensic psychophysiological detection of deception to the extent that one who jumps from a tall building is involved in flying.  Only to that extent do I believe this to be an improvement.  I believe that you have made the correct choice in referring to yourself as a polygrapher and as one who conducts polygraph exams, because this is precisely who you are and what you do---though, not because the fanciful is somewhat cumbersome but because the fanciful is fanciful.

I will pick up next week in addressing the balance of  your last post.  Have a pleasant weekend and regards,

Drew Richardson

Public Servant,

Taking up where we left off last week...

You write:

QuoteIf you re-examined the DoDPI curriculum, I believe you would see the psychology and physiology (and basic scientific research) are quite demanding and taught at the 500 level...

I have no idea what DoDPI's 500 level teaching refers to.  The only way to evaluate DoDPI's program is not to look at course offerings/coursework descriptions/numeric levels in its academic handbook, but to have a paid outside and independent expert review the video tapes of the last one or two Basic Examiner's Course psychology and physiology courses (to include any student participation) and to examine all corresponding forms of coursework evaluation and examination.  

The situation that existed at the time I went through DoDPI's program some years ago was as follows.  The individual teaching psychology and physiology was more than qualified and credentialed to teach these courses at a master's level.  (By the way, are these courses currently taught by Ph.D. level faculty?  They were at that time).  The problem that existed was not that the primary instructor could not teach, but that the students did not have the requisite background to learn at an appropriate level.  This led to two absurdities.  The instruction, of necessity, had to begin at a ridiculously low level (this is how a drop of blood traverses the circulatory system, etc. etc.) and the examination process was meaningless.  The students were given all the questions (and corresponding answers) that they might be expected to answer on the various examinations.  The only thing unknown to students was which subset of the totality of these questions might occur on any given examination.  

If the background of current students is similar (i.e., if matriculation requirements are the same), the program will now be equally weak.  There are a variety of ways to hide these weaknesses in the form of a an academic shell game, i.e., within any weaknesses that might exist in the instructor's credentials and background, the coursework taught (beginning level/depth of consideration), the evaluation process, etc., but one can be assured if student backgrounds are weak, the overall instructional program will be weak.  Again, a review of the DoDPI academic handbook is a poor substitute for a rigorous analysis of any program you might care to evaluate.

Quote...I think your scientific background lends some bias to your opinions regarding what academic background an examiner in the field needs.  He is a technician...Like the radiology tech who does just fine (often with a two year degree), taking X-rays without the radiologist (MD) being present....

I am glad you raised this analogy.  I have seen it raised several times before, but I have not had the opportunity to critique it before.  I believe you have missed the significance of your own analogy with regard to the following basic consideration.  A radiology tech is simply that—one who using standard and easily documented and repeated techniques obtains one of several forms of raw data, e.g. a chest radiograph.  This individual does not perform diagnosis, i.e., examine the radiograph for the purpose of identifying (or eliminating) various pathologies that might be suggested through this preliminary/screening medical technology.  I believe you to be correct in your assessing a radiology tech's education to be appropriate for the task(s) he/she performs.  If a polygraph examiner did nothing but collect raw data (for future analysis by a skilled diagnostician), I would have no problem with your analogy, and would agree that a polygraph examiner might well be suitably trained with comparable technical education.  BUT, a polygraph examiner attempts/pretends to perform diagnosis as well, i.e. to make determinations about the presence or absence of deception based on his analysis of the raw data.  This puts him in the situation of performing the analogous functions of both the radiology tech and the radiologist (educated with undergraduate degree, four year medical degree, internship, and residency specialty).  If you are to follow your analogy to a logical conclusion, if the polygraph examiner is to perform both analogous functions, he should have an educational background corresponding to the sum of the educations of both the technician and the diagnostician.

Regards,

Drew Richardson

Public Servant,

You write:

Quote...And why should it be required that an applicant to DoDPI has an extensive scientific background...

I don't believe the problem exists on that end of the spectrum.  The problem is that a student is not required to have any specific scientific background.  

 

Quote...To me it takes a good cop, with good interview skills, and above average intelligence (with good comprehension of the basic psychology/physiology involved) to run an effective exam....

If the polygraph exam were not intended (or at least represented as being ) to serve as a valid diagnostic technique (i.e. and not simply an interview/interrogation adjunct/prop), I would probably agree with you.  However, one cannot be a weekend wonder with regard to the scientific underpinnings of polygraphy (all that a good comprehension of the basic psychology/physiology involved might imply (or require) to many examiners) and be a skilled diagnostician.  

The most serious drawback to this lack of required formal education is that most examiners do not have the requisite background to understand why a technique/format and/or application is or is not valid in the first place.  If they did, there would be no general polygraph screening programs in existence as well as the associated problems that have directly led to the creation of this web site.  As I have said before, this type of exam is nothing but a fishing expedition with absolutely no theoretical basis for practice.  I believe it to be accurate to say, not a single Ph.D. scientist in the country (outside of those who have been on the polygraph community payroll) would say that there is any validity whatsover to present polygraph screening programs.  In fact, a few well known polygraph researchers who were previously employed in the federal polygraph research community, e.g., Charles Honts and Shelia Reed, have repeatedly condemned these techniques following their departure from government service.  

I would like to believe that you understand and appreciate these validity considerations as well, but I am not sure.  If you do not, I see no reason (from our previous exchanges) to believe that you are anything but genuine in your commentary, but likely lacking in the formal scientific education that would make these things readily apparent to you.  Perhaps, as you and others have asked of me, you might share your thoughts regarding the validity of polygraph screening as A DIAGNOSTIC TOOL as well as to provide/list/discuss the components of your science education that are the basis for any conclusions you might have arrived at.

Drew,

I've read many of the posts on this web site.  Some of what you say I totally agree with.  I may be wrong, but it would appear that there are some government agencies that make final decisions based SOLEY on the results of a polygraph examination.  I've been an examiner since 8 Nov 1991 (that date should be familiar to you Drew).  I learned very early on in my polygraph career (long before I became an examiner)that it is ONLY AN INVESTIGATIVE TOOL.  It is not an absolute, but MOST of the time, if used properly, it can assist in, and not replace, an aggressive, thorough investigation.  And that is exactly how I approach it, and it is how other agencies should approach it.  I have since retired from Federal service and secured work doing the same thing, but now I can ensure that the police officers and police administration are fully aware of the limits of the polygraph.  And I think we have been fairly successful.  In fact, when I prepare my reports, I specifically note that the results of a polygraph examination should not be used as the sole basis to obtain an arrest warrant.  When someone is "DI" on a test, there is a reason, and sometimes you just don't know why.  And I don't pretend to know what is important to the examinee or read their mind.  All I can do is try to figure out why the charts "indicate deception" and move on from there.  And as for pre-employment screening, very few actually are "DI" to the test.  I attribute that to a detailed "pre-test" to get everything out in the open.  And well over 95% of the "DI" tests, provide an explanation (call it an admission or confession, I don't care) that satisfies me.  But we DO NOT deny employment based soley on a "DI" polygraph test.  I'll keep reading this site because I'm interested in the work you are doing.  I'm open minded enough to look at making a better mouse trap.  Polygraph examiners should not be evaluated based on their admissions/confessions.  That is where the door is open for them to "overstate" the admission/confession.  But it isn't just polygraph examiners that do it, law enforcement as a whole has this problem, but only with those who lack the integrity to report the facts.  And I think a majority (I hope) of law enforcement officers do have that integrity.  I just wish you wouldn't encourage the honest examinee to use countermeasures in a pre-employment test.  I think it only hurts them.  The ones that have admitted to countermeasures to me have been eliminated from the employment process because of the actions.

Talk to you later Drew

Yankeedog,

You write (and I completely agree with-- both your assertions and your stated personal practice):

Quote...it would appear that there are some government agencies that make final decisions based SOLEY on the results of a polygraph examination...  we DO NOT deny employment based solely on a "DI" polygraph test... Polygraph examiners should not be evaluated based on their admissions/confessions.  That is where the door is open for them to "overstate" the admission/confession...

If our fellow classmates, their agencies, and the balance of your colleagues in the world of polygraphy adhered to that which you apparently (based on the material quoted above) believe and practice, I suspect this site would not exist and any need for me and others to expose wrongful and invalid practices would be substantially, if not altogether, reduced.

However, if you are suggesting to me that you believe polygraph-screening examinations, as generally administered to applicants, are "investigative tools", I'm afraid I must beg to differ.  These exams could in theory more accurately be described as investigative tools if preceded by background investigations, allowing the focus of the exam to center on surfaced problem areas (the exam then becoming a specific issue test and potentially amenable to more sound information-based testing formats).  The situation which largely exists and is comprised of either an exam which is done in the absence of a background investigation or one done prior to an investigation can hardly be described as investigation oriented or driven and is really nothing but a fishing expedition.

Quote...I just wish you wouldn't encourage the honest examinee to use countermeasures in a pre-employment test...The ones that have admitted to countermeasures to me have been eliminated from the employment process because of the actions...

I, in turn, wish there were no reason for innocent examinees to have to consider, let alone employ countermeasures.  As long as examinees are being victimized by the gross error associated with pre-employment polygraph screening (you might care to read the personal statements on this site if you have not already done so), I cannot in good conscience abstain from helping those who seek to help themselves.  Of course, I would not, and have not, suggested to any who might care to employ countermeasures that they admit having done so to you or anyone else, and, as you may further realize from your reading of this site, I do not believe you or any of your colleagues can meaningfully detect (absent admissions) polygraph countermeasures.

Although we have discussed some areas of apparent agreement and disagreement, I largely believe that if all examiners agreed (and practiced accordingly) with you on the areas that you and I apparently share common ground, the points of disagreement would become largely moot.

Best Wishes (please extend to any other former classmates you may have remained in contact with),

Drew

Public Servant,

I believe this is my sixth (and final) in a series of responses to you regarding your last post to me.  I hope in addition to any comments you might care to offer, that you will answer my various questions contained throughout these posts.  If it should be necessary or even helpful, I would be glad to extract and list those questions for you.  

You write:

Quote...How does a person with a chemistry background end up in the polygraph field?...Why did the FBI hire you as a scientist, but place you in the field as a special agent first?...What type of work did you do with the bureau before going into the lab and poly?...

In my case, I arrived at that juncture (polygraph research) having taken several professional twists and turns following the time I received an undergraduate degree in chemistry from the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill.  Having worked for approximately 3 years as an organic chemist for a pharmaceutical company I was recruited by the FBI in connection with its "science program"-hiring category for Special Agents.  At that time (and as far as I know this is still the case) all agents, including those who were hired with various future specialty assignments in mind, e.g. attorneys who would eventually be in the Office of General Counsel, accountants who might be in the Finance Division, and scientists in the FBI Laboratory, etc., served at least one initial field investigative assignment following new agent training at the FBI Academy in Quantico.  The notion, which I believe to be well founded and which dated back to the days of J. Edgar Hoover, was that one who would ultimately serve as a specialist would be more productive in that role if he/she had some prior field experience with the overall general product (law enforcement) of the parent organization.  In my case, I served an initial assignment in the Bureau's Field Office in Chicago and was involved in general criminal work, organized crime investigations, and a brief assignment involving foreign counterintelligence matters.

Following that assignment I was assigned to the Laboratory Division and served as an examiner in the Chemistry Toxicology Unit.  A few years later I was requested by the Bureau's Polygraph Unit on several occasions to conduct various toxicological examinations directed towards determining whether an examinee had used drugs in an effort to manipulate the results of a polygraph examination.  In subsequent years, along with having maintained various personal contacts within the Polygraph Unit, and at a time I was involved in two doctoral programs (completed the coursework requirements for a Ph.D. degree in pharmacology and later the overall degree requirements for a Ph.D. degree in physiology), my research interests eventually led me to become involved in the Laboratory's polygraph research program at Quantico.

Your further write:

QuoteI have seen persons...question the validity of the exam because they are not successful at validating their results with admissions/confessions...

This is probably a good point for me to both end these series of posts and to reinforce the absolute need for a scientific background if one is to engage in procedures that purport to involve meaningful diagnosis.  Although a confession by a guilty subject following a deceptive polygraph exam may anecdotally be quite useful to a case agent, the criminal justice system, and society in general, it has absolutely nothing to do with determining overall validity of a diagnostic procedure, e.g., polygraphy.  Validity is not a function of and is not determined via good interviews, interrogations, or criminal investigations (although all of these things serve vital functions) but is soundly grounded and defined by principles of science.  The problem with tying notions of validity to confessions is largely twofold: (1) Even a confession following a true positive polygraph exam is at best anecdotal and not suggestive of overall accuracy and validity, and as we know from various high profile recent (e.g., Daniel King) and other ongoing matters (e.g., Higazy?) that not all confessions are necessarily associated with guilt (The examiners involved, no doubt, believed the confessions obtained validated their respective tests, right?), and (2) More importantly, in the absence of a confession, a polygraph examiner with deceptive charts will most frequently not know (and certainly not know based on the "reading" of his charts) whether a guilty examinee has not "fessed up" or whether he is dealing with a false positive exam result and a subsequently falsely accused but completely innocent examinee.  It is precisely this phenomenon (and trying to associate validity with confessions) that will of necessity lead polygraph examiners to underestimate the number of errors (false positives) that they make during any given time period.

Again, I believe there is no more appropriate way for me to close than with this subject and with what I believe to be a very clear example of why a science background and a statistical approach to evaluating evidence is not only desirable but essential if one is to be involved in assessing validity and other parameters of a diagnostic procedure.  As always, best regards, and I will look forward to your various comments and answers to my questions,

Drew Richardson

Drew,

I read the posts a while back but have not found the time or motivation to reply until now.  As I am limiting my time spent in front of a computer, I will only make a few points that I feel are necessary.  

First of all, I am not, nor have I ever been, a part of the DoDPI research team.  I presently lack the level of formal education necessary for such a position.  I am merely a field examiner and criminal investigator.

I saw the weakness in my analogy to X-ray techs when I wrote the last post.  However, I'd make two points.  First, I know many techs who can make a good diagnosis (though it is obviously not official) just from experience.  And, I'd argue, those with doctorates who have developed polygraph methodologies have come up with a standardized method to analyze the data collected.  While a firm understanding of the physiology/psychology at work would be ideal (which I'd argue a graduate of DoDPI would possess regardless of preceeding or subsequent formal education), the simple matematical equation does not necessitate a PhD to determine if the examination had DI, Inc, or NDI indications.  While skill at diagnosis is a necessary trait, it takes the intuition of a skilled, experienced investigator to determine which way an inconclusive should have gone or if false + or - has occurred -- not necessrily a psychologist or physiologist.    And while researchers and instructors should always possess formal education and mastery of statistical analysis, empirical research, etc, a field examiner can do a great job with the basics.  He only needs these if he wishes to scientifically evaluate for himself if his profession is based on solid research. And when you do this for a living, while posessing integrity and an open mind, you know if what you're doing works.  Your demand for all examiners to be scientists sounds a bit elitist.  As if a lowly criminal investigator with a liberal arts bachelor's degree (with a rigorous 13 week course plus 40 hours continuing ed each year) can not grasp what makes an effective exam.  Please.  Would just any old PhD, MD, PsyD, or JD, possess the personality to make the exam work in the first place? No.  It takes a certain personality with some extra education and intellect, or a highly educated person with some very specific personality traits.

Which leads me to an aside about the system the bureau used in hiring you to be a scientist via being a special agent first.  I am not saying that scientists (or other professionals) can not be good investigators but... The bureau seemed to pack their ranks with attorneys, accountants, scientists, etc, for a while, at the loss of experienced cops/detectives applying at the same time.  I'll turn the table on your argument and say that perhaps the many black eyes the bureau has received over the last few years or so (to include the one this site seeks to produce) may stem from this investigative organization being run by attorneys, accountants, and scientists, instead of those with talents and experience in investigation.  Just a thought.

I've run the course on my thoughts from your posts at this point.  I'm a bit tired and busy so, I'll end it here.  If I have not addressed all that you wished, feel free to list the questions you spoke of, or pose new ones.

Thanks,

Public Servant

Public Servant,

You write:

Quote...I read the posts a while back but have not found the time or motivation to reply until now...

Although I suppose I could continue this, because you say and your post would further indicate a lack of time or motivation on your part for this interaction, I believe I will let this go for now.  Should you care to further address any of the outstanding questions/points from my preceding six posts (adressed to you) at some future time, please feel free to do so, and I will pick up with further commentary as appropriate.  Best Wishes,

Drew Richardson

Drew,

Let me apologize if I seemed curt with my last response.  However, I have lost some of my passion for this discourse. Perhaps, that indicates we have run out of common ground or we have run our disagreements to the ground. Or maybe, my constant travel and work, and a desire to spend my spare time with family, has drained the energy with which I started posting to this thread.  

I re-read your posts and noted only two other issue to which you seemed to demand response.  As to any others, I will allow you to have  the last word for now (as with a few other comments from other contributors to this thread to which I did not respond).

The first issue was that of proving the ability to detect countermeasures.  I do not speak for the rest of the polygraph community, but I will answer that challenge by continuing to be alert for the students of this site (or Doug Williams', etc) when they arrive in my office trying to conceal information regarding a felony investigation!  It's not a public show like you and George want, but I'd say it's meeting the challenge!

Secondly, you asked me to quote research regarding the validity of screening examinations.  I have repeatedly stated that I have little interest in screening exams aside from the ethical  issues raised in efforts to try to help anyone (even criminals, and their ilk) circumvent them. I raised that issue in general involving countermeasures to all types of exams.  While I do periodically review research, and I reviewed much research when I entered polygraphy (some of it required), I do not have a personal collection of such material. I also am presently limited by time and access to resources, just by virtue of location.  Sometimes I am lucky to get to access internet sites like this.

As a follow up to this request, you asked of my scientific education credentials.  I must confess that my undergraduate degree was of the liberal arts genre.  However I did excel at many science course (elective and required) and feel I have a knack for areas such as human physiology.  I have a quite extensive resume of professional education in criminal investigation, much of it including forensic science (though mostly at the technical-or "art"-level).  My formal graduate studies are limited and somewhat unfocused.  However, I intend to remedy that soon and may one day be qualified to discuss the issues at your level.

Which brings me to my closing point...  Though my scientific credentials are meager at best, I believe I have held my own in discussing difficult issues with a PhD.  I lack mostly in that I have not conducted, nor formally reviewed scientific research.  And, I have not stayed abreast of all new research as it is accomplished and reported, as I am sure you do.  However, when confronted with scholarly material such as the CNS research you attached to this thread, I have no problem comprehending it and coming up with appropriate follow up.  I am not an exception.  I am an average DoDPI graduate examiner.  I would argue that my colleagues in no way lack in intellect and the capacity for critical thought. And, DoDPI provides them sufficent insight into the science (and art) of their profession, to comprehend the strengths and weeknesses of polygraph, and how to use it effectively as a tool for objective investigation.

Though I don't demand the last word here, I feel this discussion has run its course.  However, I look forward to new discussions or something that may revive my interest in this one.  As always, it has been a pleasure.  I'll keep an eye out for more opportunities to engage you (and others) in such discussion.

Thanks,

Public Servant

Public Servant,

Thank you for your last reply.  I have largely come to the same conclusion as you regarding having reached a point of diminishing return in our ongoing discussions.  I will leave off with just a couple of comments stemming from your last post.

Quote...I will answer that challenge by continuing to be alert for the students of this site (or Doug Williams', etc) when they arrive in my office trying to conceal information.. It's not a public show like you and George want, but I'd say it's meeting the challenge...

I am afraid your desire to be vigilant is no substitute for or any evidence of reliably detecting countermeasures.  Additionally, polygraph countermeasures have nothing to do with "trying to conceal information" for an innocent examinee, but with his attempting to assure a correct result (no deception indicated)--something you and lie detection polygraphy can not reasonably guarantee this individual through present practices.

Quote...I have repeatedly stated that I have little interest in screening exams aside from the ethical  issues raised in efforts to try to help anyone...circumvent them...

I believe you have overlooked an issue with associated ethical implications considerably more serious and fundamental than the one you raise, i.e., allowing individuals and our nation to be harmed through the error of a procedure (polygraph screening) that has no theoretical basis and no validity in practice.  If you and your colleagues were to have the interest you claim to be lacking and to address this problem, the issue you concern yourself with would be a considerably lesser problem for you.

Have a pleasant weekend and best wishes,

Drew Richardson

Quote from: Public Servant on Aug 21, 2002, 12:19 PM
Drew,

 And, of course, you and the purveyors of this site have provided a mission for DoDPI researchers detracting from the aforementioned -- determining the effectiveness of counter-measures, how to identify them, and developing counter-countermeasures.  (With all that on their plate who has time to answer silly challenges from this web site. :))

Public Servant

If the purveyors of this site have caused the Federal Govenment to open there eyes and accept the fact that our enemies have been manipulating the outcome of polygraph tests, obtaining access to classified information and than using it to harm US or our agents over seas, than thats a good thing.

And hopefully, when and if your able to identify a distinctive chart pattern indicating deliberate and intentional manipulation you would except the silly challenges put forth on this site. BTW, I do not consider this challenge as silly but rather a very serious matter.

Wow!  I can't believe we've revived this old thread.  Anyway, I could not resist this reply.

QuoteAnd hopefully, when and if your able to identify a distinctive chart pattern indicating deliberate and intentional manipulation you would except the silly challenges put forth on this site. BTW, I do not consider this challenge as silly but rather a very serious matter.

We do EXCEPT this challenge!!  It is EXCEPTED from a list of serious concerns with which examiners, national security professionals, and law enforcement professionals have to deal each day.  And, I do take EXCEPTION to such comments that examiners are afraid of this challenge.  I (and many others like me) ACCEPT this challenge each day, but not in Drew or George's forum...rather in real world investigations wherein we seek to identify criminals, and eliminate the innocent, even if they try to use countermeasures!

Regards!

Quote from: Public Servant on Feb 03, 2003, 02:26 AM
Wow!  I can't believe we've revived this old thread.  Anyway, I could not resist this reply.


We do EXCEPT this challenge!!  It is EXCEPTED from a list of serious concerns with which examiners, national security professionals, and law enforcement professionals have to deal each day.  And, I do take EXCEPTION to such comments that examiners are afraid of this challenge.  I (and many others like me) ACCEPT this challenge each day, but not in Drew or George's forum...rather in real world investigations wherein we seek to identify criminals, and eliminate the innocent, even if they try to use countermeasures!

Regards!

P.S.,
As long as you and other polygraphers refuse to back up these claims with scientific evidence, you simply have no leg on which to stand.  The "evidence" you present here is a foolish thing upon which to base both our national security and criminal investigations, as it is likely riddled with observer bias and reproducability issues.  Your refusal to demonstrate these claimed abilities with scientific rigour (to say nothing of the nature of the "proof" you provide) puts you on par with psychics.

BTW, as I indicated in another post, spelling and grammar flames add very little to any debate.  I'm quite capable of them myself, and deliberately pass up ridiculing obvious errors virtually every time pro-polygraph people post.

Let's stick to the point.

Skeptic

Skeptic,

With, all due respect, I believe I did stick to the point. I merely took advantage of sie's word usage to re-iterate the same point that is challenged over and over again.  I thought it was a creative way to add a little interest in a topic in which we should quickly lose interest (since nothing new comes out of the argument over the "challenge").  If my methodology seemed mean-spirited, then I apologize to both you and sie.  

I'll save mean-spiritedness for my rebuttals of personal attacks from Beech.  He seems to take it almost as well as he dishes it out.

Regards.

Quote from: Public Servant on Feb 03, 2003, 03:22 AM
Skeptic,

With, all due respect, I believe I did stick to the point. I merely took advantage of sie's word usage to re-iterate the same point that is challenged over and over again.  I thought it was a creative way to add a little interest in a topic in which we should quickly lose interest (since nothing new comes out of the argument over the "challenge").  If my methodology seemed mean-spirited, then I apologize to both you and sie.  

I'll save mean-spiritedness for my rebuttals of personal attacks from Beech.  He seems to take it almost as well as he dishes it out.

Regards.

Actually, I'd say it's not mean-spirited so much as it violates standard "rules of engagement" for online debate.  Long experience shows that such flames almost always result in the degeneration of a thread of discussion from the relevant to the irrelevant.  Rather like the inevitable death of a debate after someone brings up a "Hitler" or "Nazi" comparison.

Do as you will, of course -- it was clever way to turn a phrase.  Perhaps I'm just tired of so little substance in these discussions, when I believe the issue deserves more serious scrutiny.

Skeptic

Quote from: Public Servant on Feb 03, 2003, 02:26 AM
Wow!  I can't believe we've revived this old thread.  Anyway, I could not resist this reply.


We do EXCEPT this challenge!!  It is EXCEPTED from a list of serious concerns with which examiners, national security professionals, and law enforcement professionals have to deal each day.  And, I do take EXCEPTION to such comments that examiners are afraid of this challenge.  I (and many others like me) ACCEPT this challenge each day, but not in Drew or George's forum...rather in real world investigations wherein we seek to identify criminals, and eliminate the innocent, even if they try to use countermeasures!

Regards!

The best counter to countermeasures would be the revelation of the ability to detect them without any uncertainty. Perhaps thats why you except rather than accept the challenge here. Because our intelligence community lacks this ability. (BTW, this would be a perfect venue and such a revelation would surely bolster National Security not threaten it.)

My Country is at war and the people who wish to harm us know our weaknesses and it appears polygraph use is one. If what this site has to say about countermeasures is true that our intelligence community is unable to detect the use of countermeasures than this window of vulnerability should be shut. Do you not agree?

Or is the perservation of the tool more important?