The recent
arrest of veteran FBI counterintelligence agent Robert Philip Hanssen on charges of committing espionage for the Soviet Union and Russia may mark yet another failure of polygraph security screening.
While it was not made clear at today's (Tuesday, 20 Feb. 2001) press conference hosted by Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, and United States Attorney Helen Fahey whether Special Agent Hanssen was subjected to polygraph screening during the period over which he is accused of having committed espionage, the FBI has indeed used polygraphy to screen counterintelligence personnel during that period.
Former FBI Special Agent Mark Mallah, who worked in counterintelligence and was wrongly accused of being a spy based on a false positive polygraph outcome, opens his public statement about his experience:
Quote:In January 1995, the FBI asked me and the other agents in the Foreign Counterintelligence division to take a polygraph test. It was to be a routine national security screening to ensure that no one was supplying information to foreign intelligence services.
Mr. Mallah's career in the FBI was ruined as a result of the false accusation. His entire statement may be read on-line at:
http://antipolygraph.org/statements/statement-002.shtml Director Freeh announced during today's press conference that former FBI Director and Director of Central Intelligence William H. Webster will be leading a review of information and personnel security programs in the FBI. It would be appropriate for Mr. Webster and his staff to examine what role the Bureau's reliance on polygraphy may have played over the course of SA Hanssen's alleged decade and a half of betrayal.
If SA Hanssen was indeed subjected to polygraph security screening (and, presumably, "passed"), it seems likely that, through the magic of post hoc analysis, polygraphers in the FBI polygraph unit will succeed in finding signs of deception in the charts, even as they did when they peered into Aldrich Hazen Ames' polygraph charts. Mr. Webster would do well to be skeptical any such claims.
Our commentary on the role that the CIA's reliance on polygraph screening played in prolonging Ames' career as a double-agent may well have some relevance to the Hanssen case, too. (See pp. 11-16 of
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector)
It is to be hoped that the FBI will avoid repeating the polygraph jihad on which the CIA embarked in the aftermath of the Ames case: hundreds of innocent Agency employees were left unable to "pass" their polygraph "tests." (See p. 16 of
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector). It was also in a knee-jerk reaction to the Ames case that FBI Director Freeh mandated polygraph screening for all newly hired FBI agents. Roughly half the candidates who were already at the FBI Academy at the time Director Freeh made that decision reportedly failed their "tests." (Id., p. 17)
The 1997 Senate testimony and follow-up correspondence of the FBI's leading scientific expert on polygraphy, Dr. Drew C. Richardson, who testified that polygraph screening "is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity" and that "anyone can be taught to beat this type of polygraph exam in a few minutes" is also relevant, perhaps now more than ever:
http://antipolygraph.org/read.shtml#senate-judiciary-1997