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You gentlemen have quoted people and declared they have "lied" and have gone as far as to admonish them.  It is clear that your publication is not written in a fair and balanced manner and you have lied in your publication in an attempt to solidify your opinion that countermeasures can't be detected effectively.  For instance, you said:  

"Indeed, in it's 30-year history, Polygraph, the quarterly publication of the APA, has not published a single article explaining how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures". (Page 135, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, 2nd edition).

The statement is a LIE and is misleading.  In an article published in Polygraph, 1999, 28 (2), titled, "A Case Study in PDD Countermeasures" (London & Krapohl), London clearly described not only how s/he detected counter-measures but how s/he employed counter-coutermeasures to confirm his/her suspicions.  The examinee then confessed he engaged in countermeasures (cheated).  London & Krapohl's article clearly explained how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures.

You also stated, "Had he not made the admission he would have passed."  

This also is a LIE and is misleading.  Most examiners are prohibited from rendering a No Deception Indicated or Deception Indicated opinion if suspected countermeasures were employed.  If suspected countermeasures were employed (either confirmed via admission or not) most examiners will not report that the examinee "passed" the exam.

L72cueak,

Thank you for sharing your criticisms, which are welcome. We bear in mind Benjamin Franklin's admonition that our critics are our friends, for they show us our faults.

You write:

QuoteYou gentlemen have quoted people and declared they have "lied" and have gone as far as to admonish them.

Actually, I think in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector we've only made reference to one person having lied, namely David M. Renzelman, who is the chief of the Department of Energy's polygraph program. The lie in question, which relates to his publicly stated rationale for directed-lie "control" questions, is documented at p. 35 and is explained in greater detail in my article, "The Lying Game: National Security and the Test for Espionage and Sabotage." (http://antipolygraph.org/articles/article-002.shtml)

When you speak of admonishment, I suppose you're referring to my admonishment of Mr. Renzelman in my recent post, DOE Polygraph Chief David M. Renzelman Caught in a Lie. (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=426.msg1985#msg1985) This post involves a different public lie, and is also well-documented.

If you dispute that Mr. Renzelman lied in either instance, please explain.

With regard to the American Polygraph Association quarterly Polygraph not having ever published a single article explaining how polygraphers can detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector (see p. 136, not 135), in the article by London & Krapohl you cite, no methodology is presented beyond a vague suggestion in the article conclusion that a relatively large reaction to a single "control" question and lack of "habituation" over several chart presentations may trigger suspicion.

For the benefit of readers without ready access to the article in question, here is how London describes his "detection" of the subject's ("John's") countermeasures in the main body of the article:

QuoteFollowing the pretest, John sat quietly in the chair as the sensors were placed on him. On the first chart, John's breathing appeared to be slow, but not uncharacteristic of other subjects tested in the past. There were no notable responses until the examiner asked the first comparison question (CQ) (3C6) [reference to illustration deleted]. The cardiograph and electrodermal tracings started moving upward and the response appeared normal. As the pens continued rising beyond that expected of a normal response, London became concerned about its authenticity. There may be no scientific explanation for the sense that something was wrong, other than the response was simply out of proportion with the general trend of other responses. London continued presenting the test questions, and when asked the next CQ, (C9) [reference to illustration deleted] there was no response. This seemed odd because if John's psychological set was truly on the comparison questions, where was the response to C9?

From the beginning of Chart II, [reference to illustration deleted] examiner London watched John closely to see if he was doing anything to help create responses. John did not appear to move, and there were no indications that he was manipulating his responses. When he was asked 3C6, the response looked like a mirror image of 3C6 on Chart I. Now there were two identical responses to the same question 3C6 [reference to illustration deleted] and different from any other question on the test. London suspected that John was creating the responses but needed more evidence. On Chart III, [reference to illustration deleted] John reacted again to 3C6 with the same intensity and appearance as on Chart I and II. It was clear now that John was practicing Cms, but still there was no sign of any movement. London wondered how long John would keep manufacturing a response at 3C6, so it was asked again on Chart III. Once more John created a response similar to the previous ones on 3C6.

Considering the evidence, London confronted John on purposely using Cms during testing. Since it was still unclear how he produced the Cms, London decided to use a direct approach without mentioning terms associated with Cms, or trying to guess what he was actually doing. John would be looking for an interrogation weakness and certainly take advantage of any vague accusations. After removing the sensors, London sat down in a chair next to him.

"John, I know what you are doing," London said firmly. John paused silently and then began his denials with poor verbal responses and behaviors often associated with deception. London used a host of logical themes while avoiding any reference to a specific Cm. After a while, John admitted he used a combination of Cms by biting his tongue and contracting his sphincter muscle each time he was asked 3C6.

If you see in London & Krapohl's article any methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, please explain it, and please be specific.

If London & Krapohl meant to present a methodology for detecting countermeasures, and not just a case study (as their title, "A Case Study in PDD Countermeasures" suggests), then perhaps they would care to accept Drew Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=418.msg1942#msg1942).

You raise a good point with regard to our statement, "Had he not made the admission he would have passed."  The subject would have passed based on numerical scoring of his charts, but the polygrapher might have countermanded that based on his unverified suspicion that the subject had employed countermeasures. In the message thread Countermeasure considerations for the innocent (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=139.msg521#msg521), Gordon Barland mentioned that federal polygraphers may be at liberty to render an opinion that a subject has employed countermeasures in the absence of an admission. I think that some clarification of this point is in order for the 3rd edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, and I thank you for calling it to our attention.

Please don't hesitate to mention anything else in the book or on this website that you think is false, misleading, or otherwise unfair.

Sir,

You also challenged Dr. Barland's integrity by saying, "Dr. Barland forgot to mention..." (pg. 138)  Dr. Barland did not say that because doing so would have been a false statement – admissions are not needed to render an opinion that tracings have been manipulated.  I do not support your position that Mr. Renzelman lied, nor am I saying that he did not.  My point was that I thought it only fair to point out the fact that you gentlemen have engaged in the same type of behavior that you accused Mr. Renzlemen and others in the polygraph community of (providing false and misleading information).

In your response you said: "If you see in London & Krapohl's article any methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, please explain it, and please be specific".
  
On page 131 in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, you described cardio countermeasures.  You suggested that a person should "constrict your anal sphincter muscle..." in an attempt to enhance your cardio response to the "control" question.    

The problem with your advice is the examinee has no way of knowing when they've reached the "pronounced sub-maximal" level.  The reason they can't determine the "pronounced sub-maximal" level is because they have no way of knowing how pronounced their responses were to the other questions on tests (relevant questions, irrelevant questions, etc.)  When they've exceeded the "pronounced but sub-maximal" level it draws an examiner's attention to that response as having been manufactured and an examiner will suspect countermeasures.  

"John" obviously exceeded the "pronounced sub-maximal" level which attracted London's attention.  Obviously, London then engaged in some "methodology" which further solidified his suspicion.  The methodology was pointed out very clearly in the article.  

1)      London suspected "John" manufactured some of his reactions on the "control" questions.
2)      He compared the suspicious response on 3C6 to the other questions on "John's" chart and concluded they looked manufactured because they were out of proportion.
3)      London engaged in counter-countermeasures by changing the position of 3C6 which confirmed his suspicion.

In your response to my post you also said, "The subject would have passed based on numerical scoring of his charts."  Again Sir, that statement is false.  To illustrate my point, if an examinee coughed, sneezed, moved his fingers, flexed his arm or moved his legs, that would produce an artifact on the chart.  If the artifact appeared in a scoreable spot, that spot would not be scored – because it contained an artifact.  Engaging in the "anal pucker" (a movement just like those mentioned above) produces an artifact as well.  Therefore, that scoreable spot and/or the entire chart would not be suitable for numerical scoring.  Being that it was not suitable for numerical scoring there is no way one could arrive at a conclusion that the person "passed".  

An admission is not needed from an examinee to render an opinion that the examinee engaged in suspected countermeasures.  To illustrate my point, the "anal pucker" produces artifacts (as in "John's" case).  Moving the fingers that the EDA plates are attached to produces artifacts as well.  When those fingers are moved it causes the tracing to leave the screen of the computer at a very sharp angle.  The examiner does not have to "see" the examinee's finger move to say that the tracing contained an artifact.  The examiner also does not need to obtain an admission from the examinee to say the tracing contained an artifact.  If an examiner does not need an admission to render an opinion that the EDA tracing contained an artifact – why would he need an admission to some form of countermeasure that produced artifacts as well?    

When people engage in countermeasures they are cheating – plain and simple.  It is no different than a person trying to cheat their way through a drug test or cheating their way through some type of written examination.  If I was an adjudicator in a hiring process and a person cheated on any of the various examinations I would conclude that the person obviously cannot be trusted.  

Perhaps you will acknowledge now that there was in fact at least one published article in Polygraph which "explaining how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures".  Surely you must understand there is a reason why there was only "one" article that has been "published."  If the U.S. Government developed counter-coutermeasures to some espionage method, I suspect there would not be many published articles describing the methodology.  Also, you should retract your statement that numerical scoring of the charts would have resulted in a "passed" call.  It is inappropriate to numerically score charts that contain suspected countermeasures - therefore, there is nothing to countermand.  The only thing that can be done is report to the adjudicator that the examinee cheated on the test.

Respectfully,

    

L72cueak,

You write:

QuoteYou also challenged Dr. Barland's integrity by saying, "Dr. Barland forgot to mention..." (pg. 138)

Yes. We are suggesting that Dr. Barland attempted to mislead scientists and engineers at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory into believing that DoDPI had developed some better-than-chance method for detecting polygraph countermeasures.

You also write:

Quote"John" obviously exceeded the "pronounced sub-maximal" level which attracted London's attention.  Obviously, London then engaged in some "methodology" which further solidified his suspicion.  The methodology was pointed out very clearly in the article.  

1)      London suspected "John" manufactured some of his reactions on the "control" questions.
2)      He compared the suspicious response on 3C6 to the other questions on "John's" chart and concluded they looked manufactured because they were out of proportion.
3)      London engaged in counter-countermeasures by changing the position of 3C6 which confirmed his suspicion.

The only thing that "confirmed" London's suspicion is John's admission that he used countermeasures. As for the rest, we have hunches, suspicions, and a subjective judgment that a response is "out of proportion," all of which might well have been set aside absent the confirmatory admission. This is no methodology for detecting countermeasures, and it doesn't seem that London & Krapohl meant to present it as such, as in their article abstract they merely write:

QuoteThe prospect of subjects using countermeasures (Cms) to alter the outcome of the Psychophysiological Detection of Deception (PDD; polygraph) examination has concerned polygraph examiners for years. This paper presents a case study of a subject who planned, practiced, and executed a combination of Cms during three different PDD screening examinations. It provides a unique learning opportunity to study the source, training, and methodology of confirmed Cms used to manipulate the PDD process, two PDD examiners, and the physiological tracings.

Keywords: case study, countermeasures

London & Krapohl don't pretend to teach counter-countermeasures in this article, and I believe it remains a fair statement that "in its 30-year history, Polygraph, the quarterly publication of the American Polygraph Association, has not published a single article explaining how polygraphers can detect such countermeasures [as are described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector]!"

You also write:

QuoteEngaging in the "anal pucker" (a movement just like those mentioned above) produces an artifact as well.

Where is this documented in the polygraph literature?

QuoteWhen people engage in countermeasures they are cheating - plain and simple.  It is no different than a person trying to cheat their way through a drug test or cheating their way through some type of written examination.

Nonsense, my friend. Polygraph "testing" is a pseudoscientific fraud, and there is every reason for a truthful person to use countermeasures to protect himself against a false positive outcome.

Quote...you should retract your statement that numerical scoring of the charts would have resulted in a "passed" call.  It is inappropriate to numerically score charts that contain suspected countermeasures - therefore, there is nothing to countermand.  The only thing that can be done is report to the adjudicator that the examinee cheated on the test.

We'll take that under advisement. Perhaps London would have reported suspected countermeasures absent John's confirmatory admission, perhaps not.

In any event, I think we should clarify in the next edition that a polygrapher may report that an examinee "cheated on the test" whether or not he can prove it.

With regard to your suggestion that any counter-countermeasures methodology the U.S. Government may have developed must remain secret, I would counter that any robust counter-countermeasure cannot depend on secrecy (in the same way that robust encryption cannot rely on the algorithm being a secret). In the same way, any robust lie-detection technique cannot depend on the examinee's ignorance of how it works (as is the case with CQT polygraphy, which in any event has not been proven by peer-reviewed research to work at better than chance levels under field conditions). The available evidence suggests that the U.S. Government has no reliable counter-countermeasures for the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector and that the most effective technique developed thus far is to dupe the examinee into making an admission.

Sir, thank you for your reply.  Have you looked at "John's" charts that were included with the article?  As soon as I look at that spot I doubt it's authenticity and suspect countermeasures (CM).  I don't need an admission to help me arrive at that conclusion.  The simple reason a CM call can be made is because the CM effort clearly exceeded the "pronounced but sub-maximal" level.  Why did it exceed that level?  Because "John" had no way of knowing what level to try and achieve.  He had no way of knowing if the pronounced level he delivered on the "control" question beat out the ones he delivered on the relevant or irrelevant questions.  You clearly advise your readers to try and achieve that level.  You go as far as to advise your readers that, "a little goes a long way."  Why do you advise them to be cautious in their application of that technique?  Could it be that there may be consequences for people like "John" who get caught?  Perhaps you'll be fair in your next edition and advise your readers of the consequences of such behavior.  You should also tell them that they don't have to admit to it for a CM call to be made and there case may be unfavorably adjudicated as a result.  To illustrate the point, a person who trys to beat a urinalysis by adulterating his/her urine specimen with a foreign substance (bleach for instance) need not confess to the adulteration so the adjudicator can take action against him/her.  

Respectfully,  

P.S. I will address your questions in your last post when I have additional time.

L72cueak,

Thank you for your participation in this forum.

QuoteThe simple reason a CM call can be made is because the CM effort clearly exceeded the "pronounced but sub-maximal" level.

Do you know of any objective scoring system for this method of "detecting" countermeasures? How about any studies indicating that this method works better than chance?

It sounds to me like "if you think the guy looks guilty and he passes with extremely high scores, he must have used countermeasures." If this simplistic methodology is actually being employed, one would expect that a tremendous number of examinees who would otherwise be judged "truthful" by this pseudoscience are being falsely accused of employing countermeasures.

You wrote: "Do you know of any objective scoring system for this method of "detecting" countermeasures? How about any studies indicating that this method works better than chance?"

No, why would one "score" charts that contain CMs.  Doing so would be as silly as trying to score a deep breath tracing or finger movement on the hand with the EDA plates.  One numerically evaluates charts to arrive at a conclusion of no deception indicated (NDI), deception indicated (DI), or No Opinion (also known as inconclusive).    

You also wrote: "It sounds to me like if you think the guy looks guilty and he passes with extremely high scores, he must have used countermeasures."

I don't know how many times I have to repeat myself gentlemen, but if one detects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?  Your website has assisted the polygraph community greatly in detecting the CMs you have written about and has brought us to that point of not scoring them.  I wonder if you gentlemen could post portions of the charts in question on your web site?  Let the public see what happened when "John" tried the "anal pucker" CM referenced in your publication.  One does not need an objective scoring system to see that "John's" response exceeded the level you advise people to try and achieve, they only need to apply some common sense.  I'll ask you the same thing I asked the other gentleman: Why do you advise your readers to be cautious in their application of the "anal pucker" CM and advise them to deliver a "pronounced but sub-maximal" level?  Also, how does one know that s/he has delivered a level that is greater than the response given on the relevant questions?    

Why not take the challenge (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=418.msg1942#msg1942)? You will go a long way towards proving your point if you did.

Thank you for the offer Sir; however, I am not in a position to participate in such a challenge.

L72cueak,

I look forward to hearing from you where it is documented in the polygraph literature that "engaging in the 'anal pucker'...produces an artifact..."


In the meantime, let me address the questions you've put to me and to Gino.

First, you asked if I've looked at the polygraph charts included with London & Krapohl's article. Yes, I have.

You also asked why we advise our readers to be cautious in the application of the anal pucker. This proviso is based largely on anecdotal evidence we've received that submaximal effort is adequate to produce a significant response on the cardio (and perhaps electrodermal) channels. It seems prudent to do no more than is necessary.

You also ask, "Could it be that there may be consequences for people like 'John' who get caught?" We don't know whether applying maximal effort on an anal sphincter contraction would increase the chances of the polygrapher accusing the subject of attempted countermeasures, but it seems plausible that it might. In any event, we're not aware of any published research indicating that polygraphers can detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector at better than chance levels, and the available research (see the two studies by Honts et al. referenced in the bibliography) suggests that such countermeasures can be effective and that even experienced polygraphers cannot detect them.

You admonish us to "be fair in [our] next edition and advise [our] readers of the consequences of such behavior." Again, we're aware of no research suggesting any correlation between a polygrapher's decision that a subject employed countermeasures and actual countermeasure use. What we can say in fairness is that federal polygraphers may report that a subject has employed countermeasures absent any admission from the examinee, as Gordon Barland explained in the message thread, Countermeasure considerations for the innocent (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=139.msg521#msg521).

In reply to Gino's questions, "Do you know of any objective scoring system for this method of "detecting" countermeasures? How about any studies indicating that this method works better than chance?" you replied, "No, why would one "score" charts that contain CMs?"

Is your "no" in response to both of Gino's questions? That is, no, you don't know of any objective scoring system for this method of "detecting" countermeasures and no, you don't know of any studies indicating that this method works better than chance? If so, then it seems that the method of countermeasures detection you have in mind amounts to little more than "I know them when I see them."

And you also asked Gino, "I don't know how many times I have to repeat myself gentlemen, but if one detects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?" Again, you've given us no reason to believe that you (or the polygraph community at large) have any reliable methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in our book. What you're really saying is not "if one detects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?" but rather, "if one suspects CMs, what is the point of scoring them?" In your lexicon it seems that suspected countermeasures = detected countermeasures.

You also asked Gino, "how does one know that s/he has delivered a level that is greater than the response given on the relevant questions?" One doesn't (though one can avoid creating a pneumo response when answering the relevant questions, which aren't quite so frightening once one understands "the lie behind the lie detector"). As we've noted elsewhere, we have made information on polygraph countermeasures available  to assist truthful people who wish to protect themselves against the risk of a false positive outcome, not to help liars beat the system.

You suggested that we post portions of the charts from the London & Krapohl article and "let the public see what happened when 'John' tried the 'anal pucker' CM referenced in [our] publication." I think posting low resolution scans for discussion purposes here constitutes fair use, and I'm happy to oblige.

It should be borne in mind that London & Krapohl report, "When a ["control" question] was asked, John slowly bit down on his tongue and/or tightened his sphincter muscle." We don't know which one or combination was applied with regard to any one asking of the "control" question. It should also be borne in mind that this case study, with n being equal to one, has zero statistical significance.

The first four graphics show the 1st and 2nd chart presentations, and the last four show the 3rd.









Edited on 15 October 2014 to make links to images use HTTPS.

I asked you why you advised your readers to be cautious in the application of the 'anal pucker' by advising them to try to do it at a level that produces a 'pronounced sub-maximal level?

You said: "This proviso is based largely on anecdotal evidence we've received that submaximal effort is adequate to produce a significant response on the cardio (and perhaps electrodermal) channels. It seems prudent to do no more than is necessary."

pru·dent   Pronunciation Key  (pr d nt)
adj.
1.      Wise in handling practical matters; exercising good judgment or common sense.
2.      Careful in regard to one's own interests; provident.
3.      Careful about one's conduct; circumspect.

Why would one have to worry about being 'prudent' if the 'anal pucker' is so effective?  If the polygraph community can't reliably detect CMs, why worry about being prudent?  What is there to be careful about?  

Thank you for posting the charts in question.  Please direct your attention to Figure 3 (chart 3) and compare the responses to question 3C6 to the rest of the questions on that chart.  Then compare those same two responses to those on charts 1 & 2 (Figures 1 & 2).  If you would like an 'objective' way to make the comparison, take a measuring device and measure the amplitudes of the EDA tracing on 3C6 (Figure 3) and compare it to the amplitudes of the EDA tracings of 3C6, figures 1 & 2.  Do you agree or disagree that the amplitude on 3C6, figure 3, is significantly different than all the other questions on the charts?  It should not be too difficult to arrive at the correct answer since the EDA response on 3C6, figure 3, completely exceeded the top portion of the chart.  'John' delivered a 'pronounced' level - that is for sure!  However, 'John' failed to produce a 'little that goes a long way.'  By the way, where is is documented in the literature that a 'little" will go a long way?  

Gentlemen, I agree that everyone that employs CMs is not going to get caught.  If your publication is to be fair and balanced you should at least be able to acknowledge that everyone that employs CMs will not pass their exam either.  

You should also be able to acknowledge that if suspected CMs were employed, most examiners will not 'score' the charts and WILL NOT say they "passed.'

You listed the following quote in a letter to the Seretary of Defense:  

    "If a problem has no solution, it may not be a
    problem, but a fact, not to be solved, but to be coped
    with over time." (Shimon Perez)

Cms are obviously a problem for the polygraph community; however, they are being coped with.  'John's' case is just one of many 'real world' examples of how they are being dealt with.  I'm sure the Gov't will not disclose the amount of CM cases detected, but you sir also can't produce and 'real world' evidence that CM help people in their effort to beat the system.

Respectfully,

Please correct me if I am wrong,  or take the time to enlighten me further on this topic:

Isn't the main reason that John's polygrapher suspected him of using countermeasures because he made the mistake of using countermeasures on only one of the control questions (the same control question on multiple exams), rather than employing them on all control questions?  

QuoteFrom the beginning of Chart II, [reference to illustration deleted] examiner London watched John closely to see if he was doing anything to help create responses. John did not appear to move, and there were no indications that he was manipulating his responses. When he was asked 3C6, the response looked like a mirror image of 3C6 on Chart I. Now there were two identical responses to the same question 3C6 [reference to illustration deleted] and different from any other question on the test. London suspected that John was creating the responses but needed more evidence. On Chart III, [reference to illustration deleted] John reacted again to 3C6 with the same intensity and appearance as on Chart I and II. It was clear now that John was practicing Cms, but still there was no sign of any movement. London wondered how long John would keep manufacturing a response at 3C6, so it was asked again on Chart III. Once more John created a response similar to the previous ones on 3C6.
 

And since he only used countermeaures on one of the questions,  his responses looked suspicious because they were totally unproportional in comparison to his reactions on the other control questions?

So,  if John were to have employed the biting tongue/anal pucker technique on ALL control questions,  (as The Lie Behind the Lie Detector suggests to do) rather than just on ONE chosen control question,  the examiner would have no suspicions based on the fact that his heightened reactions on the controls would be uniform throughout the exam?

Am I missing something here? On to something here?

I could easily understand how a polygrapher would become suspicious if there was a tremedous reaction to only one control question throughout the test--a reaction that seems to be totally unproportional.  But,  if the examinee reacts tremendously to all the control questions (resulting from the use of countermeasures),  doesn't the examiner just have to take it as being that the person reacts with levels of that magnitude?  

Are there "reaction magnitude" standards that can be applied to all people, uniformly throughout (for example,  no one should react in the GSR over a certain level)?  Or does each person differ (for example, the max GSR for person A can be significantly higher than max GSR reaction for person B)?


I would think that each person has a peak that they can reach on reactions based on their natural body reactions,  and that countermeasures can take each person OVER their natural reaction potential.  So if this is the case,  the natural reaction trend that is layed out on the polygraph paper will look unproportional where a countermeasure is used on one question throughout the exam (because the other control question reactions will show the persons natural stress reaction pattern,  but the single countermeasure question will appear totally unproportional to the persons natural pattern).

But, on the other hand,  if the individual employs the countermeasure on each and every control question, from the start to the end, and on every test,  then the examiner would have no choice but to accept it as the natural reaction of the individual to control questions (even though it was heightened by countermeasures)....?

Is anyone following me here?  Am I missing something?

You said: "Isn't the main reason that John's polygrapher suspected him of using countermeasures because he made the mistake of using countermeasures on only one of the control questions (the same control question on multiple exams), rather than employing them on all control questions?"

No, that is not why.  The main reason was because when he did it on the last chart it was a tremendous reaction compared to what he delivered when it was asked previously (see the charts that were posted).  The two tremendous responses on the last chart are not even close to being similar to the other responses he delivered to the same question on the previous charts.  

You also said, "And since he only used countermeasures on one of the questions,  his responses looked suspicious because they were totally out of proportion in comparison to his reactions on the other control questions?"

No, they were simply out of proportion to what he delivered on the SAME "control" question on previous charts.  

You also said, "So, if John were to have employed the biting tongue/anal pucker technique on ALL control questions,  (as The Lie Behind the Lie Detector suggests to do) rather than just on ONE chosen control question, the examiner would have no suspicions based on the fact that his heightened reactions on the controls would be uniform throughout the exam?"

Wrong again...look at the charts sir.  He employed CMs on 3C6 every time – only one of the questions - and he could not keep it looking the same every time.  If you read London's article s/he wondered "how long John could keep manufacturing a response  at 3C6."   Even a lay person can see they are out of proportion.  You may not be able to see the question marking 3C6 on the bottom of the charts.  3C6 was asked on all 3 charts.

The reason the guy got caught was because he had no way of knowing "how hard" he was employing the CM.  He can't see the screen.  Also, the reason why he didn't employ CMs on ALL the CQ was because he didn't recognize all of them as CQ.  This guy practiced and practiced and practiced and was not able to pull it off.    

L72cueak,

You asked,

QuoteWhy would one have to worry about being 'prudent' if the 'anal pucker' is so effective?  If the polygraph community can't reliably detect CMs, why worry about being prudent?  What is there to be careful about?

As I explained above, while we don't know whether applying maximal effort on an anal sphincter contraction would increase the chances of the polygrapher accusing the subject of attempted countermeasures, it seems plausible that it might.

You asked, "By the way, where is is documented in the literature that a 'little' will go a long way?" I am aware of no published references regarding this. Our suggestion that the anal pucker be applied with sub-maximal effort is based on anecdotal evidence only.

You also opined:

QuoteGentlemen, I agree that everyone that employs CMs is not going to get caught.  If your publication is to be fair and balanced you should at least be able to acknowledge that everyone that employs CMs will not pass their exam either.

Of course, what you meant to write is that not everyone that employs countermeasures is going to get caught. We don't claim that everyone who employs countermeasures will "pass" their polygraph "test," but there is no reason to believe that the polygraph community has developed a better-than-chance methodology for detecting the countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, or that a polygrapher's decision that a subject employed countermeasures has any correlation with actual countermeasure use.

You seem to attach a significance to London & Krapohl's case study that isn't there: it seems that for you, John's admission that he employed countermeasures validates some vaguely-defined method for detecting countermeasures. Again, with the number of subjects in this study (n) being equal to one, no statistical significance may be drawn from it.

Moreover, any counter-countermeasure approach based on case studies of subjects who admit to having employed countermeasures when challenged is liable to be tainted by confirmation bias (http://www.skepdic.com/confirmbias.html).

You also write:

QuoteYou should also be able to acknowledge that if suspected CMs were employed, most examiners will not 'score' the charts and WILL NOT say they "passed.'

As I noted above (perhaps you missed it?):

QuoteAgain, we're aware of no research suggesting any correlation between a polygrapher's decision that a subject employed countermeasures and actual countermeasure use. What we can say in fairness is that federal polygraphers may report that a subject has employed countermeasures absent any admission from the examinee, as Gordon Barland explained in the message thread, Countermeasure considerations for the innocent (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=139.msg521#msg521).

We'll be making that point clear in the next edition.

You also write:

QuoteCms are obviously a problem for the polygraph community; however, they are being coped with.  'John's' case is just one of many 'real world' examples of how they are being dealt with.  I'm sure the Gov't will not disclose the amount of CM cases detected, but you sir also can't produce and 'real world' evidence that CM help people in their effort to beat the system.

How is the polygraph community coping with the problem of countermeasures? It seems to me that they are doing so by pretending to have developed a reliable-but-secret method of countermeasure detection.

With regard to real world evidence that countermeasures can help deceptive persons to pass a polygraph "test," we have the example of Aldrich Ames, who twice used countermeasures to help pass CIA screening exams while spying for the Soviet Union/Russia. We also have the example of Larry Wu-tai Chin, who passed his CIA polygraph examinations while spying for China. Did he use countermeasures? Perhaps. I don't know.

CIA polygraphers were also deceived by a network of Cuban double agents who all passed their CIA polygraph interrogations. As former CIA agent Robert D. Steele writes in his article, "Creating a Smart Nation: Information Strategy, Virtual Intelligence, and Information Warfare" (http://www.oss.net/Papers/reform/CREATINGASMARTNATION.html):

QuoteMost distressing, and typically American, has been the substitution of technology for thinking, of bodies for brains. Two examples will suffice. A simple example is found in the field of counterintelligence, where reliance on the polygraph machine ultimately has resulted in the destruction of the field of counterintelligence. Two of my classmates in the clandestine service were video-taped doing dead drops in Cuba because all of the Cuban agents had been doubled, and all of them had passed the CIA's polygraph tests.

Did these Cuban agents use countermeasures? I don't know, but it seems plausible.

In any event, we do have peer-reviewed research that suggests that countermeasures may help deceptive persons to pass a polygraph "test" and that polygraphers cannot detect these countermeasures at better-than-chance levels.

If the polygraph community would have us believe that it has some methodology for detecting countermeasures, it will have to prove it. Claims that "we know how, but we can't tell you" ring hollow.

You said, "By the way, where is documented in the literature that a 'little' will go a long way?" I am aware of no published references regarding this. Our suggestion that the anal pucker be applied with sub-maximal effort is based on anecdotal evidence only.

Anecdotal evidence?  You critiqued the polygraph community for allegedly having only having "anecdotal" evidence, yet you use "anecdotal" evidence yourself to corroborate your position.  

hy·poc·ri·sy   Pronunciation Key  (h -p k r -s )
n. pl. hy·poc·ri·sies
1.      The practice of professing beliefs, feelings, or virtues that one does not hold or possess; falseness.
2.      An act or instance of such falseness.

The London & Krapohl article is anecdotal evidence as well.  I am not trying to attach much significance other than to use it as a speaking point to illustrate that CM can and are being detected.  

You said, "What we can say in fairness is that federal polygraphers may report that a subject has employed countermeasures absent any admission from the examinee..."

That would be fair Sir; however, is incomplete and not fair to your readers.  

You said, "But Dr. Barland forgot to mention that the person was not successful because he admitted to having employed countermeasures.  Had he not made this admission, he would have passed." (Page 138, The Lie Behind the Lie Detector)

As I have stated from the beginning that was NOT a true statement (Lie) and it misleads your readers into believing that all they have to do is employ CM and if confronted - lie about it.  Your assertion is that as long as they lie about it they will "pass" their exam.   Perhaps you might tell your readers that if they goof up their employment of the CM and the agency suspects CM they might not "pass."  By the way "passed" or "failed" is not a conclusion arrived at in any PDD examination that I am aware of.

Where in the literature can one can find evidence that if a person does not make an admission that they will pass?  Is this more anecdotal evidence as well?

Thank you for your response and again, thank you for posting the charts in question.  

I asked, "Do you agree or disagree that the amplitude on 3C6, figure 3, is significantly different than all the other questions on the charts?"

If you disagree, why?  

How can your readers know when they employ a CM that they have achieved the "pronounced but sub-maximal level"?  How will they know if they exceeded it?

  

Regarding your question to me about where in the literature does the 'anal pucker' produce an artifact?  I am aware of know specific mention of that; however, what I was trying to say was that any voluntary movement will produce an artifact.  The question is whether or not the examiner is skilled enough to detect it?  

Sir, you said, 'With regard to real world evidence that countermeasures can help deceptive persons to pass a polygraph 'test,' we have the example of Aldrich Ames, who twice used countermeasures to help pass CIA screening exams while spying for the Soviet Union/Russia."

Where in the literature does it say he 'twice used countermeasures'?  I could be mistaken; however, I seem to remember he was rather disappointed when he spoke to his case officer about his upcoming polygraph in that he expected them to give him some specific advice, perhaps even a drug that he could consume that would help him pass the test, but they did not.  I believe the only advice given to Ames was to relax and be nice to your examiner, or something like that?  I will research what I said above, but again, I would like to know where its documented that he employed CM?  Thank you.

L72cueak,

Our basis for the assertion that Ames used countermeasures is drawn from two statements made by Dr. Andrew Ryan of the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute. They can be found on p. 26 of the 2nd edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.

Quote. . .DoDPI researcher Dr. Andrew Ryan has directly contradicted this Senate report [concluding that Ames did not use countermeasures]. Speaking at the Department of Energy's public hearing on polygraph policy at Sandia National Laboratories on 16 September 1999 (U.S. Department of Energy, 1999c), Dr. Ryan stated: ...What we do know is that people have been successful in the past in using countermeasures to defeat the polygraph exam. The Ames case was an example. He was taught by the Soviets how to defeat our process.... (p. 20 of hearing transcript).

The following day, speaking at Los Alamos National Laboratory (U.S. Department of Energy, 1999d), Dr. Ryan stated:...We do acknowledge that there have been cases where we've been defeated by countermeasures. I guess one of the most famous ones was the Aldrich Ames case, by the CIA. It was found he was trained by the Soviets in how to defeat the polygraph. So we basically had a mole inside the agency taught how to beat the polygraph, even though he went through several of them. (p. 153 of hearing transcript).

L72cueak,

Thanks for your recent remarks; I'll respond to them in the order you posted them.

You contend that it is hypocritical for us to recommend based on anecdotal evidence that the anal pucker be applied with sub-maximal effort when we have "critiqued the polygraph community for allegedly...only having 'anecdotal' evidence." Could you clarify here what you have in mind?

With regard to polygraph counter-countermeasures, our critique is that although polygraphers frequently claim that any experienced polygrapher can easily detect countermeasures, there is no available evidence that such is the case. By contrast, with regard to polygraph countermeasures, there is peer-reviewed research that suggests that polygraph countermeasures may be effective, that they may be quickly and easily learned, and that polygraphers cannot detect them at better than chance levels.

With regard to our statement in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector that London & Krapohl's "John" would have passed if he had not admitted to using countermeasures, I think that your arguments are well taken, and as I noted in an earlier post, Gino and I will take that under advisement. London may or may not have reported suspected countermeasures absent John's confirmatory admission.

You also asked, "Do you agree or disagree that the amplitude on 3C6, figure 3, is significantly different than all the other questions on the charts?"

I agree with you that on their face, reactions on question 3C6 (especially the electrodermal channel) stand out. But I'm not certain what logical inference may be drawn therefrom.

You next asked, "How can your readers know when they employ a CM that they have achieved the 'pronounced but sub-maximal level'?  How will they know if they exceeded it?"

That's a determination they'll have to make on their own. Again, we don't know whether applying maximal effort on an anal sphincter contraction would actually increase the chances of the polygrapher accusing the subject of attempted countermeasures.

QuoteRegarding your question to me about where in the literature does the 'anal pucker' produce an artifact?  I am aware of know specific mention of that; however, what I was trying to say was that any voluntary movement will produce an artifact.  The question is whether or not the examiner is skilled enough to detect it?

How does a polygraph examiner acquire the skill to determine whether or not a reaction on any particular channel is the result of voluntary vs. involuntary movement (or some other physiological phenomenon)?

With regard to Aldrich Ames' CIA polygraph examinations, see p. 26 of the 2nd edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, where DoDPI Research Division chief Dr. Andrew J. Ryan is quoted:

Quote...We do acknowledge that there have been cases where we've been defeated by countermeasures.

I guess one of the most famous ones was the Aldrich Ames
case, by the CIA. It was found he was trained by the Soviets in how to defeat the polygraph. So we basically had a mole inside the agency taught how to beat the polygraph, even though he went through several of them.

In closing, I ask again, how is the polygraph community coping with the problem of countermeasures? As I noted in my previous post, it seems to me that they are doing so by pretending to have developed some allegedly reliable-but-secret method of countermeasure detection.

George, you said:

You contend that it is hypocritical for us to recommend based on anecdotal evidence that the anal pucker be applied with sub-maximal effort when we have "critiqued the polygraph community for allegedly...only having 'anecdotal' evidence." Could you clarify here what you have in mind?'

What I had in mind is that the published London case is a piece of anecdotal evidence.  You said that based on anecdotal evidence the anal pucker be applied with sub-maximal effort.  You have critiqued the polygraph community for using that sort of evidence, then you do the same thing yourself.  Somewhat hypocritical, isn't it?

I find it interesting that you've latched onto Dr. Ryan's quote regarding the Ames case.  There is publicly available evidence which indicates Dr. Ryan's statement was not completely accurate.  AMES acknowledged he was not trained by the Soviets in countermeasures.  (Early, P.  Confessions of a Spy).  Beyond quoting Dr. Ryan's statement, what evidence do you have that AMES was trained by the Soviets to employ CMs?    

I was glad to see you were able to acknlowledge the EDA responses in the London case were rather pronounced.  That's what happens when one exceeds your recommended 'sub-maximal' effort.  Regarding how one develops skill in detecting CMs?  If you check DoDPI's web site, it appears they hold a training course in CMs.  Apparently they're teaching examiners something in that 40 hours.  Also, it seems logical to conclude that perhaps some examiners may read your publication as well as Mr. Williams', employ the CMs themselves and see (via bio-feedback) what it looks like when they apply the 'sub-maximal' effort and when they exceed the 'sub-maximal' effort.  

What evidence do you have to support your statement that London's subject would have 'passed' his exam had he not made the admission?  London's examinee didn't pass the previous exams - which was why London ran the exam in question.  If London didn't believe the reactions were real, do you honestly think he would have said the guy passed?  Apply a little common sense here.

Your statement in your book that 'he would have passed' had he not made the admission is not true (also know as a lie) and is misleading.  If you were really interested in being fair and providing your readers with accurate information, why not acknowledge that on the front page of your web-site instead of waiting for the 3rd edition to be published?  What's the chance of your readers finding our threads?  

If a person is evaluated a deception indicated during a normal exam (no CMs), and the person makes no admissions to the relevant questions, do you think polygraph examiners say the person 'passed' just because he didn't make an admission?  Of course not - they're still called deception indicated (unconfirmed).  The same thing is done when unconfirmed CMs are suspected.      

Respectfully,

  

  

Retrieved from DoDPI's web site:  

COUNTERMEASURES (40 CEH)

This 40-hour course gives the PDD examiner the information and experience needed to deal with countermeasures in criminal and intelligence (human intelligence, offensive counterintelligence, and security screening) environments. The course presents concepts, theories, research data, laboratory exercises, and case histories involving criminal and intelligence testing, including the Ames case. Detailed information is included on countermeasure programs and operations conducted by hostile intelligence services during the Cold War, and current foreign polygraph capabilities. This course devotes more time to counter-measures than the Operational Source Testing course described below. As such, it is intended as the primary countermeasures course for criminal and security screening PDD examiners, or as a periodic refresher course for examiners experienced in human intelligence and offensive counterintelligence PDD operations. The course includes daily homework assignments followed the next day by classroom seminars and quizzes. The course includes a final examination.

L72cueak,

QuoteWhat I had in mind is that the published London case is a piece of anecdotal evidence.  You said that based on anecdotal evidence the anal pucker be applied with sub-maximal effort.  You have critiqued the polygraph community for using that sort of evidence, then you do the same thing yourself.  Somewhat hypocritical, isn't it?

My criticism of London & Krapohl's case study is not that it is anecdotal, but rather that it is no evidence that the polygraph community has developed a better than chance method of detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. I don't believe we've argued either in the book or on this message board that anecdotal evidence is per se devoid of any value.

QuoteI find it interesting that you've latched onto Dr. Ryan's quote regarding the Ames case.  There is publicly available evidence which indicates Dr. Ryan's statement was not completely accurate.  AMES acknowledged he was not trained by the Soviets in countermeasures.  (Early, P.  Confessions of a Spy).  Beyond quoting Dr. Ryan's statement, what evidence do you have that AMES was trained by the Soviets to employ CMs?

Perhaps I've attached more significance to Dr. Ryan's statement regarding the Ames case than it deserves. I had supposed that Dr. Ryan, as chief of DoDPI's research division, was speaking with some authority on the topic.

With regard to the London & Krapohl case study...

QuoteYour statement in your book that 'he would have passed' had he not made the admission is not true (also know as a lie) and is misleading.  If you were really interested in being fair and providing your readers with accurate information, why not acknowledge that on the front page of your web-site instead of waiting for the 3rd edition to be published?  What's the chance of your readers finding our threads?

I agree with you that our conclusion that London & Krapohl's "John" would have passed if he had not admitted to using countermeasures goes beyond the available evidence. London may or may not have reported suspected countermeasures absent John's confirmatory admission. While we'll be sure to clarify this in the next edition, I don't think the point is of such great importance as to warrant a front page announcement.

If, on the other hand, the polygraph community were to demonstrate that a polygrapher's accusation of attempted countermeasures had some correlation with actual countermeasure use, that would warrant the prompt release of a new, revised edition. But the available evidence suggests that the polygraph community has no more an effective method of "detecting" countermeasures than to bluff the subject into making an admission.

Yes, perhaps you did attach too much significance to Dr. Ryan's statement.  It appears that you latched onto that statement, without conducting any other research to determine its veracity, and published it as some evidence that CMs are effective.  Will you be making that correction in your 3rd edition as well?    

L72cueak,
If you were to have us discount that which the Chief of Research of the venerable Department of Defense's Polygraph Institute proclaims about polygraph practice, whom would you have us trust for the polygraph community's perspective and for reliable information?????  Perhaps, you??? :)

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 02, 2002, 12:52 PM
Yes, perhaps you did attach too much significance to Dr. Ryan's statement.  It appears that you latched onto that statement, without conducting any other research to determine its veracity, and published it as some evidence that CMs are effective.  Will you be making that correction in your 3rd edition as well?    

At this point, I don't see that there is anything for us to correct. The passage to which you refer appears at page 26 of the 2nd edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. There, we point out that Dr. Ryan has directly contradicted the statement in the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's 1994 report on the Ames case that "Ames said he never received training from the KGB on how to beat the polygraph." Among other things, Dr. Ryan stated:

Quote...We do acknowledge that there have been cases where we've been defeated by countermeasures.

I guess one of the most famous ones was the Aldrich Ames case, by the CIA. It was found he was trained by the Soviets in how to defeat the polygraph. So we basically had a mole inside the agency taught how to beat the polygraph, even though he went through several of them.

The contradiction is there, and we've documented it. Just what is it that you think stands in need of correction for the 3rd edition?

My point is that you use the AMES case as an illustration that CM are effective - when evidence suggests he did not employ them:  

Early, P. (1997).  Confessions of a spy: The real story of Aldrich Ames.  New York:
Berkley

Page 168:

A short time later Rick received a notice from the CIA's Office of Security, informing him that it was time for his routine background investigation.  Every employee was supposed to undergo a routine investigation and take a polygraph test every five years.  Rick had forgotten that he was due for testing.  He decided to ask VLAD for advice.  He heard rumors that the KGB had discovered a way to fool the lie detector machine.  VLAD told him to "remain calm, get a good night's rest, eat a good breakfast, and convince the examiner that you want to be helpful in answering all questions."  Rick was disappointed.  He had hoped the KGB had invented some sort of pill that would help a person conceal his reactions.  He thought the test had gone well, until the woman giving it announced that the machine had noted that he had reacted slightly to one question, possibly indicating an attempt at deception."
      "Which one?" he asked.
      "Why don't you tell me which one you think it is? She replied.
      Rick shrugged his shoulders.  "Well, I can't imagine."
      She read him the question: "Have you ever been approached or pitched by a foreign intelligence service?"  She asked Rick if he had any idea why the machine showed he was stumbling over that query.
      "I guess it's because, you know, I have been involved in a lot of developmental relationships with Eastern Europeans and I, myself, have pitched them and oftentimes they were probably thinking about pitching me at the same time I was pitching them," he replied.  As an afterthought, he added that he was nervous because he was leaving soon for Italy and he thought he might be pitched there.
      The examiner said that she would give Rick a few minutes to relax, and then ask him that same question again.  As he was sitting there, Rick suddenly realized that he had never been pitched by the KGB.  "The question was written incorrectly."  It was: 'Have you ever been approached or pitched by a foreign intelligence service?' and I hadn't been!  I was the one  who approached them!  I wasn't lying when I said I'd never been pitched.
      When the examiner asked Rick the question again, he answered, "No," and this time the machine didn't indicate a reaction.

George, you said:

"I agree with you that our conclusion that London & Krapohl's "John" would have passed is he had not admitted to using countermeasures goes beyond the available evidence."  

What does 'goes beyond the available evidence' mean?  Is that an evasive way of saying there is no evidence?  If it was not based on evidence, do you concede it was a misleading statement?  If not, please explain.

In my opinion, you've essentially admitted the statement in your publication was not true, not based on evidence, and was misleading.  

In response to my position that you provided false and misleading information and that you should notify your readers now, you stated its not 'of such great importance' to notify your readers now.  Do I understand you correctly that you don't think its important to notify your readers in a timely manner that you provided them false and misleading information?  Why don't you think it is not 'of such great importance' to tell them now?  

You've been quick to level accusations against Dr. Barland and Mr. Renzleman for allegedly lying and making misleading statements – yet you've done the same thing you've charged them with doing.  If you caught anyone in the polygraph community engaging in that behavior, I'm positive you would react to it in a very timely manner.  I'm pretty sure you would not wait until the publication of your 3rd edition.  I'm pretty sure it would be published on the front page of your web site.  

I understand your hesitation in acknowledging in a timely manner to your readers that you have provided them with false and misleading information.  Doing so now speaks directly to your credibility.  You have no evidence to back up your claim that he would have passed (the same thing you criticize the polygraph community of doing – making statements without any evidence to back it up).  Again sir, I submit to you that your behavior is hypocritical.  Also, you're not acting in a very objective manner.  Do you agree that your behavior is hypocritical?  If not, please explain.

L72cueak,

Thank you for providing the above citation from Confessions of a Spy. It suggests a possible resolution of the contradiction between the Senate report and Dr. Ryan's remarks: perhaps the Soviets only advised Ames with regard to behavioral countermeasures, and Ames did not regard that as "training on how to beat the polygraph" while Dr. Ryan did.

You also wrote:

QuoteGeorge, you said:

"I agree with you that our conclusion that London & Krapohl's "John" would have passed is he had not admitted to using countermeasures goes beyond the available evidence."  

What does 'goes beyond the available evidence' mean?  Is that an evasive way of saying there is no evidence?  If it was not based on evidence, do you concede it was a misleading statement?  If not, please explain.

"Goes beyond the available evidence" merely means that the evidence was inadequate to support the conclusion, not that there was no evidence for it. The conclusion may or may not have been correct.

QuoteIn response to my position that you provided false and misleading information and that you should notify your readers now, you stated its not 'of such great importance' to notify your readers now.  Do I understand you correctly that you don't think its important to notify your readers in a timely manner that you provided them false and misleading information?  Why don't you think it is not 'of such great importance' to tell them now?

Again, our conclusion that "John" would have passed had he not admitted his use of countermeasures goes beyond the available evidence and may or may not be the case. The reason I don't see an urgent need for a front page announcement or the immediate release of a new edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector is that the point, in my judgment, is relatively minor. The key point is that the London & Krapohl article provides no evidence that the federal polygraph community has come up with a better than chance methodology for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in our book. Again, I'm grateful for your criticism, which will be reflected in the next edition.

QuoteI understand your hesitation in acknowledging in a timely manner to your readers that you have provided them with false and misleading information.  Doing so now speaks directly to your credibility.  You have no evidence to back up your claim that he would have passed (the same thing you criticize the polygraph community of doing – making statements without any evidence to back it up).  Again sir, I submit to you that your behavior is hypocritical.  Also, you're not acting in a very objective manner.  Do you agree that your behavior is hypocritical?  If not, please explain.

No, I don't agree that my behavior is hypocritical. With regard to Gordon Barland's comments at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, I think his intent was clearly to scare his audience of scientists and engineers into believing that nowadays, polygraphers can detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. However, the London & Krapohl article to which he made reference provides no convincing evidence that such is the case. We'll continue to point out misrepresentations and occasional outright lies from those in the polygraph community. We will doubtless make mistakes of our own along the way, as we may have done in concluding that London & Krapohl's "John" would have passed had he not admitted to having employed countermeasures. But we have not intentionally misled anyone regarding polygraphy (as polygraphers do on a daily basis), and we continue to welcome criticism from those in the polygraph community.

We've provided, via this message board, an uncensored forum where all may post their comments and criticism. (Even this message thread was included as a "featured link" on the AntiPolygraph.org home page.)

Any further criticism you may have is welcome.

George, I was curious about your thoughts concerning DoDPI's countermeasure course?  If they haven't devloped techniques to detect countermeasures, what would be the purpose of the course?  

DoDPI hasn't set forth any reliable technique for the detection of deception. Nonetheless, DoDPI pretends to teach several such techniques. I suppose the same probably holds true with regard to the detection of countermeasures.

I don't know what DoDPI is teaching in its countermeasures course. Perhaps you could enlighten us?

That said, I think the fact that no one in the federal polygraph community has accepted Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=418.msg1942#msg1942) speaks to that community's level of confidence in its ability to detect countermeasures.

Below is a copy of the course description from DoDPI's web site.  

COUNTERMEASURES (40 CEH)

This 40-hour course gives the PDD examiner the information and experience needed to deal with countermeasures in criminal and intelligence (human intelligence, offensive counterintelligence, and security screening) environments. The course presents concepts, theories, research data, laboratory exercises, and case histories involving criminal and intelligence testing, including the Ames case. Detailed information is included on countermeasure programs and operations conducted by hostile intelligence services during the Cold War, and current foreign polygraph capabilities. This course devotes more time to counter-measures than the Operational Source Testing course described below. As such, it is intended as the primary countermeasures course for criminal and security screening PDD examiners, or as a periodic refresher course for examiners experienced in human intelligence and offensive counterintelligence PDD operations. The course includes daily homework assignments followed the next day by classroom seminars and quizzes. The course includes a final examination.

Glaringly absent from the DoDPI countermeasure course description is any mention of any technique(s) for the detection of countermeasures.

It is clear that the individual who employed the countermeasure made the mistake of not keeping careful track of the intensity he put forth.

This can be easily avoided by practicing a specific countermeasure (a number of times) before going in for the exam.

It seems logical that a tremendous response (tremendous in the sense that it is dramatically different) might raise suspicion.  Again, practice makes perfect.

I believe that biting the tongue,  and other painful countermeasures, are much easier to self-monitor during an exam since the employment is much more basic.  I also believe that "flexing the pucker" might interfere with an inexperienced individual's breathing pattern (baseline, for example) due to it being an unatural contraction.

L2zeak (sp?):

You are making a huge argument out of an easily preventable error that the person made.

George, you're correct - the course description does not discuss any specific "techniques."  Why would a course description specifically address and identify the techniques for you?  Doing so would be counterproductive for those in the polygraph community actively engaging in efforts to detect CM.  The description does however state: "This 40-hour course gives the PDD examiner the information and experience needed to DEAL with them in criminal and intelligence..."  Obviously we are dealling with them.  I know for a fact that more and more people are being caught engaging in CM.  Whether or not they confess or not has no bearing on whether they are caught or not.  You've identified CM techniques to your readers, we've developed counter-countermeasures to your techniques.  It would be stupid for us to disclose that to you so you could use that info to develop additional CM to our CCM.  I welcome the opportunity to go up against your readers in the real world.    

L72cueak,
 
Considering you have remained anonymous (and, granted, there may be legitimate reasons for doing so) you have not even met any challenges to your credentials on a message board let alone in the "real world" you speak of.  Perhaps if you care to reveal yourself and you satisfy Dr. Richardson's challenge qualifications of being "...from the ranks of federal polygraph instructors or operators, leading civilian polygraphers or any other group whose credentials and experience would be deemed impeccable in polygraph circles..." you might care to accept his challenge.  If not, don't continue to bluster about "willing to go up against" anything or anybody.

L72cueak,

You asked me why a course description would specifically address and identify for me any specific countermeasure techniques for the detection of countermeasures taught at DoDPI. I never suggested that it should. My observation is that the course description doesn't even mention any instruction in how to detect countermeasures. You seem to be suggesting that the DoDPI countermeasure course does indeed include instruction in how to detect countermeasures. Is that right?

If I understand you correctly, you are suggesting that it would be stupid of you (meaning, I presume, the federal polygraph community) to disclose what counter-countermeasures you have developed, because that would enable us to develop additional countermeasures. That may be so, but I suspect that the real reason that DoDPI shrouds in secrecy everything having to do with countermeasures is that in reality, the federal polygraph community has no better-than-chance method for detecting the kinds of countermeasures described on AntiPolygraph.org.

That no one in the polygraph community has shown the requisite confidence in their ability to detect countermeasures to accept Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=418.msg1942#msg1942) tends to support this suspicion.

The course description does say that it teaches one how to "deal" with countermeasures.  I respect your opinion as to why you believe DoDPI does not disclose counter-countermeasure information.  The fact is that in the real-world, federal polygraph examiners are taught how to "deal" with countermeasures.  Federal examiners detect people engaging in countermeasures all of the time.  Do some slip through - yes, I'm sure they do.  One thing is for sure, if countermeasures are detected (even without a confession) the chance of one "passing" a polygraph is pretty slim.  If you believe polygraph should be eliminated what do you suggest the Government do instead?  Normal "background" investigations surely have failed to detect spies in the past.  Should we do away with background investigations as well?        

L72cueak,

You asked:

QuoteIf you believe polygraph should be eliminated what do you suggest the Government do instead?  Normal "background" investigations surely have failed to detect spies in the past.  Should we do away with background investigations as well?

For discussion of the questions you raise, see the message thread, What's more effective than the polygraph? (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=509.msg2514#msg2514), begun by Dr. Barland.

Thank you for think to the thread.  As evidenced by Dr. Barland's statement recruiting spies/defectors doesn't happen that often and most spies are caught via someone defecting.  Your position is that polygraph is ineffective at catching spies.  Background investigations are not effective either at "catching" spies.  Should the Government do away with background investigations as well since they are also ineffective at catching spies?  The Government obviously does make attempts to recruit spies/defectors - is that your only solution?  

George,

In your chapter "Polygraph Countermeasures" - "What about the Relevant Questions?" you said, "Even if you produce a slight response when asked the accusatory relevant questions, you will have artificially produced stronger responses while answering the control questions."  

How does one know they have produced a stronger response on the CQ than the RQ?  How do they know what they delivered on the RQ?  For example, if an examinee delivered an EDA response to a RQ that was 30mm in amplitude, how does one know how to artificially produce an EDA response that exceeds 30mm in amplitude and still be at the sub-maximal level?  

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 23, 2002, 01:07 PM
Thank you for think to the thread.  As evidenced by Dr. Barland's statement recruiting spies/defectors doesn't happen that often and most spies are caught via someone defecting.  Your position is that polygraph is ineffective at catching spies.  Background investigations are not effective either at "catching" spies.  Should the Government do away with background investigations as well since they are also ineffective at catching spies?  The Government obviously does make attempts to recruit spies/defectors - is that your only solution?  

No, I don't think the government should do away with background investigations. There is an important distinction to be made between a background investigation and a polygraph "test." The former is not a pseudoscientific fraud.

L72cueak,

You asked:

QuoteHow does one know they have produced a stronger response on the CQ than the RQ?  How do they know what they delivered on the RQ?  For example, if an examinee delivered an EDA response to a RQ that was 30mm in amplitude, how does one know how to artificially produce an EDA response that exceeds 30mm in amplitude and still be at the sub-maximal level?

Clearly, one cannot know with absolute certainty that one has produced stronger responses to the "control" questions than to the relevant questions. (However, the absence of a post-test interrogation will provide some indication that one has succeeded.)

Reactions can only be controlled directly with regard to the repiratory channels of the polygraph instrument. On the respiratory channels, one can be certain not to produce a scorable reaction with regard to any of the relevant questions while wilfully producing scorable reactions when answering the "control" questions.

It seems likely that any potential reactions to the relevant questions on the electrodermal and cardio channels will be attenuated when one understands the fraudulent nature of polygraph "testing," simply because one will understand that one need not fear them. As some who report having successfully employed countermeasures have observed, the hardest part may be not to laugh as the polygrapher goes through his monkey drill.

Those who wish to compare their relative responses to "control" vs. relevant questions on the electrodermal channel may do so by making a tape recording of a question series with a mix of relevant, irrelevant, and "control" questions at 20-30 second intervals and playing it back while monitoring their electrodermal responses with a galvanometer.

In any event, as I've mentioned before, in Honts' published research on countermeasures, some 50% of programmed guilty subjects were able to defeat the CQT with no more than 30 minutes of instruction, and even experienced polygraphers were not able to detect countermeasure attempts with better than chance levels of accuracy.

If you'd like me or other readers to believe that the federal polygraph community has developed a better than chance method for detecting countermeasures of the kind described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, please provide some evidence therefor.

George, thanks for your reply.  I don't have access to Honts' article at the moment.  I suspect that "experienced" polygraphers aren't necessarily examiners that have been trained in countermeasures.  Does the article indicate if the "experienced" examiners were Federal examiners trained in countermeasures and counter-countermeasures?  If they were not, I would hardly consider them qualified to detect countermeasures and how to engage in counter-countermeasures.  The information you seek concerning the Government's ability to detect countermeasures and employ  counter-countermeasures is not available for public dissemination; therefore, I will not comment on it.  Is there a chance that one employing countermeasures might beat an  examiner?  Yes, there is a chance.  In addition to beating the examiner they will have to also beat the examiners who conduct quality control reviews.  However, there is also the chance that he will not succeed.  Unfortunately for the users of your information, the chances are not in their favor if they are dealing with an experienced Federal examiner trained to detect countermeasures and  counter-countermeasures.    

L72cueak,

You asked:

QuoteDoes the article indicate if the "experienced" examiners were Federal examiners trained in countermeasures and counter-countermeasures?

In the 1st of Honts et al.'s peer-reviewed countermeasure studies, Honts himself performed all the examinations. He was trained at the Backster School of Lie Detection and had five years of field experience at the time. The 2nd peer-reviewed study mentions that examinations were administered by "an experienced polygraph examiner" but does not mention whether that examiner was a federal one trained in countermeasures and counter-countermeasures.

In a more recent study by Honts, Amato, and Gordon ("Effects of Spontaneous Countermeasures Used Against the Comparison Question Test," Polygraph, Vol. 30 [2001], No. 1, pp. 1-9), DoDPI instructors were unable to detect "spontaneous" (untrained) countermeasure attempts at better than chance levels. Such countermeasures included altered breathing, mental, and physical countermeasures. Honts et al. note:

QuoteThe present study also examined the ability of highly trained polygraph examiners to detect the use of countermeasures. The results of this study indicate that they cannot detect the use of spontaneous countermeasures. Their ratings of the likelihood of countermeasure use were generally unreliable and were not associated with actual countermeasure use at better than chance levels. Field polygraph examiners generally appear to operate under the notion that a detection of countermeasure attempts is synonymous with attempted deception to the relevant questions of the examination [reference omitted]. Clearly that  notion is incorrect. The results of this study show that an examiner's decision of countermeasure use is unrelated to both countermeasure use, and to deception. Our analyses indicated that almost half of the subjects judged to be using countermeasures were in fact Innocent subjects. These results strongly suggest that the field practice of equating countermeasure attempts with deception to the relevant issues of an examination should be abandoned.

Speaking at the 4th meeting (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=259.msg1170#msg1170) of the National Academy of Sciences' Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph, Prof. Honts stated that polygraphers cannot detect the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. Click here (http://video.nationalacademies.org/ramgen/dbasse/072301_2.rm) to listen to his remarks in RealPlayer format.

Thus, the available information suggests that even experienced polygraphers have no ability to detect countermeasures, whether spontaneous or sophisticated, at better than chance levels. Your cocksure (but completely unsupported) assertion that:

QuoteUnfortunately for the users of your information, the chances are not in their favor if they are dealing with an experienced Federal examiner trained to detect countermeasures and  counter-countermeasures

seems like little more than wishful thinking.

L72cueak,

QuoteI know for a fact that more and more people are being caught engaging in CM.  

And we also know that more and more people are passing these "tests" via countermeasures from the numerous e-mails we receive. This is nothing more than anecdotal evidence that cancels out for both sides of the argument.

QuoteWhether or not they confess or not has no bearing on whether they are caught or not.

Keep telling yourself this and eventually you may believe it. In a similar manner to how individuals are baselessly accused of deception by polygraphers, it is likely that examiners are accusing persons of using countermeasures without corroboration by confession. Although adverse action may result in both cases, an examiner's accusation absent a confession does not mean a person is "caught." Furthermore, in both of the above cases, it is quite likely that the accused did not engage in the activity (deception/countermeasures) that he is accused of.

Quote. . .we've developed counter-countermeasures to your techniques.  It would be stupid for us to disclose that to you so you could use that info to develop additional CM to our CCM.

If these techniques you refer to do even exist, it is overwhelmingly likely that they operate at the same level of accuracy as the CQT polygraphy you champion—chance. Still, I can understand the need for secrecy on behalf of federal government examiners. The polygraph emperor is naked, and the federal polygraph community is attempting to hide him behind the convenient cloak of "classified." The explanation "it works, but we can't tell you how" is a convenient cop-out that may be acceptable for some. It will not fly here.

Since we are unlikely to get anywhere when discussing polygraph examinations where secrecy is an issue, perhaps you can explain to us how private examiners and others without DoDPI training (police examiners, etc) detect countermeasures? As you know, the use of polygraphy outside of the federal government (police employment, probation and post conviction programs) has increased tremendously in recent years. Surely these examiners, especially those (foolishly) entrusted with supervising our country's criminals, need reliable techniques for catching those who attempt to beat the box.

From our review of the literature, it is safe to say that there is no established methodology for detecting countermeasures. The only reasonable assumption is that examiners are developing their own techniques on an individual basis (i.e. "he looks and acts guilty, but he produced a strongly 'truthful' chart, so he must have been using countermeasures").

Please prove me wrong by pointing out an established methodology for detecting polygraph countermeasures in use by private examiners. Furthermore, please do not waste everyone's time by telling us that this is "secret" as well.

As George pointed out in his 17 March 2002 FOIA request to DoDPI (http://www.antipolygraph.org/foia/foia-010-1.shtml), the methodology of any standardized test can not depend on secrecy.

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 23, 2002, 07:55 PM
George, thanks for your reply.  I don't have access to Honts' article at the moment.  I suspect that "experienced" polygraphers aren't necessarily examiners that have been trained in countermeasures.  Does the article indicate if the "experienced" examiners were Federal examiners trained in countermeasures and counter-countermeasures?  If they were not, I would hardly consider them qualified to detect countermeasures and how to engage in counter-countermeasures.  The information you seek concerning the Government's ability to detect countermeasures and employ  counter-countermeasures is not available for public dissemination; therefore, I will not comment on it.  Is there a chance that one employing countermeasures might beat an  examiner?  Yes, there is a chance.  In addition to beating the examiner they will have to also beat the examiners who conduct quality control reviews.  However, there is also the chance that he will not succeed.  Unfortunately for the users of your information, the chances are not in their favor if they are dealing with an experienced Federal examiner trained to detect countermeasures and  counter-countermeasures.    

Why not shut us all up by simply posting any case, any evidence, any charts, any criminal charges, anything in which a polygraph interrogation subject was caught-- not through virtue of verbal admission-- using the kinds of countermeasures advocated in The Lie Behind The Lie Detector (http://antipolygraph.org/lie-behind-the-lie-detector.pdf)?

Why won't you do that? Just post the evidence man!

Until such time as you or someone else does, I dismiss your dire prognostications of not succeeding as unadulterated drivel.

BT

p.s. Were the CIA and DIA polygraphers who administered polygraph interrogations to Anna Montes trained in countermeasure detection? Anyone? Anyone?

Gentlemen, regarding your statement:

The explanation "it works, but we can't tell you how" is a convenient cop-out that may be acceptable for some. It will not fly here.

It is not a cop-out.  The information can't be disseminated because it is classified at various levels.  Disclosure of such information would be a violation of law.  I'm surely not going to violate the law to illustrate a point to you.

As I suspected, there apparently was no information in the article that suggested the examiners were actually trained in CM detection and CCMs.  

One day I would like to see some research conducted in a similar manner with examiners that are trained in CM and CCM.    

Regarding what private examiners and non-DoDPI personnel do or don't do regarding CM and CCM, I don't know.

QuoteIt is not a cop-out.  The information can't be disseminated because it is classified at various levels.  Disclosure of such information would be a violation of law.  I'm surely not going to violate the law to illustrate a point to you.

It certainly is a cop out--not on your part (this should have been clear when I suggested steering the discussion toward non-federal examiners)--but on the part of those who have decided to "classify this information at various levels."

QuoteAs I suspected, there apparently was no information in the article that suggested the examiners were actually trained in CM detection and CCMs. One day I would like to see some research conducted in a similar manner with examiners that are trained in CM and CCM.

So would I. But before this can happen, someone will have to publicly float a purported scheme for detecting polygraph countermeasures.

QuoteRegarding what private examiners and non-DoDPI personnel do or don't do regarding CM and CCM, I don't know.

Neither does anyone else—or so it seems. Until a uniform method designed to detect sophisticated countermeasures is published (even in a trade journal like Polygraph, I think it is fair to say that private examiners are all doing their own thing. This is a chilling thought considering the increased reliance on polygraphy outside of the federal government.

In an ideal world, examiners would have a method of detecting sophisticated countermeasures proven reliable and valid by peer-reviewed research. Note that polygraphy itself has not met this burden with regard to the ability to discern truth from deception.

Although it would be hardly persuasive to the educated individuals who frequent this site and critical thinkers among the general public, the next best thing would be to have a method shown to be reliable and valid by those with an interest in the continued viability of polygraphy (this could be a DoDPI study, something published in Polygraph, etc).

In the absence of having a method supported by research (however flawed), the next best thing would be to have a methodology that is agreed upon by the field (however incompetent that it is) as a uniform method for detecting sophisticated countermeasures.

At the very least, a polygrapher using his real name could publish an article in Polygraph or another shop journal on how to detect sophisticated countermeasures. So far, we have yet to see even this level of persuasiveness (if you can call it that). The only theories on detecting sophisticated polygraph countermeasures that I have seen to date have been published by anonymous individuals on Internet message boards. It comes as no surprise that no one has been willing to step up to the microphone on Dr. Richardson's challenge.

Gino, you said:

At the very least, a polygrapher using his real name could publish an article in Polygraph or another shop journal on how to detect sophisticated countermeasures. So far, we have yet to see even this level of persuasiveness (if you can call it that). The only theories on detecting sophisticated polygraph countermeasures that I have seen to date have been published by anonymous individuals on Internet message boards.

There was an article published in Polygraph on how sophisticated CM were detected and defeated with CCM, written by London & Krapohl.  I doubt there will be any future articles of that nature because of obvious reasons.  

Beech, you said:

Why not shut us all up by simply posting any case, any evidence, any charts, any criminal charges, anything in which a polygraph interrogation subject was caught-- not through virtue of verbal admission-- using the kinds of countermeasures advocated in The Lie Behind The Lie Detector.

A case was already discussed and posted (London & Krapohl).  George & Gino advised readers not to make admissions to CM and they will "pass" (which was a false and misleading statement).  The fact that the person described in London & Krapohl's article made an admission had no bearing on whether or not it was a CM.  As explained in the article, the decision the examinee engaged in CM was made prior to the admission being obtained.  

I could post a case to illustrate my point where the CM were detected, defeated with CCM and the person did not confess to the crime or the CM & was later convicted of the offense, but what would be the point?  It will not "shut you guys up" (that is not my objective here anyway...).  I like running into your readers in the field.  Some have confessed to CM (they obviously didn't read your literature thoroughly) and some have not confessed.  The fact is they were all listed as having employed CM.  As I have said before, some people will defeat an examiner not trained in CM and CCM - but not all of them.    

George, regarding your statement:

"It seems likely that any potential reactions to the relevant questions on the electrodermal and cardio channels will be attenuated when one understands the fraudulent nature of polygraph "testing," simply because one will understand that one need not fear them."

If a guy has molested his daughter, stolen something, murdered, etc., you think his responses to the RQ will be attenuated because he "understands the fraudulent nature of polygraph testing..."?  The person still fears the consequences of having committed the felony.  The fact is that there are reactions to all questions on an exam - even the irrelevant questions - even when a person employs CM.  So, I'll ask you again: How does one know at what level to employ the CM if he doesn't know what he delivered on all of the RQ?  The correct answer is that one can't know.  That lack of knowledge coupled with an inability to always deliver a sub-maximal level on the CQ and an examiner trained in CM and CCM makes for a difficult task.        

L72cueak,

QuoteIf a guy has molested his daughter, stolen something, murdered, etc., you think his responses to the RQ will be attenuated because he "understands the fraudulent nature of polygraph testing..."? ?The person still fears the consequences of having committed the felony.

Sure, but for the person who understands that polygraphy is a fraud, the relevant questions are no longer as intimidating as they otherwise might be. Again, reactions on the pneumo channels are easily prevented, and those who wish to be assured of their ability to produce a reaction on the electrodermal channel can test their ability at home with a galvanometer. For the cardio channel, a sphygmomanometer may be used. Alternatively, the criminal who wishes to test his ability to beat the polygraph can also arrange with a lawyer to take a confidential practice "test" with a private polygrapher.

You seem to imply that if one creates too great a reaction to a "control" question, one will be "detected" using countermeasures by a polygrapher who has been trained in countermeasure detection. But again, the available scientific research does not support the conclusion that polygraph examiners can detect countermeasures (or indeed, deception) at better than chance levels.

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 10:59 AMIf a guy has molested his daughter, stolen something, murdered, etc., you think his responses to the RQ will be attenuated because he "understands the fraudulent nature of polygraph testing..."?  The person still fears the consequences of having committed the felony.

Here is a shining example of the fraudulent and abusive use of the polygraph. Just what the hell kind of reaction do you think you would get from an innocent subject who comprehends that a failed test would bring about the possible consequences of 1. a failed marriage 2. social pariah 3. possible forced psychotherapy, including the forced ingestion of drugs among many other negatives? Do you honestly expect anyone to believe that an innocent subject's reactions to a question like 'have you ever lied to an employer?' would be greater than 'did you penetrate your daughter's vagina?' when essentially that person's whole world hangs in the balance?

Beech, you missed the point of the question.  My question was for George concerning if a guilty person submitted to a CQ exam in which the relevant questions pertained to one of the subjects I mentioned (child abuse, muder, theft, etc.).  Key word being "guilty" - not innocent!  There is no need for me to respond to any of the questions you posed as they don't pertain to what I was asking George in the first place.

George, I find it interesting that you latch onto the research conducted by Honts to illustrate your point that CM can't be detected at better than chance levels.  If the study involved examiners that were trained in CM and CCM - that might have some bearing on this discussion.  

George & Gino, how many real polygraphs have either of you undergone and "passed" via CM?

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 12:42 PM
George, I find it interesting that you latch onto the research conducted by Honts to illustrate your point that CM can't be detected at better than chance levels.  If the study involved examiners that were trained in CM and CCM - that might have some bearing on this discussion.  

My observation was merely that "the available scientific research does not support the conclusion that polygraph examiners can detect countermeasures (or indeed, deception) at better than chance levels." If you are aware of any research whatsoever supporting the conclusion that polygraphers can detect countermeasures at better than chance levels, perhaps you'd care to share it with us?

Beech, no reply to my reply concerning your post ?

Beech, you said:

Why not shut us all up by simply posting any case, any evidence, any charts, any criminal charges, anything in which a polygraph interrogation subject was caught-- not through virtue of verbal admission-- using the kinds of countermeasures advocated in The Lie Behind The Lie Detector.

A case was already discussed and posted (London & Krapohl).  George & Gino advised readers not to make admissions to CM and they will "pass" (which was a false and misleading statement).  The fact that the person described in London & Krapohl's article made an admission had no bearing on whether or not it was a CM.  As explained in the article, the decision the examinee engaged in CM was made prior to the admission being obtained.  

I could post a case to illustrate my point where the CM were detected, defeated with CCM and the person did not confess to the crime or the CM & was later convicted of the offense, but what would be the point?  It will not "shut you guys up" (that is not my objective here anyway...).  I like running into your readers in the field.  Some have confessed to CM (they obviously didn't read your literature thoroughly) and some have not confessed.  The fact is they were all listed as having employed CM.  As I have said before, some people will defeat an examiner not trained in CM and CCM - but not all of them.

George, do the CM you teach in your manual always work and people pass without the CM being detected?

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 01:09 PM
George & Gino, how many real polygraphs have either of you undergone and "passed" via CM?

None. You'll note that our arguments in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector are based not on any claimed personal authority on our part, but on peer-reviewed research and other published material that skeptical readers may check.

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Apr 28, 2002, 01:10 PM


My observation was merely that "the available scientific research does not support the conclusion that polygraph examiners can detect countermeasures (or indeed, deception) at better than chance levels." If you are aware of any research whatsoever supporting the conclusion that polygraphers can detect countermeasures at better than chance levels, perhaps you'd care to share it with us?

And my point was that the research you cite as evidence did not involve examiners trained in CM and CCM.  If you are aware of any research whatsoever that shows examiners trained in CM and CCM CAN'T detect CM at better than chance leveles, perhaps you can share it with us...  We both know that neither of us can cite such research as their is no indication it has been done yet.  

An "experienced examiner" could be someone who has been involved in the field for many years.  That does not mean the person has had any exposure to or experience in any CM and CCM.  Why would you think an "experienced" examiner not trained in detecting CM and employing CCM would be able to detect CM?  Do you agree that an examiner trained in CM and CCM is more likely to detect and defeat CM than one who is not?  

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 01:13 PM
George, do the CM you teach in your manual always work and people pass without the CM being detected?

Probably not. For example, if a subject mistakes a relevant question for a "control" question and augments his reactions to it, he's likely to fail. However, the feedback we've received from those who report having employed countermeasures has been overwhelmingly positive.

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 01:19 PM
And my point was that the research you cite as evidence did not involve examiners trained in CM and CCM.  If you are aware of any research whatsoever that shows examiners trained in CM and CCM CAN'T detect CM at better than chance leveles, perhaps you can share it with us...  We both know that neither of us can cite such research as their is no indication it has been done yet.  

And in the absence of any such research, what compelling reason is there to conclude that polygraphers can detect countermeasures at better than chance levels? (Note that in Honts' most recent study involving "spontaneous" countermeasures -- which polygraphers could not detect -- the examiners were all DoDPI instructors whose training in countermeasure detection was presumably state-of-the-art.)

You also asked:

QuoteDo you agree that an examiner trained in CM and CCM is more likely to detect and defeat CM than one who is not?

I have no rational basis for concluding that the former would be able to detect countermeasures better than the latter, or that either would be able to detect countermeasures at better than chance levels.

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Apr 28, 2002, 01:25 PM


Probably not. For example, if a subject mistakes a relevant question for a "control" question and augments his reactions to it, he's likely to fail. However, the feedback we've received from those who report having employed countermeasures has been overwhelmingly positive.

How much feedback have you received from those who reported not being successful?  There are obviously those who have been detected.

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 01:32 PM
How much feedback have you received from those who reported not being successful?  There are obviously those who have been detected.

Only one such report comes to mind, which you'll find in the message thread Taking One for the Team Part Two (https://antipolygraph.org/forum/index.php?topic=206.msg859#msg859).

George, thank you for the link.  Interesting account.  A good example of what happens when one does not achieve the sub-maximal level you recommend.  I noticed that post was made in July, 2001.  The author didn't admit to the CM, yet still "failed" the test.  That's interesting, because your current edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, dated well after that post, said that as long as one doen't admit to CM they will "pass."  You and Gino obviously knew at the time you published your manual that the statement you made was not true, false, miseleading, etc. (also known as a "lie").  Why did you knowingly make that false statement?  I see it as evidence of Lies contained in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector.  

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Apr 28, 2002, 01:32 PM


And in the absence of any such research, what compelling reason is there to conclude that polygraphers can detect countermeasures at better than chance levels? (Note that in Honts' most recent study involving "spontaneous" countermeasures -- which polygraphers could not detect -- the examiners were all DoDPI instructors whose training in countermeasure detection was presumably state-of-the-art.)

You also asked:


I have no rational basis for concluding that the former would be able to detect countermeasures better than the latter, or that either would be able to detect countermeasures at better than chance levels.

You know what happened when one presumes...  Just because one went through DoDPI doen't mean they were trained in CM and CCM.  The CM course is a continuing education course.  Regarding your response to my question, you didn't answer the question.  According to Mr. Sapir (www.lsiscan.com), when somebody doesn't answer the question, they did!  Apply a little common sense, what do you think?  Are the chances better or not?  

L72cueak,

You wrote:

Quote...your current edition of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, dated well after that post, said that as long as one doen't admit to CM they will "pass."

We did not write that one will pass as long as one does not admit to using countermeasures. Our reference was only with regard to "John" in London & Krapohl's article. As we've discussed above, I now agree that John may or may not have passed had he not admitted to having employed countermeasures.

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 02:25 PM
You know what happened when one presumes...  Just because one went through DoDPI doen't mean they were trained in CM and CCM.  The CM course is a continuing education course.  Regarding your response to my question, you didn't answer the question.  According to Mr. Sapir (www.lsiscan.com), when somebody doesn't answer the question, they did!  Apply a little common sense, what do you think?  Are the chances better or not?  

The examiners in Honts et al.'s latest countermeasure study to which I referred were not just DoDPI graduates, but DoDPI instructors.

It's interesting that you cite Avinoam Sapir, who runs a business he calls the "Laboratory for Scientific Interrogation." As chance would have it, I went through his week-long "Scientific Content Analysis" (SCAN) course some years ago. He's a former polygrapher, as I recall. In any event, there's nothing "scientific" about his theories of statement analysis, which seem to be unsupported by any scientific research whatsoever. But I digress.

As to whether attending DoDPI's countermeasure course improves one's ability to detect the kinds of counterrmeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, I simply have no rational basis for concluding that it does. If DoDPI really believes it has a better than chance method for detecting countermeasures, it should seek to have it's research supporting that method published in a refereed scientific journal.

Again, you didn't answer the question.  I didn't ask you if had a rational basis...  I asked that you apply a little common sense and answer the question.  

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Apr 28, 2002, 02:53 PM


The examiners in Honts et al.'s latest countermeasure study to which I referred were not just DoDPI graduates, but DoDPI instructors.

It's interesting that you cite Avinoam Sapir, who runs a business he calls the "Laboratory for Scientific Interrogation." As chance would have it, I went through his week-long "Scientific Content Analysis" (SCAN) course some years ago. He's a former polygrapher, as I recall. In any event, there's nothing "scientific" about his theories of statement analysis, which seem to be unsupported by any scientific research whatsoever. But I digress.

As to whether attending DoDPI's countermeasure course improves one's ability to detect the kinds of counterrmeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, I simply have no rational basis for concluding that it does. If DoDPI really believes it has a better than chance method for detecting countermeasures, it should seek to have it's research supporting that method published in a refereed scientific journal.

Because one was or is an instructor at DoDPI doesn't mean they have been trained in CM and CCM, or that they have even completed the CM course.  I don't think there is anything scientific about statement analysis, it is an art - just like interrogation is an art.  However, you illustrated Sapir's point well by not answering the question.  I understand your apparent motive for doing so.  The obvious answer is yes, the chances are probablly greater that a trained person would detect CM more readily than one who is not trained.  The question is simple, but you are purposely avoiding answering it by trying to make it more complicated than it is.  

Quote from: George W. Maschke on Apr 28, 2002, 02:36 PM
L72cueak,

You wrote:


We did not write that one will pass as long as one does not admit to using countermeasures. Our reference was only with regard to "John" in London & Krapohl's article. As we've discussed above, I now agree that John may or may not have passed had he not admitted to having employed countermeasures.

You took a middle of the road type position on that one.  Why would you think that after the examiner strongly believed the examinee engaged in CM he would turn around and say the person passed?  That makes no sense.  

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 03:51 PM
Again, you didn't answer the question.  I didn't ask you if had a rational basis...  I asked that you apply a little common sense and answer the question.  

What you asked was:

QuoteDo you agree that an examiner trained in CM and CCM is more likely to detect and defeat CM than one who is not?

Again, I have no rational basis for concluding that the former would be able to detect countermeasures better than the latter, or that either would be able to detect countermeasures at better than chance levels. You may not be satisfied with that answer, but so be it.

I am struck by the irony of your remonstrance, "I didn't ask you if had a rational basis...  I asked that you apply a little common sense and answer the question."

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 04:18 PM
You took a middle of the road type position on that one.  Why would you think that after the examiner strongly believed the examinee engaged in CM he would turn around and say the person passed?  That makes no sense.  

When London & Krapohl write, "It was clear now that John was practicing Cms, but still there was no sign of any physical movement," they write with 20/20 hindsight. We cannot know what opinion London would have ultimately rendered absent "John's" admission that he employed countermeasures.

I concede you don't have a "rational basis" to conclude that.  By just applying common sense, what do you think?  

George, I asked you: "Why would you think that after the examiner strongly believed the examinee engaged in CM he would turn around and say the person passed?"   Once again, you didn't answer that question...   I would not do that - even without a confession.  I'm pretty sure London wouldn't have either.  Why do think saying he passed would have been an option?  

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 04:38 PM
I concede you don't have a "rational basis" to conclude that.  By just applying common sense, what do you think?  

What is common sense in the absence of reason? The available information about DoDPI's countermeasures course (that provided on DoDPI's webiste) doesn't give me any reason to think that those who matriculate from the course will be any more capable of detecting the kinds of countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector than they were before the course.

Quote from: L72cueak on Apr 28, 2002, 04:43 PM
George, I asked you: "Why would you think that after the examiner strongly believed the examinee engaged in CM he would turn around and say the person passed?"   Once again, you didn't answer that question...   I would not do that - even without a confession.  I'm pretty sure London wouldn't have either.  Why do think saying he passed would have been an option?  

One consideration that may have made London hesitate to accuse John of having employed countermeasures absent his admission is that John was described as a "high-priority candidate for employment with the federal government."

If London were prepared to render a decision that countermeasures were employed absent any admission from John, then he need not have bothered with the post-"test" interrogation. He could have simply rendered his opinion and shown John to the door.

London & Krapohl also place some importance on obtaining an admission when they write:

QuoteSince this case, London has worked several other confirmed Cms cases and presented them as case studies to various gatherings of PDD examiners. From the feedback received during the conferences, those examiners who have suspected examinees of using Cms were reluctant to probe the issue because they lacked substantial evidence and a suitable interrogation strategy. This suggests a need for practical hands-on training for examiners on detecting Cms, employing validation procedures, and developing effective elicitation and interrogation strategies for handling Cms.

The emphasis on interrogation strategies suggests that admissions are indeed of some importance to rendering a determination that a subject employed countermeasures.