Anonymous said:
Quote: When asked how you would handle the subject, instead of saying “I would proceed as planned with the CQT polygraph screening because no problem exists, i.e., I can rely on my DoD-developed countermeasure detection algorithm to sort out any countermeasure attempts…” you have done quite something else.
You seem to have misunderstood what I’ve been saying. I have never said, nor implied, that no countermeasure problem exists. On the contrary, it has expanded dramatically. During the Cold War, the government’s main concern about countermeasures was what hostile intelligence services were doing. That involved a miniscule number of examinations out of all that were conducted. Today, the testing environment is completely different. Detailed countermeasure instructions are available on the Internet to everyone. The incidence of easy-to-detect low level CMs is diminishing, and the incidence of the more sophisticated mid-level CMs has increased dramatically. There is no longer a real need for foreign intelligence services to spend their resources developing countermeasures, for the techniques are all available on the Internet for a nominal fee or free of charge. The sad thing about this, in my view, is that it is American citizens who are advising sex offenders, murderers, spies, and rapists how to beat the test.
What I have said is that we have learned a lot about detecting mid-level countermeasures. There are a number of factors which influence the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of countermeasures. Some are under the complete or partial control of the person being examined, others by the examiner. I have also said that we are increasingly able to detect mid-level countermeasures, and that innocent/truthful persons should be aware of that and the associated consequences when they are deciding whether to try them. Finally, I have said that I do not know what percentage of mid-level countermeasures we are detecting in real world examinations, for I don’t know the base rate for countermeasures. I know that an increasing number of Federal examiners have received formal training in how to detect them, and that we are in fact detecting more of them. Whether this is due to the training, or because more people are trying countermeasures, is hard to say. I suspect it is a combination of the two.
Anonymous’ final point was that I appear to be willing to quickly abandon the CQT. That misconstrues my position. I think it is important to keep all forms of the CQT in the examiners’ armamentarium. But this does not mean that in today’s testing environment we can conduct business as usual.
The CQT was developed more than half a century ago. As it was modified and numerical scoring systems were developed, it was all on the premise that persons taking the test were generally naďve about how the test was structured and scored. That is no longer the case, though I’m not sure the polygraph profession fully realizes the implications of that. There are short term fixes and long range solutions that must be developed. I would certainly hope that the CQT is not the end point in the evolution of credibility assessment technology.
One of the short term fixes, in my opinion, is to decrease the emphasis on the CQT. The majority of examiners today probably consider it the technique of preference in virtually every situation. I have long advocated a greater role for other formats, such as peak of tension, guilty knowledge, and relevant-irrelevant tests. Every testing technique has an inherent set of strengths and weaknesses, capabilities and limitations. In a situation where the person being tested is using or is likely to use point countermeasures, it makes good sense to switch to a test which is less susceptible to them.
Peace.