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Very Hot Topic (More than 25 Replies) DIA's Insider Threat Program (Read 166877 times)
John M.
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #255 - Apr 18th, 2024 at 7:38pm
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John M. wrote on Jul 4th, 2023 at 4:26pm:
BTW, I have kept meticulous records, and I have agreed to publish all of them on ap.org when this is all over.

John M.:  I see on another thread that you lost your appeal in February.  Is that the end?

Pierre: My case is currently on the docket at the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - Case No. 24-5056.
  

"The polygraph examination is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of investigation.  No, unfavorable administrative action shall be taken based solely on its results."  ~ DODI 5210.91.
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John M.
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #256 - May 30th, 2025 at 3:25pm
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10 years after its inception, DIA's Insider Threat Program is thoroughly embarrassed, as one of its own is arrested by the FBI for intentionally mishandling classified material.

They need to stop wasting resources on their beloved polygraph program and focus on conducting proper background checks.
  

"The polygraph examination is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of investigation.  No, unfavorable administrative action shall be taken based solely on its results."  ~ DODI 5210.91.
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #257 - May 31st, 2025 at 4:27am
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Nathan Vilas, who worked for the DIA Insider Threat Program, was himself, the insider threat!  LOL.  He just got arrested by FBI for trying to pass classified information.  I wonder how long he did this for and when he "passed" his most recent polygraph?


https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-employee-arrested-attempting-provid...
  
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #258 - May 31st, 2025 at 4:34am
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Name correction:   
*Nathan Vilas Laatsch
  
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George W. Maschke
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #259 - May 31st, 2025 at 4:20pm
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Regarding Nathan Vilas Laatsch's alleged attempted espionage, see the U.S. Department of Justice's press release dated 29 May 2025:

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-government-employee-arrested-attempting-provid...

The release notes "In March 2025, the FBI commenced an operation after receiving a tip that an individual — now known to be Laatsch — offered to provide classified information to a friendly foreign government."

Although not stated, I think it's highly likely that the tip came from the government that Laatsch approached. Such was the case with Jonathan and Diana Toebbe, who attempted to sell information about U.S. nuclear submarines to Brazil: the Brazilians promptly informed the U.S. government about the attempt, and undercover agents proceeded with a sting operation, with the cooperation of the Brazilian embassy.

The choice for a government friendly to the United States is an easy one: why risk taking an American walk-in as a source when in all likelihood, it may be an undercover U.S. agent testing how that government would handle such a situation? Why risk the harm it could cause to bilateral relations?

In Laatsch's case, it seems that the U.S. government was on to him essentially from the get-go.

So, with respect to polygraph policy, it would seem that fear of the polygraph did not deter Laatsch, and if he was polygraphed during the approximately two months from the time he approached the friendly foreign government until the time of his arrest, then DIA's polygraph unit was likely briefed on the situation.
  

George W. Maschke
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quickfix
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #260 - Jul 25th, 2025 at 3:01pm
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John M, you lose again.  Another victory in the fight against insider threats.
  

USCOURTS-caDC-24-05056-0.pdf ( 282 KB | 84 Downloads )
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George W. Maschke
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #261 - Jul 26th, 2025 at 12:08pm
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quickfix wrote on Jul 25th, 2025 at 3:01pm:
John M, you lose again.  Another victory in the fight against insider threats.


Are you familiar with any instances where the polygraph requirement was waived for a person holding a position that would normally require polygraph screening? If so, under what sort of circumstances has that happened?
  

George W. Maschke
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quickfix
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #262 - Jul 26th, 2025 at 3:02pm
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Never.  In my almost 40-year polygraph career with 3 different DOD polygraph agencies, I have never seen or heard of it happening.  We have had individuals with a legitimate medical reason for not being suitable for testing, and they are simply not granted the access, removed from access (as John Morter was) or not hired.  It is simply a myth that a polygraph requirement can be "waived".
  
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George W. Maschke
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #263 - Jul 26th, 2025 at 3:09pm
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Thank you. I haven't heard of such a waiver ever being granted in any federal agency. I'm not sure such a requirement can't be waived. I would expect that the heads of most agencies with a polygraph requirement would have the authority to grant a waiver. But as a practical matter, it seems that it never (or at most very rarely, and without public notice) happens.
  

George W. Maschke
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Pierre from Canada
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #264 - Aug 11th, 2025 at 4:39pm
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quickfix wrote on Jul 25th, 2025 at 3:01pm:
John M, you lose again.  Another victory in the fight against insider threats.

Code
Select All
 



Has anyone herd from John M. for his take?  Would like to hear his thoughts.
  
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Pierre from Canada
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #265 - Aug 11th, 2025 at 4:40pm
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[quote author=606478727A777869110 link=1487351318/260#260 date=1753455681]John M, you lose again.  Another victory in the fight against insider threats.

Has anyone heard from John M. for his take?  Would like to hear his thoughts.
  
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John M.
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #266 - Dec 22nd, 2025 at 8:05pm
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Today, my petition for a writ of certiorari was docketed in the US Supreme Court. #25-737.

I’m representing myself, and I’m hoping that anyone with relevant expertise — psychologists, researchers, clinicians, attorneys, or scholars — might consider whether these issues warrant independent amicus (friend-of-the-court) support. Any such involvement would be entirely voluntary and independent, and focused on the broader legal and scientific issues rather than my personal situation.

The Questions Presented are:

1.      Whether a federal agency may, consistent with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and EEOC regulations, redefine a security screening requirement—such as a counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) examination—as an “essential job function,” thereby eliminating the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to employees whose documented medical conditions render them unsuitable for such testing.

2.      Whether mandatory Department of Defense regulations, including DoDI 5210.91—which (a) prohibit adverse administrative action based solely on an unresolved polygraph result and (b) require medical deferral or exemption for individuals who are psychologically or medically unsuited for testing—are judicially enforceable under the Rehabilitation Act, or instead may be disregarded under a theory of unreviewable “security discretion.” (App. F)

3.      Whether courts may extend Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), beyond clearance adjudications to cover ordinary personnel and medical accommodation decisions, effectively placing federal employees’ statutory rights outside judicial review even when no security clearance has been suspended, revoked, or unfavorably adjudicated.

4.      Whether an agency that categorically refuses to consider disability-based accommodations or to engage in the interactive process required by 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(o)(3) may nevertheless be deemed to have acted lawfully under the Rehabilitation Act when its justifications are shifting, medically unsupported, and contrary to its own binding regulations.
 
If you're interested, or would like more information, I am also available on Signal at sammorter.11
  

"The polygraph examination is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of investigation.  No, unfavorable administrative action shall be taken based solely on its results."  ~ DODI 5210.91.
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John M.
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #267 - Dec 30th, 2025 at 4:59pm
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You may access the Petition and Appendix on the Court's website here: 

https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/publi...
  

"The polygraph examination is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of investigation.  No, unfavorable administrative action shall be taken based solely on its results."  ~ DODI 5210.91.
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John M.
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #268 - Jan 6th, 2026 at 6:56pm
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I posed the four questions presented in my case to Grok, and this is what it came up with -

1. Whether a federal agency may, consistent with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and EEOC regulations, redefine a security screening requirement—such as a counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) examination—as an “essential job function,” thereby eliminating the duty to provide reasonable accommodation to employees whose documented medical conditions render them unsuitable for such testing.

A federal agency generally may not redefine a security screening requirement—such as a counterintelligence scope polygraph (CSP) examination—as an "essential job function" solely to eliminate the duty to provide reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 501) and EEOC regulations.

Key Principles Under the Rehabilitation Act and EEOC Guidance

The Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities and requires them to provide reasonable accommodations unless doing so would cause undue hardship. A "qualified individual" is one who can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation (29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), incorporated into federal sector rules).

Essential functions are the fundamental duties of the position, not marginal ones. Factors for determining them include:
• The employer's judgment
• Written job descriptions
• Time spent performing the function
• Consequences of not requiring it

Courts and the EEOC defer to employer judgments on essential functions but scrutinize attempts to manipulate them to avoid accommodation obligations.

Application to Security Requirements Like CSP

Positions requiring access to classified information (e.g., in intelligence or defense agencies) often mandate security clearances, which include polygraph screenings like CSP for counterintelligence purposes. Holding or obtaining such a clearance is frequently considered a qualification standard or essential eligibility requirement for the role.

However:

• Agencies cannot arbitrarily relabel a screening requirement as "essential" to bypass the interactive process for reasonable accommodation.
• If a documented medical condition (e.g., certain anxiety disorders, heart conditions, or other impairments that affect physiological responses) renders an employee unsuitable for polygraph testing, the agency must explore accommodations—such as alternative screening methods, reassignment to a non-sensitive position, or waivers—if they would enable the individual to perform the job's core duties without undue hardship.

EEOC guidance emphasizes that medical examinations (including those that may interact with disabilities) must be job-related and consistent with business necessity. Polygraphs are not classified as medical examinations under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act, but if a disability prevents successful completion, the agency cannot simply declare the test itself "essential" without justification tied to the position's fundamental duties.

Relevant Considerations and Limitations

•      National security exception: In roles involving sensitive classified information, courts often uphold denial of accommodations that compromise security (e.g., waiving a clearance requirement could pose a direct threat or fundamental alteration). Undue hardship in the federal context can include risks to national security.
•      No direct precedent on CSP: There are no widely reported court cases specifically addressing CSP polygraphs and reasonable accommodation claims under the Rehabilitation Act. Analogous cases involving security clearances (e.g., Kaplan v. Northrop Grumman Corp. or EEOC v. Exxon) treat clearance as an essential requirement where core job duties involve protected information.
•      Employee options: If denied accommodation, an employee may challenge the designation via the EEOC federal sector process, arguing the agency failed to engage interactively or that the polygraph is not truly essential.

In summary, while agencies have broad discretion to define essential functions—especially for security-sensitive roles—they cannot redefine requirements merely to evade accommodation duties. The determination must be based on legitimate job needs, and the interactive process is required. For specific situations, consult an attorney or file with the agency's EEO office/EEOC, as outcomes depend on case facts, job description, and agency mission.
  

"The polygraph examination is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of investigation.  No, unfavorable administrative action shall be taken based solely on its results."  ~ DODI 5210.91.
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John M.
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Re: DIA's Insider Threat Program
Reply #269 - Jan 6th, 2026 at 7:00pm
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2. Whether mandatory Department of Defense regulations, including DoDI 5210.91—which (a) prohibit adverse administrative action based solely on an unresolved polygraph result and (b) require medical deferral or exemption for individuals who are psychologically or medically unsuited for testing—are judicially enforceable under the Rehabilitation Act, or instead may be disregarded under a theory of unreviewable “security discretion.”

Mandatory Department of Defense (DoD) regulations in DoDI 5210.91 (Polygraph and Credibility Assessment Procedures) are generally judicially enforceable in the context of a Rehabilitation Act claim, and agencies may not disregard them under a broad theory of unreviewable "security discretion."

Core Holding from Department of the Navy v. Egan (1988)

The Supreme Court in Egan held that merits of security clearance decisions—including grants, denials, or revocations—are committed to executive discretion and generally not subject to judicial review. This protects predictive judgments about risks to national security. Courts have extended this to bar review of discrimination claims (including under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act) when resolution requires second-guessing the substance of a clearance decision (e.g., recent cases like Lee v. DOJ (D.C. Cir. 2024), where revocation after failed polygraphs barred review of discrimination claims).

However, Egan does not create absolute immunity for all security-related actions. Courts may review claims alleging that an agency violated its own mandatory procedures or statutory obligations, particularly where the challenge targets procedural compliance rather than the predictive security judgment.

Application to DoDI 5210.91 Provisions

DoDI 5210.91 establishes binding procedures for DoD polygraph programs, including:

• Prohibition on adverse action based solely on unresolved polygraph results — Agencies must have additional supporting evidence or resolution before acting.
• Requirement for medical deferral or exemption — Examiners must postpone or exempt individuals deemed psychologically or medically unsuitable (e.g., conditions affecting physiological responses), often involving evaluation by medical authorities.

These are mandatory internal rules ("shall" language in the instruction), not discretionary guidelines.

In a Rehabilitation Act context:

• If an agency ignores these provisions—e.g., taking adverse action solely on an inconclusive polygraph or refusing a required medical deferral/exemption for a documented disability—an employee can argue this violates the duty to engage in the interactive process or provide reasonable accommodation (e.g., alternative assessment methods, waiver, or reassignment).
• Such a claim challenges procedural noncompliance with DoD's own binding regulations, not the merits of whether the employee poses a security risk.
• Courts and the EEOC routinely review whether agencies followed their own rules in discrimination cases, even in security-sensitive contexts, as long as the inquiry does not probe the substantive clearance judgment.

Limits of "Unreviewable Security Discretion"

Agencies cannot invoke "security discretion" to disregard mandatory regulations. While broad deference applies to ultimate clearance outcomes, procedural violations tied to anti-discrimination laws remain reviewable (e.g., via EEOC federal sector process or limited judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act for arbitrary/capricious action). National security can justify "undue hardship" denials of accommodation, but it does not shield outright noncompliance with DoDI 5210.91.

Practical Outcomes

• No reported cases directly litigate these exact DoDI provisions under the Rehabilitation Act, but analogous challenges (e.g., failure to follow security regulations in discrimination claims) have proceeded past motions to dismiss where framed procedurally.
• Employees can raise noncompliance in EEO complaints, arguing it evidences failure to accommodate or pretext.

In summary, while security clearance merits are largely unreviewable, mandatory procedural protections in DoDI 5210.91 are enforceable in Rehabilitation Act claims challenging agency disregard of those rules. Outcomes turn on case specifics, such as how the polygraph interacts with the disability and job requirements.
  

"The polygraph examination is a supplement to, not a substitute for, other methods of investigation.  No, unfavorable administrative action shall be taken based solely on its results."  ~ DODI 5210.91.
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