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Posted by Anonymous
- May 20, 2001, 03:09 AMGordon,
From one of your recent postings to George Maschke on the CAAWP listserv:
"Incidentally, I will continue to make occasional posts on various matters on your .org site, but I will be orienting myself toward the average visitor to your site, not seeking to debate the hard core, professional critics. I think the scientific fora (including CAAWP) are more appropriate for serious discussions."
I presume since you have not responded to my questions/comments, I fall within your categorization of "hard core, professional critics." I am disappointed to see you take this approach. Although clearly a gentleman, this (what appears to be a) cowardly approach is neither becoming of you nor edifying to the reading public. Apparently, not only does the CQT depend upon a naive and gullible populace for counter-countermeasure success, but your responses regarding the same require an audience of only the most unsophisticated and naive of the reading and writing public.
If I have misjudged, a thousand pardons. If you truly care to address the important issues raised, please do so in any forum you chose, the CAAWP list, or in Sanskrit in the Bangkok Gazette or anywhere else you choose. Just let me and others know where we might look for answers.
From one of your recent postings to George Maschke on the CAAWP listserv:
"Incidentally, I will continue to make occasional posts on various matters on your .org site, but I will be orienting myself toward the average visitor to your site, not seeking to debate the hard core, professional critics. I think the scientific fora (including CAAWP) are more appropriate for serious discussions."
I presume since you have not responded to my questions/comments, I fall within your categorization of "hard core, professional critics." I am disappointed to see you take this approach. Although clearly a gentleman, this (what appears to be a) cowardly approach is neither becoming of you nor edifying to the reading public. Apparently, not only does the CQT depend upon a naive and gullible populace for counter-countermeasure success, but your responses regarding the same require an audience of only the most unsophisticated and naive of the reading and writing public.
If I have misjudged, a thousand pardons. If you truly care to address the important issues raised, please do so in any forum you chose, the CAAWP list, or in Sanskrit in the Bangkok Gazette or anywhere else you choose. Just let me and others know where we might look for answers.
Posted by Anonymous
- May 16, 2001, 01:25 PMGordon,
In order to advance our discussion and to summarize outstanding issues (for only those posts/replies placed within your countermeasure thread by me--there are several additional from Mr. Maschke and others), I have prepared this short list of unanswered/unaddressed questions/comments for your consideration. I hope this summary will aid in your full and timely response to these outstanding issues:
(1) Victimization of polygraph screening examinees (replies #4, 18, 28) and how this victimization should be prevented in the future and how these victims should be compensated for past serious injustices,
(2) Any evidence for your claims of robustness of existing CQT counter-countermeasures (replies #4, 19),
(3) An evaluation of the sting scenario I suggested involving leaders of the polygraph world and their susceptibility to polygraph countermeasures (reply # 10),
(4) Reaction to my evaluation of your commentary regarding examinee dissociation (reply # 19),
(5) Reaction to my commentary about the ease of using posted DoDPI chart evaluation criteria to produce responses to control questions and consequently yield effective countermeasures (reply # 19), and
(6) Your apparent abandonment for both practical and theoretical reasons of the CQT (for RI technique) with knowledgeable subjects and your characterization of it as depending upon, for any success obtained, the na•vet* of a gullible populace (replies # 26, 28)
I would suggest/urge your beginning with that contained in point number one for the following reason: your credibility with the audience you are addressing on all other subjects depends upon your realizing and clearly verbalizing the plight that your profession has placed these individuals in. Although you are not personally responsible for these exams and their consequences, anything less than a full and complete statement about the victimization of the majority of those who both created/maintain and contribute to this site will ring empty and will appear to be nothing but idle lip service (to include your claim that those individuals have "your deepest sympathy").
In order to advance our discussion and to summarize outstanding issues (for only those posts/replies placed within your countermeasure thread by me--there are several additional from Mr. Maschke and others), I have prepared this short list of unanswered/unaddressed questions/comments for your consideration. I hope this summary will aid in your full and timely response to these outstanding issues:
(1) Victimization of polygraph screening examinees (replies #4, 18, 28) and how this victimization should be prevented in the future and how these victims should be compensated for past serious injustices,
(2) Any evidence for your claims of robustness of existing CQT counter-countermeasures (replies #4, 19),
(3) An evaluation of the sting scenario I suggested involving leaders of the polygraph world and their susceptibility to polygraph countermeasures (reply # 10),
(4) Reaction to my evaluation of your commentary regarding examinee dissociation (reply # 19),
(5) Reaction to my commentary about the ease of using posted DoDPI chart evaluation criteria to produce responses to control questions and consequently yield effective countermeasures (reply # 19), and
(6) Your apparent abandonment for both practical and theoretical reasons of the CQT (for RI technique) with knowledgeable subjects and your characterization of it as depending upon, for any success obtained, the na•vet* of a gullible populace (replies # 26, 28)
I would suggest/urge your beginning with that contained in point number one for the following reason: your credibility with the audience you are addressing on all other subjects depends upon your realizing and clearly verbalizing the plight that your profession has placed these individuals in. Although you are not personally responsible for these exams and their consequences, anything less than a full and complete statement about the victimization of the majority of those who both created/maintain and contribute to this site will ring empty and will appear to be nothing but idle lip service (to include your claim that those individuals have "your deepest sympathy").
Posted by Gordon H. Barland
- May 13, 2001, 09:12 AMFalse + (5/09/01 at 16:59:14) wrote:
1. I won't second guess what conclusions they will reach or how they express them. They have world class reputations. I'm confident they will take a fresh look at the data and the issues within the scientific literature. I do not know to what extent they will solicit information from the polygraph community, observe real world examinations, etc. I do not know how they will weigh or resolve the various conflicting data and viewpoints. I will be rather surprised if they don't contribute some fresh insights to the literature. Anything new they have to say will benefit society.
2. Of course it will affect my knowledge of the polygraph. I strive to be open minded and incorporate all new information into the way I view the polygraph. Would I reverse my views if they conclude it doesn't work better than chance? Not unless they make a far more persuasive case than the critics have thus far; there is just too much evidence that it works far better than chance.
3. The false positive rate varies from one type of exam to another. It is probably lower in security screening than it is in criminal investigation, and vice versa. Certainly, some who claim they were false positives, are lying. Others are not. I don't pretend to know what the ratio is. I'm sure there are many variables affect it. One is how one defines an error. This is a variable seldom discussed, but I'm convinced it is an important one and worthy of serious discussion.
Peace.
QuoteI'm curious to get your opinion on the ongoing NAS Polygraph study.
1. Do you have any opinion as to what the study's conclusion will basically be?
2. Will the conclusion of the study bear any impact at all on how you view polygraphy? Would you view polygraphy any differently if the study essentially says the premises of polygraph analysis are scientifically invalid?
3. Do you think those who claim to be victims of incorrect polygraph results all fit into the reported 0.1% of error rate? Or do you think that the vast totality of those claiming to be judged in error are making it up?
1. I won't second guess what conclusions they will reach or how they express them. They have world class reputations. I'm confident they will take a fresh look at the data and the issues within the scientific literature. I do not know to what extent they will solicit information from the polygraph community, observe real world examinations, etc. I do not know how they will weigh or resolve the various conflicting data and viewpoints. I will be rather surprised if they don't contribute some fresh insights to the literature. Anything new they have to say will benefit society.
2. Of course it will affect my knowledge of the polygraph. I strive to be open minded and incorporate all new information into the way I view the polygraph. Would I reverse my views if they conclude it doesn't work better than chance? Not unless they make a far more persuasive case than the critics have thus far; there is just too much evidence that it works far better than chance.
3. The false positive rate varies from one type of exam to another. It is probably lower in security screening than it is in criminal investigation, and vice versa. Certainly, some who claim they were false positives, are lying. Others are not. I don't pretend to know what the ratio is. I'm sure there are many variables affect it. One is how one defines an error. This is a variable seldom discussed, but I'm convinced it is an important one and worthy of serious discussion.
Peace.
Posted by Gordon H. Barland
- May 11, 2001, 12:49 PMJane Doe III said:
Jane,
Federal agencies have specific guidelines about when an examiner must render an "inconclusive" opinion. I believe that with some agencies, one of the situations requiring that decision would be when the examiner has reason to believe the examinee is engaging in countermeasures or purposeful non-cooperation.
Frankly, I'm glad there is an inconclusive category. With ambiguous situations, better to render no opinion than to make a mistake.
Peace.
QuoteRe: Countermeasure considerations for the innocent (Date posted: 05/05/01 at 23:32:34) Logged
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hello,
It seems to me that Mr. Barland is stating that polygraph examiners are now attempting to detect countermeasures from readings that would normally be considered a "truthful" reading. If that's the case then that would explain the high number of "inconclusive" results as polygraphers are naturally assuming that the examinee is going to employ countermeasures on the test. Thus to justify their suspicions they label the test results at best "inconclusive". I am certainly no expert in this field, but I think that a so-called scientific "truth or lie" machine that was declared to be imperfect and beatable should not be used to judge peoples lives and should be relegated to the circus side-show circuit.....of course, that's just my opinion. I could be right.
Jane,
Federal agencies have specific guidelines about when an examiner must render an "inconclusive" opinion. I believe that with some agencies, one of the situations requiring that decision would be when the examiner has reason to believe the examinee is engaging in countermeasures or purposeful non-cooperation.
Frankly, I'm glad there is an inconclusive category. With ambiguous situations, better to render no opinion than to make a mistake.
Peace.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 10, 2001, 06:58 AMQuote from: Gordon H. Barland on May 09, 2001, 01:33 PM
There is no longer a real need for foreign intelligence services to spend their resources developing countermeasures, for the techniques are all available on the Internet for a nominal fee or free of charge. The sad thing about this, in my view, is that it is American citizens who are advising sex offenders, murderers, spies, and rapists how to beat the test.
Gordon,
Earlier in this message thread, you wrote "If you don't mind, I'd like to focus in this thread on the risks of using countermeasures..." Now that you've chosen to venture into commentary on ethics, perhaps you'd care to respond to the following questions I posed in my initial reply, which you had earlier shrugged off. For convenience, I'll re-state them here:
Our discussion of the ethics of polygraph countermeasures [in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector] is short and simple:
Quote
We believe that it is not unethical for truthful persons--faced with a government that routinely lies to and deceives its employees and prospective employees through the polygraph screening process--to employ polygraph countermeasures to protect themselves against a false positive outcome.
Do you disagree? If so, why? Is it ethical for our government to lie to and deceive employees and applicants for employment through the polygraph process? If so, why? (The deceptions involved are discussed in Chapter 3 of The Lie Behind the Lie Detector).
Posted by False +
- May 09, 2001, 07:59 PMMr. Barland,
I'm curious to get your opinion on the ongoing NAS Polygraph study.
1. Do you have any opinion as to what the study's conclusion will basically be?
2. Will the conclusion of the study bear any impact at all on how you view polygraphy? Would you view polygraphy any differently if the study essentially says the premises of polygraph analysis are scientifically invalid?
3. Do you think those who claim to be victims of incorrect polygraph results all fit into the reported 0.1% of error rate? Or do you think that the vast totality of those claiming to be judged in error are making it up?
I'm curious to get your opinion on the ongoing NAS Polygraph study.
1. Do you have any opinion as to what the study's conclusion will basically be?
2. Will the conclusion of the study bear any impact at all on how you view polygraphy? Would you view polygraphy any differently if the study essentially says the premises of polygraph analysis are scientifically invalid?
3. Do you think those who claim to be victims of incorrect polygraph results all fit into the reported 0.1% of error rate? Or do you think that the vast totality of those claiming to be judged in error are making it up?
Posted by Jane_Doe_III
- May 09, 2001, 02:58 PM Mr.G.Barland states;
"The sad thing about this, in my view, is that it is American citizens who are advising sex offenders, murderers, spies, and rapists how to beat the test."
Well sir, if it wasn't for the fact that Law Enforcement agencies were completly abusing this machine as a do-or-die hiring device the world probably would still be left in the dark about this atrocious beast that you call a "lie detector". This information that is being distributed is the direct result of numerous people being denied employment for false, baseless accusations made by people like yourself. Sure we don't want to see the type of people that you mentioned above get over on the system. But we all now know that your machine that has incriminated so many people in the past is full of flaws and not based on any proven scientific theory, infact it's been admonished by the scientific community.
So don't go blaming anyone but yourself and your constituents for this valuable information posted for all of the world to see.
Thank god we still use "beyond a reasonable doubt" in our criminal justice system. There is nothing but "reasonable doubt" in your instrument you blindly see as a lie detector.
"The sad thing about this, in my view, is that it is American citizens who are advising sex offenders, murderers, spies, and rapists how to beat the test."
Well sir, if it wasn't for the fact that Law Enforcement agencies were completly abusing this machine as a do-or-die hiring device the world probably would still be left in the dark about this atrocious beast that you call a "lie detector". This information that is being distributed is the direct result of numerous people being denied employment for false, baseless accusations made by people like yourself. Sure we don't want to see the type of people that you mentioned above get over on the system. But we all now know that your machine that has incriminated so many people in the past is full of flaws and not based on any proven scientific theory, infact it's been admonished by the scientific community.
So don't go blaming anyone but yourself and your constituents for this valuable information posted for all of the world to see.
Thank god we still use "beyond a reasonable doubt" in our criminal justice system. There is nothing but "reasonable doubt" in your instrument you blindly see as a lie detector.
Posted by Anonymous
- May 09, 2001, 02:57 PMGordon,
Although you somewhat place your admission in perspective, it in no way changes its overall nature as simply that--an admission that CQT counter-countermeasures are for all practical purposes a functional myth. Although you suggest keeping the CQT in the present polygrapher's armamentarium, you give no compelling reason for doing so. In fact, your own subsequent commentary relegates the CQT to ancient history dependent upon the widespread naïveté of a gullible populace. In fact, Gordon, under cross-examination, you would make an excellent expert witness for why the national security should no longer rest with CQT polygraphy. You should be congratulated on your honesty, even though it clearly runs counter to the sort of wild claims of invincibility normally put forth by the polygraph community, e.g., numerous such posts on polygraphplace.com.
If you believe what you suggest about information-based tests, then we do have some common ground.
You still need to answer to those victimized by the CQT regarding how they should be compensated (following up on your "doctors bury their mistakes" observation). And you should very clearly understand that the reason for Americans providing the world with polygraph countermeasures is that the American population is that which has been most heavily victimized by polygraphy (American polygraphers representing a majority of the world's population of polygraphers). Although Great Britain has had spies as has the U.S., British subjects have not played a role in disseminating polygraph countermeasure information, not because they are more patriotic than U.S. citizens, but because their relatively enlightened government has protected its subjects from the victimization of polygraphy.......
Although you somewhat place your admission in perspective, it in no way changes its overall nature as simply that--an admission that CQT counter-countermeasures are for all practical purposes a functional myth. Although you suggest keeping the CQT in the present polygrapher's armamentarium, you give no compelling reason for doing so. In fact, your own subsequent commentary relegates the CQT to ancient history dependent upon the widespread naïveté of a gullible populace. In fact, Gordon, under cross-examination, you would make an excellent expert witness for why the national security should no longer rest with CQT polygraphy. You should be congratulated on your honesty, even though it clearly runs counter to the sort of wild claims of invincibility normally put forth by the polygraph community, e.g., numerous such posts on polygraphplace.com.
If you believe what you suggest about information-based tests, then we do have some common ground.
You still need to answer to those victimized by the CQT regarding how they should be compensated (following up on your "doctors bury their mistakes" observation). And you should very clearly understand that the reason for Americans providing the world with polygraph countermeasures is that the American population is that which has been most heavily victimized by polygraphy (American polygraphers representing a majority of the world's population of polygraphers). Although Great Britain has had spies as has the U.S., British subjects have not played a role in disseminating polygraph countermeasure information, not because they are more patriotic than U.S. citizens, but because their relatively enlightened government has protected its subjects from the victimization of polygraphy.......
Posted by Gordon H. Barland
- May 09, 2001, 01:33 PMAnonymous said:
You seem to have misunderstood what I've been saying. I have never said, nor implied, that no countermeasure problem exists. On the contrary, it has expanded dramatically. During the Cold War, the government's main concern about countermeasures was what hostile intelligence services were doing. That involved a miniscule number of examinations out of all that were conducted. Today, the testing environment is completely different. Detailed countermeasure instructions are available on the Internet to everyone. The incidence of easy-to-detect low level CMs is diminishing, and the incidence of the more sophisticated mid-level CMs has increased dramatically. There is no longer a real need for foreign intelligence services to spend their resources developing countermeasures, for the techniques are all available on the Internet for a nominal fee or free of charge. The sad thing about this, in my view, is that it is American citizens who are advising sex offenders, murderers, spies, and rapists how to beat the test.
What I have said is that we have learned a lot about detecting mid-level countermeasures. There are a number of factors which influence the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of countermeasures. Some are under the complete or partial control of the person being examined, others by the examiner. I have also said that we are increasingly able to detect mid-level countermeasures, and that innocent/truthful persons should be aware of that and the associated consequences when they are deciding whether to try them. Finally, I have said that I do not know what percentage of mid-level countermeasures we are detecting in real world examinations, for I don't know the base rate for countermeasures. I know that an increasing number of Federal examiners have received formal training in how to detect them, and that we are in fact detecting more of them. Whether this is due to the training, or because more people are trying countermeasures, is hard to say. I suspect it is a combination of the two.
Anonymous' final point was that I appear to be willing to quickly abandon the CQT. That misconstrues my position. I think it is important to keep all forms of the CQT in the examiners' armamentarium. But this does not mean that in today's testing environment we can conduct business as usual.
The CQT was developed more than half a century ago. As it was modified and numerical scoring systems were developed, it was all on the premise that persons taking the test were generally naïve about how the test was structured and scored. That is no longer the case, though I'm not sure the polygraph profession fully realizes the implications of that. There are short term fixes and long range solutions that must be developed. I would certainly hope that the CQT is not the end point in the evolution of credibility assessment technology.
One of the short term fixes, in my opinion, is to decrease the emphasis on the CQT. The majority of examiners today probably consider it the technique of preference in virtually every situation. I have long advocated a greater role for other formats, such as peak of tension, guilty knowledge, and relevant-irrelevant tests. Every testing technique has an inherent set of strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and limitations. In a situation where the person being tested is using or is likely to use point countermeasures, it makes good sense to switch to a test which is less susceptible to them.
Peace.
Quote When asked how you would handle the subject, instead of saying "I would proceed as planned with the CQT polygraph screening because no problem exists, i.e., I can rely on my DoD-developed countermeasure detection algorithm to sort out any countermeasure attempts..." you have done quite something else.
You seem to have misunderstood what I've been saying. I have never said, nor implied, that no countermeasure problem exists. On the contrary, it has expanded dramatically. During the Cold War, the government's main concern about countermeasures was what hostile intelligence services were doing. That involved a miniscule number of examinations out of all that were conducted. Today, the testing environment is completely different. Detailed countermeasure instructions are available on the Internet to everyone. The incidence of easy-to-detect low level CMs is diminishing, and the incidence of the more sophisticated mid-level CMs has increased dramatically. There is no longer a real need for foreign intelligence services to spend their resources developing countermeasures, for the techniques are all available on the Internet for a nominal fee or free of charge. The sad thing about this, in my view, is that it is American citizens who are advising sex offenders, murderers, spies, and rapists how to beat the test.
What I have said is that we have learned a lot about detecting mid-level countermeasures. There are a number of factors which influence the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of countermeasures. Some are under the complete or partial control of the person being examined, others by the examiner. I have also said that we are increasingly able to detect mid-level countermeasures, and that innocent/truthful persons should be aware of that and the associated consequences when they are deciding whether to try them. Finally, I have said that I do not know what percentage of mid-level countermeasures we are detecting in real world examinations, for I don't know the base rate for countermeasures. I know that an increasing number of Federal examiners have received formal training in how to detect them, and that we are in fact detecting more of them. Whether this is due to the training, or because more people are trying countermeasures, is hard to say. I suspect it is a combination of the two.
Anonymous' final point was that I appear to be willing to quickly abandon the CQT. That misconstrues my position. I think it is important to keep all forms of the CQT in the examiners' armamentarium. But this does not mean that in today's testing environment we can conduct business as usual.
The CQT was developed more than half a century ago. As it was modified and numerical scoring systems were developed, it was all on the premise that persons taking the test were generally naïve about how the test was structured and scored. That is no longer the case, though I'm not sure the polygraph profession fully realizes the implications of that. There are short term fixes and long range solutions that must be developed. I would certainly hope that the CQT is not the end point in the evolution of credibility assessment technology.
One of the short term fixes, in my opinion, is to decrease the emphasis on the CQT. The majority of examiners today probably consider it the technique of preference in virtually every situation. I have long advocated a greater role for other formats, such as peak of tension, guilty knowledge, and relevant-irrelevant tests. Every testing technique has an inherent set of strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and limitations. In a situation where the person being tested is using or is likely to use point countermeasures, it makes good sense to switch to a test which is less susceptible to them.
Peace.
Posted by Anonymous
- May 08, 2001, 10:13 PMGordon,
You gave the following reply to George Maschke when queried about how to deal with a potential polygraph examinee knowledgeable about (1) the examiner deception involved in CQT polygraphy and (2) publicly disseminated countermeasures to this technique.
______________________________________________________________________
As for how I would deal with the situation, I would have no qualms about conducting an examination. My personal outlook is "when in doubt, give it a try and see what happens." I would go into the situation with my eyes open, aware of the pitfalls, and make sure that the person receiving my report was also aware of the need for caution in relying upon the results. When I was an examiner in private practice, I tested several polygraph examiners on real world matters. The only thing I did differently from testing a naïve subject was to use a relevant/irrelevant (RI) test format, which is less susceptible to point countermeasures. The RI test is far more sophisticated in design and interpretation than most critics give it credit for. To be used successfully, I believe it requires formal training followed by an internship under experienced practitioners, so this option is not realistic for many examiners.
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Maschke then characterized the RI technique as "thoroughly discredited" and "hardly reassuring" to a knowledgeable person facing the prospect of taking such an exam. He is correct on both counts, but because this audience is likely largely unfamiliar with the RI technique, I would like to spend some time with it---its theory of practice, suggested shortcomings (even in comparison to CQT polygraphy), its scoring, and ready methods for countermeasuring this type of exam or one with any number of single-stimulus (relevant) questions. All of that is a bit beyond this post, though, and the time I have available to devote to it this evening, but I would like to comment on what I believe is a critical juncture in the dialogue we are now having.
If this were a criminal interrogation, you were a criminal suspect (hopefully having been read your rights by now), and the alleged crime was fabricating the existence of a viable polygraph counter-countermeasure program for CQT polygraph screening applications, at this juncture I would stop the interview and take a signed-sworn statement.
Although you have continually (in this thread) suggested to the contrary, through your quoted commentary to Mr. Maschke what you have done is implicitly admit that no such program exists. When asked how you would handle the subject, instead of saying "I would proceed as planned with the CQT polygraph screening because no problem exists, i.e., I can rely on my DoD-developed countermeasure detection algorithm to sort out any countermeasure attempts..." you have done quite something else. What you have done is to abandon CQT polygraphy as a sinking ship under the conditions Mr. Maschke presented you and to strike out with another format (again, even a more problematic one to be discussed at a later time). The issue here is not the comparison between CQT and RI polygraph techniques, but that you would so quickly abandon CQT polygraphy. This ready betrayal of the present mainstay of government polygraph screening programs (CQT polygraphy) plus your unwillingness (and I suspect inability) to answer my questions about counter-countermeasures can only lead a reasonable person to conclude what I have said all along----counter-countermeasures to CQT polygraphy are but a bluff and a wish of a dying industry...
You gave the following reply to George Maschke when queried about how to deal with a potential polygraph examinee knowledgeable about (1) the examiner deception involved in CQT polygraphy and (2) publicly disseminated countermeasures to this technique.
______________________________________________________________________
As for how I would deal with the situation, I would have no qualms about conducting an examination. My personal outlook is "when in doubt, give it a try and see what happens." I would go into the situation with my eyes open, aware of the pitfalls, and make sure that the person receiving my report was also aware of the need for caution in relying upon the results. When I was an examiner in private practice, I tested several polygraph examiners on real world matters. The only thing I did differently from testing a naïve subject was to use a relevant/irrelevant (RI) test format, which is less susceptible to point countermeasures. The RI test is far more sophisticated in design and interpretation than most critics give it credit for. To be used successfully, I believe it requires formal training followed by an internship under experienced practitioners, so this option is not realistic for many examiners.
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Maschke then characterized the RI technique as "thoroughly discredited" and "hardly reassuring" to a knowledgeable person facing the prospect of taking such an exam. He is correct on both counts, but because this audience is likely largely unfamiliar with the RI technique, I would like to spend some time with it---its theory of practice, suggested shortcomings (even in comparison to CQT polygraphy), its scoring, and ready methods for countermeasuring this type of exam or one with any number of single-stimulus (relevant) questions. All of that is a bit beyond this post, though, and the time I have available to devote to it this evening, but I would like to comment on what I believe is a critical juncture in the dialogue we are now having.
If this were a criminal interrogation, you were a criminal suspect (hopefully having been read your rights by now), and the alleged crime was fabricating the existence of a viable polygraph counter-countermeasure program for CQT polygraph screening applications, at this juncture I would stop the interview and take a signed-sworn statement.
Although you have continually (in this thread) suggested to the contrary, through your quoted commentary to Mr. Maschke what you have done is implicitly admit that no such program exists. When asked how you would handle the subject, instead of saying "I would proceed as planned with the CQT polygraph screening because no problem exists, i.e., I can rely on my DoD-developed countermeasure detection algorithm to sort out any countermeasure attempts..." you have done quite something else. What you have done is to abandon CQT polygraphy as a sinking ship under the conditions Mr. Maschke presented you and to strike out with another format (again, even a more problematic one to be discussed at a later time). The issue here is not the comparison between CQT and RI polygraph techniques, but that you would so quickly abandon CQT polygraphy. This ready betrayal of the present mainstay of government polygraph screening programs (CQT polygraphy) plus your unwillingness (and I suspect inability) to answer my questions about counter-countermeasures can only lead a reasonable person to conclude what I have said all along----counter-countermeasures to CQT polygraphy are but a bluff and a wish of a dying industry...
Posted by Gordon H. Barland
- May 08, 2001, 08:38 PMAnonymous,
The root cause of our different views lies in whether the polygraph works better than chance or not. That is a discussion I look forward to on a different thread. It's a complex issue with many aspects, enough to keep everybody involved for months to come.
Peace.
The root cause of our different views lies in whether the polygraph works better than chance or not. That is a discussion I look forward to on a different thread. It's a complex issue with many aspects, enough to keep everybody involved for months to come.
Peace.
Posted by Anonymous
- May 08, 2001, 08:30 PM________________________________________________
Surely you jest! Countermeasures and counter-countermeasures are a high stakes battle which directly impacts the criminal justice system and national security.
_________________________________________________
No, my friend, surely you jest! Although you wrap yourself, your former profession, and its practices in the American flag and give it the solemnity due national security, this will not continue for long. Once stripped of this artificial association to national security (national security and criminal justice will be furthered through the elimination of polygraphy), polygraph counter-countermeasures and the like will properly be relegated to the likes and gravitas of Boris and Natasha or spy vs. spy of Mad Magazine. The only remaining interest and purpose left standing will be the long-term employment prospects of your former associates...
Surely you jest! Countermeasures and counter-countermeasures are a high stakes battle which directly impacts the criminal justice system and national security.
_________________________________________________
No, my friend, surely you jest! Although you wrap yourself, your former profession, and its practices in the American flag and give it the solemnity due national security, this will not continue for long. Once stripped of this artificial association to national security (national security and criminal justice will be furthered through the elimination of polygraphy), polygraph counter-countermeasures and the like will properly be relegated to the likes and gravitas of Boris and Natasha or spy vs. spy of Mad Magazine. The only remaining interest and purpose left standing will be the long-term employment prospects of your former associates...
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 08, 2001, 03:15 PMGordon Barland wrote:
Gordon, confirmation "to the satisfaction of the individual agency" is no real confirmation at all, is it? In your first post, which started this message thread, you wrote:
All you really meant to say then, is that some federal agencies will decide (based on undisclosed criteria that vary from agency to agency) that a subject employed countermeasures, whether or not the subject admits to it?
What evidence exists that DoDPI-trained polygraphers (or, indeed, any polygraphers) can detect the countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector at better than chance levels?
Lastly, if you would use the relevant/irrelevant format with sophisticated subjects (i.e., those who understand the polygraph procedure), then on what scientific basis do you expect to be able to distinguish truth from deception using this (thoroughly discredited) technique? For the informed, truthful subject who heeds your advice and does not employ countermeasures but instead admits to his/her knowledge of the trickery on which "control" question "test" polygraphy depends, the promise of being treated to a relevant/irrelevant "test" instead is hardly reassuring.
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There may be a problem with semantics here. I did not mean confirm in the sense of absolute ground truth. That is extremely difficult to do in any real world situation. Therein lies the big advantage of laboratory research, where we made our initial breakthroughs in detecting mid- and high level countermeasures. What I did mean was confirm to the satisfaction of the individual agency. The steps that must be accomplished to reach that level of confirmation vary from one agency to another. The key point is that in the Federal government, most examiners do not make such a decision arbitrarily. They must follow their agency's guidelines, which may require concurrence from their quality control office.
Gordon, confirmation "to the satisfaction of the individual agency" is no real confirmation at all, is it? In your first post, which started this message thread, you wrote:
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Each Federal agency has a quality control office which reviews every examination. I know of a number of cases where the examiner cleared the person taking the test, but the quality control office detected apparent countermeasures. The persons were re-examined, and the use of countermeasures was confirmed.
All you really meant to say then, is that some federal agencies will decide (based on undisclosed criteria that vary from agency to agency) that a subject employed countermeasures, whether or not the subject admits to it?
What evidence exists that DoDPI-trained polygraphers (or, indeed, any polygraphers) can detect the countermeasures described in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector at better than chance levels?
Lastly, if you would use the relevant/irrelevant format with sophisticated subjects (i.e., those who understand the polygraph procedure), then on what scientific basis do you expect to be able to distinguish truth from deception using this (thoroughly discredited) technique? For the informed, truthful subject who heeds your advice and does not employ countermeasures but instead admits to his/her knowledge of the trickery on which "control" question "test" polygraphy depends, the promise of being treated to a relevant/irrelevant "test" instead is hardly reassuring.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 08, 2001, 01:38 PMGordon,
In this message thread, you've referred to three categories of polygraph countermeasures: low-level, mid-level, and high-level. Could you explain the distinction between the three?
In this message thread, you've referred to three categories of polygraph countermeasures: low-level, mid-level, and high-level. Could you explain the distinction between the three?
Posted by Gordon H. Barland
- May 08, 2001, 01:17 PMSo many questions, so little time!
The reason I retired was to free up my time to pursue other interests and pleasures. I am deliberately limiting the time I spend on polygraph matters. I will get to all of your questions in time; typically one post per day. See you tomorrow!
Peace
The reason I retired was to free up my time to pursue other interests and pleasures. I am deliberately limiting the time I spend on polygraph matters. I will get to all of your questions in time; typically one post per day. See you tomorrow!
Peace