LieBabyCryBaby,
You write, among other things:
LieBabyCryBaby wrote on May 9
th, 2009 at 1:34am:
I would like to once again clarify what the NAS had to say about countermeasures, which is the exact opposite of what George Maschke is saying on this website.And they mention George by name, and they are clearly NOT referring to only spontaneous countermeasures, but rather ANY countermeasures.Could it be any clearer than this?
Authors such as Maschke and Williams suggest that effective countermeasure strategies can be easily learned and that a small amount of practice is enough to give examinees an excellent chance of “beating” the polygraph. Because the effective application of mental or physical countermeasures on the part of examinees would require skill in distinguishing between relevant and comparison questions, skill in regulating physiological response, and skill in concealing countermeasures from trained examiners, claims that it is easy to train examinees to “beat” both the polygraph and trained examiners require scientific supporting evidence to be credible.
However, we are not aware of any such research. There is also evidence that innocent examinees using some countermeasures in an effort to increase the probability that they will “pass” the exam produce physiological reactions that have the opposite effect, either because their countermeasures are detected or because their responses appear more rather than less deceptive. The available evidence does not allow us to determine whether innocent examinees can increase their chances of achieving nondeceptive outcomes by using countermeasures.
What part of that don't you understand, George?...
The NAS report
does not assert that use of the countermeasures outlined in
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector by innocent persons results in an increased risk of their failing the polygraph.
You have spliced together sentences from different portions of the NAS report and omitted an in-text citation to create such an impression. In academia, such intellectual dishonesty would be grounds for disciplinary action.
Let's look at the first part of your citation. The following text appears at
p. 147 of the NAS report:
Quote:Authors such as Maschke and Williams suggest that effective countermeasure strategies can be easily learned and that a small amount of practice is enough to give examinees an excellent chance of “beating” the polygraph. Because the effective application of mental or physical countermeasures on the part of examinees would require skill in distinguishing between relevant and comparison questions, skill in regulating physiological response, and skill in concealing countermeasures from trained examiners, claims that it is easy to train examinees to “beat” both the polygraph and trained examiners require scientific supporting evidence to be credible. However, we are not aware of any such research.
Now let's look at the second part of your citation from the NAS report, which you present as if it immediately followed the preceding text:
Quote:There is also evidence that innocent examinees using some countermeasures in an effort to increase the probability that they will “pass” the exam produce physiological reactions that have the opposite effect, either because their countermeasures are detected or because their responses appear more rather than less deceptive. The available evidence does not allow us to determine whether innocent examinees can increase their chances of achieving nondeceptive outcomes by using countermeasures.
However, the above portion actually appears on
page 140, seven pages
before the earlier cited text. And you omitted an in-text citation to the studies referenced by the foregoing passage (Dawson, 1980; Honts, Amato, and Gordon, 2001), neither of which addressed the kinds of countermeasures outlined in
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector. It is fair to say that the NAS report questions the
ease with which countermeasures can be learned. What we note in
The Lie Behind the Lie Detector is that in peer-reviewed laboratory studies by Charles Honts and collaborators, some 50% of programmed guilty examinees were able to fool the lie detector after a
maximum of 30 minutes of instruction, and even experienced polygraphers were unable to detect their countermeasures. It can be (and has been) argued that under field conditions, where the consequences of being judged deceptive are more serious, genuinely guilty persons would have a harder time producing strong enough reactions to the control questions to overcome any reactions to the relevant questions. On the other hand, those facing a polygraph under field conditions typically have much more than 30 minutes to prepare themselves and considerably greater motivation to do so than participants in a laboratory experiment. The ease with which countermeasures may be learned and successfully applied may also depend on the intelligence and educational background of the individual. As the NAS report correctly notes, research in this regard is wanting.
It's worth mentioning here the closest thing we have to a field study of countermeasures, which David Lykken relates in Chapter 19 (How to Beat the Lie Detector) of
A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector (2nd ed., 1998):
Quote:Methods Taught by Floyd Fay
I mentioned earlier my correspondence with Floyd Fay while he was serving the first two years of a life sentence for murder. His conviction, since proven to have been in error, resulted in large part from testimony by a polygrapher that this defendant had failed a stipulated lie test. At his request, I had sent Fay some information about polygraphic interrogation, including an article of my own that explains how one might attempt to "beat" the Control Question Test. After some months, I received from Fay a letter that read, in part, as follows:
"Since reading the article that you sent me ... I have been running my own experiment. The prison that I am in forces anyone that is suspected of violating a prison regulation into taking a polygraph. I have been able to get to nine of these people prior to their taking a test. Out of the nine that I KNOW were guilty of the 'offense' that they were accused of, nine have beat the test! I realize that this is a small group to work with, but the 100% 'hit rate' is nothing to laugh at. All I have done is have them read the article that you have sent me and then explain exactly what you were saying and they have all beat the test."
It would be difficult for a researcher to set up a controlled study to determine whether guilty suspects, to be tested under real life conditions, could be trained to beat the lie test. Fay does not claim to be a scientist but I think he has helped to illuminate an inaccessible corner. As he remarks, nine out of nine is nothing to laugh at. Attorney F. Lee Bailey once offered a prize of $10,000 to "anyone who can beat the lie detector." I think that it would be only fair if Mr. Bailey would pay off this bet to Mr. Fay, in wholly inadequate compensation for Fay's two years spent in prison, falsely convicted by the lie detector Bailey claims to be almost infallible.
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Probably going to use countermeasures, but I have a question.. (Read 30634 times)
