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Posted by beech trees
- Apr 02, 2002, 03:32 PMI knew this to be the case prior to Dr. Barland posting the assertion that a polygraph first caught Nicholson.
In typical revionist mode, (aka, cover your ass), the CIA polygraphers mocked up a 'computer analysis' AFTER other human intelligence revealed Nicholson to be acting suspiciously.
NICHOLSON PASSED HIS POLYGRAPHS Dr. Barland.
In typical revionist mode, (aka, cover your ass), the CIA polygraphers mocked up a 'computer analysis' AFTER other human intelligence revealed Nicholson to be acting suspiciously.
NICHOLSON PASSED HIS POLYGRAPHS Dr. Barland.
QuoteDEUTCH: The analysis of these different variables was taking place simultaneously. And so for you to fix on the October -- I think the two dates in October were the 16th and 22nd, this two events -- I think in those cases, he passed his polygraph, did not find any deception indicated.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Apr 02, 2002, 05:54 AMEdward J. Curran, who was in charge of the CIA's counterintelligence efforts at the time of Nicholson's arrest doesn't seem to think that the polygraph caught him, either. Consider the following exchange which occurred during the CBS 60 Minutes II segment "Final Exam":
QuotePelley: To your knowledge, in a routine screening, of the general population of agents or employees, has a spy ever been caught by a polygraph examination?
Curran: Not that I know of. Fairness to myself, by saying, you know, have you ever caught anybody, well, we haven't really polygraphed everybody either.
Posted by Mark Mallah
- Apr 02, 2002, 03:11 AMThis is an offshoot of the thread started by Gordon Barland entitled: What's More Effective than the polygraph? In that thread, Dr. Barland suggests that the polygraph caught convicted CIA spy Harold Nicholson. Then CIA Director John Deutch thought otherwise. Here are his remarks from a press conference. Judge for yourself if the polygraph caught Nicholson.
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From November 18, 1996. Excerpt of remarks by CIA Director John Deutch following the arrest of CIA employee Harold J. Nicholson.
QUESTION: Dr. Deutch, to follow up on his question, the issue is, he was first tripped up by a polygraph test, a routine polygraph test. Now how long would it have taken the joint force to find out about him if the polygraph test -- if he would have passed the polygraph? In other words, if he would have been a good spy and been able to doctor his own polygraph results, how long could he have lasted?
DEUTCH: First of all, let me say that I do not think that it is correct to characterize that hewas first tripped up by the polygraph.
QUESTION: But you released that, sir. That was the first indication that you were on to him.
DEUTCH: Let me say that the way I would characterize it is that the polygraph results was one thread, one important thread of a number of strands that led to the identification and the bringing of this person to justice.
There are several others mentioned in the affidavit, which I draw to your attention because they also reflect post-Ames reforms. We were concerned about his travel. There was alsothe unexplained additions of income that he had which did not compare with the financial disclosure form that he was now after the Ames is required of CIA officers.
So the polygraph is only one thread which led to his identification and being brought to justice. Let me remind you that the polygraph, by itself, is not sufficient information to either clear somebody entirely -- we saw that Ames passed them successfully -- or to convict somebody absolutely. So please do not attribute more weight to the polygraph. It was one element of the analysis, but not the exclusive one in a successful investigation.
QUESTION: As I read the FBI's affidavit, your first thread, as you call it, of suspicion was from the '95 polygraph examination. And then these other threads were rather (off-mike)
DEUTCH: That is not my characterization of it. There were three polygraphs administered in '95 -- two in October and one in December, I believe. But, there was a whole series of analysis that was woven together of which the polygraph is a single important thread.
I don't want to belittle the polygraph. But, I also don't want to -- and I think it's incorrect to -- look at the polygraph as being the essential element here.
QUESTION: (off-mike) of the subsequent analysis?
DEUTCH: The analysis was complicated and it involved the simultaneous attention to a number of variables -- money, travel, security. So, I would not say that the polygraph was the initiating piece.
QUESTION: Could you clarify -- in other words -- what raised the -- if I understand you correctly, what raised the -- red flag about him was that in the course of looking at all employees in the post- Ames world, he popped up in a sort of a profile of people who travel a lot, get a lot of money, that kind of thing? Is that -- I guess we're trying to find out is what raised the red flag?
DEUTCH: May I say two things. I don't think that I'm going to be able to give all of the detail that would satisfy you on this. What I want to stress is that right from the outset, there was a sophisticated ability for both organizations working together -- the FBI, the CIA -- to look at a lot of variables at the same time. And use this to sift through possibilities.
It was done with exceedingly great profession skill. And it was successful. I can't really and don't think it's appropriate here to go into the details.
QUESTION: If I could just try a variation on the question. And this sort of gets back to Jeff Smith's question, too. But, was he discovered in a sort of routine course in looking at everybody or was it more that there was a suspicion about him and so you started trying to look back into his past? Do you see what I mean?
DEUTCH: I'm going to stand on my prior answer here. I mean, this is a -- what is really astounding here is the difference in the quality of the analytic capability that was brought to bear in this case. And will be in place for future events should they arise compared to before Ames.
QUESTION: Sir, with all due respect...
QUESTION: You can't (off-mike) that however. I mean I'm not trying to belittle what you all have accomplished here, but I guess the thing that concerns me judging from the other questions is that while this analytical capability which you've described seems to have been racheted up post-Ames and you could zero in and make sure to see if someone is or is not a potential spy, in this release here, and bear with me for just a couple of seconds...
DEUTCH: Yes.
QUESTION: ... it says "On or about October 16th, 1995," is when he underwent a series of polygraph examinations as part of a routine security update. The next bullet says, "an analysis of CIA records, as well as personal travel and financial records" so on and so forth "uncovers a pattern."
I guess it's when did that analysis of the records begin? Did that begin before the polygraph examination, which would suggest, as he says, that he was as a part of a generalized probe, or did this thing trigger the examination?
DEUTCH: I just have to check -- I just have to check with my buddy.
Let me -- let me...
QUESTION: (off-mike)
DEUTCH: Excuse me.
(LAUGHTER)
QUESTION: I'm claiming a kickback from all the photographers for that picture.
(LAUGHTER)
DEUTCH: The analysis of these different variables was taking place simultaneously. And so for you to fix on the October -- I think the two dates in October were the 16th and 22nd, this two events -- I think in those cases, he passed his polygraph, did not find any deception indicated.
So it was later on that the problem arose. That's my recollection.
QUESTION: The first date mentioned in this chronology is December 1994 – June 1994...
DEUTCH: Yes.
QUESTION: Are you confident that that is when he began his work with the Russians?
DEUTCH: Confident would be too strong a word here. Again, we have to wait until the full analysis is in. But I would say that, as of now, that's kind of the time period that, as the complaint makes clear, that we think the first misconduct occurred -- around that time period -- but we can't -- I wouldn't want to say that completely with confidence.
QUESTION: Could I just follow up? Could you explain a little bit more about what it was that prevented you from taking this action, say, a year earlier, since some of the initial suspicions arose in '94, if I understand correctly?
FREEH: I think it's an assessment that prosecutors make and investigators make on really a case by case basis, on a day by day basis.
The significance of the surveillance in Singapore on June 27, which is set forth in the complaint, was obviously critical, putting him together with a Russian SVR agent. Events such as that have a very great impact on the timing of a decision.
But it was accumulation of evidence which we didn't feel was sufficient until very recently, and more importantly that he was about to leave the United States.
------------
From November 18, 1996. Excerpt of remarks by CIA Director John Deutch following the arrest of CIA employee Harold J. Nicholson.
QUESTION: Dr. Deutch, to follow up on his question, the issue is, he was first tripped up by a polygraph test, a routine polygraph test. Now how long would it have taken the joint force to find out about him if the polygraph test -- if he would have passed the polygraph? In other words, if he would have been a good spy and been able to doctor his own polygraph results, how long could he have lasted?
DEUTCH: First of all, let me say that I do not think that it is correct to characterize that hewas first tripped up by the polygraph.
QUESTION: But you released that, sir. That was the first indication that you were on to him.
DEUTCH: Let me say that the way I would characterize it is that the polygraph results was one thread, one important thread of a number of strands that led to the identification and the bringing of this person to justice.
There are several others mentioned in the affidavit, which I draw to your attention because they also reflect post-Ames reforms. We were concerned about his travel. There was alsothe unexplained additions of income that he had which did not compare with the financial disclosure form that he was now after the Ames is required of CIA officers.
So the polygraph is only one thread which led to his identification and being brought to justice. Let me remind you that the polygraph, by itself, is not sufficient information to either clear somebody entirely -- we saw that Ames passed them successfully -- or to convict somebody absolutely. So please do not attribute more weight to the polygraph. It was one element of the analysis, but not the exclusive one in a successful investigation.
QUESTION: As I read the FBI's affidavit, your first thread, as you call it, of suspicion was from the '95 polygraph examination. And then these other threads were rather (off-mike)
DEUTCH: That is not my characterization of it. There were three polygraphs administered in '95 -- two in October and one in December, I believe. But, there was a whole series of analysis that was woven together of which the polygraph is a single important thread.
I don't want to belittle the polygraph. But, I also don't want to -- and I think it's incorrect to -- look at the polygraph as being the essential element here.
QUESTION: (off-mike) of the subsequent analysis?
DEUTCH: The analysis was complicated and it involved the simultaneous attention to a number of variables -- money, travel, security. So, I would not say that the polygraph was the initiating piece.
QUESTION: Could you clarify -- in other words -- what raised the -- if I understand you correctly, what raised the -- red flag about him was that in the course of looking at all employees in the post- Ames world, he popped up in a sort of a profile of people who travel a lot, get a lot of money, that kind of thing? Is that -- I guess we're trying to find out is what raised the red flag?
DEUTCH: May I say two things. I don't think that I'm going to be able to give all of the detail that would satisfy you on this. What I want to stress is that right from the outset, there was a sophisticated ability for both organizations working together -- the FBI, the CIA -- to look at a lot of variables at the same time. And use this to sift through possibilities.
It was done with exceedingly great profession skill. And it was successful. I can't really and don't think it's appropriate here to go into the details.
QUESTION: If I could just try a variation on the question. And this sort of gets back to Jeff Smith's question, too. But, was he discovered in a sort of routine course in looking at everybody or was it more that there was a suspicion about him and so you started trying to look back into his past? Do you see what I mean?
DEUTCH: I'm going to stand on my prior answer here. I mean, this is a -- what is really astounding here is the difference in the quality of the analytic capability that was brought to bear in this case. And will be in place for future events should they arise compared to before Ames.
QUESTION: Sir, with all due respect...
QUESTION: You can't (off-mike) that however. I mean I'm not trying to belittle what you all have accomplished here, but I guess the thing that concerns me judging from the other questions is that while this analytical capability which you've described seems to have been racheted up post-Ames and you could zero in and make sure to see if someone is or is not a potential spy, in this release here, and bear with me for just a couple of seconds...
DEUTCH: Yes.
QUESTION: ... it says "On or about October 16th, 1995," is when he underwent a series of polygraph examinations as part of a routine security update. The next bullet says, "an analysis of CIA records, as well as personal travel and financial records" so on and so forth "uncovers a pattern."
I guess it's when did that analysis of the records begin? Did that begin before the polygraph examination, which would suggest, as he says, that he was as a part of a generalized probe, or did this thing trigger the examination?
DEUTCH: I just have to check -- I just have to check with my buddy.
Let me -- let me...
QUESTION: (off-mike)
DEUTCH: Excuse me.
(LAUGHTER)
QUESTION: I'm claiming a kickback from all the photographers for that picture.
(LAUGHTER)
DEUTCH: The analysis of these different variables was taking place simultaneously. And so for you to fix on the October -- I think the two dates in October were the 16th and 22nd, this two events -- I think in those cases, he passed his polygraph, did not find any deception indicated.
So it was later on that the problem arose. That's my recollection.
QUESTION: The first date mentioned in this chronology is December 1994 – June 1994...
DEUTCH: Yes.
QUESTION: Are you confident that that is when he began his work with the Russians?
DEUTCH: Confident would be too strong a word here. Again, we have to wait until the full analysis is in. But I would say that, as of now, that's kind of the time period that, as the complaint makes clear, that we think the first misconduct occurred -- around that time period -- but we can't -- I wouldn't want to say that completely with confidence.
QUESTION: Could I just follow up? Could you explain a little bit more about what it was that prevented you from taking this action, say, a year earlier, since some of the initial suspicions arose in '94, if I understand correctly?
FREEH: I think it's an assessment that prosecutors make and investigators make on really a case by case basis, on a day by day basis.
The significance of the surveillance in Singapore on June 27, which is set forth in the complaint, was obviously critical, putting him together with a Russian SVR agent. Events such as that have a very great impact on the timing of a decision.
But it was accumulation of evidence which we didn't feel was sufficient until very recently, and more importantly that he was about to leave the United States.