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Posted by George W. Maschke
- Nov 15, 2024, 01:19 PM@Poseidonsolom2 on Telegram is not the leaker of the two classified documents that Rahman allegedly disclosed. Instead, @Poseidonsolom2 published numerous documents all of which appear to me to be obvious fabrications.
Posted by Thinker
- Nov 15, 2024, 08:06 AMSounds like we have another polygraph-passing criminal. Man, the list of these people just keeps growing. The poly is a joke.
What was Rahman doing in Cambodia? The FBI usually cannot arrest someone outside of the U.S., and they can't even carry guns unless they are on U.S. embassy grounds, though there are a few exceptions. It is usually the local police that arrest a wanted U.S. citizen and then work with the U.S. law enforcement to extradite them, correct? Shall we assume Rahman was a CIA employee working at a U.S. embassy or consulate in Cambodia? How often does an American, working at an embassy, get arrested at the embassy by his or her colleague. That's kind of embarrassing. lol
Telegram is not secure or anonymous. It is even less secure since the CEO was arrested in September and then changed the Telegram privacy policy to read:
Telegram will now share user data, including phone numbers and IP addresses, with law enforcement agencies in response to valid legal requests. This change applies to a variety of criminal investigations, not just terror-related offenses.
If Rahman used a phone number linked to him to sign up to Telegram, and the user who posted the leak under the name Poseidonsolom2 is Rahman, and he logs in from his home or U.S. embassy IP address, then he would be an easy catch. Telegram would just give all this info to law enforcement upon request. Maybe this is how he got caught?
What was Rahman doing in Cambodia? The FBI usually cannot arrest someone outside of the U.S., and they can't even carry guns unless they are on U.S. embassy grounds, though there are a few exceptions. It is usually the local police that arrest a wanted U.S. citizen and then work with the U.S. law enforcement to extradite them, correct? Shall we assume Rahman was a CIA employee working at a U.S. embassy or consulate in Cambodia? How often does an American, working at an embassy, get arrested at the embassy by his or her colleague. That's kind of embarrassing. lol
Telegram is not secure or anonymous. It is even less secure since the CEO was arrested in September and then changed the Telegram privacy policy to read:
Telegram will now share user data, including phone numbers and IP addresses, with law enforcement agencies in response to valid legal requests. This change applies to a variety of criminal investigations, not just terror-related offenses.
If Rahman used a phone number linked to him to sign up to Telegram, and the user who posted the leak under the name Poseidonsolom2 is Rahman, and he logs in from his home or U.S. embassy IP address, then he would be an easy catch. Telegram would just give all this info to law enforcement upon request. Maybe this is how he got caught?
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Nov 14, 2024, 04:37 AMA suspect in the leak of these two documents has been arrested. He is Asif William Rahman, a CIA employee who was indicted on 7 November in the Eastern District of Virginia and who was arrested in Cambodia and taken to Guam on 12 November. Rahman held a TS/SCI clearance.
A petition for a writ of removal (from Guam to Virginia) and the indictment itself may be downloaded here:
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gud.18281/gov.uscourts.gud.18281.1.0_1.pdf
There is no indication of how Rahman was identified as the leaker of these documents, but it seems likely that the investigation would have relied on signals intelligence as well as an analysis of those who accessed these files.
There is no indication that the polygraph dragnet I feared might take place ever did.
A petition for a writ of removal (from Guam to Virginia) and the indictment itself may be downloaded here:
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gud.18281/gov.uscourts.gud.18281.1.0_1.pdf
There is no indication of how Rahman was identified as the leaker of these documents, but it seems likely that the investigation would have relied on signals intelligence as well as an analysis of those who accessed these files.
There is no indication that the polygraph dragnet I feared might take place ever did.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Oct 21, 2024, 05:53 AMTo follow up on this, I have learned that the Telegram channel to which Dan Linnaeus was referring, where hundreds of classified documents were purportedly leaked, is ResistanceTrench GC, and they were posted on 15 October by user @Poseidonsolom2.
They can be found by searching that channel for "documents." These supposed classified documents look highly dubious to me, and I suspect that they are forgeries.
Dan Linnaes tells me that the two classified documents that Telegram channel Middle East Spectator published were not among those posted by @Poseidonsolom2.
They can be found by searching that channel for "documents." These supposed classified documents look highly dubious to me, and I suspect that they are forgeries.
Dan Linnaes tells me that the two classified documents that Telegram channel Middle East Spectator published were not among those posted by @Poseidonsolom2.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Oct 20, 2024, 08:19 AMDan Linnaeus has posted to X new details about the leaked and as-yet not publicly published documents that he saw on the private Telegram channel from which the two published documents seem to have originated:
I expect that there is a Snowden-level shitstorm raging in the intelligence community over this security breach. As noted previously on the blog, a DoD polygrapher in 2016 mentioned that in the aftermath of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations, the number of polygraph examinations administered by the Department of Defense tripled.
QuoteTIMING ⏱️ The public leak from the Iranian social media channel, consisting of a single document detailing the U.S. military's observations of Israel's movements and preparations, was preceded by a considerably larger spill in a relatively closed environment just a few days earlier.
This spill spans hundreds of documents across multiple agencies, highly likely including documents pre-April 2023 that were already known breaches, as opposed to solely unknown ones from that period. However, it also exposed late 2023 and 2024 material, some as recent as September. It spans multiple theaters across numerous agencies, indicating wide systemic breaches.
This is inclusive of a document list, a three and a half minute video scrolling through the opening pages (1-2) of the breached documents, and a two and half minute video scrolling through documents and much of their contents. These contents read authentic, with correct classification markings, tiers, consistent control numbers, and detailed handling protocols.
It includes highly sensitive and classified material marked TS, SCI, TK and NOFORN, inclusive of CIA reports, NSC assessments, JCS pre-class drafts and J2 USAF ELINT operations reports, DOD Modernization Strategies, CNMF assessments, CTF-153 plans, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense internal review drafts for acquisitions documents, R&E documents, Secret Service Reports on TCO laundering operations, Special Advisory Council on ME Affairs Pentagon reports ....
....it's vast. This list is gleaned just from going back momentarily to the source to check if it's still up and skimming through some of the cover pages to get a sense of the scope and breadth of the security breach. It's unlikely that one could provide a more detailed sense of what is involved without going through the list in a manner that compromises them and inadvertently participates in the breaches.
But most of the spilled material is selective and controlled, with only the first page or a few pages released. Beyond the obvious threat imbued in such a move it appears aimed at demonstrating operational security has been compromised, forcing the U.S. and allied partners to reassess and potentially delay or halt ongoing operations.
This is noteworthy, as Barack Ravid, a known conduit for the U.S. administration's official leaks reported on the October 17 spill, sayin that senior U.S. officials told him that they are treating this as "an extremely serious incident, but noted that they believe the leak will not impact Israel's operational plans."
In short, there appears to be the public message and a private message from the propagators: 'You don't know what we know,' appears to be the public signal. But privately the message appears to be 'We have compromised your entire operation and should you engage, you don't know how prepared we may be.'
So finally: Is it plausible that the Israeli operation against Iran has been delayed pending opsec assessments, despite the assessments of 'senior U.S. officials' shared with the public through their official conduit, Barack Ravid? Moreover, who in the U.S. stands to gain from delaying, compromising or otherwise deterring an Israeli operation on Iran, or causing the US military to pull back operationally as it reassesses potential systemic breaches and attending implications? If anyone, shouldn't they be scrutinized for their potential involvement in these leaks?
I expect that there is a Snowden-level shitstorm raging in the intelligence community over this security breach. As noted previously on the blog, a DoD polygrapher in 2016 mentioned that in the aftermath of NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations, the number of polygraph examinations administered by the Department of Defense tripled.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Oct 20, 2024, 05:22 AMOn X, user @DanLinnaeus posted on 17 October 2024:
He followed up an hour later with the following post:
Linnaeus' comments suggest that more documents than the two pages published by Telegram channel Middle East Observer were published on the private Telegram channel cited by Middle East Observer as their source.
QuoteURGENT | Significant leaks of highly classified U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), National Security Agency (NSA) and numerous related agency materials have occurred over the past 72 hours. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, specific details will remain undisclosed and should not be disseminated.
A batch of material was released by a single propagator in a channel with over 7,000 subscribers. At the time 285 were logged into the system. Another leak was released to a major open channel with over 140,000 subscribers with over 200 direct responses to the leaked content.
The information is marked TS, TK and NOFORN among numerous other specific classifications.
The DoD has been alerted through secure communication channels; however, classified data continues to surface on back channels and open-source intelligence platforms. The volume, immediacy and relevance to ongoing operations of the disseminated material suggest severe breaches within U.S. security protocols, pointing to vulnerabilities in information safeguarding and operational security measures requiring immediate action.
He followed up an hour later with the following post:
QuoteJack Teixeira, a low ranking member of an intelligence unit in the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was arrested in April 2023 for "allegedly" leaking highly classified U.S. military documents online. Teixeira had access to sensitive information through his role and (is accused of) posting the documents on a Discord server, but got off lightly.
The leniency may have been because of his relatively low-ranking position, which his defense used to emphasize a lack of intent to cause harm. But the case underscores larger systemic failures in safeguarding classified information.
The material I have seen is far more recent than Teixeira's material. Much of it from 2024, some from September and October. Some from the last 24-48 hours.
It reads authentic, with correct classification markings, tiers, consistent control numbers, and detailed handling protocols. For my own safety, I reviewed only the document lists and some cover pages without reading the contents or downloading material.
Instead I notified DoD directly and furnished them with the direct sources and circumstances of the leaks. If the material is in fact authentic (which I assume is highly likely), it is extremely sensitive and spans multiple agencies.
I would never post something like this unless I was gravely concerned. While I notified DoD directly I am not certain of follow through as material continues to appear dated after the report I submitted. I am hoping that users who see this will approach their representatives and contacts to alert them to the possibility of a serious breach to prompt relevant authorities (FBI, CISA, etc.) to take immediate action mitigating as necessary.
Linnaeus' comments suggest that more documents than the two pages published by Telegram channel Middle East Observer were published on the private Telegram channel cited by Middle East Observer as their source.
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Oct 20, 2024, 05:03 AMIn my post above (now corrected), I incorrectly indicated that these classified documents were first published by the Telegram channel Middle East Spectator.
The channel, which is run by journalists, has published the attached notice, stating, among other things, "As far as we are aware, the documents first appeared in a private Telegram group with just over 7000 members, where the leaker was likely present. Somehow, the documents found their way out of the group; it was at this moment that Middle East Spectator took notice of the documents through an anonymous DM. Such DMs were sent to various other people and news outlets."
The channel, which is run by journalists, has published the attached notice, stating, among other things, "As far as we are aware, the documents first appeared in a private Telegram group with just over 7000 members, where the leaker was likely present. Somehow, the documents found their way out of the group; it was at this moment that Middle East Spectator took notice of the documents through an anonymous DM. Such DMs were sent to various other people and news outlets."
Posted by George W. Maschke
- Oct 20, 2024, 03:13 AMCNN reports on the leak of classified U.S. documents on Israel's preparations for an attack on Iran. Excerpt:
While CNN "is not quoting directly from or showing the documents," which werefirst published by the Telegram channel Middle East Spectator, they are readily available online, and I have attached them to this post.
Polygraph screening is commonly used in counterintelligence investigations, and it seems likely that suspects in this leak investigation may be required to undergo polygraph screening.
If you are a federal employee or contractor who has been directed to submit to polygraph screening, I would be interested in hearing from you about that. You can reach me anonymously and securely via AntiPolygraph.org's Signal account (ap_org.01) or via our new SimpleX account.
To my knowledge, no polygraph dragnet has ever led to the identification of a leaker.
Quotehttps://www.cnn.com/2024/10/19/politics/us-israel-iran-intelligence-documents/index.html
(CNN) — The US is investigating a leak of highly classified US intelligence about Israel's plans for retaliation against Iran, according to three people familiar with the matter. One of the people familiar confirmed the documents' authenticity.
The leak is "deeply concerning," a US official told CNN.
The documents, dated October 15 and 16, began circulating online Friday after being posted on Telegram by an account called "Middle East Spectator."
They are marked top secret and have markings indicating they are meant to be seen only by the US and its "Five Eyes" allies — Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
They describe preparations Israel appears to be making for a strike against Iran. One of the documents, which says it was compiled by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, says the plans involve Israel moving munitions around.
Another document says it is sourced to the National Security Agency and outlines Israeli air force exercises involving air-to-surface missiles, also believed to be in preparation for a strike on Iran. CNN is not quoting directly from or showing the documents.
A US official said the investigation is examining who had access to the alleged Pentagon document. Any such leak would automatically trigger an investigation by the FBI alongside the Pentagon and US intelligence agencies. The FBI declined to comment.
...
While CNN "is not quoting directly from or showing the documents," which were
Polygraph screening is commonly used in counterintelligence investigations, and it seems likely that suspects in this leak investigation may be required to undergo polygraph screening.
If you are a federal employee or contractor who has been directed to submit to polygraph screening, I would be interested in hearing from you about that. You can reach me anonymously and securely via AntiPolygraph.org's Signal account (ap_org.01) or via our new SimpleX account.
To my knowledge, no polygraph dragnet has ever led to the identification of a leaker.