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Posted by Administrator
- Mar 31, 2024, 01:15 PMWe have obtained a redacted copy of a 2-page affidavit provided by U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Ellen Ripperger regarding the polygraph examination that was at issue in a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint and that remains relevant to an ongoing Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (DHS OIG) investigation.
Regarding the polygraph examination at issue, the recording of which, as provided by the U.S. Secret Service, was almost entirely incomprehensible, Ripperger under penalty of perjury affirmed, among other things:
In order for paras. 7, 8, and 9 to be true, both the Lafayette software's "Warn on low audio" failsafe and the audio bar indicator mentioned in the Lafayette Instrument Company's affidavit must have failed. This beggars belief.
AntiPolygraph.org understands that the DHS OIG, in a meeting with attorney Thomas Gagliardo, admitted it sent the audio files of this exam out for forensic examination. If that forensic analysis did not suggest tampering, then why was this investigation not closed immediately? Indeed, it seemingly remains open in perpetuity.
Regarding the polygraph examination at issue, the recording of which, as provided by the U.S. Secret Service, was almost entirely incomprehensible, Ripperger under penalty of perjury affirmed, among other things:
Quote4. On September 18, 2014, I recorded the polygraph examinaton of Mr. [redacted] using a microphone that plugs into my Secret Service laptop computer.
5. After I recorded the preamble to Mr. [redacted] examination, I unplugged the microphone from the laptop so that I could listen to the introduction. This is my usual practice, and I do this to verify that the audio recording software is functioning properly.
6. After I listened to the preamble, I plugged the microphone back into my laptop to record Mr. [redacted] examination.
7. Throughout the September 18, 2014, polygraph examination of Mr. [redacted] the display screen on my laptop monitor indicated that the audio recording software was functioning properly.
8. I checked my laptop monitor several times during the polygraph examination of Mr. [redacted] to confirm that the audio recording was functioning.
9. Because my laptop indicated that the audio recording software was functioning properly, I did not stop the examination to listen to the recording, aside from when I listened to the preamble. This is my usual practice when conducting polygraph examinations.
In order for paras. 7, 8, and 9 to be true, both the Lafayette software's "Warn on low audio" failsafe and the audio bar indicator mentioned in the Lafayette Instrument Company's affidavit must have failed. This beggars belief.
AntiPolygraph.org understands that the DHS OIG, in a meeting with attorney Thomas Gagliardo, admitted it sent the audio files of this exam out for forensic examination. If that forensic analysis did not suggest tampering, then why was this investigation not closed immediately? Indeed, it seemingly remains open in perpetuity.
Posted by Administrator
- Mar 04, 2024, 03:43 PMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained a redacted copy of an 11-page affidavit provided by an electrical engineer with expertise in acoustic data processing regarding the audio data from U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Ellen Ripperger's polygraph examination of an applicant.
The applicant alleges abusive conduct by Ripperger that became the subject of both a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint and a Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General investigation that remains open.
The audio recording of the polygraph session is mostly incomprehensible, and the U.S. Secret Service claims that this is due to an equipment failure that occurred in the midst of the polygraph session, unbeknownst to the operator.
However, the audio expert notes, among other things (at para. 24): "If the microphone failed during this examination while capturing the "Audio_02" and "Audio_03" files, it would be an atypical microphone failure. Usually solid state devices either work (record properly), or do not work (record nothing.) Recording random noise at high decibel levels is an unusual microphone failure."
This affidavit, combined with the affidavit from the Lafayette Instrument Company (which manufactured the polygraph instrument used) attached to the preceding post, makes it very difficult to credit the Secret Service's claim that the audio was lost due to equipment failure. It seems much more likely that the Secret Service deliberately tampered with the audio in a flight from accountability.
The applicant alleges abusive conduct by Ripperger that became the subject of both a U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint and a Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General investigation that remains open.
The audio recording of the polygraph session is mostly incomprehensible, and the U.S. Secret Service claims that this is due to an equipment failure that occurred in the midst of the polygraph session, unbeknownst to the operator.
However, the audio expert notes, among other things (at para. 24): "If the microphone failed during this examination while capturing the "Audio_02" and "Audio_03" files, it would be an atypical microphone failure. Usually solid state devices either work (record properly), or do not work (record nothing.) Recording random noise at high decibel levels is an unusual microphone failure."
This affidavit, combined with the affidavit from the Lafayette Instrument Company (which manufactured the polygraph instrument used) attached to the preceding post, makes it very difficult to credit the Secret Service's claim that the audio was lost due to equipment failure. It seems much more likely that the Secret Service deliberately tampered with the audio in a flight from accountability.
Posted by Administrator
- Jan 28, 2024, 08:17 AMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained a redacted copy of the 3-page affidavit of a senior employee of the Lafayette Instrument Company attesting, among other things, that "The Lafayette Polygraph Software contains two mechanisms to allow the examiner to monitor the audio recordings and avoid failures."
The U.S. Secret Service claims (implausibly, in our view) that due to an equipment malfunction, the audio recording of the polygraph examination at issue in this message thread was almost wholly inaudible.
This affidavit supports the conclusion that if there was indeed an equipment malfunction, the polygraph examiner, in this case U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Ellen Ripperger, should have been aware of it as it occurred.
The circumstances surrounding this polygraph examination remain the subject of an as-yet-uncompleted Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General investigation.
The U.S. Secret Service claims (implausibly, in our view) that due to an equipment malfunction, the audio recording of the polygraph examination at issue in this message thread was almost wholly inaudible.
This affidavit supports the conclusion that if there was indeed an equipment malfunction, the polygraph examiner, in this case U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Ellen Ripperger, should have been aware of it as it occurred.
The circumstances surrounding this polygraph examination remain the subject of an as-yet-uncompleted Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General investigation.
Posted by Administrator
- Jul 17, 2021, 11:15 AMAntiPolygraph.org has received a redacted copy of a complaint filed with the Virginia State Bar against U.S. Secret Service lawyer Steven Giballa. The complaint alleges "numerous violations of the Virginia Bar Association professional guidelines in his submissions to the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission] on behalf of the United States Secret Service..."
Ultimately, the Virginia State Bar declined to investigate or to take any action.
The complaint and ensuing correspondence are attached.
Ultimately, the Virginia State Bar declined to investigate or to take any action.
The complaint and ensuing correspondence are attached.
Posted by Administrator
- Jun 19, 2021, 11:10 AMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained the attached two lightly redacted documents connected with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) action documented earlier in this message thread:
1. The complainant's 34-page "Response to United States Secret Service (USSS) Opposition for Reconsideration of Appeal #[redacted] Affirming a Decision for Summary Judgment to the United States Secret Service Without a Hearing" ("Response") dated 22 February 2021.
We are informed that the complainant, acting pro se, emailed this Response to the Secret Service's legal counsel, Steven Giballa, on 22 February 2021 and FedExed it to the EEOC on 23 February 2021.
2. The EEOC's 4-page "Decision on Request for Consideration" ("Decision") dated 23 February 2021, denying the complainant's request.
The complainant hypothesizes that the Secret Service's counsel, upon receiving the complainant's email on the 22nd of February, may have had an ex parte communication with the EEOC that resulted in the EEOC issuing its Decision the very next day, the 23rd of February, before the complainant's response had reached the EEOC.
Indeed, when the complainant's Response did reach the EEOC some time later, apparently after having been held up in a mail screening process (the FedEx packet bears a magenta Department of Homeland Security tape on one side), the EEOC refused to take delivery of it and sent it back unopened.
Photos of the Response as received by the complainant are attached.
1. The complainant's 34-page "Response to United States Secret Service (USSS) Opposition for Reconsideration of Appeal #[redacted] Affirming a Decision for Summary Judgment to the United States Secret Service Without a Hearing" ("Response") dated 22 February 2021.
We are informed that the complainant, acting pro se, emailed this Response to the Secret Service's legal counsel, Steven Giballa, on 22 February 2021 and FedExed it to the EEOC on 23 February 2021.
2. The EEOC's 4-page "Decision on Request for Consideration" ("Decision") dated 23 February 2021, denying the complainant's request.
The complainant hypothesizes that the Secret Service's counsel, upon receiving the complainant's email on the 22nd of February, may have had an ex parte communication with the EEOC that resulted in the EEOC issuing its Decision the very next day, the 23rd of February, before the complainant's response had reached the EEOC.
Indeed, when the complainant's Response did reach the EEOC some time later, apparently after having been held up in a mail screening process (the FedEx packet bears a magenta Department of Homeland Security tape on one side), the EEOC refused to take delivery of it and sent it back unopened.
Photos of the Response as received by the complainant are attached.
Posted by John M.
- May 29, 2021, 12:45 PMQuote from: USSSWARNING on May 28, 2021, 11:39 PMAttorney Sean M. Bigley encourages those with similar experiences to immediately contact the Office of Inspector General.
Take it from me, the Office of Inspector Generals are unable or unwilling to do anything about polygraph abuse.
It is way past time for Congress to extend the rights granted by the Employee Polygraph Protection Act to all Americans. Giving the government an exemption to this law has opened the door for widespread fraud, waste, abuse, and corruption.
Posted by USSSWARNING
- May 28, 2021, 11:39 PMThe United States Secret Service again refuses to release the polygraph recording in a Different Polygraph Court Case.
An article in clearance jobs from Attorney Sean M. Bigley where a Secret Service polygraph examinee was also repeatedly accused of being a drug addict and a liar, and the examiner threatened to "waterboard" the examinee if she doesn't come clean with "whatever else she's hiding."
The Secret Service is again refusing to release the recording of the polygraph that would corroborate the polygraph examinee's accusations.
Attorney Sean M. Bigley encourages those with similar experiences to immediately contact the Office of Inspector General. In this instance however, the Office of Inspector General has done nothing and has failed to respond to the inquiries of United States Senator Chris Van Hollen and FOIA requests, which has the hallmarks of being complicit in a coverup.
https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/01/21/background-investigator-threatens-waterboard/
An article in clearance jobs from Attorney Sean M. Bigley where a Secret Service polygraph examinee was also repeatedly accused of being a drug addict and a liar, and the examiner threatened to "waterboard" the examinee if she doesn't come clean with "whatever else she's hiding."
The Secret Service is again refusing to release the recording of the polygraph that would corroborate the polygraph examinee's accusations.
Attorney Sean M. Bigley encourages those with similar experiences to immediately contact the Office of Inspector General. In this instance however, the Office of Inspector General has done nothing and has failed to respond to the inquiries of United States Senator Chris Van Hollen and FOIA requests, which has the hallmarks of being complicit in a coverup.
https://news.clearancejobs.com/2018/01/21/background-investigator-threatens-waterboard/
Posted by Administrator
- Dec 01, 2020, 04:06 AMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained the attached three lightly redacted documents connected with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission action documented earlier in this message thread.
1. An appeal decision dated 22 September 2020 and signed by Office of Federal Operations director Carlton M. Hadden upholding Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates' 20 August 2018 Order Entering Judgment (in favor of the U.S. Secret Service, granting summary judgment).
2. Complainant's Request to Reconsider Appeal #[redacted] Affirming a Decision for Summary Judgment to the United States Secret Service Without a Hearing dated 20 October 2020. This 28-page document enumerates seven reasons why granting of summary judgment was improper. Among other things, it is noted that a DHS OIG investigation into Special Agent Ellen Ripperger's actions is still active, and that granting of summary judgment to the Secret Service during the pendency of the investigation is inappropriate.
3. The U.S. Secret Service's Agency's Brief in Opposition to Complainant's Request for Reconsideration dated 9 November 2020.
1. An appeal decision dated 22 September 2020 and signed by Office of Federal Operations director Carlton M. Hadden upholding Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates' 20 August 2018 Order Entering Judgment (in favor of the U.S. Secret Service, granting summary judgment).
2. Complainant's Request to Reconsider Appeal #[redacted] Affirming a Decision for Summary Judgment to the United States Secret Service Without a Hearing dated 20 October 2020. This 28-page document enumerates seven reasons why granting of summary judgment was improper. Among other things, it is noted that a DHS OIG investigation into Special Agent Ellen Ripperger's actions is still active, and that granting of summary judgment to the Secret Service during the pendency of the investigation is inappropriate.
3. The U.S. Secret Service's Agency's Brief in Opposition to Complainant's Request for Reconsideration dated 9 November 2020.
Posted by Administrator
- Oct 04, 2020, 01:21 PMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained the attached two letters from United States Senator Chris Van Hollen to the individual polygraphed by U.S. Secret Service Special Agent Ellen Ripperger.
The first letter, dated 19 August 2019, informs the individual, "I have just been advised by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General that its investigation in response to my inquiry is ongoing and that the agency is close to completing its investigative work."
The second letter, dated 3 September 2020, informs the individual, "At my request, my staff recently met with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG) regarding the status of your complaint. They expressed my concern about the amount of time that has passed without a response and were advised that DHS-OIG is striving to conduct a thorough investigation. In doing so, it advised, DHS-OIG is unable to provide a definitive timeline for when it will complete its investigation. It further advised that it will not provide any updates until the investigation is complete and a Report of Investigation is issued."
So the investigation of alleged misconduct by Special Agent Ripperger went from close to completion in August 2019 to ongoing and indefinite in September 2020. Something certainly seems fishy.
The first letter, dated 19 August 2019, informs the individual, "I have just been advised by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General that its investigation in response to my inquiry is ongoing and that the agency is close to completing its investigative work."
The second letter, dated 3 September 2020, informs the individual, "At my request, my staff recently met with the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG) regarding the status of your complaint. They expressed my concern about the amount of time that has passed without a response and were advised that DHS-OIG is striving to conduct a thorough investigation. In doing so, it advised, DHS-OIG is unable to provide a definitive timeline for when it will complete its investigation. It further advised that it will not provide any updates until the investigation is complete and a Report of Investigation is issued."
So the investigation of alleged misconduct by Special Agent Ripperger went from close to completion in August 2019 to ongoing and indefinite in September 2020. Something certainly seems fishy.
Posted by Administrator
- Jul 26, 2020, 02:06 PMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained the attached two documents that were provided to the DHS OIG for their investigation.
The first is a copy of Special Agent Ripperger's 2016 sworn deposition, with passages highlighted that the appellant opines were "either a false statement or just not simply credible or believable in any context."
The second document explains what the appellant alleges is wrong with each statement highlighted in the deposition.
The first is a copy of Special Agent Ripperger's 2016 sworn deposition, with passages highlighted that the appellant opines were "either a false statement or just not simply credible or believable in any context."
The second document explains what the appellant alleges is wrong with each statement highlighted in the deposition.
Posted by Administrator
- Dec 21, 2019, 10:36 AMAntiPolygraph.org has received the following statement and attached correspondence regarding the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General's investigation of the U.S. Secret Service polygraph branch's alleged destruction of an audio recording of a pre-employment polygraph interrogation that would allegedly have documented misconduct on the part of Secret Service polygraph operator Ellen Ripperger.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) office of the Inspector General (OIG) has spent a year and half investigating the possible intentional destruction of polygraph audio files by the United States Secret Service (USSS) of an Electrical Engineer's polygraph selected for a GS-15 position in the Office of the Chief Information Officer at the United States Secret Service.
Why are the results of this investigation being kept secret from the American people and not being published in DHS OIG Semiannual Reports to Congress?
Why are the results of this investigation being kept secret from Congress?
Why are the results of this investigation being withheld from Senator Chris Van Hollen, without whose assistance this matter would have been hidden and disposed of from the American people?
Why will the Inspector General not even reveal if the case is now closed or still ongoing to anyone?
Why did Special Agent Edward Alston choose to retire when OIG started investigating this matter, which means legally he no longer has to cooperate with the investigation? Recall Special Agent Edward Alston was one of two quality control reviewers who signed the quality control worksheet stating the polygraph audio files were intact and audible at random periods for the entire exam.
Why is Special Agent Ellen Ripperger (who conducted the exam whose audio was allegedly destroyed) no longer listed on LinkedIn as a Polygraph Examiner for the United States Secret Service?
The Office of the Inspector General does not keep cases without merit open for more than 30 days. It sent the audio files out for forensic examination. If there was no merit to the case, or no destruction of evidence, the case would have been closed upon receiving a forensic report indicating no malfeasance on the part of the United States Secret Service.
This is not how a Democracy or Republic is supposed to function. This is how third world countries are run, not healthy governments.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) office of the Inspector General (OIG) has spent a year and half investigating the possible intentional destruction of polygraph audio files by the United States Secret Service (USSS) of an Electrical Engineer's polygraph selected for a GS-15 position in the Office of the Chief Information Officer at the United States Secret Service.
Why are the results of this investigation being kept secret from the American people and not being published in DHS OIG Semiannual Reports to Congress?
Why are the results of this investigation being kept secret from Congress?
Why are the results of this investigation being withheld from Senator Chris Van Hollen, without whose assistance this matter would have been hidden and disposed of from the American people?
Why will the Inspector General not even reveal if the case is now closed or still ongoing to anyone?
Why did Special Agent Edward Alston choose to retire when OIG started investigating this matter, which means legally he no longer has to cooperate with the investigation? Recall Special Agent Edward Alston was one of two quality control reviewers who signed the quality control worksheet stating the polygraph audio files were intact and audible at random periods for the entire exam.
Why is Special Agent Ellen Ripperger (who conducted the exam whose audio was allegedly destroyed) no longer listed on LinkedIn as a Polygraph Examiner for the United States Secret Service?
The Office of the Inspector General does not keep cases without merit open for more than 30 days. It sent the audio files out for forensic examination. If there was no merit to the case, or no destruction of evidence, the case would have been closed upon receiving a forensic report indicating no malfeasance on the part of the United States Secret Service.
This is not how a Democracy or Republic is supposed to function. This is how third world countries are run, not healthy governments.
Posted by RobbieG
- May 30, 2019, 03:00 AMTo George and Mr. (redacted):
Thank you for your updates and copies of documents in this fascinating case. I've worked as an investigator for civil and criminal attorneys for several years. I've handled cases where evidence was intentionally destroyed, but never by a federal law enforcement agent like what happened here. I can't express how revolting this is to me. I would say I hope her career burns for this, but I realize that is unlikely. My word and integrity is all I have, and I would never be able to work again if I got caught doing what she did.
Thank you for your updates and copies of documents in this fascinating case. I've worked as an investigator for civil and criminal attorneys for several years. I've handled cases where evidence was intentionally destroyed, but never by a federal law enforcement agent like what happened here. I can't express how revolting this is to me. I would say I hope her career burns for this, but I realize that is unlikely. My word and integrity is all I have, and I would never be able to work again if I got caught doing what she did.
Posted by Administrator
- May 05, 2019, 12:01 PMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained minimally redacted copies of two additional documents associated with the case of an applicant for a GS-15 information technology position with the U.S. Secret Service who received treatment for obsessive compulsive disorder and whose application was rejected following an allegedly failed pre-employment polygraph "test." For background information, see the previous posts in this message thread.
The new documents, submitted before the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations, include:
1. The U.S. Secret Service's 19 October 2018 "Opposition to Complainant's Appeal" of Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates' 20 August 2018 Order Entering Judgment (in favor of the U.S. Secret Service, granting summary judgment). This 13-page brief, signed by Steven Giballa and U.S. Secret Service Chief Counsel Donna Cahill, provides legal arguments as to why Judge Eates' order dismissing the case should be upheld.
2. The complainant's 22 April 2019 "Response to USSS Opposition of Appeal from a Decision of Summary Judgment to United States Secret Service Without a Hearing." This 21-page pleading by complainant's attorney, Thomas J. Gagliardo, addresses in detail the arguments made in the USSS opposition brief, and provides legal arguments that Judge Eates' granting of summary judgment was premature and "should be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings."
We invite anyone with knowledge of this case, or of other relevant information regarding the U.S. Secret Service polygraph program, to contact us (anonymously if you prefer). You can anonymously send us a note (as a plain text document) or upload relevant documents via our OnionShare dropbox.
The new documents, submitted before the U.S. Equal Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations, include:
1. The U.S. Secret Service's 19 October 2018 "Opposition to Complainant's Appeal" of Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates' 20 August 2018 Order Entering Judgment (in favor of the U.S. Secret Service, granting summary judgment). This 13-page brief, signed by Steven Giballa and U.S. Secret Service Chief Counsel Donna Cahill, provides legal arguments as to why Judge Eates' order dismissing the case should be upheld.
2. The complainant's 22 April 2019 "Response to USSS Opposition of Appeal from a Decision of Summary Judgment to United States Secret Service Without a Hearing." This 21-page pleading by complainant's attorney, Thomas J. Gagliardo, addresses in detail the arguments made in the USSS opposition brief, and provides legal arguments that Judge Eates' granting of summary judgment was premature and "should be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings."
We invite anyone with knowledge of this case, or of other relevant information regarding the U.S. Secret Service polygraph program, to contact us (anonymously if you prefer). You can anonymously send us a note (as a plain text document) or upload relevant documents via our OnionShare dropbox.
Posted by Administrator
- Oct 21, 2018, 05:02 AMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained minimally redacted copies of six documents associated with the case of an applicant for a GS-15 information technology position with the U.S. Secret Service who received treatment for obsessive compulsive disorder and whose application was rejected following an allegedly failed pre-employment polygraph "test." Most of the audio recording of the polygraph session provided to the complainant and the administrative judge is incomprehensible.
On 20 August 2018, administrative judge Antoinette Eates granted a U.S. Secret Service request for summary judgment against the complainant, despite the fact that the circumstances surrounding the defective audio recording are the subject of a pending U.S. Department of Homeland Security Inspector General's investigation.
The six documents, attached to this post, comprise:
1. Motion to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed for Spoliation of Evidence dated 4 October 2016;
2. Agency's Opposition to Complainant's Motion to Show Cause dated 13 October 2016;
3. Supplement to Motion for Sanctions sent via e-mail dated dated 6 October 2016;
4. Order Denying Complainant's Motion to Show Cause and Extending Deadlines dated 21 October 2016 by Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates;
5. Order Entering Judgment dated 20 August 2018 by Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates;
6. Appeal of a Decision for Summary Judgement to the United States Secret Service Without a Hearing dated 19 September 2018.
The last document is of particular interest.
On 20 August 2018, administrative judge Antoinette Eates granted a U.S. Secret Service request for summary judgment against the complainant, despite the fact that the circumstances surrounding the defective audio recording are the subject of a pending U.S. Department of Homeland Security Inspector General's investigation.
The six documents, attached to this post, comprise:
1. Motion to Show Cause Why Sanctions Should Not Be Imposed for Spoliation of Evidence dated 4 October 2016;
2. Agency's Opposition to Complainant's Motion to Show Cause dated 13 October 2016;
3. Supplement to Motion for Sanctions sent via e-mail dated dated 6 October 2016;
4. Order Denying Complainant's Motion to Show Cause and Extending Deadlines dated 21 October 2016 by Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates;
5. Order Entering Judgment dated 20 August 2018 by Administrative Judge Antoinette Eates;
6. Appeal of a Decision for Summary Judgement to the United States Secret Service Without a Hearing dated 19 September 2018.
The last document is of particular interest.
Posted by Administrator
- Oct 01, 2018, 02:01 AMAntiPolygraph.org has obtained minimally redacted copies of the 18 October 2016 depositions of U.S. Secret Service polygraph operators Ellen Ripperger and Edward D. Alston. They are attached to this post.
Notes on Ripperger deposition:
p. 36: Ripperger lied under oath when, upon being asked "how does [the numbers test] factor into the rest of the polygraph process?" she answered: "We want to see what the individual's physiology looks like when he tells a lie, so we ask him to lie at number four."
Ripperger told the same lie that polygraph operators routinely tell examinees about the rationale for the numbers test (or stimulation, or "stim" test). It's actually intended to "sell" the polygraph to the examinee and convince him that the polygraph can detect the slightest hint of deception.
p. 59: "Well, per Secret Service policy, okay, a countermeasures call is only made when an individual has made an admission to countermeasures." (Later in the deposition, it is disclosed that this policy has changed since September 2014.)
p. 68: "There's inability to maintain a baseline in the breathing, which, what we're seeing here is consistent with countermeasures."
pp. 70-71: "At 1B on page 57, you have convergent and divergent pneumographs. This is consistent with countermeasures."
p. 78: no changes to polygraph protocol due to examinee's disclosure of medications and OCD.
p. 111: "...I don't believe denials when I have a failing polygraph result."
p. 116: No periodic polygraphs for USSS employees.
p. 144: "I said I was certain of my results. What I wasn't -- or what -- countermeasures -- we can't specifically say countermeasures on a report unless we get an admission of countermeasures, or at that time we couldn't.
Q You can now?
A The policy has changed, yes."
Notes on Alston deposition:
p. 18: Alston was almost certainly lying when he denied knowing what the policy at Security Management Division (SMD) or Security Clearance Division (SCD) is regarding whether a failed polygraph precludes one from Secret Service employment.
p. 20: Alston was almost certainly lying about not understanding what "better qualified applicant" (BQA) means. It means that some other, "better qualified applicant" was given the job.
p. 47: Alston didn't actually know what LEPET stands for (Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Test). He thought it was Law Enforcement Placement Test.
pp. 54-55: Alston essentially admits that the question about medications is not needed for purposes of conducting the polygraph exam.
Notes on Ripperger deposition:
p. 36: Ripperger lied under oath when, upon being asked "how does [the numbers test] factor into the rest of the polygraph process?" she answered: "We want to see what the individual's physiology looks like when he tells a lie, so we ask him to lie at number four."
Ripperger told the same lie that polygraph operators routinely tell examinees about the rationale for the numbers test (or stimulation, or "stim" test). It's actually intended to "sell" the polygraph to the examinee and convince him that the polygraph can detect the slightest hint of deception.
p. 59: "Well, per Secret Service policy, okay, a countermeasures call is only made when an individual has made an admission to countermeasures." (Later in the deposition, it is disclosed that this policy has changed since September 2014.)
p. 68: "There's inability to maintain a baseline in the breathing, which, what we're seeing here is consistent with countermeasures."
pp. 70-71: "At 1B on page 57, you have convergent and divergent pneumographs. This is consistent with countermeasures."
p. 78: no changes to polygraph protocol due to examinee's disclosure of medications and OCD.
p. 111: "...I don't believe denials when I have a failing polygraph result."
p. 116: No periodic polygraphs for USSS employees.
p. 144: "I said I was certain of my results. What I wasn't -- or what -- countermeasures -- we can't specifically say countermeasures on a report unless we get an admission of countermeasures, or at that time we couldn't.
Q You can now?
A The policy has changed, yes."
Notes on Alston deposition:
p. 18: Alston was almost certainly lying when he denied knowing what the policy at Security Management Division (SMD) or Security Clearance Division (SCD) is regarding whether a failed polygraph precludes one from Secret Service employment.
p. 20: Alston was almost certainly lying about not understanding what "better qualified applicant" (BQA) means. It means that some other, "better qualified applicant" was given the job.
p. 47: Alston didn't actually know what LEPET stands for (Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Test). He thought it was Law Enforcement Placement Test.
pp. 54-55: Alston essentially admits that the question about medications is not needed for purposes of conducting the polygraph exam.