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Posted by George W. Maschke
- Oct 25, 2006, 08:20 AMThe article doesn't state that the man arrested on drug charges is a DOE scientist. Nor does it state that the woman believed to be the source of the information is a DOE scientist. She is instead described merely as "a contract employee at Los Alamos National Laboratory."
Based on the available information, it seems premature to make any connection between this case and polygraph policy.
Based on the available information, it seems premature to make any connection between this case and polygraph policy.
Posted by uiop
- Oct 25, 2006, 08:05 AMWASHINGTON - A drug bust at a trailer park in New Mexico turned up what appeared to be classified documents taken from the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory, authorities said Tuesday.
Local police found the documents while arresting a man suspected of domestic violence and dealing methamphetamine from his mobile home, said Sgt. Chuck Ney of the Los Alamos, N.M., Municipal Police Department. The documents were discovered during a search of the man's records for evidence of his drug business, Ney said.
Police alerted the FBI to the secret documents, which agents traced back to a woman linked to the drug dealer, officials said. The woman is a contract employee at Los Alamos National Laboratory, according to an FBI official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the case.
The official would not describe the documents except to say that they appeared to contain classified material and were stored on a computer file.
FBI special agent Bill Elwell in Albuquerque, N.M., confirmed that a search warrant was executed on Friday night, but he refused to discuss details.
"We do have an investigation with regard to the matter, but our standard is we do not discuss pending investigations," Elwell said.
A spokesman for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in Los Alamos, N.M., declined to comment.
Los Alamos has a history of high-profile security problems in the past decade, with the most notable the case of nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee. After years of accusations, Lee pleaded guilty in a plea bargain to one count of mishandling nuclear secrets at the lab.
In 2004, the lab was essentially shut down after an inventory showed that two computer disks containing nuclear secrets were missing. A year later the lab concluded that it was just a mistake and the disks never existed.
But the incident highlighted sloppy inventory control and security failures at the nuclear weapons lab. And the Energy Department began moving toward a five-year program to create a so-called diskless environment at Los Alamos to prevent any classified material being carried outside the lab.
Even though Los Alamos is now under new management, Danielle Brian, executive director of the watchdog group Project on Government Oversight, said the lab has not done much to clean up its act.
"Los Alamos has always seemed to be rewarded for its screw-ups," Brian said. "We're waiting with bated breath to see if anything has changed."
The idea that police found classified documents at a home where a drug sting was being conducted is disturbing, she said.
"The problem is when you actually have those materials that are supposed to be protected inside the lab and you find them outside the lab in the hands of criminals — that should worry everybody," Brian said.
The FBI and the U.S. attorney's office in Albuquerque were "evaluating the information obtained as a result of the search warrant," Elwell said.
The federal charge of unauthorized removal and retention of classified material is a misdemeanor that carries a maximum sentence of a year in prison and up to a $100,000 fine.
___
Associated Press writers Seth Borenstein in Washington and Sue Holmes in Albuquerque contributed to this report.
Here ya go.
Local police found the documents while arresting a man suspected of domestic violence and dealing methamphetamine from his mobile home, said Sgt. Chuck Ney of the Los Alamos, N.M., Municipal Police Department. The documents were discovered during a search of the man's records for evidence of his drug business, Ney said.
Police alerted the FBI to the secret documents, which agents traced back to a woman linked to the drug dealer, officials said. The woman is a contract employee at Los Alamos National Laboratory, according to an FBI official who spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the case.
The official would not describe the documents except to say that they appeared to contain classified material and were stored on a computer file.
FBI special agent Bill Elwell in Albuquerque, N.M., confirmed that a search warrant was executed on Friday night, but he refused to discuss details.
"We do have an investigation with regard to the matter, but our standard is we do not discuss pending investigations," Elwell said.
A spokesman for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, in Los Alamos, N.M., declined to comment.
Los Alamos has a history of high-profile security problems in the past decade, with the most notable the case of nuclear scientist Wen Ho Lee. After years of accusations, Lee pleaded guilty in a plea bargain to one count of mishandling nuclear secrets at the lab.
In 2004, the lab was essentially shut down after an inventory showed that two computer disks containing nuclear secrets were missing. A year later the lab concluded that it was just a mistake and the disks never existed.
But the incident highlighted sloppy inventory control and security failures at the nuclear weapons lab. And the Energy Department began moving toward a five-year program to create a so-called diskless environment at Los Alamos to prevent any classified material being carried outside the lab.
Even though Los Alamos is now under new management, Danielle Brian, executive director of the watchdog group Project on Government Oversight, said the lab has not done much to clean up its act.
"Los Alamos has always seemed to be rewarded for its screw-ups," Brian said. "We're waiting with bated breath to see if anything has changed."
The idea that police found classified documents at a home where a drug sting was being conducted is disturbing, she said.
"The problem is when you actually have those materials that are supposed to be protected inside the lab and you find them outside the lab in the hands of criminals — that should worry everybody," Brian said.
The FBI and the U.S. attorney's office in Albuquerque were "evaluating the information obtained as a result of the search warrant," Elwell said.
The federal charge of unauthorized removal and retention of classified material is a misdemeanor that carries a maximum sentence of a year in prison and up to a $100,000 fine.
___
Associated Press writers Seth Borenstein in Washington and Sue Holmes in Albuquerque contributed to this report.
Here ya go.
Posted by EosJupiter
- Oct 25, 2006, 01:14 AMQuote from: uiop on Oct 25, 2006, 12:48 AMAn article I just read discussed a recent drug raid at the home of a DOE scientist which, among other things, yeilded alleged classified documents. Assuming the suspect took a polygraph, I think this will be viewed by those on this board as yet another example of how a drug dealer/user and security violator has "beat" the poly. Fair enough. However, one must also observe this is a person from the very same organization that fought so hard against the polygraph. Perhaps we now know why.
uiop,
Unless you post a link to the article or at least copy and paste the real article, then this is all hearsay and non-provable, so if you have a point to make, post the real data. Next time add the evidence to support your statements. No links or Data = BS. Always support your position.
Regards ....
Posted by uiop
- Oct 25, 2006, 12:48 AMAn article I just read discussed a recent drug raid at the home of a DOE scientist which, among other things, yeilded alleged classified documents. Assuming the suspect took a polygraph, I think this will be viewed by those on this board as yet another example of how a drug dealer/user and security violator has "beat" the poly. Fair enough. However, one must also observe this is a person from the very same organization that fought so hard against the polygraph. Perhaps we now know why.
Posted by EosJupiter
- Oct 13, 2006, 11:54 PMTrueScientist,
It would be great to have your story, and have it added to the other volumes of testimonials that reside here on the abuses of the polygraph, and those that have been affected by the abuse. Obviously sanitize it and post it. Always good to have this documented for posterity.
Regards ...
It would be great to have your story, and have it added to the other volumes of testimonials that reside here on the abuses of the polygraph, and those that have been affected by the abuse. Obviously sanitize it and post it. Always good to have this documented for posterity.
Regards ...
Posted by TrueScientist
- Oct 12, 2006, 05:22 PMQuote from: EosJupiter on Oct 10, 2006, 05:04 PMTrueScientist,
I have to ask what was the end result after the polys ? Did you continue to work without any repercussions ?
Or did they just white wash the failures in order to keep you working ? And not lose your talent. How you answer will say volumes on the polygraph program where you work. Welcome to the board and another talented mind is always welcome.
Regards ....
I'm currently in a non-sensitive, non-LE position. So the polygraph results for a position in another agency have no relevance to my current employment. I'd be willing to bet that they couldn't reveal the results unless something pertinent to my character or current position was uncovered. Otherwise, they'd likely open themselves up to defamation litigation.
A frustrating process nonetheless, perhaps I'll do a full write-up one day. The story is definitely entertaining.
TS
Posted by EosJupiter
- Oct 10, 2006, 05:04 PMTrueScientist,
I have to ask what was the end result after the polys ? Did you continue to work without any repercussions ?
Or did they just white wash the failures in order to keep you working ? And not lose your talent. How you answer will say volumes on the polygraph program where you work. Welcome to the board and another talented mind is always welcome.
Regards ....
I have to ask what was the end result after the polys ? Did you continue to work without any repercussions ?
Or did they just white wash the failures in order to keep you working ? And not lose your talent. How you answer will say volumes on the polygraph program where you work. Welcome to the board and another talented mind is always welcome.
Regards ....
Posted by TrueScientist
- Oct 10, 2006, 03:02 PMQuote from: EosJupiter on Oct 06, 2006, 02:57 AMPolyfool,
The DOE wasn't left much choice as many of there top researchers and scientists were in open revolt to the polygraph policy. Quite a few quit in mid project stranding a bunch of desperately needed research. Bottom line has and will remain, do not mess with scientists and engineers. Or better yet let the polygraphers try and do the science and research. As we all know how highly scientific their process is.
Regards ...
I'm glad Eos has expressed this sentiment. I'm a Govt. scientist with an advanced degree and went through the whole polygraph experience as well. I won't mention the agency, but the ordeal echoed that of many stories posted here. It was actually enlightening to come across this site after the fact. I had unknowingly caught on to the whole control Q "trick," and actually questioned the form of the questions. Needless to say, before the 2nd poly he actually asked if I had visited antipolygraph.org (I didn't visit until after the 2nd "failure").
Anyways, the process is indeed weeding out the best talent in their respective fields. This statement comes directly from inside this agency (from PhDs and supervisory level employees), and from individuals working some of the highest profile cases in CT. And rest assured there is much consternation within such agencies over the whole polygraph "filter."
Always question a process which is based on the premise of ignorance.
Posted by Drew Richardson
- Oct 08, 2006, 12:24 PMFair Chance,
You write:
You write:
QuoteWhen last I knew, the FBI Laboratory had in its employ over 1000 individuals. These agent examiners, professional civilian scientists, technicians, and others plus other employees from various technical groups (e.g., engineering, etc) within the FBI can make a difference if they wake up and demonstrate the courage to tell the emperor that he has no clothes. The generation of agent examiners that I spent a career working with now runs the FBI Laboratory. Although the Bureau has implicitly admitted that polygraphy (in particular, polygraph screening) has nothing to do with science and has moved it from the Laboratory Division to another HQ division, I maintain that serious minds and credible scientific backgrounds can still make a difference. Come on guys and gals---wake up as have your colleagues in the DOE National Labs and help to make for a more rational workplace existence for yourselves, your colleagues, and your future colleagues (applicants).
All,
I was the first to admit that the polygraph usage would increase in the FBI. Unlike DOE, the percentage of scientific minds at the FBI is not high enough to warrant concern about defection of current employees.
I have also been the first to state that the FBI is headed for a meltdown in their ability to attract top notch technical talent today and in the future. Their computer systems are still behind schedule and budget.
More and more support applicants are being disqualified strictly on polygraph results alone which is eliminating a huge pool of job candidates available for security clearances thoughout the Federal government (the agencies that rely on polygraph testing and ask if you have ever taken a polygraph before).
The remaining agencies are getting into a food fight over cleared people available for job assignment. My count has gone from five years to four before a realization by the agencies involved that the polygraph testing is really affecting recruitment.
Time will tell.
Regards.
Posted by Fair Chance
- Oct 07, 2006, 01:37 PMAll,
I was the first to admit that the polygraph usage would increase in the FBI. Unlike DOE, the percentage of scientific minds at the FBI is not high enough to warrant concern about defection of current employees.
I have also been the first to state that the FBI is headed for a meltdown in their ability to attract top notch technical talent today and in the future. Their computer systems are still behind schedule and budget.
More and more support applicants are being disqualified strictly on polygraph results alone which is eliminating a huge pool of job candidates available for security clearances thoughout the Federal government (the agencies that rely on polygraph testing and ask if you have ever taken a polygraph before).
The remaining agencies are getting into a food fight over cleared people available for job assignment. My count has gone from five years to four before a realization by the agencies involved that the polygraph testing is really affecting recruitment.
Time will tell.
Regards.
I was the first to admit that the polygraph usage would increase in the FBI. Unlike DOE, the percentage of scientific minds at the FBI is not high enough to warrant concern about defection of current employees.
I have also been the first to state that the FBI is headed for a meltdown in their ability to attract top notch technical talent today and in the future. Their computer systems are still behind schedule and budget.
More and more support applicants are being disqualified strictly on polygraph results alone which is eliminating a huge pool of job candidates available for security clearances thoughout the Federal government (the agencies that rely on polygraph testing and ask if you have ever taken a polygraph before).
The remaining agencies are getting into a food fight over cleared people available for job assignment. My count has gone from five years to four before a realization by the agencies involved that the polygraph testing is really affecting recruitment.
Time will tell.
Regards.
Posted by polyfool
- Oct 07, 2006, 11:12 AMEos,
Yes, it's a little hard to dupe the researchers and scientists. Now, if only applicants of the Intel agencies who use the polygraph would become educated and refuse to submit to it, those agencies too, would be forced to abandon the ridiculous requirement.
Yes, it's a little hard to dupe the researchers and scientists. Now, if only applicants of the Intel agencies who use the polygraph would become educated and refuse to submit to it, those agencies too, would be forced to abandon the ridiculous requirement.
Posted by EosJupiter
- Oct 06, 2006, 02:57 AMPolyfool,
The DOE wasn't left much choice as many of there top researchers and scientists were in open revolt to the polygraph policy. Quite a few quit in mid project stranding a bunch of desperately needed research. Bottom line has and will remain, do not mess with scientists and engineers. Or better yet let the polygraphers try and do the science and research. As we all know how highly scientific their process is.
Regards ...
The DOE wasn't left much choice as many of there top researchers and scientists were in open revolt to the polygraph policy. Quite a few quit in mid project stranding a bunch of desperately needed research. Bottom line has and will remain, do not mess with scientists and engineers. Or better yet let the polygraphers try and do the science and research. As we all know how highly scientific their process is.
Regards ...
Posted by polyfool
- Oct 05, 2006, 12:50 PMhttp://www.salon.com/wire/ap/archive.html?wire=D8KI3EU00.html
Energy Dept. Scales Back Polygraph Tests
- - - - - - - - - - - -
By H. JOSEF HEBERT Associated Press Writer
October 04,2006 | WASHINGTON -- The Energy Department is ending required polygraph tests for thousands of workers at its nuclear weapons facilities, including most scientists at the government's national research labs.
The department no longer will require polygraph tests as part of a general screening of new applicants, or automatically for employees in areas of high security. Tests will be required for narrow purposes where there is specific cause, the department said.
Applicants still will undergo broad security reviews, as will current workers on a periodic basis. But, with narrow exceptions, these workers will no longer automatically be subject to a lie detector test, department officials said.
The new requirements, to go into effect Oct. 30, "will significantly reduce the number of individuals who will undergo polygraph examinations," the department said in a summary printed in the Federal Register.
The widespread use of polygraphs at federal nuclear weapons labs and elsewhere within the Energy Department has been the subject of intense resentment, especially among scientists at the national laboratories.
Critics of the polygraph program have argued that it has kept good scientists from working at federal labs, such as Lawrence Livermore in California and Los Alamos in New Mexico, and caused others to quit.
There are an estimated 20,000 high-risk security positions at the Energy Department and among its contractors that under the old rules have been routinely subject to polygraphs, according to the department.
Officials could not provide numbers Wednesday on how many workers will still be subject to polygraphs under the new criteria.
But the new rules say mandatory polygraphs would be limited to workers whose jobs require them to work with or in other agencies that require polygraphs; those where there is "a specific indication" of a clandestine relationship with a foreign country, organization or terrorist group; and those where a test is ordered in response to a specific incident of concern.
The department said a polygraph may also be administered as part of random counterintelligence evaluations.
"This is a significant retreat from the (more widespread) use of the polygraph," said Steven Aftergood, director of the project on government secrecy at the Federation of American Scientist.
"DOE deserves credit for responding to the scientific critique and employee concerns" about the uncertainties surrounding polygraph tests, Aftergood said, adding that's not been the case at some other government agencies including the FBI and intelligence community.
In fact, earlier this week, the FBI and U.S. Secret Service won a legal victory when a federal judge ruled those two agencies could continue to use polygraphs for across-the-board screening of prospective employees.
The Energy Department rejected a call by representatives of some DOE scientists and others to stop using polygraph tests altogether. Critics of the technology long have argued that such tests are not reliable and can ruin a person's career if erroneously interpreted by technicians.
The call for greater polygraph use was enflamed by the alleged espionage scandal surrounding Los Alamos computer scientist Wen Ho Lee. Lee, who was under investigation for years, was never charged with espionage and eventually was largely exonerated.
Responding to the Lee case and a string of unrelated security lapses, Congress in 1999 directed the department to use polygraphs as a broad screening tool for high-security workers including scientists at the national labs. That brought outrage from some weapons lab workers, who argued that polygraphs were not needed to assure security and were hurting morale.
In 2002, a National Academy of Sciences study said that polygraphs should not be used as the sole reason for judging an applicant for employment. The study said it should be only used in conjunction with a broader review.
As a result, Congress directed the Energy Department to revamp its policy on polygraph use and take into account the NAS findings, resulting in the revised regulations that will go into effect at the end of this month.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Energy Dept. Scales Back Polygraph Tests
- - - - - - - - - - - -
By H. JOSEF HEBERT Associated Press Writer
October 04,2006 | WASHINGTON -- The Energy Department is ending required polygraph tests for thousands of workers at its nuclear weapons facilities, including most scientists at the government's national research labs.
The department no longer will require polygraph tests as part of a general screening of new applicants, or automatically for employees in areas of high security. Tests will be required for narrow purposes where there is specific cause, the department said.
Applicants still will undergo broad security reviews, as will current workers on a periodic basis. But, with narrow exceptions, these workers will no longer automatically be subject to a lie detector test, department officials said.
The new requirements, to go into effect Oct. 30, "will significantly reduce the number of individuals who will undergo polygraph examinations," the department said in a summary printed in the Federal Register.
The widespread use of polygraphs at federal nuclear weapons labs and elsewhere within the Energy Department has been the subject of intense resentment, especially among scientists at the national laboratories.
Critics of the polygraph program have argued that it has kept good scientists from working at federal labs, such as Lawrence Livermore in California and Los Alamos in New Mexico, and caused others to quit.
There are an estimated 20,000 high-risk security positions at the Energy Department and among its contractors that under the old rules have been routinely subject to polygraphs, according to the department.
Officials could not provide numbers Wednesday on how many workers will still be subject to polygraphs under the new criteria.
But the new rules say mandatory polygraphs would be limited to workers whose jobs require them to work with or in other agencies that require polygraphs; those where there is "a specific indication" of a clandestine relationship with a foreign country, organization or terrorist group; and those where a test is ordered in response to a specific incident of concern.
The department said a polygraph may also be administered as part of random counterintelligence evaluations.
"This is a significant retreat from the (more widespread) use of the polygraph," said Steven Aftergood, director of the project on government secrecy at the Federation of American Scientist.
"DOE deserves credit for responding to the scientific critique and employee concerns" about the uncertainties surrounding polygraph tests, Aftergood said, adding that's not been the case at some other government agencies including the FBI and intelligence community.
In fact, earlier this week, the FBI and U.S. Secret Service won a legal victory when a federal judge ruled those two agencies could continue to use polygraphs for across-the-board screening of prospective employees.
The Energy Department rejected a call by representatives of some DOE scientists and others to stop using polygraph tests altogether. Critics of the technology long have argued that such tests are not reliable and can ruin a person's career if erroneously interpreted by technicians.
The call for greater polygraph use was enflamed by the alleged espionage scandal surrounding Los Alamos computer scientist Wen Ho Lee. Lee, who was under investigation for years, was never charged with espionage and eventually was largely exonerated.
Responding to the Lee case and a string of unrelated security lapses, Congress in 1999 directed the department to use polygraphs as a broad screening tool for high-security workers including scientists at the national labs. That brought outrage from some weapons lab workers, who argued that polygraphs were not needed to assure security and were hurting morale.
In 2002, a National Academy of Sciences study said that polygraphs should not be used as the sole reason for judging an applicant for employment. The study said it should be only used in conjunction with a broader review.
As a result, Congress directed the Energy Department to revamp its policy on polygraph use and take into account the NAS findings, resulting in the revised regulations that will go into effect at the end of this month.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------