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A forum for free and open discussion of polygraph-related topics
Posted by Poly-Killer
- Jun 04, 2003, 09:46 AMYes, Beech Trees...I agree with washed-up fed, let EVERYONE know what happens when you are honest, and how they reward you for such honesty. Is it any wonder why most people, who understand the fraud behind polygraphy, elect to use countermeasures?
PK
PK
Posted by Fed-up Fed
- Jun 03, 2003, 07:28 PMHey beech trees, tell them what happens when you brag about knowing all about countermeasures.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Jun 03, 2003, 03:29 AMPublic Servant,
You write, "For Mr. Webb, or anyone else, to provide information on how examiners deal with the 'informed' examinees, would be quite counter-productive."
Why do you believe this to be so?
If a subject informs the polygrapher in the pre-test phase that he/she understands the function of the probable-lie "control" questions, then the whole set of assumptions on which the probable-lie CQT depends is negated. That subject will not be (falsely) persuaded that the polygrapher wants and expects a completely truthful answer to the "control" questions.
Doesn't such an honest subject deserve to know what is going to happen if he admits his "forbidden knowledge" of polygraph procedure?
When the American Polygraph Association and DoDPI refuse say what will happen to such honest individuals, you should not be surprised if the latter choose to keep such knowledge to themselves and instead employ countermeasures to protect themselves against your invalid "test."
You write, "For Mr. Webb, or anyone else, to provide information on how examiners deal with the 'informed' examinees, would be quite counter-productive."
Why do you believe this to be so?
If a subject informs the polygrapher in the pre-test phase that he/she understands the function of the probable-lie "control" questions, then the whole set of assumptions on which the probable-lie CQT depends is negated. That subject will not be (falsely) persuaded that the polygrapher wants and expects a completely truthful answer to the "control" questions.
Doesn't such an honest subject deserve to know what is going to happen if he admits his "forbidden knowledge" of polygraph procedure?
When the American Polygraph Association and DoDPI refuse say what will happen to such honest individuals, you should not be surprised if the latter choose to keep such knowledge to themselves and instead employ countermeasures to protect themselves against your invalid "test."
Posted by Public Servant
- Jun 02, 2003, 10:57 AMQuoteMoreover, Menges' suggestion that making countermeasure information available to the public should be criminalized only makes sense if 1) he believes that such countermeasures have some reasonable prospect of working and 2) he lacks confidence in the ability of polygraphers to detect them.
I would agree that number 1 would likely be a prerequisite for advocating criminalization of such practices. However, I don't believe number 2 would be a prerequisite since, as I asserted previously, detected countermeasures could also be detrimental to examinee, examiner, agency, and perhaps to justice in general.
For the record, while I take issue with the ethicality and responsibility of this site, I would not advocate having it criminalized. I have devoted my entire adult life to the defense of freedom, both in the armed forces and law enforcement. As Mr. Webb stated in your cited email, it is your right to speak your opinions on this site.
On the issue of dealing with known or suspected "informed" subjects; there are a number of ideas and methodologies, which often vary from agency to agency, examiner to examiner. Prior to attending DoDPI, students must undergo a screening exam. Due to extensive exposure while observing exams on their assigned cases, few in my agency were completely naive to CQT when they applied for polygraph training. Yet the senior examiners are still able to conduct effective exams on the applicants. I know it worked for my examination. At least one of these methods has been effective.
But now I am back to the same point, regarding informed subjects, that I have made so often regarding the countermeasure challenge. For Mr. Webb, or anyone else, to provide information on how examiners deal with the "informed" examinees, would be quite counter-productive.
Yes, everyone can feel free to make the same attacks to this as were made when I have asserted this regarding CMs in the past. Feel free to go to old threads and cut and paste!!
But, please don't have Drew issue a challenge regarding "informed" subjects. I can barely deal with the monotony of the present challenge countdown reminders.Take care!
Public Servant
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Jun 02, 2003, 05:35 AMMarty,
The question of how to deal with informed subjects is one that the polygraph community seems unwilling to confront. See, for example, my e-mail exchange with American Polygraph Association president Skip Webb:
http://antipolygraph.org/read.shtml#informed-subjects
The question of how to deal with informed subjects is one that the polygraph community seems unwilling to confront. See, for example, my e-mail exchange with American Polygraph Association president Skip Webb:
http://antipolygraph.org/read.shtml#informed-subjects
Posted by Marty
- Jun 02, 2003, 05:15 AMQuote from: Public Servant on Jun 02, 2003, 03:34 AM
Whether detected, or undetected, countermeasures do harm.
Public Servant,
I think your point has perhaps even more validity than you posited. Knowledge of the CQT test technique itself potentially reduces its effectiveness even with no countermeasures utilized since it is unlikely a person will react as strongly on the controls. For that matter if they do react it liklely would be out of concern that they might underreact rather than concern of being detected as deceptive on the control. This all gets rather messy and one can't help but wonder how the polygraph community handles this. Ask examinees if they are knowledgable of polygraphy and if they are switch to a DLT? I don't think knowledge about polygrapy itself is a ever a "relevant" D/Q ing question, but it sure can alter the assumptions polygraphy is based on.
-Marty
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Jun 02, 2003, 04:18 AMPublic Servant,
I'm not saying that Mr. Menges' argument that making countermeasure information available to the public is unethical, and his suggestion that it should be outlawed, is, in and of itself, proof that countermeasures cannot be detected. Rather, what I'm saying is that it is circumstantial evidence that, combined with other evidence (such as that discussed above), strongly supports a conclusion that DoDPI has no reliable method of countermeasure detection. Additional circumstantial evidence supporting this conclusion is the fact that no polygrapher has ever demonstrated any ability to detect countermeasures.
I agree with you that a polygrapher's (or, more generally speaking, an investigator's) job should be to get to the truth regarding the relevant matter. But CQT polygraphy is not a valid diagnostic test for such purposes. It doesn't detect lies. It doesn't detect deception. It doesn't "verify truth" (as some polygraphers are fond of saying). CQT polygraphy is sheer pseudoscience, and the investigator who wants to get to the truth needs to understand this.
Paul Menges doesn't. His ethical arguments flow from the false premise that "[p]olygraph is scientifically valid."
Moreover, Menges' suggestion that making countermeasure information available to the public should be criminalized only makes sense if 1) he believes that such countermeasures have some reasonable prospect of working and 2) he lacks confidence in the ability of polygraphers to detect them.
I'm not saying that Mr. Menges' argument that making countermeasure information available to the public is unethical, and his suggestion that it should be outlawed, is, in and of itself, proof that countermeasures cannot be detected. Rather, what I'm saying is that it is circumstantial evidence that, combined with other evidence (such as that discussed above), strongly supports a conclusion that DoDPI has no reliable method of countermeasure detection. Additional circumstantial evidence supporting this conclusion is the fact that no polygrapher has ever demonstrated any ability to detect countermeasures.
I agree with you that a polygrapher's (or, more generally speaking, an investigator's) job should be to get to the truth regarding the relevant matter. But CQT polygraphy is not a valid diagnostic test for such purposes. It doesn't detect lies. It doesn't detect deception. It doesn't "verify truth" (as some polygraphers are fond of saying). CQT polygraphy is sheer pseudoscience, and the investigator who wants to get to the truth needs to understand this.
Paul Menges doesn't. His ethical arguments flow from the false premise that "[p]olygraph is scientifically valid."
Moreover, Menges' suggestion that making countermeasure information available to the public should be criminalized only makes sense if 1) he believes that such countermeasures have some reasonable prospect of working and 2) he lacks confidence in the ability of polygraphers to detect them.
Posted by Public Servant
- Jun 02, 2003, 03:34 AMQuoteAdditionally Paul M. Menges, who teaches the DoDPI countermeasure course, has recently suggested that making countermeasure information available to the public is unethical and should be criminalized. Would he be making such arguments if DoDPI had a reliable method of countermeasure detection?
George,
Your assertion that since a DoDPI official feels teaching countermeasures is unethical and should be illegal, countermeasures cannot be detected; is quite flawed. No doubt, you assume that if countermeasures can be detected, there is no possibility of harm being caused by countermeasures. Thus examiners should not care if countermeasure techniques are publicized.
The flaw in this thought process is as follows. Whether detected, or undetected, countermeasures do harm. You (incorrectly) assume the only concern an examiner has is not allowing the deceptive person to avoid detection. In fact, the examiners job is to get to the truth regarding the relevant matter. Thus, even detected countermeasures interfere with the mission of a sworn law enforcement or intelligence agent. The examiner who catches an examinee using countermeasures now has to determine if the person is concealing guilt or is an innocent person just trying to "help" himself. This leaves the examiner with nothing more than interrogation to resolve the matter (assuming thorough investigation has been conducted, as well it should, prior to the exam).
An otherwise innocent/non-deceptive person caught utilizing countermeasures has now compromised his or her own integrity and damaged their own professional reputation. This site advocates the use of countermeasures by innocent persons to ensure they pass (no doubt to disassociate themselves from criminals who might also use the info to avoid justice). However, the provider of countermeasure information with advice to use them, to any otherwise non-deceptive person, is complicit to the damage caused by countermeasures being detected (not just for damage caused by a guilty person using them to evade justice).
If you take a cheat sheet with you to an exam in college, yet find you knew the answers without using it, does it negate the ethical violation? Your integrity is still jeopardized; and if you were caught with the cheat sheet, you could never prove you actually passed the exam of your own merits. Correlate this to polygraph and a fair-minded person will see why complaints, based upon ethics, to countermeasure info dissemination, does not indicate countermeasures cannot be detected.
Regards,
Public Servant
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Jun 01, 2003, 12:38 AMShadow,
My comments above were restricted to the polygraph examiner basic course that all new federal polygraph examiners receive. I think it is significant that such little time is dedicated to the subject of countermeasures, and that it is tacked on to the end of the course (as if it were an afterthought).
Thank you for posting the countermeasure course description. I note that has changed since the last time I read it. It formerly read:
That DoDPI has a 40-hour countermeasure course has been discussed earlier (see the message thread Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, which includes the earlier course description). But the existence of this course presents no convincing evidence that DoDPI has developed any reliable method of countermeasure detection, and there is strong circumstantial evidence that it has not.
For example, the National Academy of Sciences notes in its report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection, in a subchapter titled "Bias, Conflict of Interest, and Unscientific Decision Making":
Interestingly, the new countermeasure course description states that the course "presents...research data related to polygraph countermeasures." One wonders precisely what countermeasure research data is being presented in the class, and why any such data was not made available to the National Academy of Sciences. (The publicly available countermeasure research, conducted by Charles R. Honts and collaborators, suggests that even experienced polygraphers cannot detect countermeasures of the kind described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector at better-than-chance levels of accuracy.)
Additionally Paul M. Menges, who teaches the DoDPI countermeasure course, has recently suggested that making countermeasure information available to the public is unethical and should be criminalized. Would he be making such arguments if DoDPI had a reliable method of countermeasure detection? See the discussion thread A Response to Paul M. Menges for more on this.
Finally, note that that Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge has now gone 488 days without takers.
My comments above were restricted to the polygraph examiner basic course that all new federal polygraph examiners receive. I think it is significant that such little time is dedicated to the subject of countermeasures, and that it is tacked on to the end of the course (as if it were an afterthought).
Thank you for posting the countermeasure course description. I note that has changed since the last time I read it. It formerly read:
QuoteCOUNTERMEASURES (40 CEH)
This 40-hour course gives the PDD examiner the information and experience needed to deal with countermeasures in criminal and intelligence (human intelligence, offensive counterintelligence, and security screening) environments. The course presents concepts, theories, research data, laboratory exercises, and case histories involving criminal and intelligence testing, including the Ames case. Detailed information is included on countermeasure programs and operations conducted by hostile intelligence services during the Cold War, and current foreign polygraph capabilities. This course devotes more time to counter-measures than the Operational Source Testing course described below. As such, it is intended as the primary countermeasures course for criminal and security screening PDD examiners, or as a periodic refresher course for examiners experienced in human intelligence and offensive counterintelligence PDD operations. The course includes daily homework assignments followed the next day by classroom seminars and quizzes. The course includes a final examination.
That DoDPI has a 40-hour countermeasure course has been discussed earlier (see the message thread Lies in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector, which includes the earlier course description). But the existence of this course presents no convincing evidence that DoDPI has developed any reliable method of countermeasure detection, and there is strong circumstantial evidence that it has not.
For example, the National Academy of Sciences notes in its report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection, in a subchapter titled "Bias, Conflict of Interest, and Unscientific Decision Making":
Quote...we were advised by officials from DOE and DoDPI that there was information relevant to our work, classified at the secret level, particularly with regard to polygraph countermeasures. In order to review such information, several committee members and staff obtained national security clearances at the secret level. We were subsequently told by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency and DoDPI that there were no completed studies of polygraph countermeasures at the secret level...
Interestingly, the new countermeasure course description states that the course "presents...research data related to polygraph countermeasures." One wonders precisely what countermeasure research data is being presented in the class, and why any such data was not made available to the National Academy of Sciences. (The publicly available countermeasure research, conducted by Charles R. Honts and collaborators, suggests that even experienced polygraphers cannot detect countermeasures of the kind described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector at better-than-chance levels of accuracy.)
Additionally Paul M. Menges, who teaches the DoDPI countermeasure course, has recently suggested that making countermeasure information available to the public is unethical and should be criminalized. Would he be making such arguments if DoDPI had a reliable method of countermeasure detection? See the discussion thread A Response to Paul M. Menges for more on this.
Finally, note that that Dr. Richardson's polygraph countermeasure challenge has now gone 488 days without takers.
Posted by The Shadow
- May 31, 2003, 08:54 PMGeorge,
Perhaps you should tell the entire story and not put a Spin on the training. I found this on the same DoDPI site you found the four hours of training on the last day of classes:
COUNTERMEASURES (40 CEH)
This 40-hour course prepares the PDD examiner to deter, detect, and prevent employment of polygraph countermeasures in criminal and intelligence testing environments. The course presents background information as a foundation, concepts, theories, and research data related to polygraph countermeasures. Laboratory exercises are included to enhance skills and provide hands-on experience. Detailed discussions of numerous case studies involving examples of confirmed countermeasures efforts targeting law enforcement and intelligence polygraph examinations are used to demonstrate methods of detecting and defeating this threat to law enforcement and intelligence polygraph operations. Information provided includes discussion of threats posed by foreign intelligence services, terrorist organizations, and other criminal elements attempting to defeat law enforcement and or intelligence polygraph examinations. This course is intended as the primary polygraph countermeasures course for criminal and security screening PDD examiners or as a periodic refresher course for examiners supporting intelligence operations. The course includes daily directed reading assignments followed by classroom discussions and quizzes. Prerequisite: The student must be employed or contracted as a polygraph examiner by a federal law enforcement or counterintelligence agency.
I have said it before, I'll say it again.... I may not be a big fan of the polygraph, but lets stop spinning the issues before you start to sound like a politician!
Code Select
Perhaps this block of instruction is so short (and included almost as an afterthought) because DoDPI has no reliable methodology for the detection of countermeasures. Perhaps you should tell the entire story and not put a Spin on the training. I found this on the same DoDPI site you found the four hours of training on the last day of classes:
COUNTERMEASURES (40 CEH)
This 40-hour course prepares the PDD examiner to deter, detect, and prevent employment of polygraph countermeasures in criminal and intelligence testing environments. The course presents background information as a foundation, concepts, theories, and research data related to polygraph countermeasures. Laboratory exercises are included to enhance skills and provide hands-on experience. Detailed discussions of numerous case studies involving examples of confirmed countermeasures efforts targeting law enforcement and intelligence polygraph examinations are used to demonstrate methods of detecting and defeating this threat to law enforcement and intelligence polygraph operations. Information provided includes discussion of threats posed by foreign intelligence services, terrorist organizations, and other criminal elements attempting to defeat law enforcement and or intelligence polygraph examinations. This course is intended as the primary polygraph countermeasures course for criminal and security screening PDD examiners or as a periodic refresher course for examiners supporting intelligence operations. The course includes daily directed reading assignments followed by classroom discussions and quizzes. Prerequisite: The student must be employed or contracted as a polygraph examiner by a federal law enforcement or counterintelligence agency.
I have said it before, I'll say it again.... I may not be a big fan of the polygraph, but lets stop spinning the issues before you start to sound like a politician!
Posted by orolan
- May 31, 2003, 05:36 PMAnd a whopping six hours to "Legal and Ethical Aspects of PDD". And since it starts at 6:30 in the morning I'm sure half the class will sleep through most of it.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 31, 2003, 05:29 PMThe website of the Department of Defense Polygraph Institute, which has responsibility for the training of all federal polygraph examiners, features a calendar that includes the training schedule for the polygraph examiner basic course.
Interestingly, training on polygraph countermeasures is reserved for the very last day of classes, and consists of only four hours of classroom instruction followed by three hours of practical exercises.
Perhaps this block of instruction is so short (and included almost as an afterthought) because DoDPI has no reliable methodology for the detection of countermeasures.
Interestingly, training on polygraph countermeasures is reserved for the very last day of classes, and consists of only four hours of classroom instruction followed by three hours of practical exercises.
Perhaps this block of instruction is so short (and included almost as an afterthought) because DoDPI has no reliable methodology for the detection of countermeasures.