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Posted by Mark Mallah
- Apr 10, 2002, 03:41 PMMr. Sensor's "security transgression" can be anything from selling classified information to forgetting to lock up your desk before you leave. How convenient to be able to explain "anomolies" by attributing them to "security transgressions" which virtually everyone is guilty of at some level.
It would seem that one explanation for these "anomalies" which has definitively been ruled out is polygraph error.
The delusion continues...
It would seem that one explanation for these "anomalies" which has definitively been ruled out is polygraph error.
The delusion continues...
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Apr 10, 2002, 08:49 AMFBI Assistant Director Kenneth H. Senser, who now heads the Bureau's Security Division, addressed FBI polygraph policy in his written statement submitted at the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary's 9 April 2002 hearing on "Reforming the FBI in the 21st Century: The Lessons of the Hanssen Espionage Case."
The following is an excerpt of the relevant portions of his statement:
The following is an excerpt of the relevant portions of his statement:
QuoteExpanded Polygraph Program: During the course of Hanssen's Bureau career, he never took a polygraph examination. In 1994, the FBI established a requirement to test all new employees prior to them beginning their service. Additionally, individuals with access to certain sensitive programs or cases were polygraphed and it was also used during serious internal inquiries to resolve unexplained anomalies and ambiguities.
Former Director Freeh ordered after Hanssen's arrest periodic polygraph examinations for those individuals, who by the nature of their assignment, have broad access to our most sensitive information. Polygraph examinations were also ordered for those employees serving in overseas assignments.
Since the limited polygraph expansion became effective, close to 700 counterintelligence (CI) -focused examinations have been conducted. While the initial population of employees occupying positions with access to the most sensitive information was estimated to be close to 550, this population is dynamic. For example, as employees have retired, new incumbents for these positions were chosen and, ultimately, polygraphed. The vast majority of employees who were polygraphed have successfully completed the process. We are continuing to work with slightly more than one percent of the tested population to resolve anomalies. We developed a process for attempting to resolve anomalous outcomes which takes into account the fact that polygraph is only one element of a healthy personnel security vetting program and assures that, while it may be necessary to modify the sensitivity of an employee's access to information during the inquiry, no adverse action will be taken against the employee based on polygraph results alone. While no admissions have been surfaced during the polygraph examinations to date that are of a seriousness equivalent to that of the Hanssen case, the process has identified lesser security transgressions and other behavior that has resulted in referrals to the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for appropriate disciplinary considerations. This is a necessary component of changing to a culture of security awareness.
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III, recently agreed to a new risk-based framework for the Polygraph Program and slightly expanded the pool of employees subject to CI-focused examinations. I will discuss this in greater detail later in my statement.
...
In order to address security vulnerabilities impacting FBI information systems, since July 2001, the FBI:
...
• Moved Polygraph Unit from the Laboratory to the Security Division.
• Continued to conduct polygraph examinations according to the criteria established in March 2001 as part of the limited expansion.
• Received conceptual approval by Director Mueller to continue with a limited and careful expansion of the polygraph program. The formal decision memo has been generated for his signature. The proposal:
Expands the population already subject to CI-focused polygraph examinations to all personnel involved in the CI, CT, and Security Programs.
Establishes a risk-based program comprised of four elements -- for both employees and non-Bureau personnel -- with access to the most sensitive FBI information. The elements include:
Examinations as part of initial applications for employment or access.
Periodic examinations tied to security reinvestigations.
Aperiodic or random examinations.
Compelled examinations if necessary to resolve issues that impact trustworthiness as defined by Executive Order 12968 and the Adjudication Guidelines that implement it.
Posted by Mark Mallah
- Jul 23, 2001, 10:21 PM"Unexplainable false positives?" That is an oxymoron.
"False positive" means that the truthful subject was incorrectly deemed deceptive. There is no need to "explain" anything. The polygraph was wrong. What exactly is unexplainable?
Mr. Senser's phrase is meant to save face and to continue to stigmatize the innocent subject. Even though the subject is innocent, his "failing" of the test is somehow "unexplainable," so he is still on the hook.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Jul 23, 2001, 08:44 AMOn 18 July 2001, the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing on "Reforming FBI Management: The Views from Inside and Out". Kenneth H. Senser, Acting Deputy Assistant Director, Security Programs and Countermeasures, briefly discussed FBI polygraph policy in a statement submitted for the record. The relevant portion is excerpted below:
Senser's complete statement is available on the Committee's website at:
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/te071801-sen.htm
Senser's acknowledgement that "there will be unexplainable false positives" is prima facie proof that the FBI is aware of the false positive problem. And although he claims that "the potential for damage to be done by traitors outweighs these concerns," it should be noted that in the case of applicants for employment with the Bureau, the vast majority who "fail" are not accused of lying about national security issues, but about illegal drug use. Their applications are peremptorily terminated with no appeal. The FBI needs to be held accountable for its denial of due process based on a pseudoscientific procedure that it knows to be unreliable.
Quote
Expanded Polygraph Program. Currently, the FBI conducts polygraphs of all new employees prior to them beginning their service. In addition, individuals with access to certain sensitive programs or cases are polygraphed and, of course, the polygraph is used during serious internal inquiries to resolve unexplained anomalies and ambiguities.
As an interim measure, we identified for periodic polygraph examination those individuals who, by the nature of their assignment, have broad access to the FBI's most sensitive information. This includes any level of employee in any occupation who has access to our most sensitive information, such as data base administrators. In addition, we are conducting polygraph examinations of those employees leaving for and returning from permanent foreign assignments. These polygraph examinations are essentially complete. A more significant proposal for expanding the polygraph program is currently being reviewed by the AD security task force.
Judge Webster will closely examine the entire polygraph issue to include random polygraphs and inclusion of the polygraph as part of the five-year reinvestigation every employee now undergoes.
As there are elsewhere in the Intelligence Community, there will be unexplainable false positives and, as we saw in the Ames case, false negatives. On balance, however, we believe the potential for damage to be done by traitors outweighs these concerns. Accordingly, Director Freeh implemented this interim step with the full expectation that Judge Webster will examine this issue in its entirety and make further recommendations.
Senser's complete statement is available on the Committee's website at:
http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/te071801-sen.htm
Senser's acknowledgement that "there will be unexplainable false positives" is prima facie proof that the FBI is aware of the false positive problem. And although he claims that "the potential for damage to be done by traitors outweighs these concerns," it should be noted that in the case of applicants for employment with the Bureau, the vast majority who "fail" are not accused of lying about national security issues, but about illegal drug use. Their applications are peremptorily terminated with no appeal. The FBI needs to be held accountable for its denial of due process based on a pseudoscientific procedure that it knows to be unreliable.