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Posted by George W. Maschke
- Jun 15, 2008, 10:43 AMOn Friday, 13 June 2008, the Armed Forces Network, Afghanistan, aired a report on the use of PCASS in Afghanistan. Not surprisingly, AFN's reporting on PCASS is completely uncritical, and the segment is more a public relations release for PCASS than television journalism. I've posted the story, along with commentary on YouTube:
The video can also be viewed directly on YouTube here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiP5wlYzij0
The video can also be viewed directly on YouTube here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uiP5wlYzij0
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 17, 2008, 11:05 AMClose to the time that Bill Dedman's excellent investigative report appeared on MSNBC, Fox News interviewed Professor Stephen Fienberg, who chaired the National Academy of Sciences/National Research Council Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph:
Posted by Lethe
- May 11, 2008, 12:50 AMQuote from: Lethe on May 10, 2008, 05:49 AMQuote from: Lethe on May 08, 2008, 03:49 PMYES!When the troops use this device and it shows the detainee is being truthful, that means that the detainee is being truthful, that the machine's error rate of 10-50% (whatever you believe it to be) is causing an inaccurate reading, or that the detainee knows how to beat the port-a-poly.
If the device indicates that the detainee is being deceptive, that means the detainee is being deceptive, or they are being truthful but the device's 10-50% (whatever you believe it to be) error rate is causing an inaccurate reading, or that the detainee was trying to employ countermeasures and did such a poor job that it resulted in a "DI" score.
I don't see how that can possibly be an asset to the troops. They don't know anything more after using the PCASS than they did before using it. After using the PCASS they'll be taking a guess and putting their lives on the accuracy of that guess.
They could also be issued a silver dollar and flip it each time they question a suspected terrorist. Sometimes the coin would be right, but would that make it better than nothing? According to your stated logic, it would. I disagree.
The Department of the Treasury would be upset with the Department of Defense if they follow your recommendation, Sergeant. They're trying to promote those new gold dollar coins now, the ones with the presidents on them.
In more seriousness, it would be very, very difficult, I think, for a soldier to go against the port-a-poly (a clever name that I'll try not to overuse). If the PCASS indicates deception, but you follow the other information that you have and decide to place some measure of trust in the person, and then anything bad happens, it's likely that your credibility before your men is going to be pretty much shot (but thank God if that's all that gets shot).
I think polygraphers underestimate the enourmous amount of pressure that will be on soldiers who want to go against the recommendation of the PCASS. I don't think very many will. I think it's likely that far too much reliance will be placed on the device. Thus the need for reliable experimental data produced in tests that more accurately reflect war zone conditions. Regardless of what data those tests produce, if the PCASS is deployed the troops must know how accurate it is.
And I really do hope they have the chance to play around with the device and try to beat it. Whether they can or can't, it'll be a very illuminating exercise.
Posted by Sergeant1107
- May 10, 2008, 05:49 AMQuote from: Lethe on May 08, 2008, 03:49 PMYES!When the troops use this device and it shows the detainee is being truthful, that means that the detainee is being truthful, that the machine's error rate of 10-50% (whatever you believe it to be) is causing an inaccurate reading, or that the detainee knows how to beat the port-a-poly.
If the device indicates that the detainee is being deceptive, that means the detainee is being deceptive, or they are being truthful but the device's 10-50% (whatever you believe it to be) error rate is causing an inaccurate reading, or that the detainee was trying to employ countermeasures and did such a poor job that it resulted in a "DI" score.
I don't see how that can possibly be an asset to the troops. They don't know anything more after using the PCASS than they did before using it. After using the PCASS they'll be taking a guess and putting their lives on the accuracy of that guess.
They could also be issued a silver dollar and flip it each time they question a suspected terrorist. Sometimes the coin would be right, but would that make it better than nothing? According to your stated logic, it would. I disagree.
Posted by Lethe
- May 09, 2008, 03:25 PMQuote from: Lethe on May 08, 2008, 09:01 PM"Port-o-Poly" Pimps care more about money.
I wonder, do they have a strong lobby on Capitol Hill?
TC
TC, I'm no expert on that angle of the business, but I doubt it. Most decisions to use the polygraph are made by department heads and police chiefs, not by legislators. This decentralization is helpful to the polygraph-industrial complex, as it leaves fewer traces of the debate on it's usefulness and allows them to get a few individual people aside and convince them that they need to cover their ass, regardless of how reliable the polygraph may be. It also makes it easier to strong arm people with bandwagon tactics: c'mon, everyone else is doin' it, just try it, it won't hurt you the first time.
If done at the legislative level, there'd be more questions about reliability and the assumptions about the polygraph would be questioned more in depth. These proceedings would also leave records, which polygraphers want to avoid. So I doubt they have a big lobbying arm--it's not needed. They want to avoid that venue, if at all possible. Remember, the polygraph thrives on secrecy, it can only exist in the dark, not in the Light.
Posted by T.M. Cullen
- May 08, 2008, 09:01 PM"Port-o-Poly" Pimps care more about money.
I wonder, do they have a strong lobby on Capitol Hill?
TC
I wonder, do they have a strong lobby on Capitol Hill?
TC
Posted by Lethe
- May 08, 2008, 04:51 PMSackett, how accurate must a device be before it can be used? Suppose the PCASS is accurate only 55% of the time (I'm not saying that's the case, but just for instance) would that be accurate enough to warrant using it? If so, what if it were only 51% accurate? If not, how accurate would it need to be in order to be used?
Also, I'm not sure that current research has addressed the susceptibility of the PCASS to countermeasures. Former APA President Skip Webb appears pretty concerned that it can be beaten easily with CM and has tacitly implied that this is the case. Given the probability that the very people that we'd most want to detect in deception (members of Al Qaeda and similar groups) are the most likely to know how to use CM, isn't this an important point to address?
Also, I'm not sure that you can do lab experiments with Americans and assume that the same accuracy will be obtained when using the PCASS on someone whose country you have invaded and occupied and who has had you stick a gun in his face. A lot of these people in Afghanistan and Iraq probably don't really like our country nor trust our service members. Given the importance of the subject believing at least some of what the polygrapher/PCASSer says, isn't it possible that this could impact accuracy? I think these are all points worth at least investigating before giving the PCASS the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.
Given all of the unaddressed problems with the device, I think it is reasonable to call into question just how accurate it is going to be. You claim it will be accurate enough, but just how accurate is that?
Also, regardless of what the accuracy level is, should our troops be given accurate information about the accuracy level? Or should they just get the "it's very, very accurate" line that polygraphers like to give?
Also, George, I think it'd be a good idea to encourage soldiers who have access to the PCASS to try it out on each other and see if they can beat it. Since it is the machine--and not the operator--who makes the determinations on deception, these informal experiments should be very easy to conduct. They can help illustrate either the ease or difficulty with which the machine can be beaten; if they find it easy to beat they can decrease the confidence they put in it, if it is hard to beat they can increase such confidence. In either case, people in harm's way have more information about their tools, which is a good thing. Also, if it turns out to be easy to beat, hopefully word of this will filter out.
Also, I'm not sure that current research has addressed the susceptibility of the PCASS to countermeasures. Former APA President Skip Webb appears pretty concerned that it can be beaten easily with CM and has tacitly implied that this is the case. Given the probability that the very people that we'd most want to detect in deception (members of Al Qaeda and similar groups) are the most likely to know how to use CM, isn't this an important point to address?
Also, I'm not sure that you can do lab experiments with Americans and assume that the same accuracy will be obtained when using the PCASS on someone whose country you have invaded and occupied and who has had you stick a gun in his face. A lot of these people in Afghanistan and Iraq probably don't really like our country nor trust our service members. Given the importance of the subject believing at least some of what the polygrapher/PCASSer says, isn't it possible that this could impact accuracy? I think these are all points worth at least investigating before giving the PCASS the Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.
Given all of the unaddressed problems with the device, I think it is reasonable to call into question just how accurate it is going to be. You claim it will be accurate enough, but just how accurate is that?
Also, regardless of what the accuracy level is, should our troops be given accurate information about the accuracy level? Or should they just get the "it's very, very accurate" line that polygraphers like to give?
Also, George, I think it'd be a good idea to encourage soldiers who have access to the PCASS to try it out on each other and see if they can beat it. Since it is the machine--and not the operator--who makes the determinations on deception, these informal experiments should be very easy to conduct. They can help illustrate either the ease or difficulty with which the machine can be beaten; if they find it easy to beat they can decrease the confidence they put in it, if it is hard to beat they can increase such confidence. In either case, people in harm's way have more information about their tools, which is a good thing. Also, if it turns out to be easy to beat, hopefully word of this will filter out.
Posted by sackett
- May 08, 2008, 03:49 PMQuote from: Lethe on May 08, 2008, 06:28 AMQuote from: Lethe on May 07, 2008, 02:50 PMYou George, as always, have once again MISSED THE POINT!There is no logical requirement that a person have an alternative to an inaccurate instrument before stating that the instrument is, in fact, inaccurate.
What is your alternative suggestion to the problem; in the field? You do not have one! That is MY point! I'd rather rely on something that works 80% of the time, than nothing that works none of the time...
Sackett
You would rather have troops use a flawed machine and rely on possibly erroneous results than to use nothing?
YES!
Posted by Sergeant1107
- May 08, 2008, 06:28 AMQuote from: Lethe on May 07, 2008, 02:50 PMYou George, as always, have once again MISSED THE POINT!There is no logical requirement that a person have an alternative to an inaccurate instrument before stating that the instrument is, in fact, inaccurate.
What is your alternative suggestion to the problem; in the field? You do not have one! That is MY point! I'd rather rely on something that works 80% of the time, than nothing that works none of the time...
Sackett
You would rather have troops use a flawed machine and rely on possibly erroneous results than to use nothing?
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 07, 2008, 03:10 PMJim,
The PCASS has not been shown to work 80% of the time. It has not been shown to reliably detect deception at better-than-chance levels of accuracy under field conditions. Worse still, this simplistic test can easily be passed through the use of simple countermeasures. Our troops are better off using their best judgment when questioning individuals, giving due consideration to available evidence and information, and reaching considered conclusions.
The PCASS has not been shown to work 80% of the time. It has not been shown to reliably detect deception at better-than-chance levels of accuracy under field conditions. Worse still, this simplistic test can easily be passed through the use of simple countermeasures. Our troops are better off using their best judgment when questioning individuals, giving due consideration to available evidence and information, and reaching considered conclusions.
Posted by sackett
- May 07, 2008, 02:50 PMYou George, as always, have once again MISSED THE POINT!
What is your alternative suggestion to the problem; in the field? You do not have one! That is MY point! I'd rather rely on something that works 80% of the time, than nothing that works none of the time...
Sackett
What is your alternative suggestion to the problem; in the field? You do not have one! That is MY point! I'd rather rely on something that works 80% of the time, than nothing that works none of the time...
Sackett
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 07, 2008, 01:17 PMJim,
One needn't be a "human 'rights' lemming" (whatever that may mean) to recognize the stupidity of relying on a lie detector that doesn't work, or the immorality of passing off such emperor's-new-clothes technology on our troops in harm's way (as Don Krapohl & Co. at DACA have done).
One needn't be a "human 'rights' lemming" (whatever that may mean) to recognize the stupidity of relying on a lie detector that doesn't work, or the immorality of passing off such emperor's-new-clothes technology on our troops in harm's way (as Don Krapohl & Co. at DACA have done).
Posted by sackett
- May 07, 2008, 12:19 PMHey Guys! I have an idea.
Take PCASS off the field. Let's have the soldiers in harms way simply ask their detainees if they're linked or related to Al Queda. If they say yes, because we know they'll be honest with us, then arrest them. If they say no, just give them their weapons back and send them along their merry way.
Sounds like a plan, huh?!
Sackett
P.S. Lethe and all you other human "rights" lemmings out there... stop salivating! It's not gunna happen!
But had ya going there for a minute!!!
Take PCASS off the field. Let's have the soldiers in harms way simply ask their detainees if they're linked or related to Al Queda. If they say yes, because we know they'll be honest with us, then arrest them. If they say no, just give them their weapons back and send them along their merry way.
Sounds like a plan, huh?!
Sackett
P.S. Lethe and all you other human "rights" lemmings out there... stop salivating! It's not gunna happen!
But had ya going there for a minute!!!
Posted by George W. Maschke
- May 06, 2008, 10:45 AMThe 24 April 2008 issue of the Fort Jackson Leader, the post newspaper at the home of the Defense Academy for Credibility Assessment, includes an article on the fielding of PCASS in Afghanistan, for which destination DACA instructor James Waller departed on Sunday, 20 April. The full issue of the Leader is attached to this post as a 12.3 mb PDF file. A transcription, along with commentary, has been posted to the blog. See The Port-A-Poly Goes to Afghanistan.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Apr 29, 2008, 03:09 AMOne point of particular concern regarding the PCASS is that a red light on this "traffic light of truth" should not be taken as a green light for torture "enhanced interrogation techniques."