On October 7th, 2011, then-President Obama established an Executive Order, "STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED NETWORKS AND THE RESPONSIBLE SHARING AND SAFEGUARDING OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION."
The intent of this Order, was to stop any further WikiLeaks-style disclosures. As a result, the Insider Threat Task Force was formed and directed to find potential traitors. Individuals in this Task Force aggressively target employees that exhibit specific indicators.
Within the Defense Intelligence Agency, this Task Force has morphed into the "Insider Threat Program" and works with the "Creditability Assessments Program" for the Office of Security. For this program to succeed in its mission, it must identify and mitigate potential threats. Unfortunately, innocent federal employees are being abused in the process, as their polygraph results are being used to punish them. Reputations, careers and lives are forever ruined by senior officials who willfully violate approved and relevant regulations in an effort to advance themselves.
It is against Public Law (100-347) to use polygraph results as the sole basis for taking unfavorable or adverse action against the general public. Polygraph tests are inherently probabilistic and to use the results alone as justification for punishment is strictly forbidden. Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5210.91, SUBJECT: Polygraph and Credibility Assessment (PCA) Procedures, affords this same protection and civil liberties for Federal Civilians.
The overriding mandate in this regulation is that Polygraph examinations are a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of screening or investigation. No unfavorable administrative action (to include access, employment, assignment, and detail determinations) shall be taken solely on the basis of the results of the polygraph examination.
It is indisputable fact that this is happening. My numerous attempts to stop this injustice have so far gone unsuccessful. Inspector Generals at all levels are unable, or unwilling to enforce the regulations. Even my congressman and senators are helpless.
This policy must be stopped immediately and someone held accountable!
John,
Thank you for sharing this information. I would be interested to know more about what is happening. Could you share documentation of polygraph results being used to punish DIA personnel, and could you share it with us?
I would welcome information from anyone with knowledge of such abuses at DIA to contact me via Signal Private Messenger or Wire. My contact information is in my signature block below.
QuoteReputations, careers and lives are forever ruined by senior officials who willfully violate approved and relevant regulations in an effort to advance themselves.
It is against Public Law (100-347) to use polygraph results as the sole basis for taking unfavorable or adverse action against the general public. Polygraph tests are inherently probabilistic and to use the results alone as justification for punishment is strictly forbidden.
It is worse than you think. The way they get around the "......results alone" mandate is to falsify confessions. This is the real crime. A browbeaten victim pushed to the brink of reality by the twisted logic and incessant hammering of the polygraph examiner may make some confused utterance which is then categorized as a "confession". The "confession" added to the charts are then verified by the polygraph lynch mob in the security division of whatever agency it involves and no innocent person thus framed stands a chance.
It is worse than everyone thinks.
No confessions - period. No attempts at countermeasures either. No written findings were ever produced. I sat through five polygraphs in three years with results alternating between "No Opinion" and "Significant Response."
I was stripped of my clearance, made to occupy a meaningless position in an unclassified area for 10 months, then involuntarily reassigned to HQ DIA. These are all considered "Unfavorable Administrative Actions" (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32: National Defense, Part 154 - Definitions).
I filed an IG Complaint with DOD. After a sloppy investigation - I obtained everything through FOIA - the case was closed when officials from DIA and SOCOM pointed fingers at each other and denied any responsibility.
The question is, how can we get DOD to enforce its own regulations?
Google the case of former DIA employee John Dullahan, who was terminated for allegedly failing 2 (or 3) polygraphs. Was not told the specific reasons. DIA cited the following little-known clause: if national security might be harmed, the reasons for termination need not be disclosed.
He successfully won his lawsuit.
I'll go out on a limb by speculating it was a case of age discrimination. You may fire away quickfix!
I was told the specific reason, as was my congressman - for my inability to successfully "complete" multiple polygraph examinations. They come right out and say it in a letter from the Congressional Relations Division.
DIAI 5200.002 was enacted 03 JUL 2014 when LTG Flynn was in charge. It directly contradicts the higher authority DODI 5210.91 - almost word for word. When I complained to DOD that their regulations were being violated, they declined to investigate and referred my complaint to DIA for their information and appropriate action.
They are getting away with this abuse and no one can stop them. I understand the USD(I) is responsible for enforcing DODI policy, but every time I try to blow my damn whistle, I end up being referred back to DIA.
QuoteI understand the USD(I) is responsible for enforcing DODI policy, but every time I try to blow my damn whistle, I end up being referred back to DIA.
My understanding is that the polygraph policy for all military and intelligence agencies comes from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI is heavily influenced in a bad way by Congress and the polygraph lobby. The unbreakable part of the sinister iron triangle appears to be Congress. There are a few congressman such as Senator Grassley (IA) and former Representative Holt (NJ) who occasionally conduct oversight hearings pertaining to polygraph abuse, but most of our elected representatives are getting their palms greased by the billion dollar polygraph lobby and therein lies the problem.
The only thing that could get DOD and executive branch agencies to follow the law and stop polygraph abuse would involve a morally courageous person to become DNI or get enough congressmen to ignore the polygraph lobby and provide meaningful oversight over its excesses. Unfortunately, I think the odds of Lot finding 10 good men in Sodom and Gomorrah were much better than the odds of finding one good morally courageous man or woman in the upper echelons of our government.
Thanks for the input Wandersmann.
I have been in close contact with my congressman and senators. I have filed complaints with the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Chair - Ron Johnson), and with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Chair - Jason Chaffetz).
Clapper is/was a complete idiot and a political hack. His appointment to the position of DNI is an embarrassment to the entire intelligence community. I briefed him a couple times when he was in charge of NGA and got to know him as an alcoholic asshole and a sycophant.
The Insider Threat Program operates like a modern day Stassi. As I said in my earlier post, they advance in their careers by ruining the lives and careers of others. Public Law 100-347 and DODI 5210.91 were created to guard against this pernicious type of abuse. I vow to continue fighting them until their abuses are brought to light and they are held accountable.
Judgement is coming, remember Lot's wife.
QuoteIt is worse than everyone thinks.
No confessions - period. No attempts at countermeasures either. No written findings were ever produced. I sat through five polygraphs in three years with results alternating between "No Opinion" and "Significant Response."
I was stripped of my clearance, made to occupy a meaningless position in an unclassified area for 10 months, then involuntarily reassigned to HQ DIA. These are all considered "Unfavorable Administrative Actions" (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 32: National Defense, Part 154 - Definitions).
I filed an IG Complaint with DOD. After a sloppy investigation - I obtained everything through FOIA - the case was closed when officials from DIA and SOCOM pointed fingers at each other and denied any responsibility.
The question is, how can we get DOD to enforce its own regulations?
Isn't losing a security clearance virtually tantamount to the ending of one's employment in the IC? I'm actually impressed that they even bothered to create an employment "accommodation" for you at DIA!
Generally, losing that almighty clearance doesn't put one into a "protected class" under federal anti-discriminatory guidelines! 8-)
QuoteI was told the specific reason, as was my congressman - for my inability to successfully "complete" multiple polygraph examinations. They come right out and say it in a letter from the Congressional Relations Division.
DIAI 5200.002 was enacted 03 JUL 2014 when LTG Flynn was in charge. It directly contradicts the higher authority DODI 5210.91 - almost word for word. When I complained to DOD that their regulations were being violated, they declined to investigate and referred my complaint to DIA for their information and appropriate action.
They are getting away with this abuse and no one can stop them. I understand the USD(I) is responsible for enforcing DODI policy, but every time I try to blow my damn whistle, I end up being referred back to DIA.
Time was when DIA (like the FBI) did not routinely polygraph all applicants and employees! :(
Yanking someone's clearance and labeling them a vulnerability based solely on the results of the polygraph is libel. They defamed my character and ruined my reputation. I worked for 34 years in Intel and never once had a security violation.
George M. and I were just talking about how the efforts to ramp up polygraph examinations have taken off since Snowden. It big business like Wandersmann said.
Since there is a new SECDEF and a new DNI on the way, I figured it would be a good time to file another whistleblower complaint to the House Oversight Committee.
They'll probably just blow me off again, but here's what I said:
• Senior Officials in the DIA Office of Security are abusing their authority by taking unfavorable administrative actions against innocent federal employees based solely on the results of the polygraph. These actions directly violate DOD regulations and individual rights through illegitimate and discriminatory actions.
• These officials have repeatedly deflected and defeated attempts to investigate my claims by twisting the facts and providing false testimony.
• Inspector Generals at all levels are unable to (for whatever reasons/cover-up by DIA/ODNI) enforce approved and relevant regulations to prohibit these abuses and safeguard individual rights.
• DODI 5210.91 explicitly forbids taking unfavorable administrative actions against an individual based solely on the results of the polygraph. In direct opposition to authority, DIA enacted DIAI 5200.002. This internal FOUO regulation improperly sanctions these types of abusive actions.
• My goal is expose this pernicious type of abuse and get it to stop. Plans to conduct polygraph examinations on all employees and contractors will lead to further abuse. Further abuse of this nature will most likely result in a class action lawsuit.
• Agency officials have also committed perjury in official Department of Labor documents. They lied to the investigators in my claim by saying that their actions were allowed and simply a function of my employment.
• Agency officials have also lied to my Congressman about their actions in a letter dated April 6th, 2016.
• I require an independent fact finder to provide validation of my claims.
QuoteI have been in close contact with my congressman and senators. I have filed complaints with the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Chair - Ron Johnson), and with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Chair - Jason Chaffetz).
Good to read your input John, although I'm sorry for your suffering. Same thing happened to me. 30 years in the Army and Intell community without as much as a verbal reprimand. I'm working after retirement to try to put two kids through college and they stole my livelihood as well. I'm working at a job not commensurate with my background making 25% of the pay I was once getting. I like what you said, it is
libel. Our Founding Fathers would have supported challenging these clowns to a duel to the death over their dishonorable actions. I wish we still could. If we could, however ,that would be the end of the polygraph profession. Bullies are cowards who don't attack if the victim poses a potential threat. I've been saying all along that these bastards need to get sued out of existence after they go to prison for their fraud.
On a more substantive note, I'd like to write Chaffetz and Johnson and echo your information. Will they consider a complaint from someone who is not a constituent? I don't know if I could qualify at this point under Whistle blower regs, but I'd love to support your efforts. In the past I have written Sen Grassley and Rep Holt who were involved in polygraph oversight. They kept referring me to my local Congressman and Senators who have done nothing more than refer my complaint back to my agency.
I firmly believe that if anyone could get through to Congressman Trey Gowdy and make him aware of what is going on he would erupt. He is the most honorable guy on the hill, can't stand Bureaucratic waste, fraud, and abuse, and knows the Constitution by heart. He is a staunch believer in due process and would easily see through the technical machinations the polygraph community uses to subvert the Constitution.
Thank you for your input Wandersmann. It pains me greatly to hear about others suffering the same fate as I did. That is exactly why I decided to go public and expose the injustice. My congressman's office has been somewhat helpful – mainly only to request status updates and to request clarifications of my IG complaints.
Chaffetz and Johnson chair House and Senate Committees that provide whistle blower platforms. Maybe if we all get together and blow our whistles, we can eventually get someone to hear us.
Here is the link for the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: https://oversight.house.gov/subcommittee/full-committee/ Click on the "Blow the Whistle" link at the top of the page. By the way, Trey Gowdy sits on this committee as well.
The US Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs is the other congressional forum that I believe can help. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings Click on "Contact" at the top of the page and select "Whistleblowers". You can submit a complaint to both Johnson and McCaskill. An individual from this office contacted me last week and wants to set up an interview with me.
I've been keeping records since this all started in October 2013. I have indisputable facts (through testimonies, affidavits, interviews and emails that I obtained through FOIA) that show they have violated important regulations and my individual rights.
Like you, I'm not financially secure, so I can't afford a lawyer. I feel the only thing we can do is keep blowing the damn whistle. Maybe with the new administration (SECDEF and DNI) we can get some traction. I would love to tell Rep. Gowdy my story - I dream of testifying before a committee someday.
Do you use Wire?
John M. I applaud your efforts to bring a stop to the actions of the evil polygraph operators. I have been fighting these bastards for almost 40 years. I have been using a three-pronged attack against them - EDUCATION, LEGISLATION and LITIGATION. I suggest you continue using those same tactics.
EDUCATION - No one should ever take a polygraph test until they have educated themselves about how it works and how to protect themselves from being falsely accused of deception. Of course I like my manual and accompanying DVD entitled HOW TO STING THE POLYGRAPH, but Dr. Maschke's book THE LIE BEHIND THE LIE DETECTOR is also very good.
LEGISLATION - Government employees should press for the same protections afforded to the private sector employees. The protections provided by the EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT should be extended to all government employees.
LITIGATION - Until such time as the EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT is expanded to include government employees, there are many protections in this act that apply to government employees. You have pointed out some of them, but there are many more that will be evident with a careful reading of the law. For instance, a government employee can refuse to take the polygraph test, and not suffer any consequences for that refusal. If an employee is damaged as a result of the polygraph operator or an agency's violation of this law, they should file a tort action to recover damages.
Keep up the good work, and I wish you GOOD LUCK, (believe me, you will need it).
From Florence Federal Prison - Doug Williams
Quote from: Doug_Williams on Feb 21, 2017, 11:57 PMFor instance, a government employee can refuse to take the polygraph test, and not suffer any consequences for that refusal.
Does that mean that, say, a CIA employee could simply decline to be re-polygraphed during the course of employment at the Agency, without adverse personnel action being taken?
Keep fighting on from within the Federal Gulag -- it's the only way that the IC will ever be held accountable and the myth of the polygraph as a "scientific instrument" definitively smashed! :'(
Quote from: Doug_Williams on Feb 21, 2017, 11:57 PMFor instance, a government employee can refuse to take the polygraph test, and not suffer any consequences for that refusal.
Does that mean that, say, a CIA employee could decline to be re-polygraphed during the course of his employment at the Agency, without adverse personnel action being taken?
Keep fighting on from within the Federal Gulag -- it's the only way that the IC will ever be held accountable and the myth of the polygraph as a "scientific instrument" be definitively smashed! :'(
Quote from: Wandersmann on Feb 21, 2017, 08:10 PMGood to read your input John, although I'm sorry for your suffering. Same thing happened to me. 30 years in the Army and Intell community without as much as a verbal reprimand. I'm working after retirement to try to put two kids through college and they stole my livelihood as well. I'm working at a job not commensurate with my background making 25% of the pay I was once getting. I like what you said, it is libel. Our Founding Fathers would have supported challenging these clowns to a duel to the death over their dishonorable actions. I wish we still could. If we could, however ,that would be the end of the polygraph profession. Bullies are cowards who don't attack if the victim poses a potential threat. I've been saying all along that these bastards need to get sued out of existence after they go to prison for their fraud.
An identical fate befell me, with the difference being that I never entered into employment at an IC component. Certainly my loss of lifetime earning power due to the BI and probably the polygraph is likely over 50% ! :-?
Thanks for your support Mr. Williams. I have read your story with great interest and admire your ability to take on the government's pernicious use of the polygraph.
I have read George's book – several times, but always steered clear of your advice on countering the polygraph. I never had anything to hide and was afraid that I would get accused of trying to employ countermeasures – thus, end my career. I always showed up on time and followed all their orders. I was polygraphed and interrogated five times in three years. The last four times, it ended with me having a nervous breakdown – the final time, I had to be counseled by two DIA psychologists.
The polygraph operators are evil, but this evil has now become institutionalized. Way back in 1997, in his condemnation of the polygraph in the government, Dr. Drew Richardson tells the Senate Judiciary Committee that the polygraph examiners report to mid-level managers who are largely ignorant of polygraph matters. These mid-level managers in turn report to executives, who have real problems for which they seek needed solutions (e.g., the need to protect national security from the danger of espionage, and the need to hire employees with appropriate backgrounds). These executives are left unable to evaluate that polygraph is not a viable solution and do not comprehend that ignorance and misinformation are built into their own command structure.''
This policy is being carried out by DIA's Office of Security. A whole program has been established to catch the next Snowden. It's an all-out witch hunt. If you work in this program, you better find some people and label them as threats, or miss out on promotions, bonuses, etc.
Like I said in my previous post, if we can get enough people to blow the whistle to the government about this devious policy, we'll eventually get someone with enough authority and moral courage to make stand.
I encourage everyone who has experienced adverse actions based solely on the results of the polygraph to file a whistle-blower complaint to the House Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs https://oversight.house.gov/subcommittee/full-committee/ - just click on the "Blow the Whistle" link at the top of the page – you can even file anonymously.
We need to educate the legislators. I agree with you on Public Law 100-347. The government has an exemption to administer the polygraph to its employees, but the way I read it, there are important restrictions on the use of those exemptions. "Section 8, (a)(1), Except as provided in paragraph (2), the exemption under subsection (d) of section 7 shall not apply if an employee is discharged, disciplined, denied employment or promotion, or otherwise discriminated against in any manner on the basis of the analysis of a polygraph test chart or the refusal to take a polygraph test, without additional supporting evidence."
Or (2), "In the case of an exemption described in subsection (e) or (f) of such section, the exemption shall not apply if the results of an analysis of a polygraph test chart are used, or the refusal to take a polygraph test is used, as the sole basis upon which an adverse employment action described in paragraph (1) is taken against an employee or prospective employee."
And there is another reference that applies directly to me, under rights of the examinee, Section 8 (b)(1)(D) "the examiner does not conduct the test if there is sufficient written evidence by a physician that the examinee is suffering from a medical or psychological condition or undergoing treatment that might cause abnormal responses during the actual testing phase."
I've had my own three pronged attack Mr. Williams, and I've been executing it since June 2014. I expect Judgement will come any day now – from Federal Judges.
Quote from: John M. on Feb 19, 2017, 02:26 PMThanks for the input Wandersmann.
I have been in close contact with my congressman and senators. I have filed complaints with the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Chair - Ron Johnson), and with the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Chair - Jason Chaffetz).
Clapper is/was a complete idiot and a political hack. His appointment to the position of DNI is an embarrassment to the entire intelligence community. I briefed him a couple times when he was in charge of NGA and got to know him as an alcoholic asshole and a sycophant.
The Insider Threat Program operates like a modern day Stassi. As I said in my earlier post, they advance in their careers by ruining the lives and careers of others. Public Law 100-347 and DODI 5210.91 were created to guard against this pernicious type of abuse. I vow to continue fighting them until their abuses are brought to light and they are held accountable.
Judgement is coming, remember Lot's wife.
Just remember that Ron Johnson is a fairly conservative Republican from WI. He is most unlikely to take a critical stance on any issues involving the IC, LE, polygraphy, etc. :(
Quote from: xenonman on Feb 22, 2017, 12:34 AMDoes that mean that, say, a CIA employee could simply decline to be re-polygraphed during the course of employment at the Agency, without adverse personnel action being taken?
Whether that means what is says or not, it doesn't matter anyway unless they are held accountable for abiding to it.
You may ask yourself, why have regulations anyway?
Well of course the CIA is a law unto itself in all matters, including personnel.
I doubt very much that any employee there who declined a routine re-polygraph would be allowed around Langley much longer.
Of couse the DCI and DDCI are nicely exempted from ever being polygraphed at all, and I suspect that the same holds true of the DNI.
:(
Quote from: xenonman on Feb 25, 2017, 05:12 PMOf couse the DCI and DDCI are nicely exempted from ever being polygraphed at all, and I suspect that the same holds true of the DNI.
Sometimes the bigwigs do allow themselves to be polygraphed to set a positive example for the commoners that work below them. They always pass. Imagine that.
Quote from: Wandersmann on Feb 21, 2017, 08:10 PMI firmly believe that if anyone could get through to Congressman Trey Gowdy and make him aware of what is going on he would erupt. He is the most honorable guy on the hill, can't stand Bureaucratic waste, fraud, and abuse, and knows the Constitution by heart. He is a staunch believer in due process and would easily see through the technical machinations the polygraph community uses to subvert the Constitution.
Your boy just went on FOX News this morning and called for using the polygraph to find out who's leaking in the White House.
QuoteQuote from: Wandersmann on Feb 21, 2017, 08:10 PMI firmly believe that if anyone could get through to Congressman Trey Gowdy and make him aware of what is going on he would erupt. He is the most honorable guy on the hill, can't stand Bureaucratic waste, fraud, and abuse, and knows the Constitution by heart. He is a staunch believer in due process and would easily see through the technical machinations the polygraph community uses to subvert the Constitution.
Your boy just went on FOX News this morning and called for using the polygraph to find out who's leaking in the White House.
Unfortunately, as I've observed numerous times, in American popular culture, there continues to be that aura of mystery and awe surrounding the polygraph. It continues to be viewed as the automatic, ultimate arbitrator of guilt or innocence, mostly by those with no understanding of the "toy". This is evidenced by the ubiquitous role played by the polygraph in true crime programs on TV and in true crime paperbacks.
Gowdy's latest advocacy of polygraph use is very reminiscent of Nixon's statements in favor of more use of the polygraph in government, as revealed in the White House tapes from Watergate days. ::)
QuoteYour boy just went on FOX News this morning and called for using the polygraph to find out who's leaking in the White House.
At least it would be specific issue testing. In fact, a CIT may be applicable.
Quote from: Arkhangelsk on Feb 28, 2017, 02:35 PMAt least it would be specific issue testing. In fact, a CIT may be applicable.
Arkhangelsk - God member - Are you freaking kidding me? Exactly what would, or wouldn't the testing results prove?
A possibility that someone may, or may not have done something? The polygraph amounts to little more than an approved method to interrogate and threaten the crap out of innocent people.
According to the Law (and DOD regulations), the polygraph results alone may not be used as the sole basis to convict someone - so why else use it? If everyone knew this going in, they would have to stop using the damn полиграф машина, right?
RISE UP PEOPLE!
QuoteExactly what would, or wouldn't the testing results prove?
In the case of the CIT, that the subject had specific knowledge which was encoded into memory.
QuoteA possibility that someone may, or may not have done something? The polygraph amounts to little more than an approved method to interrogate and threaten the crap out of innocent people.
According to the Law (and DOD regulations), the polygraph results alone may not be used as the sole basis to convict someone - so why else use it? If everyone knew this going in, they would have to stop using the damn полиграф машина, right?
This might certainly foul up CIA recruitment processes.
Of course neither federal laws nor DOD regulations appear to apply very much in Langley! ;D
Quote from: xenonman on Feb 28, 2017, 08:55 PM
This might certainly foul up CIA recruitment processes.
I haven't done any research into the CIA regulations regarding the use of the polygraph, so I can't speak to that.
DoD regulations though, specifically prohibit taking any unfavorable actions based solely on the results of the polygraph exam - except for
initial eligibility/access. Should this policy be enforced, exams administered to previously cleared employees will be useless - but only if the employees know about the regulation.
Everyone going in to take a polygraph needs to know this simple fact!
During my ordeal (5 polys in 3 years), I was told not to do any research in to the polygraph because it could affect my performance -and possibly produce a false positive. Do you think that they don't want you to know that no unfavorable administrative actions can be taken against you based solely on the results of the test?
Why isn't this important detail more widely known? Perhaps it is to perpetuate that "aura of mystery" you talked about earlier.
Then, you have people like Arkhangelsk of course, who still believe it can magically identify things that you have "encoded in memory."
QuoteThen, you have people like Arkhangelsk of course, who still believe it can magically identify things that you have "encoded in memory."
John M.
I am not a revolutionary nor an activist. I am but a polymath standing in awe of the universe around me. I do share your concern for those who would use the polygraph as a prop to carry out an interrogation. But, you are wrong in your zeal to discount the entire field of forensic psychophysiology. It is indeed possible to detect memory using peripheral indices commonly measured with the polygraph, the P300 Event Related Potential as well as Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. I suggest you do some research before embarrassing yourself with snarky comments.
Quote from: Arkhangelsk on Mar 01, 2017, 09:41 AMI suggest you do some research before embarrassing yourself with snarky comments.
Whoa, Arkhangelsk - spoken like a true God, before all worlds.
I have done enough research to realize that the lie detector is in fact a hoax, a crutch and an indolent method for conducting investigations. Using the results as the sole basis for taking unfavorable action against an innocent person is a violation of their individual rights.
The entire field of forensic psychophysiology? Come on man. The polygraph and its ability to discern when someone is lying is all I'm commenting about here. Your claim that it is "possible", to detect memory using "peripheral indices" really doesn't generate much confidence either.
I'm sorry you felt my comments were snarky, but you are the one who should feel embarrassed. Thousands of people have been victimized by the "possibility" that they are liars. This website is devoted to putting an end to this sort of witchcraft – "Exposing the Lie Behind the Polygraph" - and I support it 100%.
I suspect that if you were ever screwed over, labeled a vulnerability and had your reputation ruined because of a false positive, you might feel differently.
John,
The procedure Archangelsk refers to (CIT - "Concealed Information Test," also known as a "Guilty Knowledge Test") is a rarely used polygraph technique that has a sounder basis than lie detection "tests." See this chapter on it from the first edition of the late David T. Lykken's seminal work on polygraphy, A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector:
https://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-037.pdf
I think it is exceedingly unlikely that the Guilty Knowledge Test would be used in any federal leak investigation.
QuoteDuring my ordeal (5 polys in 3 years), I was told not to do any research in to
...and I thought that the two polygraphs that I underwent in a three-year period were agonizing enough! Of course, after my second one, in 1982, any remaining doubt on my part as to the utter worthlessness of the polygraph was completely resolved, after the NSA polygrapher accused me of deception by my concealing of homosexual relationships and meetings with foreign intelligence services! Back then, as far as I know, there was little discussion about successful countermeasures to the polygraph. It was largely believed that only psychotics, sociopaths, and small children were capable of "beating" the polygraph. The CIA examiner I had did, however, ask me if I'd "studied" the polygraph at all.
I have no idea what, if any, regulations the CIA has regarding polygraphing or re-polygraphing its employees. On all matters regarding personnel, the CIA is, of course, a law unto itself. Even the number of polygraphers the CIA employs is kept classified. As far as I know, re-polygraphing of its "on board" employees is required at least every five years. I would obviously have no idea as to how extensively this is carried out in practice or if Agency employees have actually been terminated solely on the basis of a re-polygraph "interview".
Yes, you're correct about this "aura" of mystery and awe in which the polygraph continues to be held. The same "aura" equally surrounds the CIA. Until this "aura" can be lifted, we'll see no reform of either institution.
Of course, Presidents quickly become addicted to their daily intelligence briefings (PDB's), and as a result seldom speak about reforming either evil.
JFK supposedly spoke bitterly about the CIA, following the debacle at the Bay of Pigs, but look at what happened to him. ;D
::) ::)
Quote
I suspect that if you were ever screwed over, labeled a vulnerability and had your reputation ruined because of a false positive, you might feel differently.
John, I am sympathetic to your angst. I am not a polygraph proponent, but I do not see much benefit in complete polarization either.
My observation regarding polygraph ethics has revealed two levels:
1. The "truth test" polygraph technique is not rooted in firm psychological foundations. Thus it is indeed a pseudoscience, and should not be used as a Human Resource tool because its accuracy is unknown and perhaps unknowable.
2. The mind is a private domain with its own providence and sanctity and should not be breached by anyone even if they were to have a highly accurate way to detect deception.
Those of the first mindset should not object if an authentic truth machine were to surface; those of the second would still scoff.
The level of vitriol in this forum worries me too. The one positive factor evidenced by this all-too-apparent rising contentiousness is, to me at least, confirmation of the utter uselessness of the polygraph and of the fact that its proponents have been put very much on the defensive. :P
xenonman
I disagree. This board was even more contentious when I began posting. As for the usefulness of polygraph, I could not have made a living offering my services privately unless many people and businesses found it useful. Ask yourself why you have never seen a complaint on this board about an EPPA test. Are you even aware of EPPA?
Are you referring to the federal legislation which set very strict limits on the (mis)use of the polygraph by employers in the private sector? ::)
The EPPA, or the Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, or Public Law 100-347 supposedly provides protections for employees from polygraph abuse.
What is polygraph abuse? Simply stated: Misusing the results.
To be clear, the law provides several exemptions, but also places explicit restrictions on those exemptions.
#1 on the list of restrictions is that the results of the polygraph shall not be used as the sole basis for taking unfavorable administrative action or adverse employment actions against an employee.
As I've said before, DODI 5210.91 provides this same protection for DOD employees. I would assume the other agencies have their own instructions to prevent this type of abuse.
And for those who think the government gets to decide what is, and what an unfavorable administrative action isn't, see the Code of Federal Regulations - Title 32, Part 154.3. Definitions:
(bb) Unfavorable administrative action. Adverse action taken as the result of personnel security determinations and unfavorable personnel security determinations as defined in this part.
(cc) Unfavorable personnel security determination. A denial or revocation of clearance for access to classified information; denial or revocation of access to classified information; denial or revocation of a Special Access authorization (including access to SCI); nonappointment to or nonselection for appointment to a sensitive position; nonappointment to or nonselection for any other position requiring a trustworthiness determination under this part; reassignment to a position of lesser sensitivity or to a nonsensitive position; and nonacceptance for or discharge from the Armed Forces when any of the foregoing actions are based on derogatory information of personnel security significance.
I have spent thousands of hours over the past 3 years trying to expose this abuse.
Imagine if everyone who was already an employee with a security clearance knew this? No need to worry, go take their silly little test - they can't do anything to you, right?
Or, better yet, what if those charged with enforcing the regulations (DODI 5210.91) actually did their freaking jobs?
Yeah, I'm talking to you DOD and DIA IG.
Quotesupposedly provides protections for employees from polygraph abuse.
Yes, the word "supposedly" is the critical qualifier here!
Incidentally, you should also be talking to the IG's at the NSA, CIA, and NRO - all agencies which I doubt are covered by DOD regulations! ::)
John M
The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, a federal labor law enforced by Wage and Hour Division of DOL, applies only to employees of private businesses, employees of any branch of federal, state or local government are excluded.
Whatever your beef with governmental use of polygraph EPPA has nothing to do with it.
Quote from: pailryder on Mar 10, 2017, 05:48 PMJohn M
The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, a federal labor law enforced by Wage and Hour Division of DOL, applies only to employees of private businesses, employees of any branch of federal, state or local government are excluded.
Whatever your beef with governmental use of polygraph EPPA has nothing to do with it.
Correct.
We should be glad that (mis)use of the "magic box" has now been virtually outlawed in the private sector, except in certain very limited circumstances.
The real irony is that with Congress having thus regulated the vile "box", it is now the US Government which is the principal (ab)user of the polygraph! ::)
Quote from: pailryder on Mar 10, 2017, 05:48 PMWhatever your beef with governmental use of polygraph EPPA has nothing to do with it.
I have never, ever had a "beef" with the EEPA. In fact I fully support it. Like I said, it provides exemptions for certain situations and permits the use of the polygraph, but it clearly has restrictions on those exemptions too. The Law clearly prohibits those administering the lie detector from using the results alone as the sole basis for taking unfavorable actions against an otherwise innocent individual.
DODI 5210.91 covers the use of the polygraph for DOD employees (like me) and provides the same protections as the Public Law. It states "The polygraph is a supplement to, not a substitute for other methods of investigation. No unfavorable administrative actions shall be taken based solely on the results of the polygraph."
As Mr. Williams stated in his post to this thread 3 weeks ago, it's time for the EPPA to be expanded to include government employees.
This is an individual rights issue.
QuoteAs Mr. Williams stated in his post to this thread 3 weeks ago, it's time for the EPPA to be expanded to include government employees.
That's an excellent idea, but it's about as likely to take place as it is to expect to find a living Ivory Billed Woodpecker!
Unfortunately, too many in Congress continue to believe the lunacy seeping from the polygraph industry and the IC as to the absolute necessity of needing to employ the polygraph to save our country from the danger of imminent invasion by Putin or Raul Castro. Yes, think of all those brave CIA and other "three-letter" employees fighting and dying for us in the front lines in those wretched conditions found in US embassies far from home, all the time cowering behind the bona fide Foreign Service staff!
The mythology behind the polygraph will survive as long as the mystical aura surrounding the IC endures.
Incidentally, DOD regulations governing the polygraph, impressive as they are, will not change a single iota the personnel policies of, say, the CIA, NSA, or NRO, who continue to be laws unto themselves on matters of employee recruitment and selection!
This certainly is an individual rights issue, I agree, but in the view of far too many, that concern is subordinate to that of preventing the Cuban Revolutionary Navy from shelling Palm Beach! :( :D
QuoteAs Mr. Williams stated in his post to this thread 3 weeks ago, it's time for the EPPA to be expanded to include government employees.
This is an individual rights issue.
This is spot on. It is an individual rights issue. I'm sick of the old defense, "you don't have the right to a security clearance, the Government can do as it pleases"
Really? Then why not subject Government clearance holders to waterboarding during their BI? Is mental torture humane and moral? Who made that decision?
The methods used by polygraphers to extract information are identical to the methods used by the former East German STASI. Threats of loss of livelihood (made real), extensive interrogation followed by isolation, lies to extract confessions absent any previous evidence of wrongdoing, etc, etc. The big difference is that the STASI only used these tactics against perceived enemies of their state. The polygraph thugs use these tactics against their own comrades to make an easy living and a fast buck. Ultimate traitors they are.
Quoteit's time for the EPPA to be expanded to include government employees.
https://antipolygraph.org/ceppa.shtml
I think an EPPA like law should be passed for all facets of polygraph at this point, and I have only recently come to this realization.
I have recently come into possession of some documents and recordings of TAPE meetings and discussion in the hospitality room, that have totally convinced me that this industry is in desperate need of government intervention and regulation, because to trust the industry to do it from within, I am sad to say, is hopeless.
Tonight, I have reached the point where I fully support and will actively work toward the passing, EPPA like laws at all levels of polygraph operation and administration. There should be more governmental oversight of the industry and the industries anti competitive behavior should be looked into deeply.
I will testify in front of any committee about what I have experienced in my career, and why the industry cannot be trusted to manage or regulate corruption in the industry; not because it is unable to, but because it is unwilling to. I will also testify, that in some circles, unethical, and possible illegal behavior, at least in Texas, is not only tolerated, it is encouraged.
All research and data should be reviewed, at all facets of polygraph specialization, and decisions should be made in regard to the validity and reliability of each specialization and the viability of the procedures as well as the culture of the industry.
Let me be clear, my problem is not with the test, or most of it's uses; my problem is with the people who are just truly awful and evil in this industry, and the people who marginalize or defend their behaviors. Any good thing can be abused, and I have been witness to abuse in the industry.
I'll say it again, the problem is not the test, in my opinion. The problem resides in the awful and evil people in the industry, and the people who protect or marginalize the awful behavior.
When I saw the polygraph place stuff, I thought I was going to be sick. But listening to what I have now, I weep at the idea that some of these people are considered polygraphs best and brightest. If something doesn't, fundamentally, in the polygraph culture, this industry is doomed.
Antipolygraph.org will not be the end of the industry. The industry elites, and the protected class within, will be he end of the industry.
At least tonight, I found a couple more people in the Texas industry who finally sees these people for what they are, and that is how the downfall will happen. It will have nothing to do with procedure or accuracy.
The end will be attributed to examiners who go too far thinking they are bullet proof, and an industry that will do nothing about the behaviors of the unethical, and punish the person bringing the unethical behavior to light.
Because if you can't trust the industry leaders, how can you trust what we are selling. If our leaders will no nothing, or in Texas' case, be actively involved in the unethical behavior, the Government will eventually see no choice by to step in. It happened in 1988; it happened to the Board of polygraph examiners in Texas; and it will happen again soon. And the industry will it there and say, we served what we got, just like they do with eppa, and no nothing to fix the core problem.
Over the years, I have noticed that this industry does more to avoid dealing with issues, than it does solving issues or avoiding the creation of issues in the first place.
The greedy and corrupt will do more damage to this industry than anyone.
The day will come, when something so reprehensible will happen or come to light, that there will be no more protection for the unethical examiner or their corruption, and the leadership will have to address it before the government says, something has to be done. That day, might be coming sooner than anyone thinks.
It's amazing what people will say when they think they are around safe ears. They never think that they will cross a moral line and someone won't hit, record.
Mr. McCarthy,
Sir, I can't thank you enough for your understanding and for your efforts to help put a stop to polygraph abuse.
I was hesitant to post here – for fear that someone would find out who I am. After several of my former co-workers called and told me that they were also being abused, I decided enough was enough.
There is much more about my story that has yet to be told, but the effects of polygraph abuse nearly ruined my life. Thanks to a couple wonderful doctors and the miracle of anxiolytic medications, I've come back from a very dark place.
I was granted a federal disability retirement due the psychological issues caused by excessive polygraph abuse. I submitted an appeal to the ECAB on 30 July, 2016. I fully expect to win this case due to several precedents that consider among other things, negligence and willful violation of approved and relevant regulations. I possess the indisputable material facts.
You're correct about the level of corruption involved, and Wandersmann's comparison to the East German Stassi is astonishing when you think about it. What the hell is going on?
Imagine you have a job, where you decide who gets to have a job, based on their performance in an interrogation. Or, even better, your job is to catch the next Edward Snowden and you're not doing too well. I know, let's interrogate some more of them! Find those "vulnerabilities" and "mitigate" them.
What's really scary, is that people are advancing in their careers by ruining the careers of others. What the hell is going on?
I have come to the same realization as you have – let's put an end the polygraph industry and the corrupt officials that enable it.
I'm so glad that I decided to post on here.
QuoteI was granted a federal disability retirement due the psychological issues caused by excessive polygraph abuse.
Really? That's very interesting. Was "polygraph" mentioned in your disability paperwork? I have heard many stories of polygraph related anguish here, but never one of it having resulted in a pathology.
Quote from: Arkhangelsk on Mar 16, 2017, 06:01 PMWas "polygraph" mentioned in your disability paperwork? I have heard many stories of polygraph related anguish here, but never one of it having resulted in a pathology.
They don't list the cause of the disability in the "paperwork", only the illness itself.
I guess you've heard it now.
Official diagnosis was generalized anxiety disorder and chronic PTSD, followed by depression. Five times in three years - like I've said before, the last three ended in a nervous breakdown.
Subjected to an intense unavoidable and inescapable stressor.
You want to hear the worst part?
I presented medical evidence of the above illness and begged not to have to go through it again. Despite my objections, they went ahead and did it anyway. I thought that I had to, or I would lose my job.
Immediately after that last one, I had to meet with two DIA psychologists - Drs. Jill Tucillo and Richard Ault. After a couple hours, they cleared me to go home and advised me to continue seeing my doctors.
What part caused you so much distress? What it a potential loss of a career? Was there possible legal jeopardy? Were you subjected to intensive interrogation? Or, just an aggregation of all facets of it? I think you are trying to maintain some anonymity, so share only what you can.
During the initial polygraph screening, the examiner told me that I displayed abnormal physiological responses to one of the questions. I was summoned for a second appointment two days later.
The second time didn't go any better because I feared that I would react abnormally again when he asked the question again. It wasn't the subject of the question that caused me to react, it was the question itself. I was scared to death that I was going to fail at it again. And I did. After four hours of name calling and accusations, the examiner was furious. He unhooked everything, slammed it on the desk, and then held open the door telling me to get my things and leave. I was shaking and felt like I was going to pass out. I sat in the hotel lobby for about 15 minutes – just to calm down enough so that I could drive back to work.
When I got back, I immediately reported to the SSO and told them what had happened. I even wrote a four point paper for the record, about why I felt sensitive to the question (much longer story here).
Now, let's get something straight. I don't know how others "administer" the polygraph examination, but DIA uses professional interrogators. My exams lasted from 3 to 4 hours. The diagnostic opinion for the first two was "No Opinion", the third "Significant Response", the fourth "No Opinion", and the last was "Significant Response".
Do you know what goes on for four hours? I know what the East Germans must have felt like.
So, 20 months after the fourth interrogation (remember the result was "No Opinion"), one that I had to go TDY to DIA and take in their execution chamber-like set up, the Director of the Insider Threat Program calls me in to his office. He yanks my badge and my accesses and has me reassigned to an unclassified area. I was brandished and labeled a vulnerability to security, based simply on the results of the polygraph examination.
Have you ever experienced a panic attack? After going a week without being able to sleep, I went to see my primary care provider. She diagnosed me with situational anxiety – and my job was the situation. She also composed a letter to my supervisor and advised him to allow liberal use of sick leave to address the debilitating symptoms of the illness. I used it all. My supervisor even coordinated with admin to change the sick leave I took for all my doctors appointments to "admin leave".
So, for 10 months I sat waiting for my fate - with nothing to do, answering phones and occupying a meaningless position. They put me in a section they affectionately called "The Misfit Toys". This is where people go who lose their clearances for things like beating their wife, drunk driving, or drugs.
This was probably the darkest period. My former co-workers were afraid to talk me – some were told I might even be a spy.
My final exam/interrogation took place at DIA again, this time with full knowledge of my illnesses. The doctor I had been seeing provided sufficient diagnoses and the DIA Central Adjudication Facility even issued an advisory letter acknowledging it.
Eventually, I was involuntarily reassigned to an unclassified position at HQ DIA in DC. On the brink of losing it completely, my doctors suggested that I apply for OWCP and disability retirement - due to the effects of this pernicious abuse.
John S. Morter, USAF Retired - aka John M.
John, which exam format did they administer to you? The Test for Espionage and Sabotage? Were you instructed to lie on any of the questions? Which question did they say you exhibited abnormal responses to?
They call them periodic exams. I suppose you would call it a Guilty Knowledge Test.
DIA has ordered every one of its employees and contractors to undergo this type of "testing". I have obtained through discovery that DIA has taken unfavorable administrative actions against at least 20 other people. I predict there will be many more, unless something is done about it.
The business is catching potential spies, and buddy, business is good.
Mishandling Classified Information.
John,
The Guilty Knowledge Test is not used for polygraph screening purposes. DIA uses a technique alternately called the "Test for Espionage and Sabotage" or the "Test for Espionage, Sabotage, and Terrorism." See my still-relevant 1999 commentary on this pseudoscientific ritual here:
https://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-002.shtml
I'm sorry. They were Control Question Tests. They do make you lie to a question so they can get a "baseline", or whatever. That's what they said.
Part of the deception is in the terminology. The people involved are unable to even know when they're being lied to. Insider Threat investigators and their enablers have found a way to get around the regulations/Law by claiming adherence to the regulations – when it's obvious they aren't.
Isn't it ironic that the true liars are those charged to catch liars?
At this point, the DIA Creditability Assessments Branch has essentially lost its creditability.
DOD policy also states that if an individual does not successfully complete (their way of saying "pass") the polygraph, the individual shall be given the opportunity to undergo additional examination. If the additional examination fails to resolve all relevant questions, the Head of the DoD Component may initiate a CI investigation in accordance with DoD Policy.
It doesn't say, haul them back in here again and again until they crack.
Happy St. Patrick's day Mr. McCarthy,
Is é ár lá beagnach anseo!
QuoteYou're correct about the level of corruption involved, and Wandersmann's comparison to the East German Stassi is astonishing when you think about it. What the hell is going on?
Imagine you have a job, where you decide who gets to have a job, based on their performance in an interrogation. Or, even better, your job is to catch the next Edward Snowden and you're not doing too well. I know, let's interrogate some more of them! Find those "vulnerabilities" and "mitigate" them.
Unfortunately, that's exactly the mentality which plagues the IC today, the same as 1947 -- that they are the sole barrier which prevents Raul Castro from occupying Key West or Putin from seizing Little Diomede AK! (and that every applicant for employment in the IC is a likely plant by the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces or the Russian VSR or GRU) ::)
QuoteI know what the East Germans must have felt like.
I often wonder if the application process for the Stasi was ever as arduous as that for the CIA. Somehow, I doubt it! ::)
I was beginning to think that my last few posts had left everyone speechless.
Upcoming rulings will be in my favor and we'll finally be able rip the cover from this evil abuse.
In the meantime, please help get the word out to all DIA employees that it is strictly forbidden by DOD Regulations to take unfavorable administrative actions against them based solely on the results of the polygraph.
QuoteI was beginning to think that my last few posts had left everyone speechless.
Upcoming rulings will be in my favor and we'll finally be able rip the cover from this evil abuse.
In the meantime, please help get the word out to all DIA employees that it is strictly forbidden by DOD Regulations to take unfavorable administrative actions against them based solely on the results of the polygraph.
What do you mean by "upcoming rulings" ? :)
Found this to be so appropriate.
That logo is just beautiful! Where did you ever come across it?
:D
QuoteThe overriding mandate in this regulation is that Polygraph examinations are a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of screening or investigation. No unfavorable administrative action (to include access, employment, assignment, and detail determinations) shall be taken solely on the basis of the results of the polygraph examination.
You seem to have ignored the following section; You need to go back and re-read 5210.91:
6. REFUSAL TO TAKE OR COMPLETE A PSS. DoD-affiliated personnel who refuse to take or complete a polygraph examination, and are in positions designated as requiring a PSS polygraph examination as part of determining initial eligibility for access to Top Secret, SAP, or other sensitive intelligence or operational information or for initial assignment or detail to the CIA or other IC elements, may be denied access, assignment, or detail.
Quote from: 3427303F22510 on Feb 17, 2017, 06:58 PMI'll go out on a limb by speculating it was a case of age discrimination. You may fire away quickfix!
a. If, after reviewing the examination results, the requesting agency determines that they raise a significant question relevant to the individual's eligibility for a security clearance or continued access, the individual shall be given an opportunity to undergo additional examination.
There is nothing in the reg that MANDATES you to undergo additional testing. "Opportunity" is not a mandate. Polygraph testing is voluntary, not mandatory.
Quote from: quickfix on Mar 26, 2017, 02:53 PMYou seem to have ignored the following section; You need to go back and re-read 5210.91:
Come on man. I read 5210.91 so many times, I can recite it word for word. I neither refused nor failed to complete a PSS. In fact, I was early each and every time. I have probably sat through over 40 hours of interrogation and never left until I was dismissed.
Besides, I was already in access – had the same job for 14 years before this happened. This was not a case of initial eligibility or assignment.
You are correct that there is nothing in the reg that MANDATES me to undergo additional testing. What it does say though, is if the additional examination fails to resolve all relevant questions, the Head of the DoD Component may initiate a CI investigation in accordance with DoD policy.
What it doesn't say is, go ahead and use the polygraph results by themselves to take unfavorable actions against the poor sucker. It is an indisputable fact that it explicitly prohibits it.
The rulings that are coming will be of the LANDMARK variety.
The polygraph industry and those who use it to commit abuse are in for a very rude awakening.
I've attached 5210.91 here to clear up any further confusion on this matter.
QuoteI neither refused nor failed to complete a PSS.
a. Polygraph examinations be conducted pursuant to section 1564a of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (f)). Personnel who refuse to take or are unable to successfully complete the polygraph examination may be denied access to information identified in Reference (f).
If you were deemed No Opinion or Significant Response, then you did in fact complete the polygraph; you simply did not
successfully complete it. You can use all the circular logic and semantics you want, you have multiple unresolved completed polygraphs. And it also applies to continuing access as well as initial. You didn't read that part either.
h. Designate positions requiring a personnel security screening (PSS) polygraph as part of determining initial or continuing eligibility for access to Top Secret information, special access program (SAP), or other sensitive intelligence or operational information.
Quickfix, do you work for DIA, or what?
Circular logic and semantics aside, the indisputable material fact in this case is that NO UNFAVORABLE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS shall be taken based solely on the results of the polygraph.
Read that again and come to terms with it.
Your reference to Enclosure 2. h. is like something that the DIA Office of Security would use to further confuse the situation. How the hell does designating the positions that require a PSS have anything to do with using the results as the sole basis for taking unfavorable actions.
Polygraph abuse, pure and simple.
Fire away!
I work for a DoD component, and participated in the creation of the reg as well as its revision.
QuoteThe rulings that are coming will be of the LANDMARK variety.
You're not the first to say that, nor will you be the last. We're still waiting...
Thank you for helping to create the document that will exonerate me.
I really hate to keep you waiting - The judicial process is so slow. Believe me, I tried to get the abuse to stop over three years ago. People like yourself can't continue the cover-up much longer.
It's incredible to me that people actually believe that they can punish someone based solely on the results of the polygraph.
I really hope for your sake, that you're not involved in this type of abuse.
Quote from: quickfix on Mar 26, 2017, 05:04 PMYou're not the first to say that, nor will you be the last. We're still waiting...
...and unfortunately I'm afraid that you're absolutely correct. ::)
"When the wicked advance against me to slander me, it is my enemies who will stumble and fall."
- Psalm 27:2
I posted this over on the "Latest WikiLeaks" post the other day. Posting here in case you missed it.....
I hope and pray that the upcoming rulings in my cases will be the klieg lights that finally expose this crap for what it is. It's way past time to put a stop to this pernicious form of abuse.
Here it is. DIA created a classified document to help cover-up their abuse - DIAI 5200.002. Signed by David R. Shedds for Michael T. Flynn on 3 Jul 2014 and marked "UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY".
I guess that they classified it to keep it out of the public eye - paragraph 4.22 on page 10 directly refutes DOD policy.
I obtained a copy of this Instruction in one of my requests for discovery - you won't be able to find it anywhere. I put the attached together for my congressman as well as several congressional and senate committees.
Fire away quickfix.
Once again, you are quoting only the sections that appear favorable to you. You ignore the part of 5210.91 that says "except as provided in Sections 6 and 7 of Enclosure 4".
Now here is what section 6 and 7 of Enclosure 4 say:
6. REFUSAL TO TAKE OR COMPLETE A PSS. DoD-affiliated personnel who refuse to take or complete a polygraph examination, and are in positions designated as requiring a PSS polygraph examination as part of determining initial eligibility for access to Top Secret, SAP, or other sensitive intelligence or operational information or for initial assignment or detail to the CIA or other IC elements, MAY BE DENIED access, assignment, or detail.
7. FAILURE TO RESOLVE A PSS. DoD-affiliated personnel in positions cited in section 6 of this enclosure who are unable to resolve all relevant questions of a PSS shall be so advised. The results of the examination shall be forwarded to the requesting agency.
a. If, after reviewing the examination results, the requesting agency determines that they raise a significant question relevant to the individual's eligibility for a security clearance or continued access, the individual shall be given an opportunity to undergo additional examination.
b. If the additional examination fails to resolve all relevant questions, the Head of the DoD Component may initiate a CI investigation in accordance with DoD policy.
c. Additionally, the Head of the relevant DoD Component may temporarily suspend an individual's access to controlled information and deny the individual assignment or detail that is contingent on such access, based upon a written finding that, considering the results of the examination and the extreme sensitivity of the classified information involved, access under the circumstances poses an unacceptable risk to the national security. Such temporary suspension of access may not form the part of any basis for an adverse administrative action or an adverse personnel action.
d. The individual shall be advised in writing of the determination, that the determination may be appealed to the Head of the relevant DoD Component, and that his or her final determination is conclusive.
If you're going to wave regs around, make sure you have the ENTIRE reg, not just the pages you like.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 05, 2017, 02:37 PMdetermining initial eligibility for access to Top Secret, SAP, or other sensitive intelligence or operational information or for initial assignment or detail to the CIA or other IC elements, may be denied access, assignment, or detail.
I know that the CIA requires military personnel assigned to the Agency to undergo the polygraph. I wouldn't be surprised if the CIA would also require personnel from even other IC agencies to undergo its own polygraph ordeal prior to allowing entry into the sanctum sanctorum of Langley. ::)
Quote"UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY".
What exactly is the definition and purpose of the "FOUO" classification? :-?
QuoteI obtained a copy of this Instruction in one of my requests for discovery - you won't be able to find it anywhere. I put the attached together for my congressman as well as several congressional and senate committees.
One major thing you've overlooked John, and it's easy to understand. Your reg refers to "
no adverse action" to be taken as the result of a polygraph. What you don't understand is that the evil, twisted Nazi's that run our security divisions do not consider falsely accusing you, taking away your livelihood, ruining your reputation, etc, etc, etc, to be an adverse action. They consider themselves nice guys because they don't send you to prison for not passing a polygraph. They define
adverse action in a way that benefits only them. It's like the character played by Ned Beatty, portraying a U.S. Senator, in the movie
Shooter says, "
truth is what I say it is". >:(
Come on quickfix. Do you even read what you've cut and pasted? Reading comprehension must not be one of your strong suits. Keywords: INITIAL, BASED ON A WRITTEN FINDING.
Please read the ENTIRE regulation again and come to terms with the fact that the results of the polygraph by themselves can not be used to take unfavorable administrative action against an individual who is already been granted a clearance.
This is POLYGRAPH ABUSE!
When the Federal Judges come down with their ruling - and it will come soon - will you believe me then?
Wandersman - see my earlier post about the Code of Federal Regulations and the definition of Unfavorable Administrative Actions.
I know exactly what it says, as I participated in the creation of the regulation. You are confusing clearance and access. A person's CLEARANCE may not be revoked or suspended. Access is completely different and can be denied or withdrawn. Every DOD agency follows this guideline. Access and clearance are NOT the same. One can have a clearance and not be granted access, which is apparently where you fit. In addition, initial and continuing access are both covered in 5210.91. I already previously cited the portion of the reg that covers continuing access. Unless your CLEARANCE has been suspended or revoked, you have no legal argument. You let us know when you hear from those federal judges.
quickfix, you are part of the problem. You are either deliberately trying to cover up the truth, or you have trouble with reading comprehension.
What does UNFAVORABLE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION mean to you?
I suggest you read the Code of Federal Regulations - especially definitions. The regulation doesn't cover anything related to the difference between clearance and access -come on man, you're just making stuff up now.
Your reference to continuing access was directly in taken from the part where it states who can be subjected to the polygraph - not what you can do with the results.
I have been trying to make this point for over three years now and finally, it's about to be exposed.
How do you know what every DoD organization does? Maybe everyone outside of DIA follows the regulation.
I have an idea quickfix. How about discussing this with your OGC. If you are DIA, start with Brett Stern (202)-231-6094.
Let's see you twist this -
Unfavorable administrative action. Adverse action taken as the result of personnel security determinations and unfavorable personnel security determinations as defined in this part.
Unfavorable personnel security determination.
A denial or revocation of clearance for access to classified information; denial or revocation of access to classified information; denial or revocation of a Special Access authorization (including access to SCI); nonappointment to or nonselection for appointment to a sensitive position; nonappointment to or nonselection for any other position requiring a trustworthiness determination under this part; reassignment to a position of lesser sensitivity or to a nonsensitive position; and nonacceptance for or discharge from the Armed Forces when any of the foregoing actions are based on derogatory information of personnel security significance.
An even better POC in the DAI/OGC is Brent Evitt (703)735-6317.
lawyer up buddy.
Quote from: quickfix on Mar 26, 2017, 02:53 PMPolygraph testing is voluntary, not mandatory.
Are you serious ? Just like when someone holds a gun to your head and demands your wallet. If you give the armed robber your wallet under those circumstances, it is also voluntary.
Quote from: Wandersmann on Apr 05, 2017, 10:39 PMQuote from: quickfix on Mar 26, 2017, 02:53 PMPolygraph testing is voluntary, not mandatory.
Are you serious ? Just like when someone holds a gun to your head and demands your wallet. If you give the armed robber your wallet under those circumstances, it is also voluntary.
Of course it's voluntary; you just kiss the rest of your application processing good-bye! ;D
Quotelawyer up buddy.
No need. Unlike you, I passed my poly.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 05, 2017, 03:56 PMAccess and clearance are NOT the same.
What exactly, in practical terms, is the difference between the two? :-?
QuoteSo, for 10 months I sat waiting for my fate - with nothing to do, answering phones and occupying a meaningless position. They put me in a section they affectionately called "The Misfit Toys". This is where people go who lose their clearances for things like beating their wife, drunk driving, or drugs.
I suppose that we should be grateful that the DIA at least makes an effort to provide accommodation for its now "useless" employees who've lost clearances.
At the CIA, it would just be "see you later, sucker" ! lol ;D
For those like John M. who are ignorant of the difference between a clearance and access, here are the differences:
one can have a TS clearance and not have access. A clearance only grants one the eligibility to have access to that level. Clearance granting is based on a favorable background investigation.
Access is the approval for read-on to special programs, special compartmented information (SCI), or other restricted or protected programs or information. Certain programs require additional security measures as a condition. Special Access Programs (SAP), SCI, JWICS, NSA network, CIA access, and other similar programs may require successful completion of a polygraph exam as a condition for that specific access. Failure to successfully complete a polygraph will result in denial of access, but not loss of the clearance. As a result, loss of access is not considered "administrative adverse action", as John M. incorrectly believes. Adverse administrative action means loss of job, loss of clearance when clearance is a condition of employment, loss of pay, or reduction in grade. Loss of clearance occurs when credible derogatory information exists to justify revocation (loss) of clearance. A civilian employee who loses access is simply put into another position at the same grade and pay that does not require access.
Which is why John M. has been banging his head against the table for 3 years. He has no valid argument regarding loss of access after 5 unresolved polygraphs.
Okay, this is getting really old. Is the regulation that hard to understand? Possibly, but I doubt it. If people like quickfix actually believe what he says, DIA's abuse of the polygraph has become institutionalized.
I'll repeat this one more time, the DOD regulation states:
The polygraph is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of screening or investigation. No unfavorable administrative action (to include access, employment, assignment, and detail determinations) shall be taken solely on the basis of either a refusal to undergo a polygraph examination or an unresolved polygraph examination.
The Code of Federal Regulations Title 32, Part 154, subpart 154 defines an unfavorable administrative action as:
Unfavorable administrative action. Adverse action taken as the result of personnel security determinations and unfavorable personnel security determinations as defined in this part.
Unfavorable personnel security determination. A denial or revocation of clearance for access to classified information; denial or revocation of access to classified information; denial or revocation of a Special Access authorization (including access to SCI); nonappointment to or nonselection for appointment to a sensitive position; nonappointment to or nonselection for any other position requiring a trustworthiness determination under this part; reassignment to a position of lesser sensitivity or to a nonsensitive position; and nonacceptance for or discharge from the Armed Forces when any of the foregoing actions are based on derogatory information of personnel security significance.
Now, what is that bullshit about access and clearance again quickfix?
QuoteIf people like quickfix actually believe what he says, DIA's abuse of the polygraph has become institutionalized.
There's doubtlessly a quickfix in all the Offices of Security throughout the IC, the DOD, and the various branches of the Armed Forces.
With this thread, I'm starting to understand the mentality of these security cadres in the Government. ::)
Quote from: xenonman on Apr 06, 2017, 09:21 PMWith this thread, I'm starting to understand the mentality of these security cadres in the Government.
Easy to understand. Insecure, envious, insignificant people who can feel important by messing with people superior to them in every way through this stupid voodoo that is sanctioned by a corrupt government. I remember one little miscreant with a high school degree who was getting his jolly's by messing with a PhD. If it wasn't for the polygraph most of these clowns would be working in a car wash. ;)
Quote from: xenonman on Apr 06, 2017, 09:21 PMWith this thread, I'm starting to understand the mentality of these security cadres in the Government.
Precisely why I started it. My goal was to expose this insidious and pernicious form of abuse and make it stop.
Major class action lawsuit here - lawyers like Mark Zaid should take notice and seize on this opportunity.
I completely agree with you Wandersmann.
Once again, John M. chooses to parrot his own version of 5210.91 and ignore Sections 6 and 7 of Enclosure 4. Which is why he's now likely greeting customers at Wal-Mart.
I already addressed items 6 and 7 of enclosure 4 earlier - they don't apply. Did you contact the Office of General Counsel yet? Apparently not, because if you did, they would be telling you to shut up about it.
I believe you have been indoctrinated in to thinking that it's okay to violate individual rights by using the results of the polygraph to punish someone.
Please stop posting here until you comprehend what the regulation prohibits. You're wasting our time and showing what an idiot you are.
(expletive deleted) and the horse you rode in on.
QuotePlease stop posting here until you comprehend what the regulation prohibits. You're wasting our time and showing what an idiot you are.
I will post as often as I want. You don't like it, come after me with your fucking lawyers and your judges!!!5210.91 Enclosure 4 Section 6 and 7 does apply. You just wish it didn't. Now everyone knows you are a national security risk.
So, I guess it is that you do like to waste our time by showing us that you're an idiot.
Like I said before on this thread at least three times, Item 6 concerns initial eligibility – I was in the same cleared-for-access job that I had for the previous 13 years.
Item 7 pertains to the fact that after reviewing the results of the polygraph, the agency may give another polygraph. If that polygraph is still inconclusive, the agency may initiate a CI investigation.
Here's what it doesn't say – except as provided, go ahead and slander someone by calling them a "vulnerability", marking him a potential traitor and humiliating him before the entire intelligence community – trashing an otherwise stellar career. And it sure doesn't say that it's okay to force him to pick up and move 1000 miles away to the cesspool known as D.C. if he wants to keep his pay grade.
The polygraph test is inherently probabilistic. Therefore, Congress and DoD put explicit restrictions on its use and the use of the so-called "results". Go back and re-read Enclosure 2, Item 2, GENERAL PROGRAM PROCEDURES, Subparagraph g. one more time and quit grabbing for straws.
George, if you are quickfix, thanks. Thanks for helping me tell the complete story and to show just how ridiculous this whole situation is.
QuoteGeorge, if you are quickfix, thanks. Thanks for helping me tell the complete story and to show just how ridiculous this whole situation is.
I'm pretty certain that George (if you are referring to the Moderator of AP) is not "quickfix"! ;D
I wish that I had had the benefit of this most revealing thread back when I was wasting time with IC applications. It's people like Mr. Q who are the ones whom are making the personnel decisions throughout the IC. These are the troglodytes who conduct and "interpret" the polygraph, and conduct and misinterpret the BI's. It is they who control the access to the various gates to the IC. It's certainly not the IC recruiters, who are probably kept wholly in the dark by their respective Offices of Security, thus enabling recruiters to make false promises, and even to initiate contact with prospective applicants whom people like "Q" have already determined to have "improper" backgrounds.
The present thread has been most revealing for me about the blind cave salamanders who really run the IC. "Q" has trashed me extensively over at "federalsoup", the online forum for federal employees seeking to raise their "GS" levels.
In that regard, those at the CIA already have the unique advantage of being two full GS grades above federal employees at other agencies with similar qualifications and education levels!
I think we have to realize that folks like "Q" honestly believe that, in controlling the IC's personnel selection processes, they are final line of national defense that keeps Kim Jong-Un's navy from sailing up the Columbia to Portland, or Raul Castro's Cuban Revolutionary Navy from shelling Fort Lauderdale.
Had I had the benefit of this thread 30 or 40 years ago, I might have better grasped the reasons for such agencies as the CIA or DMA (one of the many predecessors to the NGIA) and their personnel policies being as f*cked up as they are! >:(
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 07, 2017, 03:35 PMNow everyone knows you are a national security risk.
Of course he is! Because of him, Putin will now be able to send the Red Army over to "liberate" Little Diomede Island AK! :D :D
QuotePlease stop posting here
He's also very active over at the IC boards on "federalsoup"! ;D
QuoteSo, I guess it is that you do like to waste our time by showing us that you're an idiot.
Actually it hasn't been a waste of our time at all, because it affords us a revealing "inside" look at the refined level of knowledge enjoyed by those "patriots" who are the real gatekeepers at the IC! ::)
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 07, 2017, 03:35 PMI will post as often as I want
Fortunately that isn't too often! :D
Once again, John M. chooses to cherry-pick from the 5210.91 and discards what he doesn't like. Every time he does this, I will follow right behind with what he conveniently ignored:
Enclosure 4, para (5)b. PSS Examinations. PSS examinations are used to assist in determining an individual's eligibility for sensitive duties or positions as established by the Heads of the DoD Components to cover detailees and incumbent employees in designated positions.
As a DIA employee, you were subject to polygraph testing, both initially, and periodically thereafter. Now everyone know why you are no longer a DIA employee after 5 unresolved polygraphs, and are a national security risk.
To tell you the truth, it's really tiring to watch you try to justify this abuse. Why can't you just be honest with yourself and admit you're wrong.
Here again, you point to another item in the regulation that has nothing to do with taking unfavorable administrative actions based solely on the polygraph "results."
The passage you refer to simply states what the PSS is used for – to ASSIST in determining an individual's eligibility for sensitive duties of positions." Like I have repeated over and over throughout this thread, the polygraph is a supplement to, not a substitute for other methods of investigation, NO UNFAVORABLE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS shall be taken based solely on the "results."
Why is this simple concept so difficult for you to understand? Is it because you're being exposed and now your job is threatened?
Let's be clear here - there are many reasons why an individual might produce false positives on a polygraph test. Your statement that I am a national security risk because I failed 5 polygraph tests is astonishing and an example of everything that is wrong with the process. People like you have no shame – and are more likely to pass a polygraph with flying colors.
My advice, spread the word and stop this abuse now.
Quote from: xenonman on Apr 08, 2017, 01:51 AMActually it hasn't been a waste of our time at all, because it affords us a revealing "inside" look
It absolutely does - and it's appalling what they are getting away with, isn't it?
QuoteLet's be clear here - there are many reasons why an individual might produce false positives on a polygraph test. Your statement that I am a national security risk because I failed 5 polygraph tests is astonishing and an example of everything that is wrong with the process. People like you have no shame – and are more likely to pass a polygraph with flying colors.
Yes, it's astonishing- that you were retested that many times. Most agencies would have removed you from access after not passing twice.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 08, 2017, 11:48 AMYes, it's astonishing- that you were retested that many times. Most agencies would have removed you from access after not passing twice.
I had to quote that before it was removed. Reminds me of Jack Nicholson - you can't handle the truth! You just admitted to the abusive policy.
And just like Jack Nicholson, you still don't get it.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 07, 2017, 02:13 PMWhich is why he's now likely greeting customers at Wal-Mart.
What a sick mind. He thinks ruining people's lives is funny. You are the national security risk Quickfix. You falsely accuse innocent people and exonerate guilty people. This stupid polygraph, proven inaccurate, has replaced time tested investigative procedures and has put Americans at risk......all for power and money for people not good enough to be real investigators.
Imagine being a self-sacrificing patriot for 30 years earning an honest reputation and having it all erased in one afternoon by being falsely labeled a risk to national security. Imagine knowing you offered to give your life for your country and you went in harms way only to be labeled a risk to national security by the traitors in our security departments. Think of Audie Murphy being labeled a risk to national security after two medals of honor if he had gone on to work for one of today's 3-letter agencies and then flunking a polygraph.
The polygraph community and leadership of the intelligence and security agencies that supports current polygraph policy are parasites, nothing more. Guys like Quickfix think that because they currently have the blessing of a corrupt Congress whose palms are being greased by the polygraph lobby they are justified. Kim Jong Un thinks the same way.
are you finished with your blather?
Here are the INDISPUTABLE MATERIAL FACTS:
1) Fear and anxiety are irrepressible emotions – emotions that the polygraph interprets as a "lie."
2) Because the polygraph is inherently probabilistic, DoD has put protections in place that explicitly prohibit abusing an employee based solely on the results of the polygraph.
3) People in DIA like quickfix, advance in their careers by violating approved and relevant regulations - in full view of everyone involved. (To further prove this point, I have a 397 page independent investigation that contains affidavits, interrogatories and sworn testimonies from senior officials who admit to doing it. I have also obtained hundreds of emails and other documents through FOIA that reveal their behind-the-scenes cover-up).
4) Due to the lies, semantics and attempts to misdirect from the DIA Office of Security (like quickfix has so ineptly used on this thread), Inspector Generals at all levels (IC, DoD, DIA) are helpless to enforce the regulations and stop this abuse.
My Congressman and Senator's offices are very aware of the issue, as is the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Because I am still awaiting the Judge's rulings from two separate federal cases, I have been advised by all to wait for those Judge's rulings. This is why those rulings will be landmark – they will once and for all prove that DIA is in violation of DoD authority and my individual rights.
Quickfix's arrogance is disgusting and his willful ignorance is utterly shameful. If he is as who he says he is, a senior official involved in this pernicious abuse, he along with the others must be held accountable.
It takes a willing hand to punish horrible men.
Quote from: John M. on Apr 09, 2017, 11:21 AMHere are the INDISPUTABLE MATERIAL FACTS:
1) Fear and anxiety are irrepressible emotions – emotions that the polygraph interprets as a "lie."
2) Because the polygraph is inherently probabilistic, DoD has put protections in place that explicitly prohibit abusing an employee based solely on the results of the polygraph.
3) People in DIA like quickfix, advance in their careers by violating approved and relevant regulations - in full view of everyone involved. (To further prove this point, I have a 397 page independent investigation that contains affidavits, interrogatories and sworn testimonies from senior officials who admit to doing it. I have also obtained hundreds of emails and other documents through FOIA that reveal their behind-the-scenes cover-up).
4) Due to the lies, semantics and attempts to misdirect from the DIA Office of Security (like quickfix has so ineptly used on this thread), Inspector Generals at all levels (IC, DoD, DIA) are helpless to enforce the regulations and stop this abuse.
My Congressman and Senator's offices are very aware of the issue, as is the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Because I am still awaiting the Judge's rulings from two separate federal cases, I have been advised by all to wait for those Judge's rulings. This is why those rulings will be landmark – they will once and for all prove that DIA is in violation of DoD authority and my individual rights.
Quickfix's arrogance is disgusting and his willful ignorance is utterly shameful. If he is as who he says he is, a senior official involved in this pernicious abuse, he along with the others must be held accountable.
It takes a willing hand to punish horrible men.
Indisputable facts as YOU see them.
Our facts: no pass polygraph, no get job. No pass polygraph, no keep access.
Since you can't handle the truth, I'm done with you quickfix. I refuse to answer one more of your silly little lies. Thanks for helping me prove my point though.
You and those like you will ultimately be held accountable.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 09, 2017, 09:08 AMare you finished with your blather?
I certainly hope that he is NOT! ::)
QuoteThanks for helping me prove my point though.
One major point I have learned from this thread (combined with my own negative experiences with the IC) is that one's talents, skills, interests, and desire to work for the IC run a very far, far second to one's ability to play the polygraph and BI games, when it comes to employment within the IC.
The polygraph is, of course, modern day alchemy and the BI is essentially a popularity contest.
At the time of my applications to the IC, I had a perfect credit history, a clear police record, and a "satisfactory" residential and lifestyle history. All that merely made it necessary for the BI's to have to dig deeper for dirt, until they finally were able to come upon some, in the form of a few jerks at a place where I worked part time when I was in college (known as "developed informants" in FBI-speak).
On another occasion, CIA recruiters informed me that because of my knowledge and skills, I was virtually assured of an "offer of employment" from the Agency. This contact came as the result of my being approached by someone at the Agency, NOT the other way around. Unfortunately, as I learned the hard way, the recruiters are wholly out of the loop of the Office of Security, and have no input into its processes. The Offices of Security of the IC agencies are the last redoubt and deep cave for the troglodytic "quickfixes" of the IC.
Those applicants best able to worm their way through the polygraph and BI tend to be chameleons and sociopaths, selected because of their ability to be deceptive and to be "all things to all people". Since one's qualifications, skills, and aptitude apparently play virtually NO role whatever in the personnel selection decisions of the IC agencies' Offices of Security" , it is small wonder that IC personnel are so mediocre and that the IC is a perfect incubator for the mental development of specimens like a "quickfix"!.
In the case of the CIA, its successful applicants appear to be college grads with otherwise unemployable majors, who have lucked their way through the BI popularity contest and the polygraph, and who have thus been hired based primarily upon luck and chameleonship, rather than occupational qualifications!
I wish to thank the various participants in this thread. More than most of the other posts on this site, the present prolonged thread has provided me with ample clarification and insight as to the attitudes of those who in fact control the keys of access into the IC. ::)
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 07, 2017, 02:13 PMWhich is why he's now likely greeting customers at Wal-Mart.
Well, didn't Felix Bloch (the suspected Soviet mole at State) end his work career, after being stripped of his federal pension, as a cashier in a retail store or supermarket? Supposedly, he also was apprehended for shoplifting at another retail establishment too! ;D
This is what this thread looks like to Aunty --
George W. Maschke, Doug Williams, Wandersmann, xenonman, John M., et. al.: Some government agencies are violating their own guidelines that limit administrative actions based on the polygraph lie detector. As an applicant or employee, you may be required to undergo a polygraph examination. You will have an even chance to fail whether you are lying or not, and because these agencies illegally violate their own prescribed procedures, if you fail a polygraph test you will not be hired or you will lose your clearance.
quickfix: No, you guys are wrong wrong wrong. If you fail a polygraph test you will not be hired or you will lose your clearance.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 09, 2017, 02:24 PMOur facts: no pass polygraph, no get job. No pass polygraph, no keep access.
So Quickfix is the God of hiring... Qualifications don't matter if the polygraph chicken bone tossing comes out against the applicant. So John M this thread should be extremely helpful to your cause. God speed my friend... And Quickfix keep posting your nonsense. Your posts demonstrate the insanity of polygraph examiners.
Quote from: Caca_Dau on Apr 10, 2017, 10:22 AMSo Quickfix is the God of hiring... Qualifications don't matter if the polygraph chicken bone tossing comes out against the applicant.
It isn't just quickfix, but also all of his colleagues at the various agencies' respective Offices of Security throughout the entire IC. You will find that his type of mentality permeates every agency that restricts access to its premises and/or that handles classified info. ::)
Thank you to everyone for helping me to expose this pernicious form of abuse. As I mentioned before, in the discovery phases of my cases, DIA provided me a list of 20 individuals (with their names redacted, of course) who have been abused by this policy. That was two years ago - I suspect there have been many more innocent lives ruined since then.
Class action lawsuit anyone?
I will post the rulings in my cases as soon as they come available.
Stay tuned!
Quote
Class action lawsuit anyone?
I will post the rulings in my cases as soon as they come available.
Much luck in your endeavors!
I might even be game for a class action? lol 8-)
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 09, 2017, 02:24 PMOur facts: no pass polygraph, no get job. No pass polygraph, no keep access.
Corollary : Know people that like to gossip? No pass BI. No get IC job. ;D
QuoteClass action lawsuit anyone?
Count me in for sure. When you are ready let me know and we'll work out a way to get in contact. When we find some honest jurists with half a brain this should be huge. Libeling people with absolutely no evidence or proof, taking away livelihoods with no due process. Sooner or later they will take down someone with the right political connections and it will all come crumbling down. It is inevitable now because they are parasites and parasites can't stop feeding until it is too late. Beware the fury of a patient man.
Quote from: AuntyAgony on Apr 10, 2017, 08:13 AMThis is what this thread looks like to Aunty --
George W. Maschke, Doug Williams, Wandersmann, xenonman, John M., et. al.: Some government agencies are violating their own guidelines that limit administrative actions based on the polygraph lie detector. As an applicant or employee, you may be required to undergo a polygraph examination. You will have an even chance to fail whether you are lying or not, and because these agencies illegally violate their own prescribed procedures, if you fail a polygraph test you will not be hired or you will lose your clearance.
quickfix: No, you guys are wrong wrong wrong. If you fail a polygraph test you will not be hired or you will lose your clearance.
Good observation Aunty. The more I analyze the threads and Quickfix's comments I now think that there might be something else afoot. A lot of things don't make sense. People have surmised that Quickfix is really Dr. Maschke or another anti-polygrapher involved in a false-flag to support the anti-polygraph cause. Quickfix's postings have done much to support the anti-polygraph cause by revealing what Nazi's polygraph examiners are. I don't think Dr. Maschke, however, would do such a thing or allow such a thing.
Quickfix's comments, however, really are interesting. On one hand he occasionally quotes regulations and policy with aplomb and accuracy. On the other hand, his ridicule often stoops to the level of a half-wit bully and he can't control his use of vulgar language. Is he really who he says he is? Is he more than one person? If he's really in the military I wonder if he is wearing a Navy SEAL trident over his Coast Guard good conduct medal? Maybe he is the real deal because foul-mouthed half-wit bullies are good polygraph examiner candidates. I just don't understand why he needs to troll this site if he is who he says he is. :-?
By the way, let me quote the definition of
Quickfix as recorded in
A Dictionary of Bullshit*// A Lexicon of Corporate-and Office Speak by Diane Law:
"quick fix
1. a half-assed attempt at fixing a problem which usually results in a bigger problem that could have been avoided by doing the job properly first time around.2. no fix at all." :D ;D OK Quickfix, I'm done blathering.
Quote from: Wandersmann on Apr 10, 2017, 10:11 PMCount me in for sure.
You can also include me, although it may be problematic that I, although certainly a victim of the polygraph, was never actually hired by any "three-letter" agency. ::)
Quickfix, a clearance without access is like a defrocked priest. I'm curious, if someone fails a TES, do you break it out into a single issue and retest?--is the successive hurdles concept used?
John M., if your polygraph experiences had been favorable, would you have a positive view of the polygraph's proposed probabilistic efficacy in deterring threats to national security?
Quote from: Arkhangelsk on Apr 11, 2017, 11:50 AMQuickfix, a clearance without access is like a defrocked priest. I'm curious, if someone fails a TES, do you break it out into a single issue and retest?--is the successive hurdles concept used?
Clearance requires an SBI; it is the basic security umbrella; access may or may not require a polygraph, depending on what the access is.
Yes, breakouts and successive hurdles are the norm now.
Quote from: xenonman on Apr 11, 2017, 03:29 AMWandersmann wrote Today at 2:11am:
Count me in for sure.
You can also include me, although it may be problematic that I, although certainly a victim of ploygraphy, was never actually hired by any "three-letter" agency. (https://antipolygraph.org/yabbfiles/Templates/Forum/default/rolleyes.gif)
oh dear, a class action of 3; what a formidable adversary; a national security risk, a retired federal employee with nothing better to do in his golden years, and a mentally unstable IC applicant reject from the Jimmy Carter era. Sounds more like the 3 Stooges.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 11, 2017, 02:54 PMQuote from: xenonman on Apr 11, 2017, 03:29 AMWandersmann wrote Today at 2:11am:
Count me in for sure.
You can also include me, although it may be problematic that I, although certainly a victim of ploygraphy, was never actually hired by any "three-letter" agency. (https://antipolygraph.org/yabbfiles/Templates/Forum/default/rolleyes.gif)
oh dear, a class action of 3; what a formidable adversary; a national security risk, a retired federal employee with nothing better to do in his golden years, and a mentally unstable IC applicant reject from the Jimmy Carter era.
Sounds more like the 3 Stooges.
I didn't know that quickfix was a psychiatrist too.
A perfect example of what happens when polygraphers start to get the idea that they're medical professionals too.
It's like an alchemist trying to create gold masquerading as if he's discovered the key to atomic fusion. as well. :D ;)
Quote from: Wandersmann on Apr 10, 2017, 10:29 PMMaybe he is the real deal because foul-mouthed half-wit bullies are good polygraph examiner candidates. I just don't understand why he needs to troll this site if he is who he says he is. :-?
I see no reason to suspect that quickfix is anything other than what he so accurately presents himself as. Indeed, "foul-mouthed, half-wit bullies" are exactly the type of personalities that staff the Offices of Security across the IC.
I would be very careful with overuse of the phrase, "false flag". It used to be CIA-speak for a foreign intelligence service masquerading as representatives of another state. Today, the term has become a grossly overused component of the vocabulary of every conspiracy theorist. ;D :D ;D
Quote from: Wandersmann on Apr 10, 2017, 10:29 PMI don't think Dr. Maschke, however, would do such a thing or allow such a thing.
Neither do I, unless he is in the pay of either the Bilderbergs, the Dutch royal family, or the Netherlands security services.
All three seek to regain "Nieuw Amsterdam" and the Hudson Valley ;D :D
Why are we adversaries again? Because I want to stop the abuse? If that makes us adversaries, so be it. You were my Insider Threat, now I'm going to be your worst nightmare.
Oh yeah, count me as disabled retired – disabled by PTSD and stress disorder - from the unavoidable and inescapable abuse of recurring polygraph interrogations, public humiliation and loss of career.
My mission in life is to wipe this kind of abuse from the face of the earth.
The attached is dated November 2015. It contains a list of employees who DIA is also known to have abused. How many more have suffered the same since? There will be many more of us to come - I'm just getting started.
You can't handle the truth.
Quote from: quickfix on Apr 11, 2017, 02:54 PMSounds more like the 3 Stooges.
I love the Stooges. I'll be Larry. In the meantime Quickfix, keep working on getting that GED. You can do it! Once you get that GED you can get a job working security for United Airlines. Hopefully if you ever get asked to remove a passenger the passenger will be the returning MMA World Champion returning home after his victory. :D
Quote from: xenonman on Apr 11, 2017, 05:32 PMNeither do I, unless he is in the pay of either the Bilderbergs, the Dutch royal family, or the Netherlands security services.
All three seek to regain "Nieuw Amsterdam" and the Hudson Valley
If he is, I'll join him! I am part Dutch and think the English take-over of Nieuwe Amsterdam was one of the biggest tragedies in American history. That's when clowns like Quickfix first started to run things and it's been goin' south ever since. I believe that the polygraph is not used by the Dutch government. I know it is not used and is
verboten by the Germans.
Quote from: xenonman on Apr 11, 2017, 04:37 PMI didn't know that quickfix was a psychiatrist too.
He's not a very good one. Hasn't got me figured out at all.
QuoteThe attached is dated November 2015. It contains a list of employees who DIA is also known to have abused. How many more have suffered the same since? There will be many more of us to come - I'm just getting started.
Question - is the polygraph the reason for all of these adverse actions? It doesn't say specifically.
Their words:
"A complete list of DIA employees who have been subjected to unfavorable administrative actions solely as a result of their inability to successfully complete the PCA examination."
Quote from: Wandersmann on Apr 11, 2017, 10:24 PMQuote from: xenonman on Apr 11, 2017, 05:32 PMNeither do I, unless he is in the pay of either the Bilderbergs, the Dutch royal family, or the Netherlands security services.
All three seek to regain "Nieuw Amsterdam" and the Hudson Valley
If he is, I'll join him! I am part Dutch and think the English take-over of Nieuwe Amsterdam was one of the biggest tragedies in American history. That's when clowns like Quickfix first started to run things and it's been goin' south ever since. I believe that the polygraph is not used by the Dutch government. I know it is not used and is verboten by the Germans.
I say, just get our $24. worth of trinkets back from the Indians, and let them have back Manhattan. ;D
Quote from: xenonman on Apr 15, 2017, 06:33 AMI say, just get our $24. worth of trinkets back from the Indians, and let them have back Manhattan.
I'll agree with you there Xenonman. I don't think the Dutch want it back at this point. >:(
The waiting is hardest part.
Just received an update from my Congressman on one of my cases. Seven months from now will be three years and five months since my initial complaint was filed. It will be two years and seven months since I officially requested a hearing - and that was after a three month, 387 page Report of Investigation was completed.
The indisputable material facts have all been identified and all motions to move have been served since January, 2016.
Oh, don't let it kill you baby, don't let it get to you,
Don't let 'em kill you baby, don't let 'em get to you,
You take it on faith, you take it to the heart,
The waiting is the hardest part.
Good luck in your efforts!
(Just don't expect great miracles from your Congressman, especially in matters involving the IC) 8-)
I guess three and a half years is not bad, considering the level of corruption and abuse that is involved.
Many questions to be answered and many fingers to point.
QuoteI guess three and a half years is not bad, considering the level of corruption and abuse that is involved.
Many questions to be answered and many fingers to point.
All it will take is one decent, honest person in authority to bring this entire corrupt fraud against the American people crashing down. The tyrants who ran East Germany thought their people's paradise would last forever. Good and evil haven't changed. Beware the fury of a patient man. 8-)
In my initial post to this thread, I exposed the evil known as the "Insider Threat Program."
But even more sinister, is the all benevolent "Creditability Assessments Program." This program was signed into action by David R. Shedd on July 3rd, 2014 - see attached DIAI5200.002. (*Note: Shedd didn't actually become DIA Commander until August, 2014)
The shear audacity of the DIA Office of Security to create this program is equivalent to East German-style tyranny. Reading this regulation should give you the creeps. Their over reliance on the polygraph is where they step over the line.
It even lists DODI 5210.91 as a reference, and then directs procedures that are irrefutably in violation of it.
Abuse by polygraph, plain and simple. Pernicious, devious and self-serving.
This is the very evil that Wandersmann speaks of.
Security Executive Agent Directive 2 - 14 September, 2014, signed by James R. Clapper (attached).
(U) USE OF POLYGRAPH IN SUPPORT OF PERSONNEL SECURITY DETERMINATIONS FOR INITIAL OR CONTINUED ELGIBILITY FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR ELGIBILITY TO HOLD A SENSITIVE POSITION
Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities governing the use of polygraph examinations conducted by agencies in support of personnel security vetting for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position.
E. (U) POLICY:
l. (U) Agency heads are responsible for establishing and maintaining an effective program to ensure that access to classified information or placement in a sensitive position is clearly consistent with the interests of the national security. When an agency head elects to use the polygraph for personnel security vetting as defined in Section D, this policy will apply, consistent with the EPPA and other applicable laws and regulations.
(U) CSP examinations represent the baseline for the application of polygraph in support of personnel security vetting. Heads of agencies may authorize the use of the CSP for the purposes stated above in Section B when deemed to be in the interest of national security. CSPs may be used in support of determinations of initial eligibility for access to classified information and initial eligibility to hold a sensitive position, thereafter in support of reinvestigations or continuous evaluation, and administered at periodic or aperiodic intervals.
Like I've pointed out several times before: DODI 5210.91 is consistent with the EPPA in that the polygraph is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of investigation. No unfavorable administrative action shall be taken based solely on the results of the polygraph.
So, why is that no one can stop them from doing it?
QuoteSo, why is that no one can stop them from doing it?
Because lots of corrupt people are making lots of money off of this witchcraft and no one in authority has the courage to put an end to it. Face it, our government is run by self-serving sycophants for whom self-gain is far more important than their oath of office and sacred honor. The media are part of this evil cabal and the intricacies of the polygraph problem are concealed from the American people. The only hope lies in the ever increasing number of victims. I've heard that one-in-three Americans will somehow suffer from cancer. Likewise a similar percentage of Americans will eventually either directly or indirectly suffer from this polygraph fraud. Hopefully that will eventually bring an end to this evil. Most people would be happy to see the polygraph just come to an end, but I'd love to see these frauds and their compadre's in the security divisions that actually create policy end up in prison. >:( ;)
OK Quickfix, I'm done with my blather.
I doubt we'll see quickfix again. Maybe he finally took my advice and spoke to someone from the Office of General Counsel. Maybe Aunty Agony's comments made him question his ignorance, or I know, maybe he's trying to figure out who ordered the code red.
We'll probably never be able to totally eradicate the polygraph, but we will be able to stop the abuse. The DIA Office of Security is out of control, and the so-called "Credibility Assessments Program" is an evil entity that profits from destroying innocent lives. They've been operating autonomously for way too long. Soon they'll all be exposed.
I never thought it would take this long, but believe me when I say, judgement IS coming.
I am very grateful for all your support.
QuoteThe DIA Office of Security is out of control,
I never thought it would take this long, but believe me when I say, judgement is coming.
Good to hear that judgement is coming! Please don't forget the victims of FBI, CIA, CBT, and other Federal agencies when things come together. The regulations that they are violating are identical to the DIA regs being violated.
Quote from: Wandersmann on Apr 30, 2017, 11:04 PMThe regulations that they are violating are identical to the DIA regs being violated.
DOD developed Instructions (5210.91) and Directives (5210.48) in order to establish policy and assign responsibilities for the use of the polygraph amongst its agencies. If there are identical regulations at the agencies you list, you must obtain them.
DIA has enacted its own policy that directly usurps DOD's authority (DIAI 5200.002). It's right there in black and white! Unmistakable and irrefutable material fact.
Even though I can clearly prove that they are in violation of Department regulations doesn't mean much. The DOD IG Congressional liaison told me that they had "limited" powers and the best they could do was "embarrass" the responsible officials. He actually said that.
I spent 34 years in the IC without a single security related incident.
Six consecutive SSBI's and a favorable adjudication by the Chief, Defense Intelligence, Central Adjudication Facility doesn't mean much either. I was stripped of my career, labeled a threat to security, a vulnerability to the mission, and needed to be "mitigated".
The truth will eventually come out, it just needs to come out sooner. Innocent people are continuing to be abused by a program that's overeager to find the next leaker. To stay relevant and keep their program alive, the offenders must keep finding potential traitors – exactly like the Stassi business model.
QuoteI doubt we'll see quickfix again.
I am still here. I need not further elaborate since DIA is not in violation of any policy or regulation. YOU are the security risk and YOU have been dealt with as authorized by DOD directive/regulation.
QuoteI spent 34 years in the IC without a single security related incident.
You mean none that you are willing to admit to.
Quote from: quickfix on May 01, 2017, 12:34 PMYOU are the security risk and YOU have been dealt with as authorized by DOD directive/regulation.
There you have it John M, the polygraph said you are a security threat so you must be. And the polygraph said Bradley (Chelsea) Manning and Edward Snowden are not security threats, so they must not be. ;D Quickfix, now get back to cleaning those latrines. How many REMF medals have you received for your heroism on the polygraph?
Well, that's it in a nutshell, isn't it Wandersmann?
I often wonder how people like Manning, Snowden, Ames, et al. "pass" the polygraph exam and then people like me, "fail" it. I also wonder if I would have been trained by someone like Mr. Williams, I could have breezed through it.
I provided a full page summary of things that I did over the course of my career that I felt were causing my apprehension about one of the questions. Apparently, that wasn't enough. I was dragged in again and again. Asked the same question over and over and over. The interrogations were the worst part. Four to five hours of accusations and insinuations interspersed with verbal abuse. I remember one altercation where the little bastard ripped off the wires, told me to grab my things and get the hell out. I suffered a nervous breakdown in the hotel lobby before returning to work.
If there is one main thing that I can point to, is that fear of failure produces strong physiological reactions, reactions that the polygraph interprets as a "lie". Once you've failed at something and you are threatened to suffer severe consequences if you fail at it again, your fear of failure will override everything else.
I recently went back and re-read this entire thread. Everything is laid out. The fact that DIA continues to violate approved and relevant DOD regulations by using the polygraph results ALONE to punish its employees, is irrefutable.
John, just curious, were you ever given any indication that they may have something in addition to the polygraph results? Could someone have done you harm from the shadows? One of the reasons I left the corporate realm is because of too many scorpions under the rocks.
I have never, repeat never, been given any indication that I did anything wrong - neither was my Congressman. I have acquired a mountain of evidence that proves the indisputable material fact that I was abused simply because I could not "pass" the polygraph.
In one of the letters to my Congressman, DIA states: "it is mandated by the DIA Director as a prudent strategy to mitigate the security vulnerabilities presented by his inability to successfully complete multiple polygraph examinations (no less than five) since March 2011."
Initially, I suspected that they wanted to get rid of me because of cut-backs. HQ USSOCOM grew immensely in the post 9-11 era and was coming under pressure to slim down. This may have been a factor, but it's impossible to know without more FOIAs. I have some email correspondence between DIA and SOCOM where the collusion is unmistakable.
I believe that the main premise for their illegitimate actions is their over eagerness to do the job that they were hired to do. Imagine if your job was to find the next insider threat – and you're not finding anyone. The pressure mounts – find someone, dammit!
DIA Office of Security officials have found a loophole that allows them to target innocent individuals, abuse them, and then get credit for a job well done - the polygraph.
But wait you say, there are laws and regulations that prohibit that......
Quote from: sammorter on May 03, 2017, 10:15 AMThe fact that DIA continues to violate approved and relevant DOD regulations by using the polygraph results ALONE to punish its employees, is irrefutable.
John - It is worse than you think. They are aware that they are on thin ice by using the polygraph alone so they actually lie in their reports and claim that you confessed! In my recent polygraph ordeal I was accused of using countermeasures. I vehemently denied this accusation (because I didn't use countermeasures). This was before my affiliation with anti-polygraph.org.
I did a Freedom of Information Act request and finally got the results of my kangaroo court, including the polygrapher's report that got my access pulled and cost me a great job. The report said I admitted to using countermeasures. >:( Do you want to know what really happened? The polygrapher kept accusing me of altering my breathing. After an unending browbeating with this stupid accusation he finally asked me what I was doing and thinking. I told him I that I was not consciously doing anything and I was trying to cooperate. In the unending psycho-torture that I was enduring I innocently said, "I'm just trying to relax". That was what he declared in his report as an admission to using countermeasures.
It's child-like logic to the most stupid degree. If a Kindergardener played with words to that degree in a school assignment he'd flunk the assignment. But these polygraph clowns have absolutely no oversight and can do whatever they want. To think how much I have suffered due to such a stupid game. Like Doug Williams said, these clowns are pure evil.
It is worse than anyone that bothers to think thinks.
That's the part of the problem. Nobody is thinking here. They're being lied to by the abusers and are unwilling, or unable to call them out on it.
The irony in the lying bastards saying we're lying is going to make the subject of a great book.
Thin ice? Ever look up what constitutes a felony? When the abuse becomes institutionalized, the corruption runs deep.
Like I said, judgement is coming, it just needs to come sooner.
Quote from: sammorter on May 04, 2017, 05:37 PMLike I said, judgement is coming, it just needs to come sooner.
Unfortunately this reign of terror has already outlasted the Salem Witch Trials and McCarthyism. The difference is that the Salem persecutors and McCarthy didn't have a billion dollar industry greasing the palms of corrupt politicians supporting them. :P
Quote from: Arkhangelsk on May 03, 2017, 12:41 PMohn, just curious, were you ever given any indication that they may have something in addition to the polygraph results? Could someone have done you harm from the shadows?
Excellent point! In my case, I believe that the BI was equally, if not more, responsible for the summary rejection of my application to the CIA "summer intern" program and all subsequent applications.
You should definitely attempt to obtain, via a FOIA/PA request, the results of you BI. You'd be surprised at the number of closeted enemies that you might have acquired over the years. :-?
Quote from: sammorter on May 04, 2017, 05:37 PMEver look up what constitutes a felony?
It's become so much easier these days to acquire a felony branding. :D ;D
Quote from: Wandersmann on May 03, 2017, 07:22 PMBut these polygraph clowns have absolutely no oversight and can do whatever they want.
Given the utter lack of any real oversight of the IC, these agencies will continue to function as laws unto themselves. Changes in the Presidency and/or Congress have thus far failed to effect such long overdue reform in the IC. :(
Quote from: sammorter on May 04, 2017, 05:37 PMEver look up what constitutes a felony?
Obstruction of Justice in a Federal Investigation. In other words, lying to the Judge.
I wonder why the DIA OGC hasn't stepped in to protect their senior officials - either they are inept, or they are so entrenched in their illicit activities that they think they are untouchable.
Hey, why isn't anyone commenting on H.R. 2213?
Quote from: Wandersmann on May 07, 2017, 09:21 PMHey, why isn't anyone commenting on H.R. 2213?
Can't find the fine print. The attachment you put in earlier only has title.
Try it again, I posted a pdf of the Bill. If it passes, it will exempt certain CBP applicants from taking the polygraph.
The walls are starting to crumble.
QuoteWhy are we adversaries again? Because I want to stop the abuse? If that makes us adversaries, so be it. You were my Insider Threat, now I'm going to be your worst nightmare.
Of course we will have adversaries.
The whole IC employment application process is, in itself, made wholly adversarial in nature. Qualifications and interests count for zilch in the odious process; what matters is what "developed informants" choose to blab about an applicant and
what charlatans choose to interpret from linear penstrokes on a chart (similar to interpreting tarot cards, and with about as much scientific validity). ::) ::)
"FOR THE 2,000TH TIME, ANSWER THE QUESTION!!!!
OR ELSE!!!!!!"
In commemoration of the release of Doug Williams this week, I have decided to release a few things myself.
This one should probably go over on the "Polygraph Experiences" page too.
Attached is a MFR and trip report (atch C to my Notice to appeal - 4 June 2013) from a rather unpleasant visit to HQ/DIA to meet with officials from the Insider Threat Program and Credibility Assessments Branch.
And here is the four point paper I mentioned in the MFR.
I developed a phobia of failing to remain calm as they asked me over and over: "Have you ever intentionally mishandled classified information?"
They asked me the same question at least 2,000 times during five sessions over three years.
I remember explaining it to them that it was like when you see flashing police lights in your rear view mirror. You know that you haven't done anything wrong, but you can't help your heart from racing. Classic anxiety disorder with panic attacks.
And they come right out and say its okay to crack a few eggs in the process.
Come on man.
Why can't we stop them from doing this even when existing regulations explicitly prohibit them from doing so?
Unfavorable actions letter - 21MAY2014.
My Notice to Appeal - 04JUN2014.
DIA Office of Security acknowledges receipt - 17JUN2014.
DIA response to Congress - 25SEP2014.
Quote from: sammorter on Jul 25, 2017, 12:57 PMDIA Office of Security acknowledges receipt - 17JUN2014.
Herein lies the problem ....... noted from the DIA response ......"unable to meet personnel security vetting requirements". Those "requirements" are nothing more than a roll of the dice or reading Tarot cards. So says the AMA, National Academy of Science and experts like Dr. Drew Richardson. The expertise relied upon by Congress is now the polygraph community itself.
What a joke. What a crime. Our legislatures that enable and endorse this system by their failure to correct it are the most liable. :-[
Quote from: Wandersmann on Jul 25, 2017, 01:19 PMWhat a crime. Our legislatures that enable and endorse this system by their failure to correct it are the most liable.
The noose is tightening.
To borrow a line from Rush Limbaugh while describing government, "Everything about them is perception, manipulation and lies. Everything. Everything is 'wag the dog'. Everything is structured deception".
Congress and all their committees and boards are helpless to their trickery, as everyone who could actually do something to stop them, falls victim to the perception deception.
Can anyone handle the truth?
To be fair and balanced, Stephen Colbert says "Truthfulness is tearing apart our country, and I don't mean the argument over who came up with the word. I don't know whether it's a new thing, but it's certainly a current thing, in that it doesn't seem to matter what facts are. It used to be, everyone was entitled to their own opinion, but not their own facts. But that's not the case any more. Facts matter not at all. Perception is everything."
It's easier to fool a man than to convince him that he was fooled.
John M: whatever happened after this? Did you comply and move to DIA HQ? Did you resign? Get fired?
Quotewhatever happened after this? Did you comply and move to DIA HQ? Did you resign? Get fired?
It's still happening, Charlie M. Three years and counting.
DIA blames SOCOM. SOCOM blames DIA. No one will accept responsibility for the decision to take unfavorable administrative actions against me.
According to my Congressman, a court ruling will be made in my case by November (this year). Stay tuned.
Can you guess what is a Prohibited Personnel Practice?
5 U.S. Code § 2302 - https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/2302
Apply the rules and policy from DODI 5210.91 and Voilà - we have the Coup de grâce
From the National Academy of Sciences - https://www.nap.edu/read/10420/chapter/1
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Basic Science
Almost a century of research in scientific psychology and physiology provides little basis for the expectation that a polygraph test could have extremely high accuracy. Although psychological states often associated with deception (e.g., fear of being judged deceptive) do tend to affect the physiological responses that the polygraph measures, these same states can arise in the absence of deception. Moreover, many other psychological and physiological factors (e.g., anxiety about being tested) also affect those responses. Such phenomena make polygraph testing intrinsically susceptible to producing erroneous results. This inherent ambiguity of the physiological measures used in the polygraph suggests that further investments in improving polygraph technique and interpretation will bring only modest improvements in accuracy.
Polygraph research has not developed and tested theories of the underlying factors that produce the observed responses. Factors other than truthfulness that affect the physiological responses being measured can vary substantially across settings in which polygraph tests are used. There is little knowledge about how much these factors influence the outcomes of polygraph tests in field settings. For example, there is evidence suggesting that truthful members of socially stigmatized groups and truthful examinees who are believed to be guilty or believed to have a high likelihood of being guilty may show emotional and physiological responses in polygraph test situations that mimic the responses that are expected of deceptive individuals. The lack of understanding of the processes that underlie polygraph responses makes it very difficult to generalize from the results obtained in specific research settings or with particular subject populations to other settings or populations, or from laboratory research studies to real-world applications.
I guess no one in government bothered to read it -
CONCLUSION: Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research and the limited ability to generalize to real-world settings, we conclude that in populations of examinees such as those represented in the polygraph research literature, untrained in countermeasures, specific-incident polygraph tests can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates well above chance, though well below perfection. Because the studies of acceptable quality all focus on specific incidents, generalization from them to uses for screening is not justified. Because actual screening applications involve considerably more ambiguity for the examinee and in determining truth than arises in specific-incident studies, polygraph accuracy for screening purposes is almost certainly lower than what can be achieved by specific-incident polygraph tests in the field.
CONCLUSION: Polygraph testing yields an unacceptable choice for DOE employee security screening between too many loyal employees falsely judged deceptive and too many major security threats left undetected. Its accuracy in distinguishing actual or potential security violators from innocent test takers is insufficient to justify reliance on its use in employee security screening in federal agencies.
Interesting - Appendix B provides a copy of the DOE Polygraph Examination Regulations.
It also prohibits taking unfavorable actions against an individual based solely on the polygraph "results".
NSA and CIA must also have regulations - are they classified?
Is this 1984 NSA/CSS regulation still relevant?
https://antipolygraph.org/documents/nsa-polygraph-regulation.shtml
If so, there are some very important take-aways:
- Under Use of Polygraph Examination Results:
Any final administrative determinations rendered in cases in which a polygraph examination is taken shall not be based on the results of an analysis of the polygraph charts.
(** This follows all other approved and relevant regulations regarding the use of the 'results')
- Under Conduct of Examinations: The Chief, Clearance (M55), with the concurrence of a certified polygraph supervisory official, shall determine whether it is appropriate to request an individual to undergo a repeat polygraph examination. When three unsuccessful examinations have been conducted on an examinee, the decision for a fourth examination will be made only by the Director of Security. Any examination beyond that must be approved by the Deputy Director for Administration.
(** My congressman was told by DIA that five polygraphs in three years was not considered to be excessive - although they didn't provide a regulation that covered it)
This is all that I could find on CIA:
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/528259-fortish15.html
A common theme remains - the polygraph is an aid to investigations.
I just had a somewhat congenial conversation on Twitter with a gentleman named Mike Himsworth.
Guess what?
He claims to have helped write DODI 5210.91 too.
And you'll never guess what else - he also is ignorant of DOD's restrictions on the use of the polygraph and the use of polygraph results. What gives?
Question - do you think he actually believes - like brainwashed, believes - or, is it more evidence of a concerted effort to cover-up the abuse?
In the end, I blame mostly Jerry Springer, Maury Povich and Dr. Phil.
I love this episode of Adam Ruins Everything - https://youtu.be/nyDMoGjKvNk
Quote from: sammorter on Aug 01, 2017, 01:55 PMIt also prohibits taking unfavorable actions against an individual based solely on the polygraph "results".
They get around this requirement with ease. During the hours long browbeating sessions that usually accompany the polygraph test, they'll find one little inconsistent or contradictory statement and fire the victim using the catch-all phrase
lack of candor. The East Germans and Soviets used the catch-all phrase
counterrevolutionary activities.
The only difference between the Soviet and Stasi thugs and these modern-day American polygraph traitors is that the Stasi/Soviet victims were sent to Hohenschönhausen or the Gulag and today's American polygraph victims lose their livelihood and reputation. We don't have it as bad, but considering what America is supposed to be all about, it's as bad as it can get.
Hopefully the Stasi/Soviet criminals will rot in the same Hell with our polygraph examiners and affiliated security officials. >:(
Quote from: Wandersmann on Aug 08, 2017, 08:20 PMThey get around this requirement with ease.
So far they have. I promise you - there will come a day very soon that this abuse will be exposed and those responsible will finally be held accountable.
Quote from: sammorter on Aug 09, 2017, 08:55 AMSo far they have. I promise you - there will come a day very soon that this abuse will be exposed and those responsible will finally be held accountable.
Good to hear. Between you, Doug Williams, and George Maschke, I hope something happens soon. Many victims who have lost their livelihood are hanging on by a thread. A change in this horrible situation will not improve their financial status, but might enable them to find employment commensurate with their background.
Here is DIA's official rationale for taking unfavorable administrative actions against me. The "mitigation strategy" included taking away 1) my access to classified information, 2) my employment and assignment to USSOCOM and 3) forcing me to make a permanent change of station to DC.
[Complainant] was informed that his "inability to successfully complete the counterintelligencescope
polygraph examination, which is a basic security requirement for all DIA employees,
presents a security vulnerability that must mitigated." McIntosh pointed out that although
Complainant's "inability to pass examination does not - on its own – suggest that [he was] a risk
to national security," his inability to successfully complete the counterintelligence-scope
polygraph examination presented "a vulnerability that must be considered and properly
mitigated' and that the "mitigation strategy implemented [was] designed to better protect
national security while giving" Complainant the opportunity to eliminate the vulnerability.
Even more disturbing is that DIA has (thus far) been able to get away with this abuse - in direct violation of DOD's authority.
In February 2014, I received a favorable security clearance determination by DIA's Central Adjudication Facility.
"McCord went on to inform Complainant that a favorable security clearance determination had been made on the basis of Complainant's decision to seek mental health care and comply with treatment recommendation. Id. Complainant was advised to report to the Agency any changes in his condition, diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, or incidents arising therefrom. Id."
But inexplicably, in April 2014, SOCOM (influenced by DIA's Insider Threat Program) does this:
"Lieutenant General John Mulholland ("Mulholland") Deputy of Co-Agency USSOCOMM had lost confidence in Complainant's ability to continue to serve at USSOCOMM due to Complainant's inability to successfully complete the PCAs. As a result of Mulholland losing confidence in Complainant's ability to continue working at USSOCOM, Stephen Norton ("Norton") the Agency's Director of Security and Steven McIntosh ("McIntosh") Insider Threat Program Coordinator decided to reassign Complainant from USSOCOM to the Agency's Headquarters. Id; see also 356. By memorandum dated May 21, 2014, McIntosh informed Complainant of a Reassignment Action.
Did these individuals know what they were doing was in violation of approved and relevant regulations? Probably, because I have evidence that they have done it to others in the past and got away with it. No one is capable of stopping them - yet.
My EEOC case was decided (wrongly) on August 23, 2017, with the honorable William Rodriguez rendering a decision in favor of the Agency. I'm working on the appeal now.
The Judge wrote, "It is not for the Commission to review and decide whether the criteria required to obtain and maintain a Top Secret Security Clearance could be set aside when an employee is unsuccessful in completing the required criteria. In essence, the anti-discrimination statutes were not intended to give the Commission the authority to substitute its judgement for that of the Agency. Complainant is a qualified disabled individual under the Rehabilitation Act in that he could perform the essential functions of an Intelligence Analyst without successfully completing a polygraph, just not at the Agency or Co-Agency when a security clearance like the one he lost is required."
Well, they took the clearance that was required because I didn't "pass" the polygraph. The judge also fails to acknowledge that DODI 5210.91 prohibits them from taking my clearance in the first place based solely on the polygraph "results". Instead, he sides with the abusers and the abuse is allowed to continue.
Due to testimonies from senior officials, and without any corroboration from an independent source, the Judge declared that the Agency had in fact, been in full compliance with DODI 5210.91 and met its burden of providing me reasonable accommodations - by allowing me to keep my job - even though it was 1,000 miles away.
In fact, the judge even misquotes the regulation. He justifies the actions by incorrectly stating: "An employee who refuses to take or is unable to successfully complete PCA's may be denied access to the handling of classified information." This is especially not true. In enclosure 4, paragraph 6 (p. 22) the application is for determining initial eligibility for access, not for continuing access. I was performing in my job - with the clearance - for nearly 14 years. Section 7 of the same enclosure directs that they may temporarily suspend my access and deny assignment or detail that is contingent on such access, based upon a written finding. There never was any sort of written finding in my case. It also goes on to direct that such temporary suspension of access may not form the part of any basis for an adverse administration action or an adverse personnel action.
It is indisputable material fact that the Agency and the Command have violated key elements of DODI 5210.91 as well as my civil rights in this case. In addition to the obvious disparate treatment, the Agency has defamed my character and denied me due process. I have previously complained to my supervisory chain-of-command, the USSOCOM OIG, the DIA OIG, the DOD OIG, the IC OIG and even my Congressman and Senators. All have thus far been unable, or unwilling to condemn those involved, or to stop the abuse. As a result, I am being denied benefits and compensation for the abusive actions that were taken against me.
I vowed from the beginning to expose this evil abuse to the highest levels possible. I had no idea it would take so long to reach those levels.
Please see the attached for incriminating evidence of what's going on at DIA.
Smoking gun?
Question - If according to the EPPA it is illegal, and a violation of individual rights to use the polygraph against someone, why in the world does the government have an exemption?
Quote from: sammorter on Sep 30, 2017, 01:32 PMQuestion - If according to the EPPA it is illegal, and a violation of individual rights to use the polygraph against someone, why in the world does the government have an exemption?
I wasinvolved in working for passage of the EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT. In fact I was given the VOLUNTEER ADVOCATE award by the ACLU for being "the one person most responsible for the passage of the EPPA". We had to allow the exemption for the government to continue to use the polygraph and order to get the law passed. But senators Hatch and Kennedy along with representative Pat Williams – authors of the Senate and House bills – we're convinced that the government would scale down the use of the polygraph when they saw the evidence we presented in the hearings. Unfortunately, this turned out not to be the case.
Quote from: Doug_Williams on Sep 30, 2017, 02:24 PMWe had to allow the exemption for the government to continue to use the polygraph and order to get the law passed.
God Bless you Doug. Your efforts have helped save the lives and careers of countless innocent individuals. You are indeed a hero and deserving of many more awards.
So, if I get this straight, the EPPA provides certain exemptions. Like for the government - to allow them to "administer" the polygraph machine. But doesn't the Act also have restrictions on the use of exemptions (Sec. 8, a. and b. 1. d.)?
Why aren't government employees given the same rights as all other citizens?
Quote from: Doug_Williams on Sep 30, 2017, 02:24 PMWe had to allow the exemption for the government to continue to use the polygraph and order to get the law passed. But senators Hatch and Kennedy along with representative Pat Williams – authors of the Senate and House bills – we're convinced that the government would scale down the use of the polygraph when they saw the evidence we presented in the hearings. Unfortunately, this turned out not to be the case.
As Otto v. Bismarck was purported to have once remarked, one should never examine too closely the making of neither sausages nor laws! ;)
I complained about the unfavorable administrative actions that were taken against me based solely on the results of the polygraph to my chain of command. Then, I went to the SOCOM IG. I told them that the Command had improperly removed me from my duty section, suspended all my accesses, and was involuntarily reassigning me to an unclassified position 1,000 miles away. He told me that since I was civilian, he couldn't help me. Instead, I would need to address it with my Agency's OIG.
Attached is my initial complaint to the DIA OIG.
This was their lame-ass response.....
This is the SOCOM reply to an "Action Referral" request from the DOD IG related to my Case #20140723-026622.
They are admitting to violating DOD regulations - and then they turn around and blame it on DIA:
-----Original Message-----
From: //REDACTED//
Sent: Tuesday, September 30, 2014 11:11 AM
To: //REDACTED//
Subject: RE: DoD IG Action Case 20140723-026622-CASE-04 (FOUO)
THANKS
I am unsure of what DOD IG is asking but here goes. USSOCOM has reviewed these documents and believes it is a DIA issue since he is a DIA employee. SOCOM follows DIA guidance when it comes to the polygraph test. If an individual fails it several times, SOCOM suspends their access and moves them out of the secured area. The case is reviewed by DIA's General Counsel and Security Chief for disposition.
Let me know if this answers the questions.
THANKS
During initial hearings in my EEO case, DIA tried to get SOCOM removed from the complaint. The judge determined rightly that they should not be removed, as they were primarily responsible for initiating the abuse in the first place.
Attached is the DOD IG case summary, which ever so succinctly, exposes the truth behind my allegations.
Quote from: Arkhangelsk on Mar 16, 2017, 06:01 PMWas "polygraph" mentioned in your disability paperwork?
Going back through this thread, it is amazing how detailed this abusive practice has been laid out. It is equally astounding that no one (as of yet) has been able to make it stop.
When Arkhangelsk (now "ex member") asked me if "polygraph" was mentioned in my disability paperwork, I said no - but in reality, the approving authority said "see medical evidence". This medical evidence are evaluations from a licensed psychologist and a board certified psychiatrist.
These medical reports state that "patient's severe anxiety disorder was triggered by a required polygraph examination (a requirement for the security level of his employment) and exacerbated by repeated polygraph examinations. The patient was removed from his position and subjected to further repetitions of traumatizing polygraph examinations. The required polygraph examination had become the traumatizing stimulus which, with inescapable repetition, intensified the patient's anxiety disorder."
Also, "At the present, the patient's acute anxiety disorder and depression appear to be a result of his being repeatedly subject to a traumatizing set of stimuli (polygraph examination with verbal interrogation), which he could not refuse or avoid, for fear of losing his employment. With each unavoidable repetition of the polygraph examination his stress responses and depressive affect cascaded to the point in which he cannot effectively function. Patient is acutely anxious, suffers moderate to severe depression and has suffered a acute insult to his self-esteem. The traumatizing events outlined above have caused the patient to suffer many emotional and physical losses."
I applied for Workers' Compensation at the same time that I applied for Disability Retirement - my Workers' Compensation claim was just recently denied because they determined that I was not injured in the performance of duty.
The OWCP also went on to say that this was all just "an administrative function of my employing agency and administrative actions by the agency can only be compensable if you prove that the employing agency erred or abused their discretionary authority beyond your mere perception".
Approved and relevant DOD and DIA regulations stipulate that when individuals are considered medically, psychologically, or emotionally unfit to undergo an examination, they should be exempted from testing. I had provided extensive documentation to them regarding my conditions (which has been acknowledged), yet they made me endure hours and hours of additional interrogations and polygraphs.
Is this my mere perception, or did they in fact commit error and abuse their authority?
As I said last week, my Workers Compensation Claim was denied because I couldn't prove that my injuries were caused in the performance of duty.
They said the polygraph was simply an "administrative function of my employing agency and administrative actions by the agency can only be compensable if you prove that the employing agency erred or abused their discretionary authority beyond your mere perception". Also, five polygraphs in three years was not considered to be excessive.
How about this: DODI 5210.91 provides protections for individuals with mental, psychological, or emotional conditions. Guess what? It says that they should be exempted - not exposed to more and more psychological torture.
For the record, when I was notified that I needed to go TDY to DIA for yet another appointment with the polygraph chair, I provided the attached letter to my chain-of-command. I was told that they didn't know of any circumstances that would allow me to bypass the requirement. Upon arrival at HQ DIA on August 5th, 2014, I provided a copy of this letter to the investigators as well. No luck. After hours of interrogations by several of them, I had a nervous breakdown and was immediately seen by two DIA psychologists.
APPLYING LEGAL PRECEDENT
The Board notes, "Where the disability results from an employee's emotional reaction to his or her regular or specially assigned duties or to a requirement imposed by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of FECA." - Lilian Cutler, 28 ECAB 125 (1976). This is in fact, the definitive precedent in the appellant's case.
According to the principles of Cutler "Where an employee experiences emotional stress in carrying out his employment duties, or has fear and anxiety regarding his ability to carry out his duties, and the medical evidence establishes that the disability resulted from his emotional reaction to such situation, the disability is generally regarded as due to an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment. This is true where the employee's disability resulted from his emotional reaction to his day-to-day duties." The appellant has alleged from the very beginning of this process; that the polygraph examination – a requirement for his position – and his fear and anxiety regarding his ability to carry out his newly, specially assigned duties, had in fact, caused his disabilities.
Also, according to the principles of Cutler, "An employee was instructed that he had to undergo a fitness-for-duty examination in order to continue in the employment. His fear of taking the examination caused him to undergo great emotional stress, and he had a mental breakdown. The Board held that if the requirement of undergoing the physical examination, and the circumstances under which this requirement was imposed upon him, caused his disability, the disability was compensable." The examination in the appellant's case was the polygraph examination, and his fear of taking it coupled with his fear of the impending punishment for not passing it, in fact, caused his disabilities. The appellant has presented an abundance of rationalized medical evidence establishing that this factor of his employment, is without doubt, the nexus between his performance of duties and his emotional condition.
Also according to the principles of Cutler, "An employee was charged with irregularities in his employment. He was removed from his regular work duties. He became disabled from an emotional condition which the evidence established was related to the above circumstances. The Board found that his disability "arose directly out of and in the course of work activities, pertaining to the charges and investigation, which he was specifically assigned by his supervisor to perform." It was noted that there had been no findings by the employing establishment that the charges against the employee had been established or that his disabling condition was caused by his willful misconduct. The Board held that his disability constituted an injury within the meaning of the Act. Similarly, the appellant was removed from his regular work duties and charged with the unsuccessful completion of a required examination – without any evidence of wrong doing on his part. The appellant has stated repeatedly throughout this entire process, that the polygraph examination coupled with the abrupt changes in his work activities, were the cause of his disabilities.
The OWCP incorrectly decided and the Board has erroneously ruled that appellant's claims are not compensable by citing Matilda R. Wyatt, 52 ECAB 421 (2001). "Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee's employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA." In this case, a woman alleged that her stress resulted from being denied her medical retirement and workers' compensation claims. The Board ruled that the development of any condition related to such matters would not arise in the performance of duty because the processing of these claims bears no relation to appellant's day-to-day or specially assigned work duties. These are not compensable factors of employment. In the appellant's case, this precedent does not apply because the repetitious polygraph examinations did, in fact, arise in the performance of duty and were directly related to, and impacted his day-to-day or specially assigned work duties. Therefore, the assertion that the employing agency's actions were merely administrative matters and not a part of his duties is completely inaccurate.
The Board has also cited William F. Fortner, 49 ECAB 324 (1998). "The Board has held that, where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded." This case involves a man who alleged that he suffered an emotional condition when the employing establishment advised him that he had been improperly placed under the Civil Service Retirement System rather than the Federal Employee's Retirement System. The Board found that this allegation related to an administrative or personnel matter, unrelated to the employee's regular or specially assigned work duties and does not fall within coverage of the FECA. This precedent does not apply in the appellant's case because the polygraph examination itself, coupled with the unfavorable actions taken by the employing agency, were in fact, directly related to his regular or specially assigned work duties and absolutely fall within the coverage of the FECA.
ANALYSIS
The Board properly acknowledges in its ruling that the appellant alleged that he sustained an emotional condition as a result of his employment conditions. However, the OWCP has misconstrued the appellant's allegations to indicate that he has only alleged error and abuse in administrative and personnel matters. The appellant has repeatedly claimed that factors of his employment - in performance of his day-to-day and specially assigned duties – have caused his disabling condition. In his case, the appellant's emotional reaction to the special assignments and the requirement imposed by the employing establishment, is therefore, a compensable work factor. (See appellant's CA-2, appellant's Response to OWCP Questionnaire, dated January 13th, 2015, and appellant's Notice of Decision Rebuttal, dated June 19th, 2017)
The Board claimed that the appellant's allegations do not pertain to his regular or specially assigned duties under Cutler. In fact, the appellant has consistently alleged throughout this entire process, that his employment – his regular and then his subsequent special assignments and duties - were in fact, the cause of his disabilities. Whether the administrative actions were taken in error or abuse is superfluous to the fact that they were in fact, actions involving his day-to-day duties, not simply an administrative matter, somehow unrelated to his duties. As a requirement of his position, the appellant was repeatedly forced to submit to the polygraph examination, an examination that caused and then exacerbated his debilitating condition. The decisions to take unfavorable actions against him were implemented because of how he performed in a requirement of his duties. This absolutely represents a compensable work factor under FECA.
The Board also acknowledges that the appellant alleged that the employing establishment committed wrongdoing by requiring him to undergo polygraph testing and by "altering" his work conditions due to the results of the same. Appellant's allegations have continually emphasized the stress that he felt before, during and after each polygraph examination/interrogation session. The Board failed to acknowledge his allegation that he suffered from emotional reactions to this requirement for which he was trying to meet the demands of his position. The Board has previously held that emotional reactions to situations in which an employee is trying to meet his position requirements are compensable (Georgia F. Kennedy, 35 ECAB 1151, 1155 – 1984); (Joesph A. Antal, 34 ECAB 608, 612 – 1983). In the appellant's case, he was directed to take the polygraph examination five times in three years. As noted by the Insider Threat Program Coordinator, successful completion of this examination is a requirement for his position. The appellant's fear and emotional reactions to his inability to meet this requirement, unequivocally establish this as a compensable work factor.
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests the Board to RECONSIDER his claim and REMAND the case to the Office in order to carry out the factual and medical developments described above, to be followed by an appropriate decision.
After participating on this message board for nearly a year now, it has become very apparent that the majority of people who "view" it are from the polygraph industry. No one dares add a comment (except for the ignorant and irresponsible off-handed remark by quickfix), for it may further expose the fraud for what it is.
Therefore, I realize that my comments have probably enabled those evil-doers to mount a defense against me. I don't have anything to hide - in fact, it is they who have everything to hide. As a result of being denied my EEO rights and my DOL benefits, I no longer have faith in the government to police itself. The polygraph lobby is so far entrenched into American politics that it's going to take a civil action to hold them accountable.
My latest Petition for Reconsideration was denied by the DOL because they claimed that I failed to establish any error of fact or law warranting further consideration. The board found that the OWCP properly denied appellant's claim for a work-related emotional condition because he failed to establish any compensable employment factors. The Board explained that appellant's allegations did not pertain to his regular or specially assigned duties under Lillian Cutler. Rather, the Board found that appellant alleged error and abuse in administrative and personnel matters, but had not established a compensable employment factor because he had not shown error or abuse in such matters. As the Board has held, an appellant may not use a petition for reconsideration as a vehicle to reopen a case for the purpose of rearguing contentions previously advanced and considered by the Board in issuing its original determination.
In my previous post, I presented the appropriate Legal Precedent and Analysis. Here are the factual errors from that petition:
Error of Fact #1:
In the Board's final ruling, it was stated that the appellant first realized on September 29, 2014 that his disabilities were caused or aggravated by his federal employment. The correct date is October 17th, 2013. This date is significant because his condition continued to worsen over time due to several factors of his employment and in his performance of his assigned duties. The appellant became incapacitated and filed for workers compensation benefits and disability retirement nearly a year later, in September of 2014.
Error of Fact #2:
The ruling also states that the appellant's immediate supervisor indicated that appellant was "properly" issued a lower classification security badge, reassigned to another work location and subsequently lost access to classified workstations and networks. He was ultimately involuntarily reassigned to a position 1,000 miles away. Nothing in the immediate supervisor's comments indicate that these actions were "proper". Neither does the immediate supervisor indicate that the polygraph testing was "properly" administered.
Error of Fact #3:
The ruling states that in a May 21, 2014 letter, the Insider Threat Program Coordinator for the employing agency noted that the decision to reassign him was not solely based on his inability to pass polygraph testing. In fact, the letter unmistakably identifies the only reason for imposing unfavorable actions against him was his inability to pass repeated polygraph tests.
Error of Fact #4:
Although superfluous to the appellant's actual allegations, the Board concludes that this letter advises that "no standards were violated" with respect to appellant's polygraph testing. It is notable that the Agency does not mention a specific regulation or policy that does permit this type of action. Expecting the offenders to admit to their offenses is pointless. The indisputable fact is that approved and relevant Department of Defense regulations explicitly prohibit exposing individuals with emotional or mental disabilities to the polygraph process all together. Agency officials violated this key restriction and as a result, directly exacerbated appellant's disabilities to the point of incapacitation to perform his assigned duties.
I truly hope that McIntosh, Lanham, Soo-thoo, Lawless, DiOrio et al, will come to their collective senses. I have said since my very first appeal, that this decision would be landmark - in that it will expose the fraud, waste and abuse that has become institutionalized in our government. This corruption must stop.
Quote from: sammorter on Jan 23, 2018, 02:26 PMI no longer have faith in the government to police itself.
Maybe you can emigrate to Iran or North Korea.
Quote from: sammorter on Jan 23, 2018, 02:26 PMI have said since my very first appeal, that this decision would be landmark
It was- we win, you lose, like all malingerers!
Thanks for making my point.
Quote from: quickfix on Jan 23, 2018, 02:57 PMMaybe you can emigrate to Iran or North Korea
No need for him to move there Quickfix. For those few Americans whose livelihoods are subject to being arbitrarily erased by traitor slugs like you, life here in America is no different than life is for the average N. Korean or Iranian. You are the one who should move to North Korea or Iran because you are a blood brother to the assholes who run those countries. Bullies and tyrants are all the same and you'd fit right in in either of those places. ;D
I'm happy right here protecting our national security from malcontents like you and (neutralized) insider threats like John M.
Quote from: quickfix on Jan 25, 2018, 02:33 PMI'm happy right here protecting our national security from malcontents like you and (neutralized) insider threats like John M.
Considering that polygraph "testing" has no scientific basis (https://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-018.shtml), and there is no documented instance of it ever catching a spy, it's likely that you and your fellow polygraph operators are doing more to harm our national security than to protect it.
"No scientific basis"- the standard party line of the deceptive. Our party line: In God we trust, all others get polygraphed.
And you're quite wrong about polygraph never having caught a spy. Jeffrey Gregory, part of the Clyde Lee Conrad spy ring, was polygraphed, failed, and confessed to spying with Conrad. You wouldn't know that, because it's information not made available to the media. There are other similar cases, also not made public due to the sensitive nature of the cases. Gregory has since been released from prison, so it's no longer a secret.
quickfix:
Source of information for your statement about James Gregory failing the polygraph?
I did find the following interesting PDF document:
https://fas.org/sgp/library/spies.pdf
In this document, no mention of the polygraph to uncover James Gregory, although Edward Lee Howard did fail the polygraph.
Sorry Jeffrey not James.
Quote from: quickfix on Jan 25, 2018, 02:33 PMI'm happy right here protecting our national security from malcontents like you and (neutralized) insider threats like John M.
I've caught real spies and sent them to prison with physical proof. I received the highest award someone in my organization could receive for my success. I am national security. You're a traitor and a fraud who sold your sacred honor for personal gain involved in the polygraph scam. You are the worst of the worst, talking about exposing liars when you yourself are the biggest liar of all as you falsely accuse innocent people for personal profit.
I'm laughing my head off as I watch the corrupt FBI hierarchy go down in flames. The rest of the country is learning what I already knew about the frauds that are at the top of our intelligence community while honest mid-level investigators, case officers, and analysts are still working miracles for the American people. I know the feeding frenzy of investigative journalists will eventually uncover this polygraph fraud as they peel back the layers of corruption. :D
Quote from: 5E4D5A55483B0 on Jan 25, 2018, 05:18 PMSource of information for your statement about James Gregory failing the polygraph?
You won't find Gregory's polygraph mentioned in open source publications. Gregory was tested by Army Counterintelligence.
Quote from: quickfix on Jan 25, 2018, 03:41 PM"No scientific basis"- the standard party line of the deceptive. Our party line: In God we trust, all others get polygraphed.
What an incredibly stupid argument. I expect better from you.
QuoteAnd you're quite wrong about polygraph never having caught a spy. Jeffrey Gregory, part of the Clyde Lee Conrad spy ring, was polygraphed, failed, and confessed to spying with Conrad. You wouldn't know that, because it's information not made available to the media. There are other similar cases, also not made public due to the sensitive nature of the cases. Gregory has since been released from prison, so it's no longer a secret.
It's true that Jeffery Eugene Gregory was polygraphed, failed, and confessed to spying with Conrad. But it's not true that he was "caught" by the polygraph. Gregory's case is documented in former U.S. Army Counterintelligence Field Activity chief Stuart A. Herrington (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuart_A._Herrington)'s 1999 seminal work on the Conrad espionage case,
Traitors Among Us: Inside the Spy Catcher's World, at p. 390 ff. Herrington avers that it was Conrad accomplice Roderick James Ramsay who fingered Gregory as a spy. Herrington writes, at p. 390:
QuoteUnder [FBI agent Joe] Navarro's gentle but unyielding pressure, Rod Ramsay admitted that to assist in accumulating the "mother lode" and spiriting it safely out of Rose Barracks, he had recruited two fellow soldiers--Jeff Gregory and Jeffrey Rondeau. Had Clyde [Conrad] known this, he would have been furious...
So it was Ramsay who identified Gregory as a spy, not the polygraph. It's true that Gregory ultimately confessed during a (no doubt specific issue) polygraph interrogation. Herrington describes it thus, at p. 395:
QuoteIn April 1993, the dour Arizonan [Gregory] caved in during a grueling polygraph examination. In a sworn statement, Gregory admitted that he had been enticed by Ramsay to serve as a lookout during the theft of the infamous "mother lode" of documents from the division headquarters. Rod had promised great riches, but in the end, Jeff Gregory's espionage career had netted him small amounts of marijuana and hashish and a couple of hundred dollars at most.
Yes, Ramsey fingered Gregory, but accomplice testimony alone is useless without corraborating evidence. The polygraph did elicit the actual confession, so polygraph did catch this spy, and again, George, you are way off the mark. But please continue to spout the "no scientific basis" defense. It is entertaining.
Quickfix is just like all other serial abusers, they need victims. I put him in the same category as Larry Nassar. Could someone really be that cruel? It's probably more likely a personality trait – one that attracts people to the polygraph career path. His taunts and harassment to victims of this abuse are sickening. I feel sorry for those who have to live with an asshole like that. Come to think of it, this is the same type of abusive treatment that they used against me in the polygraph chair – five times in three years. Is this the sort of thing that is taught in polygraph school, or is it learned via OJT?
The worst part is that approved and relevant regulations were created to ensure that this type of thing doesn't happen. Senior officials have been deceived into thinking that it is okay to take unfavorable administrative actions against an otherwise innocent individual - based solely on the polygraph "results". The polygraph lobby has done considerable damage to our individual rights in Washington, and the Insider Threat Program's hunt for the next Snowden has gone Deep State.
Maybe Jeffrey Gregory did "fail" his polygraph, but because of that, the investigators did their job and investigated him. That's where they got the evidence to convict him.
Sure enough, DoD has the same policy – if someone "fails", the Head of the DoD Component may initiate a CI investigation in accordance with DoD policy. Guess what? They did an investigation on me and there wasn't a single finding. In fact, I was granted no restrictions to access, or clearance by the DIA Central Adjudication Facility as a result of that CI investigation.
DIA gives tens of thousands of polygraphs a year to their employees. If the business is to catch spies, brother business must be good. One minor problem though, if they admit to a failure rate of 18-23%, where are all the other victims? I've been on this site for almost a year now, and I haven't seen anyone else say that they were punished solely on the polygraph "results". I believe that I was sacrificed to perpetuate the lie.
Consider this, since the regulations mandate that no unfavorable actions shall be taken against an otherwise innocent individual, why administer it at all? If this simple truth gets out, it will severely damage the polygraph industry and affect the way people approach their next appointment with the polygraph!
It's coming Wandersmann, there will be an awakening soon and those complicit will indeed be sorry, just like Larry Nassar. Help me to mount a persistent media campaign. #stoppolygraphabuse is a good start. It may take the Supreme Court to eventually decide this, but I'm willing to go there.
Any credible claim that the polygraph "caught" a spy would require that it correctly identified someone as being a spy absent any prior suspicion. The Gregory case does not meet that threshold.
That polygraphy has no scientific basis is not a "defense." It is a statement of fact.
Quote from: sammorter on Jan 26, 2018, 02:37 PMIn fact, I was granted no restrictions to access, or clearance by the DIA Central Adjudication Facility as a result of that CI investigation.
Then what are you doing here? Oh, that's right, you tried to swindle the government out of disability money for a phony PTSD claim (the big bad powygwaph man was mean to me!)
Quote from: sammorter on Jan 26, 2018, 02:37 PMIt's coming Wandersmann, there will be an awakening soon and those complicit will indeed be sorry
Just like on planet Vulcan according to Mr Spock.
Quote from: sammorter on Jan 26, 2018, 02:37 PM
It may take the Supreme Court to eventually decide this, but I'm willing to go there.
Get on the BW Parkway and head north. You can't miss it. And bring "Xenonman" with you!
George, you should know by now that facts and truths don't matter to him. He's more interested in perpetuating the lie.
Once again dickfix, you don't know what you're talking about. I am receiving disability benefits.
I am on here to do everything I can to help expose this fraud on the American people. It is unconscionable abuse and a waste of taxpayer dollars. Not to mention, a national disgrace - seriously.
Did they have twitter on star trek?
Quote from: quickfix on Jan 26, 2018, 03:23 PMGet on the BW Parkway and head north. You can't miss it. And bring "Xenonman" with you!
Don't let him get to you John M. He is a parasite, like all polygraph examiners (with some exceptions like Dan Mangum and Joe the Irishman[forgot his last name]). It took awhile for witch burning to come to an end, it will take a while for this BS to come to an end. Someday Dickfix and his polygraph colleagues will realize their entire adult life was centered around a complete fraud. Carnival workers contribute more to our society than these Nazi's. ;)
Quote from: Wandersmann on Jan 27, 2018, 02:28 PMSomeday [quickfix] and his polygraph colleagues will realize their entire adult life was centered around a complete fraud.
I think he realizes it now. quickfix does not present arguments that the polygraph has ever exposed a spy, criminal, or liar of any stripe. He simply repeats the known fact that there is no cogent defense against a polygraph-based accusation.
quickfix is well aware that the "lie detector" is a complete fraud that ruins careers and deprives employers of valuable talent. He just likes to get his nut off by coming here and crowing about getting away with it.
Quote from: AuntyAgony on Jan 29, 2018, 09:52 AMquickfix is well aware that the "lie detector" is a complete fraud that ruins careers and deprives employers of valuable talent. He just likes to get his nut off by coming here and crowing about getting away with it.
Love your posts Aunty! You are always spot on and more eloquent than I could ever dream of being. I've noticed Quickfix never responds to you because he knows you would own him. :D
Quote from: AuntyAgony on Jan 29, 2018, 09:52 AMthere is no cogent defense against a polygraph-based accusation.
Just like there is no way to respond with a "yes" or "no" to the question, "have you stopped beating your wife?" These conniving polygraph low-lifes have hit the jackpot with the polygraph. Only the devil himself could have dreamed something like this up. Of course there are always plenty of dirtbags willing to sell their souls to make a buck.
Quote from: AuntyAgony on Jan 29, 2018, 09:52 AMcoming here and crowing about getting away with it
How can this be allowed to happen?
Violating approved and relevant higher command is an abuse of authority. Why is it that no one will/can hold them accountable? Attached is DODI 5210.91 and DIAI 5200.002 side by side. Look at paragraph g on the left, and compare it to 4.22 on the right. BTW, Encl 4 deals with INITIAL eligibility and allows them to temporarily suspend access, based on a WRITTEN FINDING. Such temporary suspension may not form the part of any basis for an for an adverse administrative action or adverse personnel action.
It also goes on to say that the individual shall be advised in writing of the determination, that the determination may be appealed to the Head of the relevant DoD Component, and that his or her final determination is conclusive.
I appealed and they blew me off. Everyone points the finger at each other and they get away with it. The corruption within the DIA Office of Security is appalling and their deal with the polygraph industry devil is pernicious.
I like what Trey Gowdy said today - comparing politics and law. It's because of politics that the government is allowed to violate our individual rights. If rules and laws were enforced, they'd see right through this fraud, waste and abuse.
I remember last year when Wandersmann was pinning his hopes on Mr. Gowdy. I just hope he didn't take any blood money from the polygraph cabal.
Quote from: Wandersmann on Jan 30, 2018, 10:38 PMI've noticed Quickfix never responds to you because he knows you would own him.
quickfix does not usually respond to me because I usually attack him
ad hominem rather than on the merits of his position. This, in turn, is of course because he rarely takes a position.
The true tragedy of evil in us is the corruption of the good in us. On the occasion when quickfix argues an issue he is quite capable of defending his opinions. Sadly such occasions are rare.
This is how they do it. The lying bastards lie right to their face.
In remembrance for all who have fought against this instrument of tyranny known as the polygraph machine, I have some memos of my own that I will soon be authorizing for release.
Don't worry, they aren't classified. They do however, incriminate several high-level officials of lying under oath and perjuring themselves. I suspect though, just like the current memos, they'll only serve to embarrass the offenders. (It's not like anyone can hold them accountable or anything.)
This is the Defense Intelligence Central Adjudication Facility's advisory letter concerning continued access to sensitive compartmented information.
Despite this favorable decision, senior officials from USSOCOM and DIA Office of Security conspired to take unfavorable administrative actions against me.
These officials have maintained throughout this ordeal, that they were unaware of my psychological disabilities. I have a mountain of evidence - in the form of email correspondence and memos - that they were all very much aware
I have been advised that this evidence will be useful in future court proceedings, so I will not be posting it here yet.
Here is another memo that is already in the public domain.
It's a letter from the SOCOM Special Security Office advising leadership that they should adhere to established policies and recommends that they restore my access to classified information.
I apologize if some of this is repetitive - it is a combination of some of my posts on other threads and simply serves to help further explain my experience.
As we all know, people can "fail" the polygraph for several reasons. These are called false positives, and happen at a rate of 10-50%, depending on who you ask. The point is, it is an indisputable fact that there are an infinite number of reasons that can cause ones physiological reactions to mimic what is termed the "lie reaction."
In my case, I was clinically diagnosed with an anxiety disorder – a disorder that was exacerbated by being forced to undergo five polygraph interrogations in three years. Conducting a polygraph examination on an individual with a psychological disability is illegitimate. Punishing that individual based solely on those ill-gotten results is obvious discrimination.
My first polygraph session lasted for about three hours, and resulted in a score of "No Opinion". Throughout that session, the interrogator/polygrapher would stop the "test", and say that he was seeing "something". He told me that it involved the question related to handling classified information. He said that he was seeing "signs" that something was bothering me - maybe it didn't even have anything to do with the question. Maybe I was gay, or I was cheating on my wife, or maybe I did drugs. He suggested all kinds of horrible things, and said if I just told him about it, we could get past it and get the test over with. I told him about our office's sometimes confusing policies on handling classified information - he said that wasn't it.
I was called back two days later. I already knew which question was causing me to react excessively, and I couldn't do anything about it. This time they were ready for me. They even used a good guy/bad guy approach, telling me that if I would just confess to whatever it was that was bothering me, we could be finished. I told him more details of how I was tasked to move, or remove classified media from different classified systems – often not knowing if what I was doing was approved or not. Once again, he said that wasn't it, and that I needed to come clean with him.
This is a very important point - once they tell you that you are reacting "deceptively" to a question, it is virtually impossible to not, not react again the next time. This is the fear reaction that Dr. Richardson knew so much about. Because of my anxiety disorder, I was overwhelmed with fear. Fear of failure. When the failure will result in terrifying consequences, this "fear reaction" is intensified. Once I was accused, it was impossible for me to suppress that reaction. This fear reaction is fraudulently being labeled as a lie reaction. Once again, I was judged as "No Opinion".
10 months later, I was summoned to HQ DIA for another round of questions and interrogations, followed by more polygraph. My anxiety was out of control from the moment I was notified of the trip to DC. Predictably, I "failed" miserably, had a nervous breakdown, and was judged "Significant Response".
I returned to work and continued as if nothing happened until five months later. I was summoned once again to appear for more questions and interrogations, followed by more polygraph examinations. I have no idea how, but this time the examination was judged "No Opinion". Again, I returned to work without any restrictions.
Two years and two months later, after recently having been stripped of my clearance and physically removed from my workspace, I was sent again to DC. I was told that if I could "pass" this time, everything would return to normal and I could go back to work. If I "failed", I would be forever banished, labeled a vulnerability to security, and forced to relocate to an unclassified position in DC. My fear of failing was overwhelming, as my career, my reputation and my life were on the line. They brought in all their "experts" trying to get me to crack – the problem was, I had nothing to confess – other than what I had already told them. Well, I "failed" miserably and had another nervous breakdown. Immediately after the session, I was taken to see two DIA psychologists who talked me down.
Ultimately, I acquired PTSD from the inescapable and unavoidable abuse, and was disabled retired from federal service. So far, I've been unsuccessful in getting the Department of Labor to pay for my medical bills and medications – ironically, because senior officials have lied to investigators and federal judges. They have also perjured themselves in interrogatories, testimonies and affidavits by saying either they didn't know of my disabilities, or that no regulations or policies were violated.
It is reprehensible that we permit a policy that condones using the polygraph results by themselves, to rule against, or to penalize anyone. Especially, when there are approved and relevant regulations that prohibit doing so in the first place. It is a pernicious form of abuse to impugn ones character, to label them untrustworthy and a vulnerability. I worked 35 years in the IC without a single security related incident – if they can do this to me, they can do it to anyone.
Now is the time to stop the fraud, waste and abuse known as the polygraph. Let's all work together to remove the government's exemption to use this scientifically unreliable polygraph test to punish, abuse or judge an otherwise innocent individual.
#stoppolygraphabuse
#EPPAforall
Here's the link to the ECAB decision. They mistakenly determined that the decision to reassign me was not solely based on my inability to pass the polygraph (no one ever said that), that two polygraph tests per year was not considered excessive, and that no standards were violated when they took the unfavorable actions against me.
Through interrogatories, affidavits, testimonies, emails, letters to my Congressman and many other memos, I have the indisputable material proof that the only reason for taking unfavorable administrative actions against me was because of my inability to "pass" the polygraph.
It is a fact that approved and relevant DOD and DIA regulations explicitly direct that individuals with emotional, psychological or other mental disabilities should be exempted from polygraph examinations and interrogations. I presented them with numerous medical reports and they continued with the abusive treatment.
They approved my disability retirement based on these reports, but now I can't get them to pay for my medical bills.
They lie and no one will or can hold them accountable.
https://www.dol.gov/ecab/decisions/2017/May/16-1575.htm
#stoppolygraphabuse
#EPPAforall
I realize now, that not hiring a lawyer was a mistake. One that allowed the government to take advantage of me, and deny my request. This is what I submitted:
In January last year, DIA implemented a new policy to require all of its contractors to successfully complete a Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) examination.
http://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/Business/Contractor%20Personnel%20Security/FAQs_for_Policy_Transition_approved.pdf?ver=2016-11-18-112104-333
If DIA has tens of thousands of contractors worldwide, and they openly admit to a 21% annual failure rate for CSP examinations, it would be expected that thousands of people would be/are being punished. Is this happening?
#EPPAforall
#stoppolygraphabuse
I recently ran across this story on clearancejobs.com - https://news.clearancejobs.com/2017/05/23/new-security-clearance-criteria-released-sead-4/
I was astonished to discover SEAD-4, National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. http://ogc.osd.mil/doha/SEAD4_20170608.pdf
This directive, signed by Clapper, took effect on 08 June 2017 and is consistent with existing policy under DODI 5210.91.
Appendix A states; "No adverse action concerning these guidelines may be taken solely on the basis of polygraph examination technical calls in the absence of adjudicatively significant information."
If no one cares to enforce DODI 5210.91, will they enforce SEAD-4? There are 13 guidelines to consider when adjudicating access to classified information. I note that nowhere is the polygraph mentioned under these guidelines.
You know why? Because the polygraph is a supplement to, not a substitute for other methods of investigation.....
Check out this video. "How DIA Monitors Employee Behavior – Steve McIntosh".
This is the guy that this whole thread is about. Makes me sick to even listen to him. Notice how he says they have oversight on what the IG is doing?
https://www.govtechworks.com/talking-tech-how-dia-monitors-employee-behavior-steve-mcintosh/
On this date in 2017, I decided to go public with my story as John M. (guest.) There is no doubt that this thread has helped me to expose corruption in the government's polygraph industry - as evidenced by the 57,000 views of it.
Just so you all know, the story still isn't over. In fact, after a long six years, it's about to get real. Stay tuned.
Sam
Quote from: sammorter on Feb 17, 2020, 02:58 PMOn this date in 2017, I decided to go public with my story as John M. (guest.) There is no doubt that this thread has helped me to expose corruption in the government's polygraph industry - as evidenced by the 57,000 views of it.
Just so you all know, the story still isn't over. In fact, after a long six years, it's about to get real. Stay tuned.
Sam
Good luck Sam! Go get em tiger!
Does anyone know of a DoD employee that has had unfavorable administrative actions (in include access, employment, assignment, and detail determinations) taken against them based solely on "not successfully completing" the polygraph?
Or, how about a DoD employee that has been allowed to remain in status with no restrictions after "not successfully completing" the polygraph?
If DIA admits to a 22% failure rate (No Opinion/Significant Response,) these two questions would apply to thousands of people.
The link that I posted above featuring my buddy Steve McIntosh is no longer working. The govtechworks.com link now takes you to fakeidboss.net
In it's place, I'll upload this description of the Insider Threat Program that he wrote in 2014.
I've been sorting through my denied OWCP claim, and have uncovered several interesting documents. For example, on March 5th, 2015, the Department of Labor asks DIA to comment on a series of questions related to my claim. On April 29th, 2015, Brett Stern submits a carefully crafted letter detailing my polygraph examinations. He explained that I underwent three polygraphs in 10 months and four in 15 months, and then declares that two polygraph examinations in a year, as was NOT the case, is not considered excessive by DIA of federal standards.
That's it. That's all they received from DIA concerning my claim, and they denied it based on that letter.
Once again, here's the final ruling:
"Appellant alleged that the employing establishment committed wrongdoing by requiring him to undergo polygraph testing and by altering his work duties and work conditions due to the results of same. Such administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee's employment, are administrative functions of the employing establishment rather than the regular or specially assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA. However, the Board has held that, where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.
The Board finds that appellant has not established that the employing establishment committed error and abuse by administering polygraph testing to him between 2011 and 2014. Appellant did not present any documents, such as the findings of a complaint or grievance, establishing that the employing establishment committed error or abuse by conducting the polygraph testing. The submission of the medical evidence that appellant asserts the employing establishment had seen prior to the August 5, 2014 polygraph testing would not, in and of itself, be sufficient to show that he should have been exempted from undergoing the testing. Appellant referenced Department of Defense Instruction 5210.91 and parts of Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which he believed were violated because the employing establishment proceeded with polygraph testing. However, his mere opinion that these provisions were violated would not constitute probative evidence of error or abuse by the employing establishment. Moreover, appellant did not submit evidence supporting his assertion that the frequency of polygraph testing to which he was subjected exceeded any established limit such that the employing establishment committed error or abuse. The Chief of the Credibility Assessment Program of the employing establishment indicated that the administration of two polygraph tests per year was not considered excessive under the relevant standards and the Board notes that the administration of polygraph tests to appellant fell within these standards.
There is no evidence in the record showing that the employing establishment acted abusively or erroneously by removing appellant from his regular duties, reassigning him to new duties, or adjusting the parameters of his security clearance. Appellant has not submitted evidence showing that management violated any specific rule or regulation by carrying out these actions. He has not established his claims that he was placed in an office for "misfits" where other colleagues refused to interact with him and that he was given little to no work to perform as an improper form of punishment. Appellant has not submitted the findings of any complaint or grievance showing that these administrative/personnel actions constituted error or abuse by the employing establishment.
Thus, appellant has not established a compensable work factor under FECA with respect to his claims that the employing establishment committed error or abuse regarding administrative or personnel matters."
I haven't been able to submit the findings of any complaint or grievance showing that these administrative/personnel actions constituted error or abuse by the employing establishment because I can't get anyone to hold them accountable.
It's such bullshit. They medically retired me for what they did, but won't pay my doctors bills.
I was studying DoDI 5210.91 today, and I noticed that in Enclosure 4, Section 4. CONDUCT OF A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION. a. Pretest. (1) Obtain consent from the examinee...
Is the examinee informed of their rights when they sign this consent form? If the purpose for the polygraph is for a reinvestigation, is the examinee informed that the polygraph "results" by themselves may not be used to take unfavorable administrative actions against them?
Does anyone have a copy of one of these consent forms?
Also, Section 5. Polygraph Limitations. It states, "The examinee should not be subjected to prolonged interrogation immediately prior to the polygraph."
Why do you suppose that matters? It should say immediately prior - and during - the polygraph. Being called back for a second, third, fourth, and fifth prolonged interrogation and polygraph has the same effect as "immediately prior."
It's called a Significant Response.
#StopPolygraphAbuse
Quote from: sammorter on Feb 17, 2020, 02:58 PMJust so you all know, the story still isn't over. In fact, after a long six years, it's about to get real. Stay tuned.
It's not? Seems like it is to me! You were "medically" retired. You're done. Finished. Adios!
Quote from: sammorter on Jun 06, 2021, 06:48 PMDoes anyone have a copy of one of these consent forms?
We have plenty; but you're not getting one!
Quote from: sammorter on Jun 06, 2021, 06:48 PMDoes anyone have a copy of one of these consent forms?
The U.S. Army uses DA Form 2801 (Polygraph Examination Statement of Consent). The latest version is dated June 2011:
https://armypubs.army.mil/pub/eforms/DR_a/pdf/A2801.pdf
AntiPolygraph.org has earlier published a nearly identical version dated 1 July 1985:
https://antipolygraph.org/documents/a2801.pdf
Neither version informs the subject that the results themselves cannot be used as the basis of any adverse action.
Quote from: quickfix on Jun 07, 2021, 03:29 PMWe have plenty; but you're not getting one!
Yet another example of the obfuscation that is required to keep the corrupt polygraph industry afloat.
UPDATE
As my case sits on the DC District Court docket, I feel the need to share something.
The Agency has repeatedly escaped culpability in my complaints by claiming that they were not aware of my disabilities.
This is a report that was written by a DIA psychologist which describes my condition less than an hour after my 5th and final polygraph interrogation.
Polygraph abuse is real.
Here is the brief in support of my appeal to the EEOC.
And here is the Agency's Opposition to my appeal.
And here is the Administrative Judge's final ruling. Ultimately, I filed a timely Request for Reconsideration, which was swiftly rejected.
Quote from: sammorter on Feb 17, 2020, 02:58 PMJust so you all know, the story still isn't over. In fact, after a long six years, it's about to get real. Stay tuned.
It is now. As Don Meredith used to say, turn out the lights, the party's over!
Quote from: quickfix on May 03, 2023, 07:43 AMIt is now. As Don Meredith used to say, turn out the lights, the party's over!
I take it you missed my post at the top of this page.
Upon being notified that I was being summoned to HQ for another Polygraph Credibility Assessment, I presented the responsible officials with this official diagnosis of my disabilities. It was brushed aside, and I traveled up to DC to be subjected to the most abusive interrogation of them all. (the psychologist's report from that session is at the top of this page)
This is a report by Dr. Rothburd, and it is one of the psychological evaluations that I used to apply for OWCP benefits and disability retirement.
I know that I have posted this before, but the Department of Labor denied me OWCP benefits. Here is their reasoning:
In order for a claim to be accepted under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA), the claim must meet 5 basic elements. The claim must:
(1) Be Timely Filed.
(2) Be made by a Federal Civil Employee.
(3) Establish Fact of Injury, which has both a factual and medical component. Factually, employment incident(s) alleged must have actually occurred. Medically, a medical condition must be diagnosed in connection with the specified employment incident.
(4) Establish Performance of Duty. The medical condition must have arisen during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors.
(5) Establish Causal Relationship, which means the medical evidence establishes that the diagnosed condition is causally related to the accepted employment factors.
You have established that you are a Federal civilian employee who filed a timely claim; that the injury, accident or employment factor occurred; and that a medical condition has been diagnosed in connection with the injury or event(s). However after a thorough review of all evidence, your claim for compensation is denied because the fourth basic element. Performance of Duty, has not been met.
Specifically, your case is denied because the evidence is not sufficient to establish that a medical condition arose during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors.
The following findings of fact are made regarding the events and circumstances implicated in the
claim and whether they constitute factors of employment for compensation purposes:
Accepted Event(s) That Are Factors of Employment:
There are no accepted events that are factors of employment.
Accepted Event(s) That Are Not Factors of Employment:
1. You noted that from March 2011 through August 2014, you were forced to endure the intense psychological stress and excessive harassment of five separate interrogation/polygraph sessions. This is an administrative function of your employing agency and administrative actions by the agency can only be compensable if you prove that the employing agency erred or abused their discretionary authority beyond your mere perception. You employing agency noted you underwent Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) on the following dates: March 23, 2011, March 25, 2011, January 31, 2012, June 26, 2012, and August 4, 2014. Your employing agency also stated you were given multiple attempts to successfully pass the Polygraph Creditability Assessment (PGA) so that you could return to your regular duties. Your employing agency also noted that two polygraph examinations in a year, as was the case for you is not consider excessive by the Defense Intelligence Agency standards.
Where an employee alleges harassment and cites to specific incidents and the employer denies that harassment occurred, the Office or some other appropriate fact finder must make a determination as to the truth of the allegations. The issue is not whether the claimant has established harassment or discrimination under standards applied by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Rather the issue is whether the claimant, under the FECA, has submitted evidence sufficient to establish an injury arising in the performance of duty. To establish entitlement to benefits, the claimant must establish a factual basis for the claim by supporting allegations with probative and reliable evidence. Kathleen A. Donati, 54 ECAB (Docket No. 03-1333, issued August 13, 2003).
For harassment to give rise to a compensable disability there must be evidence that harassment or discrimination did, in fact, occur. Mere perceptions of harassment are not compensable. Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not determinative of whether such harassment or discrimination occurred. To establish entitlement to benefits, a claimant must establish a factual basis for the claim by supporting his or her allegations with probative and reliable evidence. Helen P. Allen, 47 ECAB —(Docket No. 93-1794, issued October 16, 1995); David G. Joseph, 47 ECAB — (Docket No. 94-1288, issued March 26, 1996); Edward J. Meros, 47 ECAB — (Docket No. 94-1 636, issued May 24, 1996); William E. Seare, 47 ECAB — (Docket No. 94-2370, issued July 16, 1996); Donna J. DiBernardo, 47 ECAB — (Docket No. 94-1 31 7, issued August 20, 1996).
For harassment or discrimination to give rise to a compensable disability, there must be evidence introduced which establishes that the acts alleged or implicated by the employee did, in fact, occur. Mere perceptions of harassment or discrimination are not compensable under the FECA. Unsubstantiated allegations of harassment or discrimination are not determinative of whether such harassment or discrimination occurred. Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB (Docket No. 02-1956, issued January 15, 2004); Beverly A. Spencer, 55 ECAB (Docket No. 03-2033, issued May 3, 2004); Mary J. Summers, 55 ECAB (Docket No. 04-704, issued September 29, 2004). Stress related to a claimant's pursuit of a claim before the Office does not constitute a compensable factor of employment. John D. Jackson, 55 ECAB (Docket No. 03-2281, issued April 8, 2004).
2. You stated from October 7, 2014 until August 4, 2014, you were denied the opportunity to perform your job for the sole reason of not being able to successfully complete the counterintelligence scope polygraph. This is an administrative function of your employing agency and administrative actions by the agency can only be compensable if you prove that the employing agency erred or abused their discretionary authority beyond your mere perception. Your employing agency stated you were reassigned to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) headquarters to mitigate successful completion of the counterintelligence scope examination a basic security requirement for all DIA employees.
Dissatisfaction with the type of work assigned, or desire to perform different duties, does not come within coverage of the FECA. Katherine A. Berg, 54 ECAB (Docket No. 02-2096, issued December 23, 2002).
An employee's dissatisfaction with holding a position in which he or she feels underutilized, performing duties for which he or she feels overqualified or holding a position which he or she feels to be unchallenging or uninteresting is not a compensable employment factor. A claimant's reaction to such conditions and incidents at work is self- generated and results from his or her frustration in not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to hold a particular position. Paul L. Stewart, 54 ECAB (Docket No. 03- 1107, issued September 23, 2003.
3. You stated were reassigned to a menial position, relegated to answering phones and manning an often-empty office. This is an administrative function of your employing agency and administrative actions by the agency can only be compensable if you prove that the employing agency erred or abused their authority beyond your mere perception. Your employing agency stated that you physically reassigned to another work location and subsequently loss access to classified workstations and networks. The employing agency also noted that you were not being stripped of SCI access as documented in the normal intelligence community security tracking system. The employing agency further noted you were treated as having a SCI clearance but reassignment action; you held a top secret/SCI clearance and simply needed to be rebriefed in to regain secret/SCI status. The employing agency noted you are still employed by the DIA bout would not work at your preferred location.
Administrative and personnel matters, although generally related to the employee's employment, are administrative functions of the employer rather than the regular or specially assigned work duties of the employee and are not covered under FECA.[10] However, the Board has held that where the evidence establishes error or abuse on the part of the employing establishment in what would otherwise be an administrative matter, coverage will be afforded.[11] In determining whether the employing establishment has erred or acted abusively, the Board will examine the factual evidence of record to determine whether the employing establishment acted reasonably.[12]
Appellant's allegations relate primarily to administrative and personnel actions by the vocational rehabilitation staff. In McEuen,[19] the Board held that an employee's emotional reaction to administrative actions or personnel matters taken by the employing establishment is not covered under FECA unless there is evidence of administrative error or abuse. Generally, such actions pertain to procedures and requirements of the employer and do not bear a direct relation to the work required of the employee. Absent evidence of error or abuse, the emotional condition is not employment generated. To determine whether error or abuse has occurred, the Board must examine whether the employing establishment acted reasonably.[20]
4. You states based solely on the results of my polygraph examinations, you were relieved of employment at HQ USSOCOM and involuntarily reassigned to headquarter DIA. This is an administrative function of your employing agency and administrative actions by the agency can only be compensable if you prove that the employing agency erred or abused their discretionary authority beyond your mere perception.
The Board has held that, "The assignment of a work schedule or tour of duty is recognized as an administrative function of the employing establishment and, absent any error or abuse, does not constitute a compensable factor of employment." See Helen Allen, 47 ECAB 141 (1995); Peggy R. Lee, 46 ECAB 527 (1995).
Appellant's allegations relate primarily to administrative and personnel actions by the vocational rehabilitation staff. In McEuen,[19] the Board held that an employee's emotional reaction to administrative actions or personnel matters taken by the employing establishment is not covered under FECA unless there is evidence of administrative error or abuse. Generally, such actions pertain to procedures and requirements of the employer and do not bear a direct relation to the work required of the employee. Absent evidence of error or abuse, the emotional condition is not employment generated. To determine whether error or abuse has occurred, the Board must examine whether the employing establishment acted reasonably.[20]
The Board has held that denials by an employing establishment of a request for a different job, promotion or transfer are not compensable factors of employment under the FECA, as they do not involve appellant's ability to perform his or her regular or specially assigned work duties, but rather constitute a desire to work in a different position. Charles D. Edwards, 55 ECAB (Docket No. 02-1956, issued January 15, 2004).
5. You stated on August 1, 2014, you filed a formal Equal Employment Opportunity (EEC) complaint (case number 0142014-00052) due to the fact that officials have discriminated against me based on my disability. The case remains unresolved at this time. The investigation is still in progress. The Board has long held that grievances and EEC complaints by themselves do not establish that workplace harassment or unfair treatment occurred. [22] the evidence submitted does not support appellant's allegations of harassment or discrimination on the part of her supervisors or coworkers. She did not submit adequate documentation of the dates such incidents arose, the parties involved or support her allegations with statements from any witnesses.
Incident(s) Alleged Which the Office Finds Did Not Occur:
1. You stated you were ridiculed by co-workers, as being one of the "misfit toys" — a term associated with Individuals who had committed an offense (DUI, positive drug test domestic violence, etc.) which resulted in their being reassigned to this section.
The Employees' Compensation Appeals Board held in Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470 (1993) that, "unless a claimant alleges a compensable factor of employment substantiated by the record, it is unnecessary for the Office to address the medical evidence.
2. You stated over the next 10 months, some coworkers were told not to communicate with me and others treated me like you were untrustworthy due to your status. I filed several appeals and complaints - all of which were ignored. I endured the embarrassment and humiliation of being falsely accused and demoted to performing menial duties with no recourse available. As a result, I developed severe depression which was untreated for nearly eight months.
An employee's emotional reaction to an administrative or personnel matter is not, in general, covered under the Act and would be considered as self-generated. Error or abuse by the employing agency, in what would otherwise by a personnel or administrative matter, may afford coverage under the Act. Where the evidence of record demonstrates that the employing establishment did not act reasonably in the administration of a personnel matter, coverage under the FECA may be afforded.
3. You noted during this entire process, I was continually denied opportunities to address higher management and left without support, at times even spurned by those appointed to help with administrative issues. You presented no probative evidence that there events occurred. The Employees' Compensation Appeals Board held in Effie O. Morris, 44 ECAB 470 (1993) that, "unless a claimant alleges a compensable factor of employment substantiated by the record, it is
unnecessary for the Office to address the medical evidence."
4. You stated that the DIA authorities have violated policy and misused the PCA by not following Department of Defense Instructions (DoDI 5210.91) that require them to have "procedures to assess and determine whether an individual is mentally, psychologically, and emotionally fit to undergo an examination". Also, the regulation states that written procedures must exist to "Exempt or postpone examinations when individuals are considered psychologically, or emotionally unfit to undergo an examination". Their negligence to follow set policy has led to undue mental and physical pain and suffering as I had nervous breakdowns after each of the above listed sessions. You presented no probative evidence that these events occurred.
Based on these findings, your claim is denied on the fourth basic element. Performance of Duty, because the requirements have not been met for establishing that you sustained an emotional condition that arose during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors as defined by the FECA. Medical treatment is not authorized and prior authorization, if any, is terminated.
Without revealing too much right now, this is a portion of the psychiatric evaluation that I submitted to the OWCP and the EEOC.
John M.: just out of curiosity (and if you don't mind answering), how much have you spent on legal fees pursuing this matter?
Hello, Pierre.
Let's just say that it's more than enough to buy a new car, but not enough to buy a house.
BTW, I have kept meticulous records, and I have agreed to publish all of them on ap.org when this is all over.
The attached document "Insider Threat Program" was written by then DIA Insider Threat Program Coordinator, Steven D. McIntosh. In it, he describes how they circumvented the approved and relevant regulations and policies to punish individuals with unresolved polygraph examinations.
What's relevant to my case is when he says, "A key function of the Panel is to address situations wherein an employee or affiliate is deemed medically or psychologically unsuitable for polygraph testing. Historically, DIA lacked a formal process to address these situations and cases languished for months and even years. The DIA InTP established a formal process addressing suitability determination, medical and/or psychological validation, and presentation of the case to the Panel, which in turn develops a mitigation strategy to account for the employee's non-suitability for polygraph examination."
In my case, the mitigation strategy they came up with was to yank my clearance/access, remove me from my position, and reassign me to an unclassified position 1,000 miles away in DC. According to Title 32, these are all considered unfavorable administrative actions.
In my first set of interrogatories for my EEO case, I asked for a current list, or an accurate percentage of DIA employees that have been exempted or postponed from PCA testing because of their mental, psychological, or emotional disabilities. The Agency answered, "A total of 43 DIA employees (about 0.2%) were temporarily deferred from Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) examinations due to psychological or emotional conditions."
I then asked for a complete list of DIA employees who have been subjected to unfavorable administrative actions solely as a result of their inability to successfully complete the PCA examination.
Under oath, their answer was "No DIA employee has been subjected to adverse administrative actions solely as a result of their inability to successfully complete a Counterintelligence Scope Polygraph (CSP) examination."
While preparing for my court hearing, I'm perusing and cataloging the massive amount of information that I've collected over the past 8+ years.
The attached email was written August 13th, 2014 - a week after my TDY to DIA for the 5th interrogation by polygraph. Notably, there is no mention of the DIA Psychological Report that was submitted by Dr. Jill Tucillo after that session (reply #240 posted on Apr 25th, 2023).
There are several incriminating statements in this email, but this one stands out: "At present, we do not anticipate a medical diagnosis that would support a medical deferment from the CSP examination. In any case, the InTP does not have the ability to mitigate the loss of the CSP tool (either by SUBJECT's inability to successfully complete the examination process, or through a medical deferment from the CSP examination process) while SUBJECT is assigned to USSOCOM spaces.
Furthermore, during his interrogatory, the Insider Threat Program Coordinator, Steven Douglas McIntosh, remarked that, "if a claim of disability was presented, it would not have altered the outcome as the issue is the DIA employee being unsuccessful in completing the CSP examination and presenting a threat, risk, or vulnerability to national security information and operations."
Quote from: sammorter on Jul 04, 2023, 12:26 PMBTW, I have kept meticulous records, and I have agreed to publish all of them on ap.org when this is all over.
John M.: I see on another thread that you lost your appeal in February. Is that the end?
QuoteQuote from: sammorter on Jul 04, 2023, 12:26 PMBTW, I have kept meticulous records, and I have agreed to publish all of them on ap.org when this is all over.
John M.: I see on another thread that you lost your appeal in February. Is that the end?
Pierre: My case is currently on the docket at the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - Case No. 24-5056.
10 years after its inception, DIA's Insider Threat Program is thoroughly embarrassed, as one of its own is arrested by the FBI for intentionally mishandling classified material.
They need to stop wasting resources on their beloved polygraph program and focus on conducting proper background checks.
Nathan Vilas, who worked for the DIA Insider Threat Program, was himself, the insider threat! LOL. He just got arrested by FBI for trying to pass classified information. I wonder how long he did this for and when he "passed" his most recent polygraph?
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-employee-arrested-attempting-provide-classified-information-foreign-government
Name correction:
*Nathan Vilas Laatsch
Regarding Nathan Vilas Laatsch's alleged attempted espionage, see the U.S. Department of Justice's press release dated 29 May 2025:
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-employee-arrested-attempting-provide-classified-information-foreign-government
The release notes "In March 2025, the FBI commenced an operation after receiving a tip that an individual — now known to be Laatsch — offered to provide classified information to a friendly foreign government."
Although not stated, I think it's highly likely that the tip came from the government that Laatsch approached. Such was the case with Jonathan and Diana Toebbe (https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndwv/pr/maryland-nuclear-engineer-and-his-wife-sentenced-espionage-related-offenses), who attempted to sell information about U.S. nuclear submarines to Brazil: the Brazilians promptly informed the U.S. government about the attempt, and undercover agents proceeded with a sting operation, with the cooperation of the Brazilian embassy.
The choice for a government friendly to the United States is an easy one: why risk taking an American walk-in as a source when in all likelihood, it may be an undercover U.S. agent testing how that government would handle such a situation? Why risk the harm it could cause to bilateral relations?
In Laatsch's case, it seems that the U.S. government was on to him essentially from the get-go.
So, with respect to polygraph policy, it would seem that fear of the polygraph did not deter Laatsch, and if he was polygraphed during the approximately two months from the time he approached the friendly foreign government until the time of his arrest, then DIA's polygraph unit was likely briefed on the situation.
John M, you lose again. Another victory in the fight against insider threats.
Quote from: quickfix on Jul 25, 2025, 11:01 AMJohn M, you lose again. Another victory in the fight against insider threats.
Are you familiar with any instances where the polygraph requirement was waived for a person holding a position that would normally require polygraph screening? If so, under what sort of circumstances has that happened?
Never. In my almost 40-year polygraph career with 3 different DOD polygraph agencies, I have never seen or heard of it happening. We have had individuals with a legitimate medical reason for not being suitable for testing, and they are simply not granted the access, removed from access (as John Morter was) or not hired. It is simply a myth that a polygraph requirement can be "waived".
Thank you. I haven't heard of such a waiver ever being granted in any federal agency. I'm not sure such a requirement can't be waived. I would expect that the heads of most agencies with a polygraph requirement would have the authority to grant a waiver. But as a practical matter, it seems that it never (or at most very rarely, and without public notice) happens.
Quote from: quickfix on Jul 25, 2025, 11:01 AMJohn M, you lose again. Another victory in the fight against insider threats.
Has anyone herd from John M. for his take? Would like to hear his thoughts.
Quote from: quickfix on Jul 25, 2025, 11:01 AMJohn M, you lose again. Another victory in the fight against insider threats.
Has anyone heard from John M. for his take? Would like to hear his thoughts.
Today, my petition for a writ of certiorari was docketed in the US Supreme Court. #25-737.
I'm representing myself, and I'm hoping that anyone with relevant expertise — psychologists, researchers, clinicians, attorneys, or scholars — might consider whether these issues warrant independent amicus (friend-of-the-court) support. Any such involvement would be entirely voluntary and independent, and focused on the broader legal and scientific issues rather than my personal situation.
The Questions Presented are:
1. Whether a federal agency may, consistent with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and EEOC regulations, redefine a security screening requirement—such as a counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) examination—as an "essential job function," thereby eliminating the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to employees whose documented medical conditions render them unsuitable for such testing.
2. Whether mandatory Department of Defense regulations, including DoDI 5210.91—which (a) prohibit adverse administrative action based solely on an unresolved polygraph result and (b) require medical deferral or exemption for individuals who are psychologically or medically unsuited for testing—are judicially enforceable under the Rehabilitation Act, or instead may be disregarded under a theory of unreviewable "security discretion." (App. F)
3. Whether courts may extend Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), beyond clearance adjudications to cover ordinary personnel and medical accommodation decisions, effectively placing federal employees' statutory rights outside judicial review even when no security clearance has been suspended, revoked, or unfavorably adjudicated.
4. Whether an agency that categorically refuses to consider disability-based accommodations or to engage in the interactive process required by 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) may nevertheless be deemed to have acted lawfully under the Rehabilitation Act when its justifications are shifting, medically unsupported, and contrary to its own binding regulations.
If you're interested, or would like more information, I am also available on Signal at sammorter.11
You may access the Petition and Appendix on the Court's website here:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-737.html
I posed the four questions presented in my case to Grok, and this is what it came up with -
1. Whether a federal agency may, consistent with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and EEOC regulations, redefine a security screening requirement—such as a counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) examination—as an "essential job function," thereby eliminating the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to employees whose documented medical conditions render them unsuitable for such testing.
A federal agency generally may not redefine a security screening requirement—such as a counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) examination—as an "essential job function" solely to eliminate the duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 501) and EEOC regulations.
Key Principles Under the Rehabilitation Act and EEOC Guidance
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities and requires them to provide reasonable accommodations unless doing so would cause undue hardship. A "qualified individual" is one who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), incorporated into federal sector rules).
Essential functions are the fundamental duties of the position, not marginal ones. Factors for determining them include:
• The employer's judgment
• Written job descriptions
• Time spent performing the function
• Consequences of not requiring it
Courts and the EEOC defer to employer judgments on essential functions but scrutinize attempts to manipulate them to avoid accommodation obligations.
Application to Security Requirements Like CSP
Positions requiring access to classified information (e.g., in intelligence or defense agencies) often mandate security clearances, which include polygraph screenings like CSP for counterintelligence purposes. Holding or obtaining such a clearance is frequently considered a qualification standard or essential eligibility requirement for the role.
However:
• Agencies cannot arbitrarily relabel a screening requirement as "essential" to bypass the interactive process for reasonable accommodation.
• If a documented medical condition (e.g., certain anxiety disorders, heart conditions, or other impairments that affect physiological responses) renders an employee unsuitable for polygraph testing, the agency must explore accommodations—such as alternative screening methods, reassignment to a non-sensitive position, or waivers—if they would enable the individual to perform the job's core duties without undue hardship.
EEOC guidance emphasizes that medical examinations (including those that may interact with disabilities) must be job-related and consistent with business necessity. Polygraphs are not classified as medical examinations under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act, but if a disability prevents successful completion, the agency cannot simply declare the test itself "essential" without justification tied to the position's fundamental duties.
Relevant Considerations and Limitations
• National security exception: In roles involving sensitive classified information, courts often uphold denial of accommodations that compromise security (e.g., waiving a clearance requirement could pose a direct threat or fundamental alteration). Undue hardship in the federal context can include risks to national security.
• No direct precedent on CSP: There are no widely reported court cases specifically addressing CSP polygraphs and reasonable accommodation claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Analogous cases involving security clearances (e.g., Kaplan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. or EEOC v. Exxon) treat clearance as an essential requirement where core job duties involve protected information.
• Employee options: If denied accommodation, an employee may challenge the designation via the EEOC federal sector process, arguing the agency failed to engage interactively or that the polygraph is not truly essential.
In summary, while agencies have broad discretion to define essential functions—especially for security-sensitive roles—they cannot redefine requirements merely to evade accommodation duties. The determination must be based on legitimate job needs, and the interactive process is required. For specific situations, consult an attorney or file with the agency's EEO office/EEOC, as outcomes depend on case facts, job description, and agency mission.
2. Whether mandatory Department of Defense regulations, including DoDI 5210.91—which (a) prohibit adverse administrative action based solely on an unresolved polygraph result and (b) require medical deferral or exemption for individuals who are psychologically or medically unsuited for testing—are judicially enforceable under the Rehabilitation Act, or instead may be disregarded under a theory of unreviewable "security discretion."
Mandatory Department of Defense (DoD) regulations in DoDI 5210.91 (Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Procedures) are generally judicially enforceable in the context of a Rehabilitation Act claim, and agencies may not disregard them under a broad theory of unreviewable "security discretion."
Core Holding from Department of the Navy v. Egan (1988)
The Supreme Court in Egan held that merits of security clearance decisions—including grants, denials, or revocations—are committed to executive discretion and generally not subject to judicial review. This protects predictive judgments about risks to national security. Courts have extended this to bar review of discrimination claims (including under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act) when resolution requires second-guessing the substance of a clearance decision (e.g., recent cases like Lee v. DOJ (D.C. Cir. 2024), where revocation after failed polygraphs barred review of discrimination claims).
However, Egan does not create absolute immunity for all security-related actions. Courts may review claims alleging that an agency violated its own mandatory procedures or statutory obligations, particularly where the challenge targets procedural compliance rather than the predictive security judgment.
Application to DoDI 5210.91 Provisions
DoDI 5210.91 establishes binding procedures for DoD polygraph programs, including:
• Prohibition on adverse action based solely on unresolved polygraph results — Agencies must have additional supporting evidence or resolution before acting.
• Requirement for medical deferral or exemption — Examiners must postpone or exempt individuals deemed psychologically or medically unsuitable (e.g., conditions affecting physiological responses), often involving evaluation by medical authorities.
These are mandatory internal rules ("shall" language in the instruction), not discretionary guidelines.
In a Rehabilitation Act context:
• If an agency ignores these provisions—e.g., taking adverse action solely on an inconclusive polygraph or refusing a required medical deferral/exemption for a documented disability—an employee can argue this violates the duty to engage in the interactive process or provide reasonable accommodation (e.g., alternative assessment methods, waiver, or reassignment).
• Such a claim challenges procedural noncompliance with DoD's own binding regulations, not the merits of whether the employee poses a security risk.
• Courts and the EEOC routinely review whether agencies followed their own rules in discrimination cases, even in security-sensitive contexts, as long as the inquiry does not probe the substantive clearance judgment.
Limits of "Unreviewable Security Discretion"
Agencies cannot invoke "security discretion" to disregard mandatory regulations. While broad deference applies to ultimate clearance outcomes, procedural violations tied to anti-discrimination laws remain reviewable (e.g., via EEOC federal sector process or limited judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act for arbitrary/capricious action). National security can justify "undue hardship" denials of accommodation, but it does not shield outright noncompliance with DoDI 5210.91.
Practical Outcomes
• No reported cases directly litigate these exact DoDI provisions under the Rehabilitation Act, but analogous challenges (e.g., failure to follow security regulations in discrimination claims) have proceeded past motions to dismiss where framed procedurally.
• Employees can raise noncompliance in EEO complaints, arguing it evidences failure to accommodate or pretext.
In summary, while security clearance merits are largely unreviewable, mandatory procedural protections in DoDI 5210.91 are enforceable in Rehabilitation Act claims challenging agency disregard of those rules. Outcomes turn on case specifics, such as how the polygraph interacts with the disability and job requirements.
3. Whether courts may extend Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), beyond clearance adjudications to cover ordinary personnel and medical accommodation decisions, effectively placing federal employees' statutory rights outside judicial review even when no security clearance has been suspended, revoked, or unfavorably adjudicated.
Courts generally may not broadly extend Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), beyond the merits of security clearance adjudications (grants, denials, or revocations) to shield ordinary personnel actions or medical/reasonable accommodation decisions from judicial review under the Rehabilitation Act, particularly where no clearance has been suspended, revoked, or unfavorably adjudicated.
Core Scope of Egan
Egan held that the Merit Systems Protection Board (and by extension, courts) lacks authority to review the substantive merits of a security clearance determination absent clear congressional authorization. This stems from the President's constitutional authority over national security and the predictive nature of clearance judgments (e.g., trustworthiness and risk assessment). Courts extend this to bar review of discrimination claims (including under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act) only if resolving them requires second-guessing the executive's predictive security judgment (e.g., cases like Ryan v. Reno (D.C. Cir. 1999) and recent reaffirmations in Lee v. Garland (D.C. Cir. 2024)).
However, Egan is narrow:
• It does not create absolute immunity for all security-related actions.
• Lower courts consistently refuse to extend it to non-clearance decisions or procedural/discrimination challenges that do not probe the merits of a clearance adjudication.
Application to Ordinary Personnel and Accommodation Decisions
• No extension to reasonable accommodation claims: Where an action involves failure to accommodate a disability (e.g., alternative screening, reassignment, or waivers) without involving a formal clearance revocation/denial, courts review Rehabilitation Act claims. For instance, in Sanchez v. U.S. Dep't of Energy (10th Cir. 2018), the court reviewed a failure-to-accommodate claim despite security concerns, distinguishing it from Egan's bar on clearance merits.
• Personnel actions not tied to clearance adjudication: Courts review discrimination or accommodation claims in security-sensitive roles if they target procedural violations, interactive process failures, or pretext, without requiring review of a predictive clearance judgment (e.g., challenges to reassignment denials or medical deferrals).
• No clearance action involved: If no clearance has been adversely adjudicated (e.g., polygraph unsuitability leading to accommodation denial without revocation), Egan does not apply. Courts reject broad invocations to evade statutory duties under the Rehabilitation Act, which requires interactive engagement and accommodations unless undue hardship (including legitimate security risks) is proven.
Limits and Exceptions
• National security can justify "undue hardship" denials of accommodation, and courts defer to agency judgments on risks.
• If a claim inescapably requires evaluating why a clearance was (or would be) denied/revoked, Egan bars review—even for constitutional or discrimination allegations in some circuits.
• Procedural compliance (e.g., following internal rules) remains reviewable.
In summary, Egan protects the executive's core discretion over clearance merits but does not blanket ordinary personnel or accommodation decisions—especially absent any clearance adjudication—from Rehabilitation Act scrutiny. Courts police overextensions to preserve statutory rights.
4. Whether an agency that categorically refuses to consider disability-based accommodations or to engage in the interactive process required by 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) may nevertheless be deemed to have acted lawfully under the Rehabilitation Act when its justifications are shifting, medically unsupported, and contrary to its own binding regulations.
A federal agency that categorically refuses to consider disability-based accommodations or to engage in the interactive process required by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (incorporated into the Rehabilitation Act via EEOC regulations) may not be deemed to have acted lawfully, particularly when its justifications are shifting, medically unsupported, and contrary to its own binding regulations.
Core Obligations Under the Rehabilitation Act and EEOC Regulations.
The Rehabilitation Act (Section 501) adopts the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), requiring federal agencies to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities unless doing so would cause undue hardship. A key component is the interactive process: an informal, good-faith dialogue between the agency and the employee to identify effective accommodations (EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA, as applied to the Rehabilitation Act).
• Categorical refusal to consider accommodations or engage interactively is a per se violation. The EEOC has repeatedly held that failing to participate in the interactive process—e.g., ignoring requests, denying without exploration, or blanket policies against certain accommodations—constitutes discrimination, even if an accommodation might ultimately cause undue hardship.
• Agencies must respond expeditiously and in good faith. An outright refusal breaks the process and violates the Act.
Impact of Flawed Justifications
• Shifting justifications: Inconsistent or changing reasons for denial (e.g., initially citing one policy, later another) raise an inference of pretext (EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Retaliation and Related Issues, applicable here via overlapping standards). This undermines claims of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, such as undue hardship or business necessity.
• Medically unsupported reasons: Denials must be based on individualized assessments, often requiring medical documentation review. Unsupported assertions (e.g., ignoring provided medical evidence or relying on unsubstantiated assumptions about a condition) fail to meet the interactive process requirement and may evidence bad faith or discrimination.
• Contrary to binding regulations: Federal agencies must follow their own mandatory internal rules (e.g., DoD instructions or agency-specific procedures under Executive Order 13164). Disregarding them in accommodation decisions supports findings of arbitrary action or violation of the Act, as procedural noncompliance is reviewable even in sensitive contexts.
Practical and Legal Outcomes
The EEOC and courts view such conduct as evidence of failure to accommodate, potentially leading to liability. Good-faith engagement is required; categorical policies or flawed rationales do not shield agencies. National security or undue hardship defenses must be substantiated individually, not applied blanketly.
In summary, categorical refusal combined with shifting, unsupported, or regulation-contrary justifications strongly indicates unlawful conduct under the Rehabilitation Act. Employees can challenge this via the agency's EEO process or EEOC.
I was notified last week that my petition was "DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 2/20/2026."
As we approach that important date, I would like to discuss some of the legal aspects of my case.
First, is the legal distinction between polygraph screening for applicants and polygraph screening of employees.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
A fundamental truth governs the use of polygraph examinations in federal employment: the dispositive legal issue is not the scientific validity of the instrument, but the deliberate legal distinction between its use as a pre-employment screening tool and its application to incumbent employees. This distinction is a conscious legal construct designed to balance national security needs with constitutional principles. The core issue before the Court is the preservation of this balance, which is jeopardized when an agency unlawfully erases the line separating applicants from employees.
While government agencies are afforded broad discretion in using polygraphs to gatekeep applicants for employment or security clearances, this discretion does not extend to actions taken against current employees or clearance holders. Applicants can be excluded based largely on polygraph outcomes because they lack vested legal rights. Employees, by contrast, are protected by a framework of statutory and regulatory safeguards that require due process, accountability, and substantive justification for any adverse action.
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL DISTINCTION: LEGAL RIGHTS ATTACHING UPON EMPLOYMENT
The strategic importance of the legal distinction between an individual seeking entry into a federal position and one facing deprivation of an existing one cannot be overstated. Courts have consistently recognized this as the "legal fork in the road" where the government's obligations and an individual's rights fundamentally change. Understanding this "Entry vs. Deprivation" framework is essential to a proper analysis of the lawful limits on polygraph use.
A. The Applicant Context: Non-Selection as a Gatekeeping Mechanism
An applicant for a federal job or security clearance stands on fundamentally different legal ground than an incumbent employee. Because an applicant has no vested property or liberty interest in a position they do not yet hold, an agency's decision not to proceed is legally framed as a simple "non-selection," not as a punitive or disciplinary action. This framing grants the government significant deference. At this entry stage, the polygraph functions as a risk-management device, not an adjudicative one.
The key characteristics of polygraph use at the applicant stage include:
• Purpose: It is a gatekeeping tool used for risk avoidance, allowing agencies to screen out individuals before a formal employment relationship is established.
• Legal Framing: A negative outcome results in non-selection, which is not legally considered a punishment and carries a lower burden of justification for the agency.
• Standard of Proof: The government is not required to prove deception. Courts grant heavy deference to agency decisions at this entry stage.
• Internal Terminology: Reflecting this purpose, polygraphs are considered "screening tools, not adjudicative tools."
B. The Employee Context: Deprivation Triggering Legal Safeguards
Once an individual is hired or granted a security clearance, a legal relationship exists. Any subsequent adverse action by the government is considered a "deprivation" of that established interest. This act of taking something away triggers significant legal requirements and curtails the broad discretion afforded to the agency at the applicant stage. The employee is no longer merely a candidate but a rights-bearing individual protected by a web of legal and regulatory requirements.
These safeguards fall into three primary categories:
• Statutory Protections: Employees are shielded by federal statutes that do not apply to applicants. These include the Rehabilitation Act, which may require disability accommodations; established Civil Service protections against arbitrary adverse actions; and, in certain contexts, Whistleblower laws.
• Binding Regulations: The agency itself is bound by its own regulations, which often include specific procedures and limitations on adverse actions. These can include medical deferral rules that may apply to polygraph examinations, limits on adverse reliance on non-dispositive information like polygraph results, and mandatory internal review and appeal processes.
• Judicial Scrutiny: Unlike a non-selection decision, an adverse action against an employee is subject to meaningful judicial or administrative review. Agencies must be prepared to articulate a reasoned basis for their decisions, demonstrate compliance with their own rules, and provide an explanation that goes beyond a simple dislike of a polygraph result.
This is not a semantic difference; it is the bright line where agency discretion ends, and the rule of law begins. The protections afforded to employees are not administrative hurdles but the mandatory legal consequence of a vested employment interest—a wall the agency cannot be permitted to breach.
III. THE UNLAWFUL CONFLATION: APPLYING APPLICANT LOGIC TO PROTECTED EMPLOYEES
The system breaks when an agency attempts to import the logic and broad discretion permissible in applicant screening into the highly regulated context of existing employment. This unlawful conflation is a deliberate attempt to neutralize the statutory and regulatory rights that protect incumbent employees by treating them as if they were still applicants at the front door.
Agencies execute this unlawful conflation through several distinct rhetorical and legal tactics:
• Relabeling Screening as an "Essential Job Function": This tactic re-characterizes a discretionary screening tool as a core, non-negotiable job requirement. By doing so, an agency argues that an employee who fails to "pass" a polygraph is no longer qualified for their job, thereby attempting to bypass legal protections and accommodation duties. This argument fails because it attempts to make a discretionary screening protocol legally equivalent to the substantive duties of the position itself, a conflation the law does not permit.
• Asserting Unreviewable "Trust Judgments": An agency claims that its decision is based on a subjective "trust judgment" stemming from a polygraph result. This seeks to remove the decision from judicial or administrative review by labeling it a matter of pure executive discretion—a logic appropriate for the initial selection of personnel but not for adverse actions against existing employees with vested rights. This logic is fatally flawed when applied to employees, as their statutory and regulatory protections exist precisely to subject such agency judgments to review and require they be based on a more substantial foundation than the non-dispositive output of a screening tool.
• Framing Adverse Action as a "Suitability" Issue: By using terminology associated with the initial hiring process, such as "suitability," an agency deliberately obscures the fact that a deprivation of existing employment or a security clearance is occurring. This linguistic move attempts to revert the employee back to the legal status of an applicant.
When this conflation is successful, it erases the carefully constructed distinction between applicants and employees, with severe consequences for the rule of law.
The Legal Damage of Unlawful Conflation
• It erases accommodation duties under statutes like the Rehabilitation Act, which are designed to protect employees.
• It neutralizes binding regulations that limit an agency's reliance on polygraph results and mandate specific review processes before an adverse action can be finalized.
• It expands unreviewability far beyond what is legally permitted for adverse actions against existing employees, effectively granting the agency unchecked power.
This legal error must be identified and corrected to preserve the integrity of federal employment law and the rights it confers.
IV. A PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Rectifying this unlawful conflation does not require judicial overreach into national security. Rather, it is a straightforward exercise in enforcing the legal boundaries Congress and the Executive Branch have already established. The argument presented here does not ask the Court to invalidate security screening, but to enforce the legal distinction between screening applicants and taking action against employees.
The Court can comfortably adopt a restrained, institutional ruling by affirming three established principles:
1. The Court is not being asked to second-guess security screening itself.
2. The Court is being asked to enforce the line Congress and the Executive already drew between the treatment of applicants and the rights of employees.
3. The Court would be affirming that agencies may screen aggressively at the entry stage but must follow the law once employment rights and legal protections have attached.
This framework provides a clear path for correcting a legal error while respecting the separation of powers and an agency's valid interest in maintaining a trusted workforce.
V. CONCLUSION
The fundamental legal distinction between applicants and employees is not an accident of administrative law; it is an intentional product of statutes and regulations designed to protect vested rights from arbitrary deprivation. The government is afforded wide latitude to use polygraphs as a screening tool at its "front door" precisely because applicants have not yet acquired these rights. However, once an individual is inside the system as an employee or clearance holder, that latitude recedes, and the government becomes constrained by due process, statutory duties, and its own binding rules. Any attempt by an agency to erase this distinction by applying applicant-level logic to an employee represents a clear legal error that undermines this foundational structure.
Polygraphs are tolerated as gatekeeping tools precisely because applicants lack legal protections—but once employment or clearance exists, the law requires safeguards, accommodations, and enforceable limits on reliance.
Next, I want to focus on the proper scope of judicial deference established in the landmark case Department of the Navy v. Egan. Understanding the precise limits of the Egan doctrine is therefore of critical strategic importance for upholding the statutory rights of federal employees.
I. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The core legal question presented is whether the precedent set in Egan, which pertains exclusively to formal security-clearance adjudications, can be legitimately extended to insulate routine personnel actions from judicial oversight. This includes decisions regarding medical unsuitability and an agency's refusal to provide reasonable accommodations, even in cases where an employee's security clearance has not been suspended, revoked, or otherwise negatively adjudicated.
The lower courts have incorrectly and dangerously expanded the Egan's doctrine, creating an untenable conflict with mandatory federal regulations and threatening the fundamental statutory rights of federal employees. This expansion is a misapplication of precedent that demands correction. By allowing agencies to merely invoke terms like "trust" or "security" to justify adverse actions, courts are effectively nullifying legal and regulatory protections. To fully grasp this judicial overreach, it is essential to first revisit the foundational principles and intended limits of the Egan decision itself.
II. THE FOUNDATIONAL PRECEDENT: THE LIMITED SCOPE OF EGAN DEFERENCE
Precisely defining the original holding in Department of the Navy v. Egan is the critical first step in identifying its subsequent misapplication. The Supreme Court's decision was intentionally narrow and designed to protect a very specific type of executive branch function from judicial second-guessing. Understanding these intended limits is essential to recognizing how far some courts have strayed from the original precedent.
The specific and narrow domain where Egan deference applies is the protection of the predictive judgments inherent in a formal security-clearance adjudication. This deference is tied to the unique, forward-looking assessment an agency must make when deciding whether to grant, deny, or revoke an individual's access to classified information. The Court recognized that such a decision is an "attempt to predict a person's future behavior" and that judges lack the institutional competence and access to sensitive information to replicate this process.
Consequently, Egan deference does not extend to other types of agency actions, even if they occur within a national security context. The precedent explicitly carves out broad categories of conduct from its protective scope.
Conduct Explicitly Outside Egan's Protection
• Supervisory actions
• Medical unsuitability findings
• Refusals to accommodate
In summary, the deference established in Egan is exclusively tied to the formal, substantive act of adjudicating a security clearance. It was never intended to provide a blanket immunity for any and all personnel decisions affecting a cleared employee. This clear boundary is central to understanding how the doctrine has been improperly expanded.
III. THE UNWARRANTED EXPANSION: APPLYING EGAN ABSENT A CLEARANCE ADJUDICATION
The central issue in my case is the failure of the lower courts to maintain the critical distinction between a formal security action and a general personnel action that merely invokes security concerns. When a court treats these two distinct categories as one and the same, it improperly extends Egan deference into areas where judicial review is not only appropriate but necessary.
My case is illustrative of this misapplication. The agency's adverse action was insulated from review despite the complete absence of a negative security-clearance adjudication. My clearance was never suspended, revoked, or otherwise subject to an adverse formal review. To the contrary, multiple security reviews consistently reaffirmed my eligibility and explicitly found no misconduct, no compromise of classified information, and no other basis for an adverse clearance action. The sole consistent finding by the agency was a medical one: that I was psychologically unsuitable for further polygraph testing.
Despite these facts, the lower courts deferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) actions. They treated the agency's generic assertions of lost "trust" and vague "security concerns" as dispositive, thereby barring any substantive review of the agency's conduct. By accepting "trust" as a talismanic incantation, the lower courts allowed the agency to bypass the entire formal apparatus of security-clearance adjudication that Egan was designed to protect, effectively rendering those procedures optional. This approach stands in direct conflict with decades of established legal precedent, which consistently affirms judicial authority in such circumstances.
This misapplication of precedent is profound, but the error is even more stark when measured against the agency's flagrant violation of its own binding regulations.
IV. THE CONFLICT WITH MANDATORY REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS
A foundational principle of administrative law holds that judicial deference does not apply when an agency violates its own non-discretionary regulations. This principle acts as a crucial check on executive power, ensuring that agencies are bound by the rules they establish. When a court shields such violations from review under the guise of Egan, it abdicates its responsibility to enforce the rule of law.
In this instance, the agency violated the specific regulatory framework established in Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5210.91, which governs the polygraph program. The Agency committed two specific, nondiscretionary violations of this binding instruction.
1. Failure to Accommodate Medical Unfitness The regulation requires agency Components to postpone or grant an exemption from a polygraph examination when an employee is determined to be medically or psychologically unfit for the procedure. This is a mandatory duty, not a discretionary choice.
2. Improper Basis for Adverse Action The regulation explicitly prohibits any unfavorable administrative action from being based solely on an unresolved CSP result. An agency cannot use an inconclusive test as the exclusive justification for an adverse personnel decision.
The central argument stemming from these violations is that they fall entirely outside the scope of Egan. Because these regulations are mandatory, they eliminate agency discretion in these specific circumstances. The Supreme Court's deference in Egan was premised on judicial inability to replicate an agency's complex, predictive assessment. That premise evaporates when the agency's conduct is governed not by prediction, but by a mandatory, binary regulatory command: either the employee is medically unfit and the test must be postponed, or they are not. Reviewing compliance with such a command requires no specialized security expertise. Where there is no discretion, there can be no "predictive national-security judgment" for a court to defer to. Insulating these plain regulatory violations from review has severe consequences for the legal rights of all federal employees.
V. RAMIFICATIONS: THE CREATION OF ANN UNREVIEWABLE ZONE OF AGENCY ACTION
The misapplication of Eganis not merely a procedural error; it is a substantive threat to the rule of law and the congressionally mandated rights of federal employees. By expanding Egan to cover ordinary personnel matters, courts are carving out a vast and dangerous zone of unreviewable agency action, where statutory and regulatory protections can be ignored with impunity.
The lower court's expansive interpretation of Egan, if permitted to stand, creates several critical threats to the federal administrative system:
• Nullification of Regulatory Commands: It renders mandatory, non-discretionary protections, such as those contained in DoDI 5210.91, entirely unenforceable. An agency can violate its own rules without fear of judicial correction.
• Circumvention of Federal Law: It grants agencies an unchecked ability to sidestep federal disability law. An agency could deny a reasonable accommodation for a medical condition by simply invoking security terminology, thereby immunizing a potentially discriminatory act from review.
• Immunization of Adverse Actions: Any adverse personnel action taken against an employee with a security clearance could be immunized from judicial scrutiny. An agency would only need to make a bare assertion of lost "trust" or "security concerns," even in the complete absence of a formal clearance adjudication.
• Erosion of the Rule of Law: Ultimately, it creates a broad and untenable "zone of unreviewability" where the fundamental statutory rights of federal employees are effectively extinguished. This outcome undermines the core principle that the government must operate within the bounds of the law.
These ramifications transform Egan from a narrow shield for predictive security judgments into a sword that agencies can wield to strike down employee rights without oversight.
VI. CONCLUSION
The expansion of Department of the Navy v. Egan beyond its narrow and intended context of formal security-clearance adjudications constitutes a significant judicial error. This overreach has created a legal landscape where the foundational principles of administrative law and the statutory rights of federal employees are placed in serious jeopardy.
This trend allows federal agencies to ignore their own binding regulations and violate federal disability laws under the amorphous guise of "national security." By accepting generic assertions of "trust" as a sufficient basis to avoid judicial review—even when no adverse clearance action has occurred—courts are abdicating their duty to ensure that agencies act within the law.
Therefore, judicial review is warranted to correct this overreach, reaffirm the clear and limited scope of Egan deference, and ensure the continued protection of the rule of law. Restoring proper judicial oversight is essential to prevent the creation of an unreviewable zone of agency power and to safeguard the rights that Congress has granted to the nation's federal workforce.
I learned today that the Supreme Court denied my petition for certiorari. Obviously, I'm disappointed. After everything that has happened over the past several years — professionally, medically, and personally — I had hoped the Court might take the opportunity to address the larger legal questions raised by my case.
That said, I also understand the reality of how the Supreme Court works. The Court denies the overwhelming majority of petitions it receives each year, and a denial does not mean the justices agreed with the lower courts or rejected the underlying issues. More often, it simply means the Court chose not to take this particular case as the vehicle to address them.
From the beginning, my goal has never been limited to a personal outcome. What I experienced exposed, at least for me, is a structural problem: the gap between what people assume that the polygraph can measure, and what it actually does measure, and the very real human consequences when institutions rely on them too heavily. I hoped the Court might clarify the boundaries between agency discretion and the legal safeguards that are supposed to protect employees once they are already inside the system.
One issue that continues to stand out to me is the federal government's exemption from the Employee Polygraph Protection Act (EPPA). Congress passed the EPPA in 1988 because of widespread concern about the reliability and fairness of polygraph testing in the private sector. Lawmakers recognized that these tests could be misused and could cause significant harm to employees. Yet federal agencies were carved out of those protections, even though the same scientific limitations apply. In my view, that inconsistency deserves serious reexamination. If polygraph testing is considered too problematic to allow broadly in private employment, it raises legitimate questions about why government employees and applicants should be subject to fewer protections rather than more.
Another issue is that the Department of Defense already has internal policies intended to protect employees from unfavorable administrative actions based solely on polygraph results (DoDI 5210.91) and requires that individuals with psychological, emotional, or other mental health conditions that could affect testing be excused from polygraph examinations altogether. The problem, as I experienced it, is not the absence of policy but the failure to follow and enforce it. When those safeguards are not applied in practice, and when there is no meaningful mechanism to ensure compliance, the protections exist only on paper.
For that reason, I believe one constructive path forward is legislative. Ultimately, Congress has the authority to revisit the EPPA exemption and evaluate whether it still makes sense in light of modern scientific understanding and the experiences of those affected. I would encourage anyone who shares concerns about polygraph use to consider engaging with their elected representatives and supporting efforts to review or reform the current framework.
Even though the petition was denied, I don't see this as the end of anything. Issues like this tend to move along a long arc. Over time, scientific understanding evolves, public awareness grows, and institutions are eventually forced to re-examine practices that once seemed unquestionable. Polygraph skepticism — both in research and in public discussion — is already far more visible than it was decades ago, and I believe that trajectory will continue.
Personally, I intend to keep contributing to that conversation. I'm continuing to work on a book about my experience and the broader legal, scientific, and institutional questions surrounding polygraph use. My hope is that sharing what happened — and what it reveals about the system — may help others in similar situations and encourage more evidence-based approaches in the future.
I want to thank everyone here who has offered support, information, and encouragement along the way. Whatever happens next, I remain convinced that raising awareness and asking difficult questions is worthwhile. Sometimes change doesn't happen in a courtroom. Sometimes it happens because enough people understand the problem.
— John
John,
I very much regret that the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to hear your case. I'm thankful for all you have done over the years to help call public attention to the need for polygraph policy reform. No doubt the public filings associated with your administrative and judicial cases will continue to prove helpful for others involved in or contemplating polygraph-related litigation.
I look forward to reading your forthcoming book, which I'm sure will be of interest to many and will help to shape public discourse on polygraph policy.
George,
Thank you — I sincerely appreciate your thoughtful response and your encouragement over the years. While I was certainly disappointed that the Court declined to hear the case, I also recognize that meaningful change rarely happens in a single decision or a single forum. As I mentioned this morning, issues like this tend to move along a longer arc, shaped over time by evidence, awareness, and public understanding as much as by litigation.
One thing I do take some comfort in is that the record now exists. The filings, documentation, and proceedings are part of the public domain, and if they help others better understand both the limitations of the polygraph and the potential human consequences when it is relied upon too heavily, then some good has come from the process.
I also want to take a moment to thank you personally for your steadfast commitment over the years to standing up for individuals who have been harmed by the misuse and overreliance on polygraph testing. Your work has provided an important resource, not only for those directly affected, but also for anyone trying to understand the broader policy and scientific issues involved. I know firsthand how valuable that support and information can be.
I have already begun reaching out to several national investigative reporters in the hope that broader awareness may develop around the policy issues involved — particularly the federal government's continued exemption from the Employee Polygraph Protection Act. Ultimately, I believe meaningful reform will likely require legislative attention, and public understanding is often the first step toward that kind of change. My hope is that continued discussion, combined with scientific research and real-world experiences, may eventually lead to a reconsideration of that exemption.
I'm also continuing to work on the book, which I hope will contribute to a thoughtful and constructive conversation about both the human and institutional dimensions of polygraph policy.
I'm also very grateful for the support and knowledge shared by members of this community. Whatever happens next, I remain convinced that raising awareness and asking difficult questions is worthwhile.
— John